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          The focus of this dissertation is a distinctive post-fascist ideology that emerged during the 
Cold War era. Developed and first put to practice in Francisco Franco’s Spain during the 1950s 
and 1960s, this model for a market-oriented dictatorship, which I label Hispanic technocratic-
authoritarianism, became a key ideological reference for the dictatorships of Juan Carlos Onganía 
in Argentina (1966-1970) and Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973-1988). For its chief designers, this 
theory of state represented a noble dream of a “post-ideological” society marked by neoliberal 
economic development, firm social hierarchies, and most importantly, a project of spiritual 
“perfection.” Rather than a simple mimesis, this study points to a dynamic of constant transatlantic 
intellectual dialogue between what were, in essence, three attempts to foster an alternative 
“Hispanic” modernity, within three dissimilar historical settings. 
         The venture to constitute a reactionary modernity, as a spiritual “third position” that would 
transcend the antagonistic “materialist” ideologies born at the time of the French Revolution, is as 
old as modernity itself. The present study explores a prominent case study of these ideological 
projects, in the Spanish speaking world. My point of departure is that there is a certain lacuna in 
the historical analysis on Latin America’s far-right ideology during the Cold War. Whereas 
historiography has fully scrutinized extreme neo-fascist revolutionary movements, military 
counterrevolutionary states, and populist authoritarianism in the region, there is a dearth of analytic 
work on the post-fascist technocratic ideologies of the 1960s. My analysis therefore underscores 
the role of the international Catholic Society Opus Dei as one conspicuous arena for the 
formulation of the technocratic-authoritarian ideology. Thus, my work accounts for the rise of the 
“technocrats” as a contingent historical phenomenon that mirrored the economic and cultural 
contexts of the Cold War era. Consciously setting out to replace what they thought was the failed 
fascist revolution of the 1930s, the ideologues I analyze formulated what they believed was a more 
sophisticated method of Catholic modernization - one comprising of a consumerist society 
protected from the harms of either parliamentarism or rationalism. 
        Chapter 1 of the dissertation explores how, during the 1950s, Franco’s regime propagated a 
distinct post-fascist ideology of “Hispanism” via a transnational organization by the name of 
Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, and how this traditionalist ideology founds if most zealous 
interlocutors in Argentina and Chile. Chapter 2 hones in on Spain’s novel technocratic-
authoritarian ideologies of the 1960s. Designed and implemented by members of the Secular 
Catholic Organization Opus Dei, this ideology soon became identified with Spain’s 1960s 
“economic miracle.” Chapter 3 explains how the Francoist ideologies made their way into the 
Argentine public sphere through two Argentine intellectual affiliations: the Ateneo de la República 
and the Cuadernos del Sur journal. These groups, I explain, began designing Argentina’s “post-
ideological” society during the early 1960s. Chapter 4 explores how the regime of Juan Carlos 
Onganía (1966-1970) utilized the ideologies of the aforementioned affiliations, as well as several 
Francoist “development” tactics such as “poles of growth.” Chapter 5 depicts the impact of the 
Instituto de Cultura Hispánica and the Opus Dei on the Chilean far-right during the late-1960s 
leading to the regime of Augusto Pinochet. Like Onganía, Pinochet and his ideologues borrowed 
Francoist political myths for their purposes. Last, Chapter 6 analyzes the decline of the 
technocratic-authoritarian model. The circumstances of the late 1970s, I suggest, propelled the 
authoritarian ideologues to abandon the technocratic-authoritarian schemes and seek new forms of 
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            The subject matter of this dissertation is a distinctive post-fascist ideology that emerged 
during the Cold War era. Developed and first put to practice in Francisco Franco’s Spain during 
the 1950s and 1960s, this model for a market-oriented development regime, which I label 
Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism, became a key ideological reference of the dictatorship 
of Juan Carlos Onganía in Argentina (1966-1970), and the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in 
Chile (1973-1988). For its chief designers, this new theory of state represented a noble dream of 
a “post-ideological” society marked by neoliberal economic openings, firm social hierarchies, 
civic participation, and a project of spiritual “perfection.” And yet, this dissertation does not 
present a dynamic of simple mimesis but rather of transatlantic intellectual networking and 
dialogue between what were, in essence, three historical attempts to foster a sui generis 
“Hispanic” democracy, within three separate and fairly dissimilar historic settings.  
         The venture to constitute a reactionary modernity, as a spiritual “third position” that would 
transcend the antagonistic “materialist” ideologies born at the time of the French Revolution, is 
as old as modernity itself. The present dissertation is a key inquiry into one of these ideological 
projects. Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism, I will indicate, emerged as an international 
ideology thanks to the operation of a post-fascist intellectual network, which was buttressed by 
transnational agencies such as The Institute for Hispanic Culture (Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, 
or ICH), the Opus Dei (“the work of God”) and Cursillos de la Cristiandad (“Short courses in 
Christianity”). Originating in Franco’s Spain in the 1940s, each of them aimed, in their own 
unique way, to present Latin America with a pragmatic alternative to the nationalist revolutions 
of the 1930s. In doing so, they served as the platform where Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean 
 2 
ideologues collaborated in designing a common authoritarian state-model for what were, in fact, 
entirely dissimilar political and social historical contexts.  
         During the late-1940s, in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Second World War, 
Latin America saw a salient wave of democratic transitions. Alas, this period was short-lived and 
quickly gave way to an authoritarian turn. Lasting for four decades, it came in the shape of 
military dictatorships, populist-authoritarian governments, and a handful of authoritarian 
socialistic-revolutionary regimes. This study contributes to a field of historical analysis that 
explores this unique historical context.1 Strikingly, scholars have labeled military dictatorships I 
explore as “soft” dictatorships (“dictablanda”) - “authoritarian,” rather than “totalitarian.”2 This 
classification, I contend, stems not necessarily from their actual character but from their own 
cunning propaganda. Conscious of the Nuremberg Trials and the emerging semantics of 
“genocide” and “human rights,” the ideologues I examine were particularly adept at adjusting to 
the Cold War “anti-totalitarian” critique. While still making ample use of violence and 
oppression, the technocratic-authoritarian dictatorships promoted themselves internationally as 
societies that had merely substituted parliamentarism with new systems of representation, and 
thus, as guarantors of personal “freedom” against the Left’s “totalitarianism.”  
        In other words, this study accounts for the rise of technocratic-authoritarianism as a 
contingent historical phenomenon that mirrored the political, economic, and cultural stipulations 
of the Cold War era. In recent decades, historians of Latin America have been reaching different 
conclusions regarding the character of the Cold War in the continent. In broad strokes, for those 
                                                             
1 Over the years, historians have tried to establish various general conceptions of authoritarianism in Latin America, 
see for example - Paul H. Lewis, Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Dictators, Despots, and Tyrants (Lanham 
MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, On the Characterisation of Authoritarian Regimes 
in Latin America (Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1978); Jorge I. Domínguez (ed.), Authoritarian 
and Democratic Regimes in Latin America (New York: Garland Pub, 1994). 
2 Sociologists such as Juan Linz have famously promoted the conceptual separation between “totalitarian” and 
“authoritarian,” see - Juan José Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2000). 
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researching the Caribbean and Central American hemispheres, Cold War Latin America was the 
scene of the USA’s direct economic, ideological, and military interventions, within the context of 
a relentless effort to belie the rise of socialistic-oriented political movements in this region.3 In 
the work of those researching Brazil, Mexico, the Southern Cone, and the Andean region, a more 
nuanced narrative has become apparent in recent years regarding the nature of Latin America’s 
Cold War. As historian Tanya Harmer has defined it, “rather than a bipolar superpower struggle 
projected onto a Latin American theater from outside” Latin America’s “inter-American Cold 
War” was a “multisided contest between regional proponents of communism and capitalism.”4 
This dissertation, too, holds that the meta-narratives regarding the USA’s influence in the Latin 
American and Iberian spheres are worth reappraisal and complication. Unlike Guatemala or 
Cuba, the Iberian Peninsula and the Southern Cone were far from being the USA’s direct spheres 
of control; nonetheless, as developing industrial societies they were immensely influenced by the 
expanding western economic order, set about at the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. In fact, I 
suggest that if Franco demonstrated anything to Latin America spectators it was how to build a 
successful symbiotic relationship with the USA’s financial and political elites, while at the same 
time fostering an autonomous ideological and social order.  
          While historian Odd Arne Westad has notably stressed that the Cold War was a struggle 
over the future of the Third World, by empires representing two versions of European modernity 
and striving to show the universal applicability of their ideologies, this study touches on 
                                                             
3 This has been the position of historians such as Greg Grandin, Piero Gleijeses, and John Coatsworth, see - Greg 
Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011); Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992); John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients 
and the Colossus (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994). 
4 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2011), 1; this is also the overall argument of Hal Brands and Daniela Spenser, see - Hal Brands, Latin 
America’s Cold War (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010); Daniela Spenser, “Standing Conventional 
Cold War History on its Head”, in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, In from the Cold: Latin America’s New 
Encounter with the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 381-96. 
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Westad’s overlooked ideas regarding the Third World’s so-called “third way” to modernity.5 Not 
dissimilar to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Luso-Hispanic sphere exhibited salient 
efforts to produce not only an alternative modernity but also autonomous Cold War “blocs.” 
Indisputably, the three regimes I scrutinize identified themselves as the Cold War’s anti-
communist vanguard and even exhibited unapologetic rancor towards the Détente during the 
late-1960s. On the one hand, Franco, Onganía, and Pinochet, collaborated with the communist 
bloc during in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand - and aligning with historian Luis Herrán 
Ávila’s recent notion of the Latin American “politics of enmity”6 - the authoritarian technocrats 
sought to purge Latin America from Marxism as well as from Catholic movements they 
identified as progressive. But overall, to read technocratic-authoritarianism entirely through an 
anti-communistic lens runs the risk of analytic reduction. Building on the definitions of historian 
Zeev Sternhell, I would argue that if fascism was a revision of Marxism rather than its 
consequence,7 by alleging to create a scientifically “planned” industrial society, the authoritarian 
technocrats believed their project was the pragmatic alternative to the socialists’ pipedreams, in 
what some commentators even labeled “positive anti-communism.”8 
           True enough, this analysis could have chosen an earlier date as its starting point. As the 
frequent scholarly debates over “long Cold War” have shown, one could certainly begin 
narrating Cold War history with the birth of the Communistic International and the first anti-
                                                             
5 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 2.  
6 Luis Alberto Herrán Ávila, “Anticommunism, the Extreme Right, and the Politics of Enmity in Argentina, 
Colombia, and Mexico, 1946-1972,” Ph.D., The New School for Social Research, 2017; See also – Luis Herrán 
Ávila, “Las Guerrillas Blancas: Anticomunismo Transnacional e Imaginarios de Derechas En Argentina y México, 
1954-1972,” Quinto Sol, vol. 19, no. 1 (June 2015): 1–26. 
7 Zeev Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution (Princeton, N.J., 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 3. 
8 “Anticomunismo positive,” is how the Argentines media presented the Spanish system to its readers at least, see - 
“Minorías activas,” Primera Plana, no. 38 (July 30, 1963): 14.  
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communistic movements in Europe and America in the 1920s.9 This is particularly true in the 
case of Spain, where the ideological polarization between Left and Right undermined the Second 
Spanish Republic during the 1930s, leading to the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Accordingly, 
Latin America’s Cold War - as an insoluble polarity between revolution and counterrevolution - 
cannot be grasped disconnected from this immensely symbolic war fought on the soil of Latin 
America’s Madre Patria.10 Still, the striking sense of a break with the past after May 1945, and 
division of the world into a defined bipolar system, makes the Cold War a distinctively separated 
epoch and thus a more apt periodization for the present study, in both Spain and Latin America.  
          While positioned within Cold War historiography, this dissertation does touch on the 
legacies of international fascism and Latin America’s vital place within it.11 The ideologies, 
apparatuses, and regimes examined in what follows were, I pose, a post-fascist phenomenon. As 
several historians have discussed recently, the stipulation to align with the Western Bloc after 
1945, meant that a generation of right-wing thinkers, who had believed themselves to belong to 
an international revolutionary movement of the Right in the 1930s, had little choice but to frame 
authoritarian ideologies that were to be consciously different from the fascist theories of the 
                                                             
9 Greg Grandin, “Coming to terms with the Violence of Latin America’s Long Cold War,” in Greg Grandin, and G. 
M. Joseph (eds.), A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long 
Cold War (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 2010); See also - Enzo Traverso, The European Civil War, 1919-
1945 (New York: Verso, 2016). 
10 Historians have recently showed renewed interest in the impact of the Spanish Civil War in Latin America, see for 
example - Pablo Sapag M., Chile, frente de combate de la guerra civil española: propaganda republicana y 
franquista al otro lado del mundo (Valencia: Centro Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 2003); Ricardo Pérez Montfort, 
Hispanismo y Falange: los sueños imperiales de la derecha española y México (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1992); Niall Binns, Argentina y la guerra civil española: la voz de los intelectuales (Madrid: Editorial 
Cumio, 2012); Matías Barchino (ed.), Chile y la guerra civil española: la voz de los intelectuales (Madrid: 
Calambur, 2014); Ariel Mae Lambe, “Cuban Antifascism and the Spanish Civil War: Transnational Activism, 
Networks, and Solidarity in the 1930s.” Ph.D., Columbia University, 2014.  
11 Matteo Albanese and Pablo del Hierro, Transnational Fascism in the Twentieth Century: Spain, Italy and the 
Global Neo-Fascist Network (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Federico Finchelstein, Transatlantic 
Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 2010); Andrea Mammone, Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); Roger Griffin, ed., International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus, 
Arnold Readers in History (London; New York: Arnold: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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state.12 That is to say, this study engages with ideologues that rather than promoting a return to a 
corporatist “third position,” chose to break from the fascist legacy, thereby promoting an 
alternative political imaginary. While historians focus on the global lure of corporatism (or 
alternatively, “corporativism”) in the 1930s, understood then as a legitimate alternative to 
parliamentary democracy, my research explores how components of the corporatist jargon were 
used in the 1960s to justify and sustain a novel neoliberal project; in this respect, this as much a 
study on post-fascism as it is about the birth of neoliberalism in Latin America.13 As importantly, 
I will elucidate how technocratic-authoritarianism emerged always within a dialectic feud with 
other post-fascist ideologies, struggling for hegemony between themselves as well as against a 
formidable neo-fascist mobilization, in Spain, Argentina, and Chile. 
          Put differently, I suggest that technocratic-authoritarianism fails any “fascist minimum” 
test, as proposed in the 1960s by historian Ernst Nolte and developed by the historian Stanley 
Payne.14 Yet this dissertation also differs markedly from the 1990s generation of experts of 
fascism who have alleged that fascist ideology had come to its abrupt end in 1945.15 Sure 
                                                             
12 For more recent conceptualizations of “post-fascism, see - Roger Griffin, “Interregnum or Endgame? The Radical 
Right in the ‘Post-Fascist’ Era,” Journal of Political Ideologies 5, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 63-78; Roger Griffin and 
Matthew Feldman, Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science: Post-War Fascisms (New York: Routledge, 
2004); Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella, Re-Inventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and “Post-
Fascism” (New York: Routledge, 2009); Enzo Traverso, The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right 
(Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2019); Federico Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism in History (Oakland, California: 
University of California Press, 2017);  
13 Here my work builds on the burgeoning discussion in the literature on corporatism and its global dimensions, see - 
Antonio Costa Pinto, Corporatism and Fascism: The Corporatist Wave in Europe (New York: Routledge, 2017); 
António Costa Pinto and Federico Finchelstein, eds., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Europe and Latin 
America: Crossing Borders (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019); Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and 
Comparative Politics: The Other Great “Ism” (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); Sebastián Royo, “A New Century 
of Corporatism?” : Corporatism in Southern Europe, Spain and Portugal in Comparative Perspective (Westport, 
Conn: Praeger, 2002). 
14 Ernst Nolte, Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen Bewegungen (Munich: Piper, 1968), 385; 
Stanley G. Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison, Wi.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 5-7. 
15 In these accounts, fascism had been reduced to nostalgic movement of “skinheads,” or post-fascist clerical 
“fundamentalism,” as in the case of the Iranian Revolution, see - Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, Future. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 125; Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1991); Roger Griffin, International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1998). 
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enough, in the decades following the Second World War international fascism ostensibly reached 
its political dead-end. However, as a profound belief system and transnational network fascism 
did not disappear. While European fascism was born out of the rejection of the 19th century and 
the legacies of the Enlightenment, the Cold War post-fascist intellectuals were no less avid to 
promote a state that would transgress the Enlightenment’s political theories.16 Interestingly, at 
the very same time the Frankfurt School theorists - Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer for 
instance -17 warned against the return of mythological thinking and irrational thought to the 
center of modern politics, the post-fascist theorists believed the crisis of totalitarianism could 
only be answered by salvaging components of pre-modern mysticism and alleged guild-based 
societal order. In an anti-nationalist plea, they further proposed terminating the nation-state-
oriented Westphalian Order - ironically, a demand that is not dissimilar from the call to transcend 
the “Westphalian political imaginary” voiced lately by political scientist such as Nancy Fraser.18  
           Nationalist Spain (1936-1975), a regime better known as “Francoism,” had a distinctive 
role in the perpetuation of these spiritualist post-fascist ideologies in Latin America during the 
Cold War. Under the auspice of General Francisco Franco, this dictatorship actively linked with 
its ideological counterparts in the Latin American Right in an effort to support regimes adherent 
to its ideological and mythological foundations. That this dictatorship was an anomaly in the 
Cold War ideological panorama is not only a common historiographic assessment but the 
regime’s very public teleology; Franco and his men believed their regime to be “different” - as a 
proud alternative to the Cold War blocs. A bearer of its triumphant Civil War legacy, and a 
                                                             
16 Zeev Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
17 “In the enlightened world, mythology has permeated the sphere of the profane,” they wrote in 1944, see - Max 
Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Gunzelin Noeri, The Dialectic of Enlightenment (Stanford, Ca.; Stanford 
University Press, 2002), 21. 
18 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 4.  
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conscious promoter of a Catholic “crusade” against the Enlightenment, Francoism was, 
therefore, a radicalizing entity in Latin American far-right politics. Indeed, historiography has 
shown a keen interest in Franco’s foreign policy and his neo-imperial aspirations in Latin 
America during the 1940s. The seminal work of historians Lorenzo Delgado and Raanan Rein 
has clarified, for example, that in the late-1940s this cooperation, especially between Argentina 
and Spain, was crucial for the Francoist regime’s survival.19 At the same time, historiography 
tends to present the 1960s and 1970s as a period when the regime became ideologically 
moderate, gradually abstained from meddling in Latin American affairs, and therefore of lesser 
analytic interest.20 The present study offers a corrective to these premises. I argue that the 
Spanish dictatorship actually became extremely significant - to an extent, even exemplary - for 
Latin America’s right-wing spectators during the 1960s, precisely because it indicated how to 
successfully refurbish its own fascist legacies.  
          That the Argentine and Chilean right-wing ideologues were the Spanish dictatorship’s 
most intimate interlocutors originated from their mutual recognition that Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay were the closest “racially” to the Mother Nation, and thus “Europe in America.” As 
several historians have shown, and as the first chapter of this dissertation will further explore, the 
very ideological tropes of the Francoist dictatorship had been conceived via Spanish-Argentine 
                                                             
19 An essential list of publications on this topic would include: Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Imperio de 
papel: acción cultural y política durante el primer Franquismo (Madrid: CSIC, 1992); Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-
Escalonilla, Diplomacia Franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica, 1939-1953 (Madrid: CSIC, 1988); 
Benny Pollack and Graham Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy: Spain’s International Relations from 
Franco to Democracy (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1987); Rosa María Pardo Sanz, Con Franco hacía el imperio!: 
la política exterior española en América Latina, 1939-1945 (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a 
Distancia, 1995); Celestino del Arenal, Política exterior de España hacía Iberoamérica (Madrid: Editorial 
Complutense, 1994); Raanan Rein, The Franco-Perón Alliance: Relations between Spain and Argentina, 1946-1955 
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Charles Powell, Del autoritarismo a la democracia: estudios 
de política exterior española (Madrid: Silex Ediciones, 2007). 
20 On this alleged “change of direction” see for example - Manuel Espadas Burgos, Franquismo y política exterior. 
(Madrid: Rialp, 1988), 207-25; Javier Tusell, La España de Franco: el poder, la oposición y la política exterior 
durante el franquismo (Madrid: Historia 16, 1989), 185-244.  
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cooperation.21 From an Argentine standpoint, my work principally adds to a complex genealogy 
of Argentina’s singular fascist movement self-named the “nacionalistas.”22 The ensuing pages 
account for a period when the Argentine fascists were in search of new ideological openings, 
subsequently finding ever greater interest in the Francoist post-fascist theories of the state as a 
possible model for surpassing their own theoretical cul-de-sac. From a Chilean perspective, this 
analysis delves into the history of the Chilean authoritarian ideological sphere. A more elitists 
and traditionalist group, ever since the 1930 the Chilean Right has been producing its unique 
counterrevolutionary ideologies.23 In the 1960s, it was from these two milieus that the Argentine 
and Chilean post-fascist technocratic-authoritarian ideologies were to emerge. That these 
intellectuals frequently betrayed allusions of their Francoist inspirations over the course of the 
1960s and 1970s is a feature my work will explore fully. Yet rather than arguing that Franco 
manipulated the Latin American political landscape, or that his interlocutors were mimetic of his 
state ideology, this study indicates that Argentine and Chilean intellectuals appropriated Spanish 
formulas in what was, in essence, a lively exchange of ideas. That is to say, this dissertation is 
couched in terms of collaboration and reformulation rather than imitation, and even stresses the 
                                                             
21 Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, Maeztu: biografía de un nacionalista español (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 
2003); Marisa González de Oleaga, El doble juego de la Hispanidad: España y la Argentina durante la segunda 
guerra mundial (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2001). 
22 This ideological movement has been analyzed by multiple scholars throughout the years see - Fernando Devoto, 
Nacionalismo, Fascismo y Tradicionalismo en la Argentina moderna: una historia (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno 
de Argentina, 2002); Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart, The Argentine Right: Its History and 
Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present (Wilmington, Del.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993); Federico Finchelstein, 
The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Alberto Spektorowski, The Origins of Argentina’s Revolution of the 
Right (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003); David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist 
Movement, Its History, and Its Impact (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Daniel Lvovich, El 
nacionalismo de derecha: desde sus orígenes a Tacuara (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2006); Cristián 
Buchrucker, Nacionalismo y Peronismo: la Argentina en la crisis ideológica mundial (1927-1955) (Buenos Aires: 
Sudamericana, 1987). 
23 The historiography of the Chilean far-right includes titles such as the following: Sandra McGee Deutsch, Las 
Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939 (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 
1999); Sofía Correa, Con las riendas del poder: la derecha chilena en el siglo XX (Santiago de Chile: Editorial 
Sudamericana, 2005); Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Nacionales y Gremialistas: el “parto” de la nueva 
derecha política chilena, 1964-1973 (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 200)8; José Fernando García (ed), El 
discurso de la derecha chilena (Santiago de Chile: CERC, 1992). 
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leadership of Southern Cone intellectuals within the aforementioned networks, for instance in 
periods when the Spanish dictatorship strove for a certain modus vivendi with Latin America’s 
socialistic regimes.  
          The dictatorships of Onganía and Pinochet emerged in historical contexts dissimilar to that 
of technocratic-authoritarian Spain.24 Despite periods of authoritarian intervals, Argentina and 
Chile had cultivated fairly robust democratic cultures and parliamentary institutions throughout 
the 20th century. In turn, during the Cold War the two countries witnessed the ongoing 
mobilization of their working classes within sui generis political movements that strove for a 
fundamental redistribution of their nations’ wealth. Lieutenant General Juan Carlos Onganía rose 
to power against the backdrop of an acute political instability stemming from the prohibition of 
Juan Perón’s mass-based movement in 1955. As a non-elected “president,” Onganía sought to 
therefore replace Argentina’s parliamentary democracy with what he believed was a non-violent, 
and even consensual, authoritarian regime of civic participation and rapid economic growth. 
Augusto Pinochet, on the other hand, took power in a far more murderous coup d'état, amid a 
period of profound political and economic crisis following the tenure of Salvador Allende’s 
socialist government. In his first four years in power, Pinochet too alleged to transcend 
parliamentarism towards an entirely new regime of “participation.” Seemingly detached 
authoritarian projects, the two dictatorships nonetheless exhibited a noticeable semblance: both 
generals consciously turned to the assistance of post-fascist technocratic intellectuals when 
designing their state ideologies; and the two leaders immediately sought to link politically, 
economically, and ideologically with the Francoist dictatorship. There is little evidence to 
support the claim that Onganía and Pinochet simply sought to reproduce Francoism in Latin 
                                                             
24 Given the sheer abundance of scholarly writing on each of these regimes, a detailed bibliography on Franco, 
Pinochet, and Onganía will appear in the following chapters.  
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America. Rather, by borrowing from Franco’s toolkit of political myths they sought to legitimize 
their regimes, but also to adjust and refurbish the Francoist state model further, within their own 
national contexts. By doing so, Onganía and Pinochet generated regimes that were consciously 
different from the Spanish original source of inspiration, as well as from each other.  
          Sure enough, Franco, Onganía, and Pinochet justified their initial power grab reverberating 
Carl Schmitt’s concept of “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand) - understood as a 
transcendence of the rule of law in the name of national salvation.25 Yet these regimes and their 
intellectuals also clearly surpassed Schmitt’s theoretical formulas by fostering novel concepts of 
collective action. The contempt for the “masses” - epitomized in philosopher José Ortega y 
Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses, a text frequently echoed in the words of the authoritarian 
technocrats - meant these dictatorships sought to demobilize society and purge the center of 
decision-making from any popular influence.26 To legitimate this process they tailored a 
powerful meta-narrative regarding the global transition from “sub-developed” to “developed” 
societies. The Iberoamerican sphere, the argument went, necessitated a profound modernizing 
phase in order not to become “subjugated” by the other Cold War blocs, an endeavor that could 
be only orchestrated by an authoritarian Léviathan. Accordingly, the masses were expected to 
voluntarily relinquish political agency for the sake of the common good. As will become 
apparent in the following pages, all three regimes made conspicuous efforts to demonstrate that 
the public was indeed willingly “partaking” in the regime in alternative paths, through various 
other “intermediary societies,” “councils,” and even perennial referendums.  
                                                             
25 Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class 
Struggle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 118-19; for further analyses of this term and analysis  and 
on Schmitt’s influence on post-WWII ideologies, see - Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005); Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in 
Spanish America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993). 
26 José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: Norton, 1957 [1932]). 
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         In the 1980s, German sociologist Jürgen Habermas published his Theory of Communicative 
Action, stressing, broadly speaking, a dynamic whereby a multisided debate in the public sphere 
produces “rational” through.27 The technocratic-authoritarian theory of knowledge production 
and rationality was, in a sense, the precise contrast to Habermas’s intuitions. For the Opus Dei 
intellectuals, for instance, the lesson to be learned from the age of totalitarianism was the need to 
discover a narrow “ruling elite” and grant it with the entire responsibility for defining the 
common good. While promoting the image of a society with “free press,” the authoritarian 
technocrats were nonetheless mistrustful of a pluralist political debate over the future of society, 
believing it could only lead to demagoguery, falsehood, and in the worst case, civil war.  
           Scholars and publicists have repeatedly used the term “technocrats” (“tecnócratas” or 
“tecnicos”) to portray the theorists and statesmen that are the focus of this study. A somewhat 
hackneyed term, it has been also used habitually to portray many other governments in Latin 
America during the Cold War.28 The first task this dissertation will assume will be to delineate a 
clear distinction between the emergence of “technocrats” in the Western Bloc’s liberal-
democratic context, and the authoritarian “technocrats” operating in Franco’s Spain, Onganía’s 
Argentina, and Pinochet’s Chile. Despite having coinciding traits, these were not the same 
phenomenon. The western “technocrat” was symptomatic of the 1950s capitalist order and the 
development of global markets. While seeking to “depoliticize” large segments of the state’s 
apparatus, he did not aspire to eliminate parliamentarism, as his source of political legitimation 
                                                             
27 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1984). 
28 Especially in reference to Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico, see for instance - Francisco Panizza and George Philip, 
“Second Generation Reform in Latin America: Reforming the Public Sector in Uruguay and Mexico,” Journal of 
Latin American Studies 37, no. 4 (2005), 667–91; Roderic A. Camp, “The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the 
Survival of the Political System,” Latin American Research Review 20, no. 1 (1985): 97–118; Eduardo Dargent, 
Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); Centeno, Miguel Angel, Patricio Silva (eds.), The Politics of Expertise in Latin America 
(New York, N.Y: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 
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stemmed directly from the democratic ritual itself. The “Hispanic technocrat”29 was, on the other 
hand, a post-fascist ideologue who carried deeply entrenched anti-Enlightenment sentiments and 
distinctively “spiritual” (or “mystical”) conception of man and society. As such, he believed 
himself to have transcended both parliamentary politics and the modern separation of powers, 
towards a superior modernization.   
           The notion of a regime based purely on the design of technicians and specialists goes back 
to the 19th century, for instance to Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism or Henri de Saint-Simon’s 
Industrialism. Coined in 1919 in the USA, and identified with theorist such as Howard Scott in 
the early 1930s, in its most elementary sense “technocracy” stands for a society operating 
according to the rules of “science” rather than abstract ideologies.30 More specifically, in the 
wake of the Great Depression, these theorists advocated replacing the American political elite 
with “engineers” who would calculate economic productivity and harmonize the social and 
technological aspects of industrial society. Amid a period of increasing awe of technological 
acceleration (or “Fordism”), the 1930 technocrats believed they could spur “radical social 
engineering,” and even, according to some critical voices, an “approximation of a modern 
utopia.”31 But while proposing a world of material abundance, the technocratic theorists offered 
scarce little when it came to essential ethical questions concerning the nature of collective action, 
the division of labor, and the redistribution of wealth. Consequently, within the context of the 
                                                             
29 Antonio Cañellas Mas (ed.), La tecnocracia hispánica: ideas y proyecto político en Europa y América (Gijón: 
Trea, 2016). 
30 As has been revealed in Scott’s interview to the New York Times on August 21, 1932, in which he argued the 
impossibility of further technological change, and thus for an organization of society by technicians according to the 
current system of manufacture, see also - Allen Ramond, What is Technocracy? (New York: Whittelesey, 1933), 16-
17.  
31 Charles S. Maier, “Between Taylorism and technocracy: European ideologies and the vision of industrial 
productivity in the 1920s,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 5, no. 2 (1970): 27-61; William E. Akin, 
Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900-1941 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977), 27-28, 131.  
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rise of the interventionist Keynesian model, in the 1930s technocracy disappeared entirely from 
the western ideological panorama.  
          Next, in the 1950s the “technocratic” labeling returned to the scholarly debate as a 
pejorative term used to disparage market-oriented reformers. In his seminal work, Jean Meynaud 
explained that “the complex demands and workings of technological civilization” coupled with 
the fact that methods of government seemingly have not “undergone any fundamental changes 
since antiquity” meant that in the 1950s a new demand surfaced to “dethrone the politician” and 
replace him with the “specialist,” either quietly or avowedly.32 The image of the technocrat who 
believes himself to fathom the conundrums of technological society and thus grasps the common 
good better than the politician was to become identified in particular with Charles de Gaulle’s 
Fifth French Republic. The sole mission of the French technocrats, argued some, was to 
“rationalize” the state administration and promote economic “efficiency.”33 Yet here too it is 
important to note that while de Gaulle’s ministers perhaps held such views, only in the Francoist 
state did this theory of “rationalization” first become the key political myth of the regime.   
          Which brings us to another leitmotif in this dissertation: the “post-ideological society.” At 
first blush, this concept could be well considered another one of the 1930s technocratic or 
corporatist tropes.34 However, the present study will show that the public debate on the “end of 
ideology” was more crucial during the Cold War. When in 1957 the French philosopher Raymon 
Aron heralded the “end of the ideological age” he referred to the alleged decline of the 
“proletarian” ideologies in a world ruled by nationalism and technology.35 Similarly, in 1960, 
                                                             
32 Jean Meynaud, Technocracy (London: Faber, 1968), 13.  
33 W. H. G. Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrats: A Social History (New York: Routledge, 2013 [1965]); Robert 
Elgie and Steven Griggs, French Politics: Debates and Controversies (New York: Routledge, 2013), 227-28.  
34 William E. Akin, Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900-1941 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), 97-98.  
35 Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (New York: Norton, 1962), 310-11.   
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when sociologist Daniel Bell spoke of the “end of ideology” he did not mean the end of “any 
belief system,” but of a specific 19th century “complex of ideas and passions.”36 The 
authoritarian technocrats I scrutinize, however, used these very tropes to justify their neoliberal 
turn. For them, the “end of ideologies” meant nothing less than the closing of a vicious “cycle” 
opened in the French Revolution, and the return to the lost harmony of the pre-modern era. At 
the same time, for them “ideology” - always synonymous with “materialism” - was symptomatic 
of the Third World’s “underdevelopment,” and therefore remediable through consumption and 
spiritual development.  
           That an agent advocates a “non-ideological” system of government based on his belief in 
holding the one and only “truth,” is an ideological moment par excellence. However, to avoid 
confusing emic and etic - between how the technocrats perceived the enlightenment’s 
“ideologies” and how we, critical historians, should use the word ideology as a heuristic tool - it 
is worthwhile configuring a simple, albeit hopefully not simplistic, working definition for the 
latter. Assuredly, many have done so in the past with varying degrees of success. Traditionally 
identified with communism and liberalism, for Hannah Arendt ideologies were rather a position 
“that pretends to have found the key explanation for all the mysteries of life and the world.”37 
Similarly, Louis Althusser thought they were systems of representation “endowed with both 
existence and a historical role in some particular society.”38 Adding to these two forefathers of 
ideology conceptualization, let us grant the following: any modern ideology makes assumptions 
on the human essence, and consequently, on the ethical Archimedean point for society’s 
                                                             
36 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 
1960), 17.  
37 Hannah Arendt, “On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding,” in Hannah Arendt, Essays in 
Understanding, 1930-1954 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1994), 349. 
38 This famous maxim is taken from his text “Marxism and humanism”, in Cahiers de l’I.S.E.A., June 1964; see also 
- Louis Althusser, For Marx (New York: Verso, 1969), 231; see also - https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ 
althusser/1964/marxism-humanism.htm 
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organization and future perfection. Unlike religions, although the two clearly overlap, ideologies 
do not allege to directly serve a transcendental authority but rather an abstract community. Thus, 
if the Jewish and Catholic religions serve the will of God, the Zionist ideology operates on the 
behalf of the “Jewish People” while Catholic traditionalism defends the spiritual harmony 
achieved by the “Catholic civilization.” 
           The success of any “ideological interpellation” - as a process of making knowledge 
commonsensical in everyday life - relies, however, on other operations. To begin with, without 
exception ideology relies on mythological underpinnings to totalize its ethical ground through a 
seemingly inductive method of historical reasoning. The theoretical toolbox from which to begin 
exploring this phenomenon abound. Roland Barthes’s concept of “mythologies,” and Paul 
Ricœur’s ideas of “emplotment,” are two examples of attempts to explain the mechanisms of the 
establishment of a symbol through narrative.39 More recently, philosophers Hans Blumenberg 
and Chiara Bottici have further discussed how “political myths” - be they archaic or modern - 
“ground significance” and thus are the foundation of any ideological movement. The 
preoccupation with the linguistic grounding of “floating” symbols appears in the work of 
theorists ranging from Ludwig Wittgenstein to post-structural theorists such as Ernesto Laclau 
and Slavoj Žižek. Without going deeper into their specific theories of the self, suffice it to say 
that these philosophers are preoccupied by how narration acts generate “emptied” signifiers upon 
which society constitutes entire ideological structures.40 My own analysis of the post-fascist 
theory of the spirit will further elaborate on the deep-seated connection between mythology and 
                                                             
39 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York: Noonday Press, 1972); Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
40 Building on Jacque Lacan’s concept of the linguistic point de capiton, Žižek has presented his own concept of 
ideological “quilting point” by which a narrative inversion “performs the totalization by means 
of which this free floating of ideological elements is halted, fixed,” see - Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of 
Ideology (New York: Verso, 1989), 95; see also - “Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?” in Ernesto Laclau, 
Emancipation(S) (New York: Verso, 1996), 36-47. 
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ideology. As we shall see, the interconnected ideological networks our three dictatorships shared 
relentlessly evoked pre-modern mythological components to justify the “sacred” ethical core at 
the heart of their alternative modernity.  
           Furthermore, for many theoreticians what actually makes ideology “work” as an 
instrument for political mobilization are not merely abstract ideas of justice but fantasies that, 
consciously or implicitly, spur profound emotional drives. Ideologies are nowadays debated as 
systems that are vested with psychoanalytic enjoyment, arousing operations such as fetishism, 
victimhood, and melancholia.41 In fact, as has been vastly debated in historiography already, 
fascist ideology differed substantially and ostentatiously from liberalism and communism in that 
it posed an alternative system of enjoyment as the very center of its ethical order, based on 
“irrational” spontaneity “springing from the depths of the unconscious.”42 As historian Dominick 
LaCapra has suggested, Nazi ideology relied on a profound sense of victimhood to produce a 
sensation of “negative sublime” - a powerful driving emotion that cannot be explained in simple 
materialist terminologies.43 Building on these illuminations, my analysis will explicate that the 
technocratic-authoritarian ideology, too, nourished a fantasy of a society of spiritual sublime that 
was to be pointedly different from the secular liberal society. In short, this dissertation proposes 
reading the Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian ideology as a purposeful ethical configuration 
that, based on several dominant founding myths, advocated concrete collective action towards 
both societal perfection and spiritual sublime.    
                                                             
41 In her 1997 The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, Judith Butler set the coordinates for the novel 
research of the melancholic operation in politics and society, see - Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: 
Theories in Subjection (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997); the same goes for the early work of Žižek 
that focused on Lacanian enjoyment and fetishism, see - Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: 
Enjoyment as a Political Factor (New York: Verso, 1991). 
42 Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology, 10. 
43 Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 27-30; 
Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 94.  
 18 
          Besides ideologies per se, this study is preoccupied with intellectual apparatuses. Rather 
than the fascist revolutionary “movement” or party, novel transnational societies dominated the 
Cold War far-right polity. In the ensuing chapters, I will clarify how the Opus Dei epitomized 
this novel framework, as a transnational apparatus that promoted a holistic vision of man, 
society, and state, in the midst of the secular world. What is an “apparatus”? Literary critic 
Giorgio Agamben has suggested a basic definition for this term that goes as follows: the 
apparatus is the moment when a “heterogeneous set of discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, 
and police measures” are knotted into a network with a “concrete strategic function.”44 The 
intellectual apparatus, I will add, aims to make ubiquitous and commonsensical a certain 
ideology through means of persuasion, without acknowledging ever having done so. In our case, 
the post-fascist ideological apparatus aimed to convince Catholics worldwide to replace the 
fascist revolutionary movement of the spirit with a more sophisticated immanent “crusade.” Put 
slightly differently, the technocratic-authoritarian state relied not on a revolutionary vanguard, 
but on elite societies operating independently from the state through means of soft power. 
Originally coined by political scientist Joseph Nye, this term conveys “the ability to shape 
preferences of others” - a notion that is perhaps not too distant from Michael Foucault’s idea of 
disciplinary power, but that is still important if we are to recognize how ideological groups 
appeal to audiences without either coercion or inducements.45 For Nye, the making of an opinion 
hegemonic depends on the ability of public agents to “entice and attract.”46 Indeed, what the 
Opus Dei did best in the 1960s was establishing novel modes of appealing to conservative 
                                                             
44 Giorgio Agamben, What Is an Apparatus?: And Other Essays (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 2009).  
45 Michel Foucault, in his influential work Discipline and Punish, gave special emphasis to modern disciplinary 
institutions (Schools, Prisons), but somewhat overlooked the public sphere as a scene of disciplining through 
attraction, see - Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995 
[1977]). 
46 Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 616 (2008): 95; also - Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2004), 5.  
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audiences through a combination of middle-class respectability and mystical allure, in a world 
that was gradually ridding itself from the 1930s fascist pathos.  
           Lastly, this dissertation explores the moment when an abstract ideology developed into a 
concrete state-ideology.47 There are two ways in which we should understand this term. For one 
thing, state-ideology presents the legal framework that defines and sustains tangible social 
hierarchies, the division of labor, and distribution of wealth. Breaking away from the political 
myth of the fascist corporatist statist model (or national-syndicalism) technocratic-
authoritarianism represented a fundamental shift in its conception of the state. Through 
deregulation, privatization, and elimination of taxation and tariffs, the three regime I discuss 
presented some of the more outlandish case-studies of neoliberal experimentation in the western 
hemisphere. In the early 1980s, political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell coined the term 
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (BA) in an attempt to characterize these so-called “soft” Latin 
American dictatorships, a term that has been discussed at length ever since.48 As I will illustrate 
in depth throughout my analysis, this labeling is flawed inasmuch as the technocratic-
authoritarian dictatorships aggressively promoted anti-bureaucratic and anti-statist imagery. By 
not adhering to the principle of separation of powers, the technocratic-authoritarian state also 
relied on clientelism and political violence for its survival. That is to say, while the technocrats 
took pride for pulling the state out of the economic domain, they nonetheless presented a ruthless 
control of many other spheres of social life, in particular, higher education and labor, hence 
                                                             
47 Here I also build on what Althusser had defined as the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) of concrete institutions 
and performativity, see – Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy 
and other Essays (London: New Left Books, 1971), 121-76. 
48 Guillermo O’Donnell, 1966-1973 El Estado Burocrático Autoritario: Triunfos, Derrotas y Crisis (Buenos Aires: 
Belgrano, 1982); see also - Karen L. Remmer, and Gilbert W. Merkx, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” 
Latin American Research Review, vol.17, no. 2 (1982): 3-40; Hector E. Schamis, “Reconceptualizing Latin 
American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism,” Comparative 
Politics vol. 23, no. 2 (1991): 201–20; Model David Collier “Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model,” in 
David Collier and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (eds.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), 19-32. 
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presenting their countries as havens for Direct Foreign Investment. In turn, all three dictatorships 
enjoyed periods of economic growth, which they straightaway narrated as economic “miracles.” 
           More important, the concept of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism overlooks the spiritual 
projects at the heart of the technocratic-authoritarian state-ideology. The gist of this study’s 
argument is as follows: the “technocrats” operating within the Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean 
authoritarian states sought to spur not only economic “modernization” but a “change of 
mentalities.” Reverberating the fascist imaginary of a “new man,” they constantly expressed their 
desire to alter the selfhood of the masses, a metamorphosis by the end of which the latter were 
expected to become unified, spiritual, and obedient “middle-classes.” In short, the second and 
more fundamental meaning of state-ideology is the tangible ways in which a regime consciously 
aims to mold new subjects to accept a given method of collective action willingly, believing it to 
be the only plausible path for their material wellbeing.   
          This study ultimately presents a commentary on Latin America’s conservative subjectivity, 
synonymous with the Latin American Right. A predominantly elitist subject - a category I define 
less by socio-economic criteria as by relative position to impact the political sphere and identity 
within a national and transnational imagined community - in the 1960s the Latin American Right 
believed itself to be at the forefront of a new global cultural war.49 Exhausted from the failed 
attempts to tame parliamentary democracy to their benefit, these members of society welcomed 
                                                             
49 The classic literature on the Latin American elite politics include - Seymour Martin Lipset, Elites in Latin 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); E. Bradford Burns, Elites, Masses, and Modernization in 
Latin America, 1850-1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979); John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds.), Elites 
and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992); In recent years a blessed wave of academic anthologies has been aiming to conceptualize Latin America’s 
Right ideological and socially, see - Douglas A. Chalmers, Maria do Carmo C. Campello de Souza, Atilio Borón 
(eds.), The Right and Democracy in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1992); Kevin J. Middlebrook (ed.), 
Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2000); Francisco Domínguez, Geraldine Lievesley, and Steve Ludlam (eds.), Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin 
America: Reaction and Revolt (New York: Zed Books, 2011); Juan Pablo Luna, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser 
(eds.), The Resilience of the Latin American Right (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Barry 
Cannon, The Right in Latin America: Elite Power, Hegemony, and the Struggle for the State (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2016). 
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authoritarianism as the only strategy for maintaining their privileges, and for winning the global 
modernizing race. In addition, their enthusiastic embracing of urbane Catholic authoritarianism 
should be read as a profound reaction to the far-reaching cultural changes of the 1960s. Whereas 
historiography tends to focus on the “long 1960s” revolutionary zeitgeist, my dissertation 
contributes to a nascent scholarly field that explores the fierce reaction to the 1960s secular 
rebellion.50 For my part, I focus on a generation of men and women who came of age between 
1940 and 1960. For them, Rock-&-Roll, Hippies, the sexual revolution, and the feminist 
movement, were the antithesis of how modern civility should be: heroic, disciplined, reverent, 
and intensely spiritual. Though sharing much of the fascist penchants for a redemptive “crusade” 
against the “enemies” of civilization, the technocrats were, I argue, also unique in the subtle 
techniques they promoted for “bridging” between the Western Bloc and their “Hispanic” 
spiritual domain.  
          Whether it be historian Jeffrey Herf’s influential theory of “reactionary modernism,”51 or 
political scientist Corey Robin’s recent analysis of the Reactionary Mind,52 various studies have 
aimed to explain the paradoxical modern/reactionary subjectivity. These analyses have shown us 
that unlike anti-modern fundamentalisms, in the Islamic world, for instance, reactionary 
modernists do not repudiate modernity but interpret it differently, hence proposing a hybrid of 
rational and irrational elements. “Have we ever been modern?” pondered likewise French 
                                                             
50 See for instance - Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2003); Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army 
Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); 
Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, 1958-1974 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Hugh McLeod, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
51 “There is no such thing as modernity as such. There are only national societies, each of which becomes modern in 
its own fashion,” Herf stated, see - Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in 
Weimar and the Third Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); see also - David E. Cooper, 
“Reactionary Modernism,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements no. 44 (March 1999): 291–304.  
52 Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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philosopher Bruno Latour in 1993. What he meant to say was that what had always appeared in 
western culture as purified categories - “modern” versus “archaic” - seemed by the end of the 
Cold War as a panorama of hybrids of rational and irrational thought.53 The intervention this 
dissertation will propose to Latour’s now-classic theorization is that Spain and Latin America’s 
ultra-conservative elites have never once been equivocal about their determination to 
amalgamate these seemingly unbridgeable domains. Since the scientific project had not 
convincingly answered the very mysteries of existence, they opined, a reintroduction of mystical 
thought to the center of the modern project - whether in higher education, the cultural dominion, 
or even the state’s control of its citizens’ public morality - was not only tolerable but mandatory.   
           This study explores three national histories, and as such, lacks the capacity of offering a 
meticulous historical narrative for every single country. Besides relying on secondary literature 
for bridging this gap, my justification for doing so is to bring to the fore a different ideological 
setting altogether. Like the international movement of the Left, the far-right intellectual world 
depended on an energetic sphere of publications and travelers who identified themselves as 
something larger than their national settings. Additionally, my analysis excludes other sites of 
intellectual activity. For instance, when discussing the Opus Dei, I will refrain from fully 
exploring its operation in Europe or discuss its polemical political intrigues in the Vatican. 
Likewise, this dissertation is an intellectual history of the Latin American far-right and as such 
touches on issues of economic and social history somewhat superficially, mostly to contextualize 
ideological change. Last, other Latin American cases of technocratic ideologies - in Brazil, 
Uruguay and Mexico to name a few - are absent from this analysis. Still, the unique linkage 
between the Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean intellectual networks and regime models, justifies 
                                                             
53 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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the selections of these particular case studies as an interlinked history that merits a comparative 
analysis. 
           The dissertation opens in 1945 and explores the Post-WWII transatlantic cooperation 
between Franco’s Spain and the Latin American far-right.54 Chapter 1 offers an overview of the 
role the Francoist regime sought to play in Latin American politics after 1945. The focus of my 
analysis is the Francoist-led Institute for Hispanic Culture (Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, or 
ICH). A transnational ideological apparatus, this was the first organ wherein Francoism 
cooperated with the Latin American far-right ideologues during the Cold War. It was here that 
Francoism, the Argentine nacionalistas, and Chilean authoritarian thinkers first promoted a 
“Hispanic bloc” based on the anti-modern ideology of “Hispanidad” (Hispanism). My analysis 
departs from previous views of these projects as merely a reiteration of the 1930s tropes of far-
right thinkers such as Ramiro de Maeztu. Rather, this was one of the first example of a post-
fascist network setting out to present an alternative to the 1930s national revolutions by 
suggesting a return to a pre-Westphalian spiritual order, while at the same time pledging to 
modernize Latin America technologically and socially. The collaboration between these 
ideological groups, I argue, established the ideological basis for the authoritarian experiments of 
the 1960s in the Southern Cone.     
           Chapter 2 gives insight into the rise of Spain’s unique technocratic-authoritarian ideology 
and social experiment. During the 1950s, Franco’s Spain underwent a profound ideological 
transition from a fascist terror-based dictatorship to a post-fascist technocratic-authoritarian 
regime. This change entailed diminishing the power of Franco’s fascist movement, the Falange 
(FET), and elevating the Opus Dei’s technocrats to a position of hegemony, thereby replacing 
                                                             
54 For a detailed description of the archival sources, primary sources and methodology used in this dissertation see 
Methodological Appendix, page 346.  
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Spain’s nationalist-syndicalist project with the Opus Dei’s state-ideology. Beyond analyzing the 
novelties of the “technocratic” language, the chapter underscores two essential points: For one, I 
maintain that like the ICH the work of Opus Dei’s apparatus became salient in Latin America in 
the 1960s, and thus that the Spanish technocratic ideology and social experiments soon reached 
audiences far beyond the Iberic peninsula. For another, I make the case that Spain’s technocrats 
arrived in Latin America propagating not only their “development plans” and the political myth 
of Spain’s “economic miracle” but also a roadmap for what they claimed was a “post-
ideological” consumerist society.    
          In Chapter 3, I move on to Argentina and analyze the post-Peronist era of regime changes, 
also known as the “Liberating Revolution” (1955-1966). This chapter broaches the subject of the 
profound splintering within the nacionalista ideological circles of the late-1950s, between neo-
fascist and post-fascist inclinations. My study will demonstrate that in the wake of Juan Perón’s 
relentless influence over its political sphere, Argentina witnessed the birth of its own 
technocratic-authoritarian intellectual projects. I hone in on an association by the name of Ateneo 
de la República (“Athenaeum of the Republic”) and the Opus Dei’s Argentine-Chilean journal 
Cuadernos del Sur. I argue that during the 1960s it was within these circles that the main 
groundwork for the Argentine - and to a certain point, Chilean - future technocratic-authoritarian 
experiment was conceived. Much in tandem with the discordance between the Falange and the 
Opus Dei, I further stress that the fissure between the Argentine technocratic-authoritarian 
theorists and neo-fascist nacionalistas was substantial, a condition that escalated even further 
with the salient activity of Argentina’s neo-fascist gangs in the early 1960s. Last, I will indicate 
how the technocratic-authoritarian ideology eventually became prevalent in Argentina’s 
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mainstream media during the mid-1960s against the backdrop of a profound political crisis 
during the tenure of elected president Arturo Illia (1963-1966). 
          In Chapter 4 the study analyses the rise of Juan Carlos Onganía’s dictatorship in 1966, also 
known as the “Argentine Revolution.” With its conspicuous post-ideological and Hispanic 
rhetoric, this regime displayed one of the more enthusiastic implementations of Hispanic 
technocratic-authoritarian in Latin America. Here my study illuminates the unique dialogue 
between Onganía and the Francoist regime, and Onganía’s intimate collaboration with the 
Spanish technocrats. What is more, this chapter highlights the fundamental function of the 
Ateneo de la República and Cuadernos del Sur intellectuals as the designers of the regime’s 
state-ideology of “administrative rationalization,” “mentalities change,” and “organic 
representation.” In turn, I will show that by 1969 Spain and Argentina exhibited not only fairly 
analogous regimes but also matching authoritarian “political” visions for their future. Lastly, the 
chapter will explain the circumstances for the Argentine Revolution’s dramatic breakdown 
between 1969 and 1973.   
          Chapter 5 continues to Chile and accounts for the unique ways in which the Chilean 
conservatives espoused Francoist political myths to establish their own post-fascist technocratic 
ideology between 1964 and 1977. Amid a period of working-class mobilization and reforms, by 
the late-1960s members of the Chilean conservative elite produced a unique technocratic-
authoritarian intellectual movement: the gremialistas. Joined by the Chilean ICH and Opus Dei 
intellectual apparatuses, these ideologues were at the forefront of the opposition to Salvador 
Allende’s government (1970-1973). Subsequently, these men and women became the chief 
designers of Augusto Pinochet’s ideological apparatus in its early years. Like Onganía, Pinochet 
made conspicuous efforts to link with the Spanish dictatorship, I argue. No less important, in its 
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first four years of existence, his regime conspired its own original “post-ideological” state-
ideology, comprising of “Hispanic” spirituality and voluntary “intermediate” societies. As such, 
Pinochet’s dictatorship became the third Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian regime in Cold War 
history.  
           Lastly, chapter 6 offers a comprehensive account of the decline of technocratic-
authoritarianism, as an ideology, intellectual apparatus, and state-ideology, during the 1970s. The 
chapter opens with exploring the unforeseen resurgence of neo-fascist thought and Falangist 
nostalgia during the early 1970s. This, I argue, was mostly an interconnected Spanish-Argentine 
phenomenon that originated from a shared discontent of the technocratic era. Thereafter, the 
study scrutinizes the ways by which the technocrats altered their ideological project in the face of 
new national and international circumstances. This chapter discusses the crisis of the Francoism 
in 1973, and the regime’s motion towards a return to parliamentarism. Moreover, I explore the 
continuations of several ideological concepts from Onganía’s regime to Argentina’s Military 
Dictatorship of 1976-1983. This regime, I stress, could be read as a response to the failed 
projects of the 1960s, but also, in several cases, as their ideological continuation. Next, as a way 
of conclusion, my study will inquire into the activity of the technocrats throughout the 
democratic transitions of in the late-1970s and 1980s. First, I make the case that the narratives of 
Franco’s “post-ideological” society were vividly present during the Spanish transition (1975-
1982), as the technocrats struggled to defend their legacies within the so-called Spanish 
democratic “consensus.” Second, my work elucidates Pinochet’s replacement of his technocratic-
authoritarian ideology with a new scheme of “protected democracy,” during the late 1970s, a 
process that saliently alleged to differ from the Spanish transitional model. Within this context, 
my analysis will conclude with the anecdotal return of Franco’s technocrats to Chile in the mid-
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1980s, one of the last instances of technocratic-authoritarian propaganda in the 1980s. In brief, 
this dissertation presents a rounded genealogy of the rise, zenith, and ultimate decline of the 
post-fascist authoritarian technocrats; men and women whose ideology and legacies were to have 





Chapter 1:  The Era of Hispanidad and the Search for a Workable “Third Path” for 
Modernity during the Early Cold War Years, 1945-1957 
 
           On April 8, 1945, European Fascism came to its abrupt political end. Nevertheless, as 
historians have indicated time and again, fascist ideology disappeared neither in Latin America, 
nor in Salazar’s Portugal, or even in Italy and France.1 It particular, it was Francoist Spain, the 
most conspicuous fascist remainder in Europe, that was to have a unique role in the reformation 
of fascist thought after 1945. Firmly in the hands of Francisco Franco, the victorious General of 
the Spanish Civil War and intimate ally of both Hitler and Mussolini, during the 1950s this regime 
linked with its Latin American far-right counterparts in an effort to establish a new “international” 
that would transcend the ideologies of the Enlightenment - now seemingly represented by the new 
Cold War “blocs.” Learning from the errors of fascism, a group of Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean 
intellectuals were now to jointly articulate what was meant to be yet another “third path” to 
modernity.  
          The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the transatlantic ideological projects of the 
1950s constituted the foundations of the technocratic-authoritarian regimes of the 1960s. In the 
main, rather than presenting a concrete theory of the state, these projects were preoccupied 
primarily with defining the mythologic and “spiritual” core of mankind and society. Still, this 
ongoing configuration of an alternative Catholic modernity, and the “anti-ideological” imaginary 
that appeared throughout this endeavor, informed the technocratic-authoritarianism of the 1960s. 
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As importantly, the intellectual networks established during the 1950s would reappear throughout 
this study as the ideological backbone of the Southern Cone’s authoritarian regimes. 
 
“America starts at the Pyreneans”: Franco’s regime and the turn to Latin America 
        “The purposes of the trip are multiple,” stated the report: “to establish direct contact with the 
most prominent Hispanistas in each country; obtain accurate information on the current situation 
of each of them in the social, economic, and cultural realm; search for possible guests to bring 
back to Spain […].”2 In this manner, Alfredo Sánchez Bella and Fernando María Castiella 
described their 1947 visit in Latin America to their superior, Spain’s Foreign Minister Alberto 
Martín-Artajo. As their text indicates, the diplomats’ task was to attract Latin America’s 
“Hispanistas.” And attract them, they did. In less than two years Spain saw the arrival of the 
continent’s most famous far-right figures, who all believed they were partaking in a renewed 
international post-fascist movement. Argentina, and to slightly a lesser degree Chile, led this new 
pilgrimage on the side of the Americas. 
         By reading Francoism “through Latin American eyes,” our task is primarily to clarify why 
an oppressive and impoverished regime, which by no means can be compared with the European 
powers of the 1950s economically or politically, captivated the imagination of a generation of 
conservative Latin Americans.3 The premise of this chapter is that even before Spain’s alleged 
“economic miracle” of the 1960s ever occurred, Francoism had already become exemplary for 
many among Latin America’s conservatives. To clarify this, in the next section I will briefly 
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establish a workable definition for this regime’s ideological guidelines and explain what it was 
that Franco and his followers proposed to their Latin American audiences.  
          Francoist Spain was a dictatorship that famously evaded simple ideological taxonomies. 
Even the term “Francoism” is not without its problems. Francisco Franco was a military General 
who, despite his affection for pompous speeches, left the task of ideological production to his 
intellectuals and speech-writers. Consequently, unlike Nazism or Italian Fascism, Francoism was 
a term coined and used mainly by the regime’s opponents. For Franco and his followers, their 
regime was simply “the New Spanish State,” which was not even officially “nationalist” but 
merely “Unified, Great, and Free” (una grande y libre).4 
          Francoism was born in the context of the Spanish Civil War but was essentially an outcome 
of decades of anti-modern and anti-liberal ideological production, which is worth mentioning 
succinctly as references to it will appear in many instances throughout this study. The dialectic 
motion between modern and anti-modern sentiments had defined the political landscape in Spain 
throughout the 19th century. From it emerged the founding fathers of Spain’s anti-modern 
“traditionalism,” Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo and Juan Vázquez de Mella, who quickly became 
household names among Latin American reactionaries. Then, the Generation of 98 - a category 
referring to a group of thinkers, novelists, and poets, who following Spain’s loss of empire, 
configured the “regeneration” of Spain’s national essence - was the first to articulate a calling for 
a spiritual bridge between Spain and its independent progenies. Miguel de Unamuno’s En torno al 
casticismo, for instance, outlined the ethnic essence uniting the Hispanic race (or “castizo”) vis-à-
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vis Europe’s “sameness,” and thus inspired Latin American audiences in years to come. And last, 
a selective reading of José Ortega y Gasset made Spain’s most famous liberal philosopher a 
prominent source of reference for Francoist and Latin American intellectuals alike.5   
          By and large, however, Franco based his state-ideology on two key corporatist ideological 
schools, both emerging during Miguel Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1930) and Spain’s 
Second Republic (1931-1936). On the one hand, Francoism relied on Spain’s authoritarian 
traditionalism, represented in its extreme version by Ramiro de Maeztu’s affiliation Acción 
Española, and its somewhat more moderated version by Ángel Herrera Oria’s Asociación Católica 
Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNdP). On the other hand, Franco utilized the symbols and 
revolutionary language of José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s Falange Española Tradicionalista (FET 
y de las JONS).6 While the former school was profoundly indebted to the French and German 
ultra-conservative ideologues such as Charles Maurras, Oswald Spengler, and Carl Schmitt, the 
latter took its inspiration from Mussolini’s fascist state. Whereas Maeztu proposed a reactionary 
restoration of a pre-modern monarchy, José Antonio and his followers advocated a non-clerical, 
“poetic,” and “irrational” national-syndicalist revolution.7 These movements shared, however, 
similar fantasies. Both of them sought to induce an alternative modernity, based on a spiritual 
sublime and a corporatist - be it social or statist - organization of society. More important for our 
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purposes, they both presented Latin American audiences with a heroic neo-imperial vision. 
Subsequently, Maeztu and José Antonio, both executed during the Civil War by the Republic, 
became an inseparable component of the Latin American far-right canon during the Cold War, as 
we shall see in the following chapters.8  
          Strikingly, Francoism did not only inspire but was influenced by Latin American thought. 
Nothing illustrates this better than the invention of the word Hispanidad - the elusive neologism 
that, during the 1950s served as the ideological ground for Franco’s linkage with Latin America. 
Coined in Argentina’s by the Spanish-born priest Zacarias de Vizcarra in 1926, Ramiro de Maeztu, 
then Miguel Primo de Rivera’s ambassador in Buenos Aires, adopted the term, and, in turn, 
brought it to optimal levels of publicity during the turbulent years of the Second Republic. Rather 
than deeming Hispanidad an “Argentine” or “Spanish” ideology, it is worthwhile to think of this 
term as the consciously reciprocal effort to produce a transatlantic anti-modern ideology that could 
successfully unite the Hispanic world against the alleged threat of the 20th century’s 
“internationals.” 
         What is Hispanidad? In its most basic form, the term represented a nostalgia for a pre-modern 
era, and more specifically, to the alleged spiritual harmony that existed during the 16th century 
Habsburg Iberian Empire.9 Supposedly vanquished by the Enlightenment in the 18th century, For 
Maeztu, this “spiritual equilibrium” had resolved the “anxiety” that is the essence of man;10 thus 
it was Hispanidad that created “universal history” he said,11 rather than the “false dogmas” of the 
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French Revolution.12 Without ever elucidating what the “spirit” actually was, the spokesmen of 
Hispanidad further portrayed it as a condition of nirvana-like sublime.13 Others, portrayed 
Hispanidad as a certain “style,” “way of being,” or “hierarchy of values”14 (or tautologically, 
“Hispanic values”).15 Yet if there was ever a consensus on the meaning of Hispanidad, it was that 
it signified a universal civilizing mission, deriving from the Spaniards’ unique character revealed 
in Spain’s anti-Muslimism reconquest and the Christianization of the Americas. Living in 
Tucumán, Argentina, in 1938 the Spanish theologue Manuel García Morente advocated 
Hispanidad as a mentality of a “Christian gentleman” (or “Paladín”), whose characteristics include 
“accepting stoically” his universal “mission” as a modern crusader.16 
          Another way to address the appeal of Hispanidad is by understanding it an ideological 
“empty signifier”17 whose spokespersons often advised forsaking the question of its precise 
signification. In the words of Uruguayan poet Carlos Lacalle, “one lives Hispanidad, not thinks 
it.”18 Or as García Morente put it: 
What is the typical style of Hispanidad? Difficult to answer, […] impossible to solve. 
Because the concepts that we use to define something apply well to “things,” to “beings;” 
but they cannot serve to apprehend a style which is neither a thing nor being, but a “mode” 
of things, a way of being. For that reason, we will not even try to “define” the Hispanic style 
and we will have to limit ourselves to the effort of “showing it,” of making it intuitive.19 
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14 For Laín Entralgo, Hispanidad meant a “mentality of radical melancholy,” see - Pedro Laín Entralgo, “Lengua y 
ser de la Hispanidad”, Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, no. 70 (1955): 14. 
15 XXV aniversario del Instituto de cultura hispánica Santiago de Chile (1973), 7.  
16 Manuel García Morente, Idea de la Hispanidad (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1939), 19. 
17 Here I build on Ernesto Laclau’s definition of the term, which associates any establishment of a symbolic system 
with the effective creation of an empty ontological ground, usually through tautologies or a demand not to inquire 
further into its meaning (“the constitutively unreachable”), see - Ernesto Laclau, “Why do Empty Signifiers Matter 
to Politics?” in Emancipation(s) (London: Verso. 1996), 36-46. 
18 Carlos Lacalle, “Diez años en la política de la hispanidad,” Mundo Hispánico, no. 103 (1956), 3.  




Evidently, as a mysterious place-holder, upon which a tangible political system could be built, 
Hispanidad could not be defined in simple linguistic, ethnic, or religious terminologies. Could 
Jews be included in Hispanidad? Or the once-Spanish Philippines? Nobody, it seemed, had an 
absolute answer for such questions.20 Hispanidad was a “living thing,” some Francoists stated 
proudly.21 Yet it was outlining its borderlines that made it a useful ideological tool for Franco 
when defining his regime as the most loyal guardian against the “enemies” of Hispanidad.   
          Not all Francoists were comfortable with the Hispanidad rhetoric. Being the hegemonic 
ideological group within the regime in the 1940s, the filo-fascist Falange defied this traditionalist 
trope at first, proposing Latin America its own secular “unification of culture, economic interests, 
and power.”22 As historian Ismael Saz Campos has noted, in these years Francoism was “a 
fascistized dictatorship” rather than a traditionalist one.23 This, I argue, is an apt depiction that 
nonetheless calls for further elucidation. When dealing with the question of whether Francoism 
was “fascist,” let us first grant the following: no other European regime had mimicked Mussolini’s 
state-ideology, in its symbolism and initial “nationalist-syndicalist” apparatus, as Francoism.24 
Likewise, the regime’s brutalities during its early years - including execution, mass incarceration, 
and torture of horrendous scale - should allow us to consider Francoism as the first fascist regime 
                                                             
20 The discussions over the exact Hispanic component of Sephardi Jews and the Philippines (a Spanish colony in the 
past) clearly fascinated the Francoist publishing apparatus, see for instance - Francisco Javier Conde, “La hazaña 
estupenda de la cristianización de Filipinas,” Mundo Hispánico, no. 119 (February 1958): 19-21; José María Lacalle, 
“La hispanidad mideterranea,” Mundo Hispánico, no. 151 (October 1969): 32-33; Blas Pinar, “Legazpi, fundador de 
filipinas,” Mundo Hispánico, no. 199 (October 1964): 32-34. 
21 See for instance - Alfredo Sánchez Bella, “Proyecto de decreto del ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores por él se crea 
el instituto Español de Cooperación Intelectual,” AGA, caja 82/11114. 
22 The Falange intellectuals, most conspicuously Ernesto Giménez Caballero, aimed to establish their own parallel 
secular theorization of the Hispanic essence see - Ernesto Giménez Caballero, Genio de España (Madrid: Ediciones 
Gaceta Literaria, 1932).  
23 Saz Campos, Fascismo y Franquismo, 79-87. 
24 Taken directly from the Falange’s constitution, Franco’s “twenty-six points of the Movimiento” from 1939 are a 
fascist text par excellence. My reading here aligns with Zeev Sternhell’s complete separation between Nazi 




to put its annihilationist fantasies into practice, against its own citizens.25 On a theoretical level, 
like Mussolini, Franco saw his regime as an ideology in the making.26 “We have overcome the old 
concepts of right and left”27 he often stated, confirming time and again that his “third path” had 
transcended the enlightenment’s philosophies of the state altogether. Assuredly, in April 1937 
Franco’s decree coerced Spain’s right-wing ideological groups to merge within one coordinated 
organization: the Movimiento. But he also insisted that this body was neither “a program” nor “a 
party” but a moral “principle.” Franco also spoke of an “open constitution,” thus never committing 
to a definite socio-political theory of the state.28 Instead, Francoism identified as a “pluralistic” 
assembly of ideological schools (or “families”) fighting for the same moral absolutes.  
          Francoism did purport to have a “doctrine,” however, which was intrinsically tied to the 
Catholic sacred. Franco’s own leadership (Caudillaje nacional) appeared as an indisputable 
incarnation “the Grace of God.”29 And anyone who partook in the regime agreed that the Civil 
War had been a “Crusade” of eschatological importance. A showdown between ultimate “good” 
and “evil,” for them their victory meant the closure of a universal disharmony that had begun with 
the French Revolution. Put differently, Francoism represented itself as a final condition of spiritual 
restoration. Its spokesmen and spokeswomen believed that their hunger-plagued country was the 
                                                             
25 The “Spanish holocaust” is the provocative labeling that has been used in contemporary historiography to discuss 
the campaign of annihilation conducted by Franco’s Armies, see - Montse Armengou, Las fosas del silencio: hay un 
holocausto español? (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2004); Char Prieto (ed.), El holocausto olvidado: guerra, masacre, 
pacto, olvido y recuperación de la memoria histórica española (Madrid: Editorial Pliegos, 2011); Paul Preston, The 
Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain (London: Harper Press, 2012). 
26 Here I build on the theoretical discussion initiated by historian Federico Finchelstein regarding Mussolini’s 
ideological fluctuation, see - Finchelstein, Transatlantic Fascism, 26. 
27 “Our political system is open to any improvements and perfections” he said in May 1946, see - Francisco Franco, 
“Con España están la verdad y la razón,” in Textos de doctrina politica (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1951), 
44. 
28 Francisco Franco, Pensamiento político de Franco: antología (Madrid: Servicio Informativo Español, 1964), 225.  
29 For a lucid analysis of this term, see - William Viestenz, By the Grace of God: Francoist Spain and the Sacred 




“only oasis of peace in the world,”30 as the only place where the truthful Catholic dogma 
materialized as a “confessional” state. In other words, in its own historiosophic vision not only had 
Francoism retrieved humanity to its correct path but showed the western civilization the roadmap 
for its future perfection. Tellingly, while being profoundly liturgical, Francoism was in perpetual 
conflict with the Vatican for most of its years of existence; thus, this was a rogue format of 
Catholicism, one that buttressed Franco’s “political theology” rather than the Roman Church’s 
hierarchy.31 
          In 1945, against the background of a brief period of international isolation, Franco and his 
new emerging deputy, Luis Carrero Blanco, began ridding the regime from fascist connotations. 
This meant not only the gradual closing of punishment facilities,32 but also the removal of key 
Falange figures from positions of leadership, appointing instead the more “moderate” ACNdP 
members Alberto Martín-Artajo as Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and José Ibáñez Martín as 
Minister of Education.33 Next, Franco initiated a peculiar constitutional phase, by establishing his 
own “Parliament” (Cortes),34 and granting his citizens a “Charter” (Fuero de los Españoles) - “the 
regime’s great charter of civil and social rights and political liberties” in Manuel Fraga Iribarne’s 
words.35 This young Falange intellectual was arguably less enthusiastic of the 1947 Law of 
                                                             
30 In the words of one of Franco’s more salient spokeswomen, Blanca de los Rios, see - Blanca de los Rios, 
“Hispanidad,” ABC Sevilla (October 23, 1953).   
31 After WWII, and with the beginning of the papacy of Pius VII, the Catholic Church became critical of, and at times 
openly hostile to, Franco’s dictatorship. This further made Francoism a symbol of a stronghold against the emerging 
reformist Catholic movement later culminating in the II Vatical Council. Several monographs have debated the role 
of the Catholic Church in the regime, see for instance - Javier Tusell, Franco y los católicos: la política interior 
española entre 1945 y 1957 (Madrid: Alianza, 1984); Julián Casanova, La Iglesia de Franco (Madrid: Ediciones 
Temas de Hoy, 2001); Luis Suárez Fernández, Franco y la iglesia: las relaciones con el Vaticano (Matriti: Homo 
Legens, 2011). 
32 Alberto Reig Tapia, Ideología e historia: sobre la represión Franquista y la Guerra Civil (Madrid: Akal, 1984). 
33 This meant, as historian Paul Preston put it, “casting off the burdens of Falangism while retaining the regime’s 
essential authoritarianism,” see - Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-
Century Spain (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 115.  
34 Titled “Ley Constitución de las Cortes Españolas,” of July 17, 1942. 




Succession, an arrangement that made Spain a monarchy again and appointed Franco as its regent 
for life. Approved via “referendum” in 1947, it was the regime’s most prominent seal of 
legitimacy. This notwithstanding, merely stating that the regime disposed of its fascist legacy 
would be to overlook a spectrum of ideological phenomena. For one thing, the Falange ideology 
did not disappear from the Spanish landscape. Under its tamed leadership, during the Cold War 
years, Francoism was still a laboratory for further “national-syndicalist” projects wherein the state 
alleged to harmonize labor and private production through so-called “vertical syndicates.”36 For 
another, Francoism’s common denominator were principles of “hierarchy,” “discipline,” 
“service,” and “honor.”37 Like the fascist regimes of the 1930s, it presented a fantasy of an 
unblemished patriarchal society, where the youth, woman, workers, and ethnic minorities were 
purified of their “modern” transgressions and put back in place. In short, in its early years 
Francoism was an amalgam of fascist, traditionalist, and Catholic schools of thought, overlapping 
in most of their ethical premises.   
          Over the course of the 1940s, Francoism stepped up its efforts to influence Latin American 
politics. Francoism’s message to the Latin American far-right was simple: “Hispano-America 
begins at the Pyrenean Mountains.”38After all, Spain had created the Latin American “family of 
nations” during the 16th century; therefore, for the Spaniards, it was still “a part of America.” Or 
in Franco’s words, empire had given Spain “an American character.”39 For him, Spain’s “mission 
                                                             
36 The two Falange theorists of the 1950s were Raimundo Fernández Cuesta and José Luis Arrese. Their theorization 
of national-syndicalism built on the work of Ramon Ledesma Ramos, and identified the state as the harmonizer of 
the relations between labor and capital, see - José Luis de Arrese, Política de vivienda (Madrid: Ministerio de 
vivienda, 1959). 
37 This, is how the regime’s most loyal narrators depicted it in later years, see - José Zafra Valverde, El sistema 
político en las décadas de Franco (Madrid: Grafite, 2004), 34.  
38 In the words of his loyal interpreter, Alfredo Sánchez Bella, see - “Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo 
Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por Hispanoamérica,” Archivo General Universidad de Navarra (hereafter cited AGUN), 
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in Hispanoamerica” was unifying the continent in the spirit of the Spanish Civil War, against the 
external “materialist” ideologies of the Enlightenment.40 True, after 1945 Franco and his 
ideologues refrained from uttering the word “empire.” Nevertheless, uniting the Latin American 
continent into one spiritual movement was not merely the regime’s “diplomacy,” as some 
historians have argued, but, at least at first, its self-declared raison d’être.41  
          During the late-1940s, the dictatorship founded several institutions designed to attract the 
Latin American elites. The first institution for ideological education was the Institute for Political 
Studies (Instituto de Estudios Políticos, or IEP). Established in 1939, it aspired to conceptualize 
Francoism for international readers. While perhaps hosting a myriad of Fascist intellectuals, most 
notoriously Carl Schmitt,42 it nonetheless presented a cohesive debate on Franco’s idiosyncratic 
“organic democracy,” and demarcated, even before the end of the Second Word War, a clear line 
between Nazi “totalitarianism” and the Spanish dictatorship.43 More important, the IEP was the 
first to address Spain’s mission in Latin America and invited Latin American far-right intellectuals 
to collaborate upon its publications.44 Afterwards, Franco established an institution named the 
Superior Council of Scientific Research (El Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, or 
CSIC). Controlled almost entirely by the Opus Dei, it will be examined in Chapter 2.  
                                                             
40 In Franco’s words, Spain was to become the “bridge transferring spiritual values” from one civilization to the 
other, see - Discurso en el Palacio del Senado, October 12,1950, in - Francisco Franco, Textos de doctrina política. 
Escritos y palabras de 1945 a 1950 (Madrid: Publicaciones Española, 1951), 712. 
41 Here I refer to the work of historian Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, see - Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-
Escalonilla, Diplomacia franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica, 1939-1953 (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 
1988); Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Imperio de papel: acción cultural y política durante el primer 
Franquismo (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 1992). 
42 According to historian Javier Tusell, this institution’s reputation of being a “breeding-ground of fascism” never 
“matched up to its reputation, see - Javier Tusell, Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy, 1939 to the Present 
(Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2007), 38.  
43 Alfonso García Valdecasas, “Los estados totalitarios y el estado español,” Revista de Estudios Políticos, no. 5 
(1942): 5–32. 
44 Revista de Estudios Políticos, Cuadernos de Política Social, and Revista de Política Internacional were the names 
of its chief publication, see for instance - Pablo Antonio Cuadra, “Política internacional y política universal de 




         Of all the ideological institutions that operated in Franco’s Spain, however, few were as 
decisive to the regime’s linkage with Latin America as the Institute of Hispanic Culture (Instituto 
de Cultura Hispánica, or ICH). Established on December 31, 1945, this was no ordinary 
organization for cultural interchange as its name implies, but the chief agency for the ideological 
cooperation with the Latin American Right.45 Its intellectual cadre relied on figures from various 
affiliations, but overall saw the dominance of ACNdP members, who had not been tarnished by 
any fascist image, and who could, therefore, propagate Franco’s message without alarming the 
Western Bloc.46 Alfredo Sánchez Bella is a perfect example for this. One of Franco’s most zealous 
statesman, he directed the ICH from 1949 to 1959. Born to a conservative Valencia family in 1916, 
Sánchez Bella, like Blas Piñar and Gregorio Marañon Moya who proceeded him in office, 
belonged to a generation who had served Franco as soldiers in the Civil War and who would remain 
loyal to their leader in years to come. Perhaps an unexceptional intellectual, Sánchez Bella was 
nonetheless a most efficient propagandist who epitomized the insatiable endeavor to establish 
networks with Latin America’s anti-liberal reaction.  
        The ICH official definition was, perhaps deliberately, vague, as it called for the “promotion 
of the mutual consciousness between the Hispanic peoples.”47 And yet beneath the 
Commonwealth-like appearance transpired a concrete program of political action. By the end of 
the 1940s, Sánchez Bella began coordinating the establishment of ICH branches in Latin 
America.48 These centers were designed to be autonomous “national entities,” readily adherent to 
                                                             
45 As has been mentioned several times in Spanish historiography, the ICH replaced a small organization by the 
name of “Consejo de la Hispanidad.” Operating between 1941 and 1945, it had but a limited effect in Latin 
America, see - María A. Escudero, El Instituto de Cultura Hispánica (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1994), 41-106. 
46 José María Pemán is one example, see - Delgado, Diplomacia Franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica, 
109-111; Antonio Cañellas Mas, Alfredo Sánchez Bella: un embajador entre las Américas y Europa: Diplomacia y 
política informativa en la España de Franco (Gijón, Asturias: Ediciones Trea, 2015), 79-80.  
47 “Reglamento orgánico del ICH,” BOE (España), no. 115 (April 25, 1947): 2426.  
48 “Informe de actividades del director del instituto de cultura hispánica, Alfredo Sánchez Bella,” August 10, 1949, 




the center in Madrid but also financially linked to the Spanish embassies in each country.49 Their 
mission, Sánchez Bella said, was to coordinate all local Hispanic movements towards “political 
action,”50 exemplify loyalty to “Catholic principles,” and most important, “train men towards a 
new mentality, men who will later be able to reach a new state of consciousness.”51 The ICH 
quickly established a large publishing apparatus. The institute’s main journals, Cuadernos 
Hispanoamericanos and Mundo Hispánico, proclaimed to be a “Madrid-Buenos Aires” and 
“Buenos Aires-Mexico-Madrid” collaborations, and regularly adorned their pages with 
intellectuals such as Mexican philosophers José Vasconcelos and Alfonso Junco, Romanian writer 
Vintilă Horia, and the Argentine fascist novelists Hugo Wast, to name but a few.52    
         The ICH soon developed a range of other devices to reach Latin American audiences. A 
system of international fellows (becarios),53 was to make Spain to the quintessential academic 
center for the Latin American elites, with a college system (Colegios Mayores) constructed for 
their accommodation. In Sánchez Bella’s words, “the moral and intellectual reality of our country 
[…] permeates deep into these young friends and companions for the road, who thus are liberated 
                                                             
49 In a series of trips in 1949 and 1950, Sánchez Bella personally oversaw the establishment of most all twenty-three 
of these entities, mostly by means of local funding, which Sánchez Bella said was to “give them continuity and 
authenticity,” see - Alfredo Sánchez Bella, Misión de los institutos de cultura hispánica: finalidades, organización y 
orientación (Madrid: Ediciones Instituto Caldense de Cultura Hispánica, 1959), 19; In reality, Spain financed up to 
25% of the initial costs, see - “Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por 
Hispanoamérica.” 
50 Sánchez Bella, Misión de los institutos de cultura hispánica, 28.  
51 Ibid, 14.  
52 These journals targeted, however, dissimilar audiences. Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, edited by the Falange’s 
intellectual Pedro Laín Entralgo, arguably aimed to attract the sophisticated conservative intelligentsia. Mundo 
Hispánico, on the other hand, was a Francoist propaganda platform that appealed to a more generic far-right 
audience and displayed a mixture of Catholic liturgy, triumphalist militarism, and tacky folklore imagery. Sánchez 
Bella’s reports indicate that he put much effort in the dissemination of Mundo Hispánico in Latin America, insisting 
that despite selling only 30.000 copies, this journal could reach the popularity of mainstream magazines such as 
Reader’s Digest and Paris Match, see - “Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje por 
Hispanoamérica.”  
53 Balance y perspectiva de una obra: discursos pronunciados en el día de la Hispanidad, 1950 (Madrid: Edición 
Cultura Hispánica, 1950), 20-21; see also - “Para que la influencia española en América gravite y tenga la mínima 
densidad exigible, Una masa no inferior de 15,000 estudiantes hispanoamericanos” - in “Informe reservado 




from the dangerous erosion and collapse that the contact with other cultures inflicts on them.” In 
his opinion, in Spain, the student does not “become vulgarized, or become socially over-sensitive” 
but rather “tougher, and perhaps more Christian, more independent: in a word, more of a man.”54 
These words echoed not only a fascist cult of youth and masculine virility but also a strikingly 
teleological vision of the Spanish regime as a global spiritual guide. Additionally, the ICH afforded 
much attention to Latin America’s far-right intellectuals (“friends and sympathizers” in Sánchez 
Bella’s words).55 As many of them paid tribute to Franco during the 1950s, the ICH’s texts proudly 
confirmed that “without exception, they all returned to their respective countries carrying with 
them something from here, along with the marvelous impression of our glorious past, and 
burgeoning current resurgence. The intellectual, political, and social realities of Spain have thus 
acquired spontaneous and persuaded defenders.”56 Of course, there was nothing spontaneous about 
the way these figures became fascinated by Francoism; witnessing the regime first hand and 
collaborating with it was the sole purpose of their celebratory visits.   
         The ICH also coordinated its distinctive congresses.57 On October 1, 1949, the first Spanish-
Latin American convention assembled. “The 1st Ibero-American Congress of History” was its title, 
and the conception of a “general theory of [Latin America’s] independence” was the objective of 
this unusual summit. It is telling that the most burning issue the ICH felt a need to address was a 
                                                             
54 Balance y perspectiva de una obra, 26. 
55 Ibid, 28.  
56 For instance, in 1947 and 1948, the ICH’s “Department of university assistance and cultural exchange” brought to 
Spain the following Argentine intellectuals: Juan Carlos Goyeneche, Juan Ramón Sepich, Ignacio Anzoategui, 
Octavio Derisi, Héctor Sáenz Quesada, José María Rosa, César Picó, Salvador Dana Montaño, Carlos Obligado, and 
Gustavo Franceschi; and from Chile: Sergio Fernández Larraín, Javier Vergara Barros, Oscar Larson, Jaime 
Eyzaguirre, Roque Esteban Scarpa, and Anibal Carvajal, see - Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, resumen de 
actividades desarrolladas durante el curso de 1947-1948, 10-12; “Balance cultural de 1947,” La Vanguardia 
(January 1, 1948); Scarpa, later enjoyed reflecting on his meeting with Franco, see - “Conversando con Franco,” La 
Tercera (April 19, 1981).  
57 Sánchez Bella later expressed pride over the quantity of the ICH conventions, held in Bogotá, Quito, Madrid, 
Caracas, and Cuba, see - Alfredo Sánchez Bella, “Diez años de cultura hispánica,” Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, 




historical narrative. Setting the record straight between the Mother Nation and the colonies, i.e. 
agreeing on the meanings of Spain’s imperial legacies, were the basis for any ideological 
cooperation between the two sides. Latin America’s Revolutionary Wars did not stem from a 
concrete political context, the congress concluded, but “from a complex spiritual process, linked 
to a universal history.” Hence, neither the Spaniards nor the colonies were responsible for the 
bloody wars between them.58 “The Hispanoamerican History Congress,” reflected Sánchez Bella, 
“brought us to the awareness that there had never been a plurality of histories among our nations, 
but one unique sentiment.”59  
          The following ideological congresses of Education (1949) and Intellectual Cooperation 
(1950) gradually shifted from narrative to political action.60 By this time it had become clear that 
the ICH was “not another cultural organization,”61 but rather an apparatus enabling Latin American 
ideologues to promulgate concrete political, social, and education programs. In Sánchez Bella’s 
words, “the clear notion of shared origin, of a historical climate in which we now stir, of the 
education system that we need, demands also knowing which should be its projection towards the 
future.”62 More congresses thus followed, the more prominent being the Hispanoamerican 
Feminine Congress (1951), Social Security Congress (1951), and the Economic Cooperation 
Congress (1953).63 In other words, a decade of intimate encounters awaited Latin America’s 
“hispanistas.”  
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59 Balance y perspectiva de una obra, 20-21. 
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          While baring clear resemblance to the projects of the 1930s, the ideology of Hispanidad of 
the 1950s did see some change of emphasis. If for Maeztu Hispanidad it meant a melancholic 
yearning for a pre-modern harmony, then within the context of the Cold War, Hispanidad began 
symbolizing a more concrete anti-colonial alliance. Of course, Hispanidad was still profoundly 
associated with Catholicism, a fact that went hand in hand with Spain’s parallel effort to lead the 
international Catholic organizations such as Pax Romana.64 Yet, for its chief promoters, 
Hispanidad gradually meant a motion from revolution to restoration. Even nationalism, they 
claimed, needed to be voluntarily abdicated for the benefit of Latin America’s collective 
wellbeing.65 The Francoists thus advised their American audience to perceive themselves as 
victims of a bipolar imperial process. “Hispano-Americans of the world, unite! […] we are the 
proletarians of the world, who have come late to the development of technology and 
industrialization,” announced Sánchez Bella. For him, Hispanidad was synonymous with the third 
world’s anti-ideological self-defense.66 In turn, the Spaniards presented a multilateral initiative for 
the formation of the Hispanic Community of Nations, or “Hispanic Bloc.” This “mutual Hispanic 
citizenship,” Martín-Artajo stated, could be easily “incorporated into the norms of government” in 
each country.67 Franco’s intellectuals even spoke optimistically about the creation of an 
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it quite clearly encroached on the Vatican’s sphere. However, Ruiz-Giménez’s movement towards Christian-
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65 Or in Sánchez Bella’s words, “the 19th century philosophies produced the aberration of thinking of the nation as 
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“Iberoamerican economic community” and a shared currency.68 That is to say, on the one hand, 
during the early 1950s Spain was “fascist” no more and fully committed to a political and economic 
alliance with the USA;69 and on the other hand, it advocated a union that clearly defied the USA’s 
imperial aspirations, as it saw them at least.70  
         Predictably, Latin America’s democratic transitions of the late-1940 were met with contempt 
in Franco’s Spain. For Sánchez Bella, this confirmed that the enemies of Hispanidad - be they 
Communists, Jews, Protestants, and Christian Democrats - were on the move, “joint and 
coordinated” as ever. Worse yet, he argued, Latin America’s Catholics too were now recklessly 
pinning their hopes on democracy. What was his alternative? an “authoritarian system with popular 
support,” was the answer; a regime that, unlike European fascism, would embrace the private 
sector, since “the autarchic industrialization [...] is uneconomical in the long run.”71 In effect, Latin 
America’s return to authoritarianism was imminent, Sánchez Bella thought. “They all want a 
regime like Spain, but which will not be deemed Falangist or fascist,” he stressed. Therefore, to 
assist them Spain would have to opt for a more aggressive “political” strategy: “the Spanish 
formula […] must be shown, taught to its most intimate experiences [...] among all the ruling 
classes in Spanish America,” Sánchez Bella wrote. For this purpose, Spain would even need to 
“infiltrate state apparatuses” and “disseminate the ideological bases” of the regime fully, he 
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added.72 These recommendations are noteworthy if only for their conspiratorial nature. But who 
were Sánchez Bella’s Latin American interlocutors? And did they accept this so-called Spanish 
“formula” in its entirety?  
 
Argentine fascism and the “return to the Hispanic” 
        Ever since the turn of the 19th century, the Argentine reactionary elites had been fiercely 
defying the country’s constitutional order. Argentina’s filo-fascist revolutionary movement 
consolidated during the 1920s as a reaction to the liberal ethos of Argentina’s Constitution of 1853, 
its parliamentary politics following the Saenz Peña legislation of 1912, and consequent mass-based 
mobilization during the tenure of elected president Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922; 1928-1930). 
Self-labeled “nacionalistas,” the Argentine fascists generally agreed that the late-19th century has 
been disastrous to Argentina’s social and spiritual wellbeing, and promoted instead their own 
alternative modernity - one akin to the spiritual truths discovered by the Catholic Church and 
protective of the sacred spiritual essences of the Argentine nation. If there was ever a nacionalista 
ideological consensus, it most certainly included the notion that any “third position” between 
liberalism and communism was to be founded on hierarchic, “irrational,” violent, and masculine 
action. In the same vein, the nacionalistas vaguely agreed on the need to replace parliamentary 
politics with a return to a “corporative” type of authoritarianism.73  
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         The nacionalistas had, however, disparate views on the precise myths of national origin on 
which to build their political platform. From the outset, a distinctive duality was apparent in the 
nacionalista mythological thinking between the emphasis on the Argentine (“autochthonous”) and 
Hispanic mythologies. Poet Leopoldo Lugones, arguably the first major nacionalista theoretician, 
neither showed signs of Hispanic inclination nor aligned with any traditionalist trends. In fact, 
some have even referred to Lugones as a “Hispanophob,”74 and a “passionate anti-clerical”75 - 
which both help to explain his veneration of Mussolini’s anti-traditionalist ideology. In the 1920s, 
nacionalistas such as Carlos Ibarguren further revised the history of Argentina’s 19th century, and 
more specifically, in reconfiguring the image of Juan Manuel de Rosas. Argentina’s quintessential 
19th century Caudillo, he represented, for them, the authentic anti-liberal, Federalist, viral, and 
heroic nationhood to which Argentina was to return.76 Not coincidentally, this brand of 
revolutionary nacionalismo exhibited an obsession with the racial purity of the Argentine nation, 
which went hand in hand with an unfaltering anti-Semitic sentiment. In this ideological brand one 
could include Juan E. Carulla’s journal Bandera Argentina, followed by the Enrique P. Oses’s 
notoriously anti-Semitic Crisol, and later, his even more popular nacionalista daily El Pampero.77 
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It was this ideological milieu that soon thereafter informed the short-lived dictatorship of José 
Félix Uriburu (1930-1932).78   
          Yet during the late-1920s Argentine nacionalismo also rediscovered Spain as a source of 
political myths and intellectual networks. This so-called “doctrinal nacionalismo”79 - which by 
then relied on other sources of inspiration such as Charles Maurras’s Action française - evoked the 
notions of Hispanic spirituality and myth of empire. In truth, the nacionalista “return to the 
Hispanic” appeared even before then in the work of Argentina writers such as Manuel Gálvez and 
Ricardo Rojas, whose visits to Spain in the early 20th century produced first signs of anti-liberal 
sentiments.80 Steadily, platforms such as the Argentine conservative daily La Nación, too, began 
showing interest in the Spanish intellectual world (especially that of “the generation of 98”) and 
even hosted Miguel de Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset as column writers. By the early 1930s, 
Hispanic nacionalismo had become conspicuous in various other far-right circles. One of them 
was the Cursos de Cultura Católica - an affiliation which, under the leadership of Atilio Dell’Oro 
Maini and César Pico, was one of the first platforms for Hispanic nationalismo in Argentina.81 In 
1928, Pico, along with several other far-right Argentines - Julio and Rodolfo Irazusta, Ernesto 
Palacios, Alberto Ezcurra Medrano to name a few - launched the journal La Nueva República, a 
publication that further redefined nacionalismo within traditionalist and Hispanic contours. 
         As has been detailed already in the literature, the presence of Ortega y Gasset and Maeztu in 
Buenos Aires in the 1920s left a clear imprint on the nacionalista milieu and the Spanish theorists 
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alike.82 The latter even collaborated with several nacionalista publications Criterio and Crisol, 
thereby making the discourse of Hispanidad appear as a truly Spanish-Argentine school of 
thought.83 Rather than a colonizer, Spain reemerged here as a symbol of defiance of USA 
imperialism and the European Enlightenment at large. The eruption of the Spanish Civil War in 
July 1936 further influenced the Argentine Right. By confirming their already steadfast Manichean 
world-view on an epic scale, Franco’s “Crusade” was thereby a watershed moment in the history 
of the nacionalistas. If Hispanidad had been, until this point, a mere theoretic label, now it emerged 
as the omen of a palpable regime model. 
          To be sure, under presidents Agustín Pedro Justo (1932-1938) and Roberto María Ortiz 
(1938-1942) Argentina did not officially recognize Franco’s Spain, so to not infuriate the United 
Kingdom and the USA. Yet surreptitiously these authoritarian Argentine governments aided 
Franco, primarily through trade.84 Or as the Spanish ambassador in Buenos Aires wrote Roberto 
María Ortiz in 1939, Franco’s demand to be “recognized de facto” by the Argentines was met in 
1937 and included “exchange of commercial agents.”85 Furthermore, Argentine conservatives and 
military men rapidly linked with Franco’s “new state.”86 The late-1930s saw many Argentine 
travelers in Franco’s Spain. One of them was the Argentine General and writer Jorge Giovanelli, 
who wrote back to the Argentine Foreign minister praising the nationalist army’s anhelation of the 
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“Reds.” “The moral of the population is excellent and it supports its Caudillo enthusiastically,” he 
reported.87 From 1937 onwards, the history of the nacionalistas hence became entwined with the 
teleology of the Spanish Civil War, as their publications sided unanimously with Francoism and 
against the Second Republic. 
         Mario Amadeo (born 1911), Juan Carlos Goyeneche (born 1913), and Marcelo Sánchez 
Sorondo (born 1913), were merely in their mid-twenties when the Civil War began. A product of 
the Cursos de Cultura Católica, the three toured Fascist Europe in the late 1930s and spent a vast 
portion of their time in Franco’s Spain.88 Sánchez Sorondo even became La Nación’s 
correspondent in Burgos, from where he reported empathetically on Nationalist Spain along with 
Falange writers such as Jacinto Miquelarena. While Amadeo and Goyeneche linked with the more 
traditionalist Francoist intellectuals (Alfredo Sánchez Bella) Sánchez Sorondo linked with the 
Falange’s revolutionary inner circle (Pedro Laín Entralgo). Returning to Buenos Aires, in 1938 
these youngsters began publishing the intellectual journal Sol y Luna. Here one could observe the 
burgeoning cooperation between the two Catholic fascisms, as Eugenio Montes, Franco’s 
ambassador to Argentina, propagated the Spanish “Crusade” in Argentina and praised the two 
countries’ young generations, for their “simultaneous discovery of a system of values.”89 
Presenting his guest speaker, Goyeneche declared that Spain’s war meant “the world’s rebirth.”90 
In the early 1940s, as war ravaged the European continent, the Sol y Luna milieu continued its 
collaboration with Franco’s intellectuals.91 The arrival to Buenos Aires of José María Pemán, one 
of the more distinguished Acción Española theorist, and his remarks about what European fascism 
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could learn from Argentina’s Catholic nacionalismo, indicated just how mutual the admiration 
between these two ideological currents had become by then.92  
         The Sol y Luna group was not only a prominent supporter of Franco’s Spain but the first to 
profess a “doctrinal unity” with this regime. As Goyeneche said then, “we are committed to 
‘hispanofilliation’ rather than hispanophilia,” and elaborated: “We uphold that we are, Spain and 
Hispanic America, one spiritual power, one unified culture, and one sole historical progression.”93 
Interpreting the doctrine of José Antonio, Sánchez Sorondo stated similarly that Spain “responds 
to the law of dialectical gravity that is the historical law of empire.”94 Tellingly, Sol y Luna’s 
ideology gradually disowned the Rosista mythology, rarely exhibited any anti-Semitic tendencies, 
and replaced jingoistic nationalism with a neo-imperial vision of Latin America’s anti-modern 
“third path.” In the same vein, upon the pages of the journal Nueva Política, Sánchez Sorondo 
depicted a zero-sum-game between the Hispanic essence and the Enlightenment. “Hispanoamerica 
is the most pathetic example of a community of nations disarranged by ideologies […] When 
turning against Spain they turned against their reason of being which had united them in reverence 
for centuries,” he said in 1942.95 Not surprisingly, Argentina’s fascist-friendly Officer Revolution 
of 1943 elevated the status of these young theorists. Mario Amadeo even became the political 
director of Argentina’s Foreign Ministry but resigned shortly thereafter, once Argentina declared 
its neutrality in the Second World War in March 1945. 
          As it happened, Franco’s first official linkage with the Argentine state was with Juan Perón 
- the product of the Officer Revolution, and in June 1946, the newly elected president. As 
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historiography has established by now, this was no ordinary diplomatic bond but rather a timely 
economic rescue of Franco’s Spain during its brief period of international isolation.96 The famous 
Perón-Franco economic treaties of 1946 and 1948 were an expression of fraternity between two 
regimes that self-identified as the “pillars” of the Hispanic civilizing mission. While displaying 
dissimilar state-ideologies, Perón’s Argentina and Franco’s Spain reciprocally voiced their 
commitment for an alternative spiritual modernity. Indeed, the 1946 protocols reveal not only the 
sides’ obligation to economic support but a commitment for intensive intellectual collaboration.97  
          During his first two years in office, Juan Perón often identified with the Hispanic mission.98 
His speech on Día de la Raza of October 12, 1947, directed to the Spanish people and broadcasted 
on Spain’s national radio, left a profound imprint on Franco’s ideologues. After all, here the 
“Argentine Caudillo” stated openly that against any material impulse “Argentina - the co-heir of 
the Hispanic spirituality - opts for the significant supremacy of the spirit.” In this speech, Perón 
exclaimed that the “nations of Hispanidad constitute a unity,” a fact that must impel them towards 
“a universal enterprise.” “Don Quijote must be resurrected, and the sepulcher of El Cid opened,” 
he even pleaded in pathos.99 Consequently, by the time of Martín-Artajo’s 1948 visit to Argentina, 
the Spanish newspapers spoke of a so-called “Hispanic parallelism,” whereby Argentina had 
joined Spain as the second guardian of Hispanidad already in 1810.100 Upon his arrival, the Spanish 
Foreign Minister declared that the countries “preserved the inestimable good of Christian justice 
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and charity for all nations.”101 Humberto Sosa Molina, Argentina’s interim Foreign Minister, 
responded by praising Franco for bringing “justice into the mind and victory in the heart.”102  
         What motivated the Argentines to express such avid unity with the isolated Spanish regime? 
Eva Perón’s own exuberant visit to Spain in June 1947, and her “farewell speech” to the Spanish 
people on national radio reveal some of Perón’s motivations: 
I earn your applause, Spanish workers, because they are an expression of your repudiation 
of those agitators who mobilize the people with utopian promises, and abandon them once 
they have secured their own fortunes […] The day when General Perón triumphed in the 
fairest elections in Argentine history, […] that day we visited our workers and celebrated 
together our triumph. That is why you applaud me: because we have not apostatized the 
people, the workers, the “descamisados.”103  
 
Evidently, during their first years in office, the Peróns sought to find parallels between the two 
regimes in order to send an unequivocal anti-communistic message to their more conservative 
constituency. This might also explain the somewhat overlooked visit of Argentina’s deputy 
Education Minister, Jorge Arizaga, to Franco’s CSIC, in November 1948. At a conference named 
“Towards an Argentine national education” Arizaga said that where positivism is concerned, his 
country was now “moving away from such errors and returns to the path of Spain’s spirit.” 
Addressing the aforementioned “parallelism,” Spain’s Education Minister, Ibáñez Martín, replied 
by saying that “the social policy of General Perón, like that of General Franco, has overcome the 
Marxist political myth.”104 Similarly, Argentina warmly hosted Falange figures in the late-1940s, 
most conspicuously, José Antonio’s sister and Falange leader, Pilar Primo de Rivera.105 
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          On the other hand, as Eva Perón’s speech also clearly shows, Argentina’s populist leaders 
enjoyed underscoring that their democratic government was more just and, thereby, a more popular 
regime model than the Spanish so-called “organic democracy.” Thus, the evolving collaboration 
between Spain and the USA – which meant that Franco depended on Argentine material resources 
no more, and on a symbolic level, had become aligned with Perón’s antagonists – meant Peronism 
and Francoism drifted apart after 1948.  In 1950, Perón even backed away from the Perón-Franco 
Treaties, according to the Argentine Foreign Minister, due to “Argentina’s financial circumstances 
that compel its government to modify its credit politics and export commercialization.”106 
Tellingly, next Perón jettisoned his rhetoric of Hispanidad, deliberately favoring the use of 
“Latinidad” instead.107 By the early 1950s, the regimes’ news outlets even exchanged insults - a 
feud that ended only once Franco sent Perón a personal message demanding he ordered his news 
agencies to halt their anti-Spanish campaign. “I appeal to your chivalry and honor as a soldier,” he 
wrote, “so that, in the service of friendship among our nations, you will stop the campaign of 
slander and defamation undertaken […] against the leader of a friendly nation whom you have 
distinguished with your friendship.”108 At any rate , by the time of Argentina’s 1950 elections, it 
had become clear that the countries were presenting Latin America with different post-fascist 
formulas: Perón’s democratic if anti-liberal populism, and Franco’s dictatorship of “national-
syndicalism.” Peronism’s contribution to the theorization of Hispanidad would be limited 
henceforth, and occur mainly in the 1970s, within the context of Perón’s so-called “turn to the 
right,” examined in chapter 6. This notwithstanding, the so-called “parallelism” between the 
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countries never quite dissolved. Sánchez Bella, for example, never abandoned the belief that 
Argentina was Spain’s key partner in leading the Hispanic world.109 Moreover, the countries 
cooperated within the United Nations and maintained a constant military exchange.110  
           Following Argentina’s democratization and Perón’s rise to power, the nacionalistas 
experienced a period of decline in prestige and political influence. With many of their key 
intellectuals of the 1930s dead or absent from the public sphere, it was therefore up to the younger 
generation of Sol y Luna to lead this ideological movement, among other things, by reestablishing 
alliances with the residues of European fascism, the “authentic Europe” in words of nacionalista 
Father Julio Meinvielle.111 Thus, the nacionalistas returned to Franco’s Spain. Mario Amadeo, 
Juan Carlos Goyeneche, Máximo Etchecopar, César Pico, Carlos Ibarguren, and Juan R. Sepich 
all arrived in Madrid in the late-1940s to pay tribute to their main ideological counterpart, and 
throughout, to bolster their own movement by leading the new post-fascist Hispanic 
international.112  
          The nacionalistas were not merely collaborators in Franco’s apparatus: they were the 
forefront spokesmen of the ICH and the promoters of the notion that Hispanidad was “an American 
reality,”113 born not in Castile, but with the “anxiety of a Spanish heart, dazed in the American 
landscape.”114 The friendship and mutual admiration between Amadeo, Goyeneche, and Sánchez 
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Bella was the key to the success of this network.115 These contacts meant that during Sánchez 
Bella’s 1946 visit to Buenos Aires he met every prominent nacionalista intellectual in town.116 
Goyeneche subsequently became the vice-president of the international Board of Directors of the 
ICH’s Institute of Iberoamerican Culture.117 Amadeo, for his part, became the co-editor of 
Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos together with Laín Entralgo.118 Hence, a unity of fate, rather than 
proximity of faith, led these two intellectuals, of somewhat dissimilar ideological orientations and 
temperament, to theorize Hispanidad upon this journal. Clearly, Laín’s secular Falangism did not 
entirely correlate with Amadeo’s doctrinal nacionalismo. But then again, this collaboration was 
precisely how ICH aspired to present itself to the Americas: as an inclusive platform, consensual 
in its overall mission to spiritually unite the Spanish speaking world.  
          One nacionalista became particularly identified with the new Hispanidad ideology: César 
Pico. His text “Hacía la hispanidad,” from 1942, and “Nuestro Tiempo y la misión de las Españas” 
from 1946, both published in Spain, can be seen as the roadmap of this transnational project. The 
visit of this “champion of Hispanidad” to Spain in 1947, and his encounter with Franco, clearly 
left a mark on him. “My coming to Spain fulfilled a profound desire of a lifetime” he professed, 
thereafter praising his host for the “timely invitations of Latin American figures.”119 By now 
devoid of any Fascist remanence, in Pico’s words lay the unshakable mythical core whereby prior 
to the age of rationalism the European hemisphere was one of harmony and perpetual spiritual 
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elation.120 The reason this “mystical” Europe gave way to the rational “a-historical” society, he 
said, was the ancien régime’s failure to grasp its social “dynamism” and “condensation.”121 For 
him, even the catastrophe of the world wars had been a symptom of the “atomization” of Europe’s 
“social body.”122 In this sense, Pico’s Hispanidad represented not a demand to go back in time but 
to adapt to the contemporary “social” condition. That Pico used scholastic terminologies, did not 
diminish from the fact that he ultimately relied on much “scientific” jargon, thereby appearing less 
as a teleological thinker and more as a sociologist.123 The nacionalistas as a whole now defined 
the mission of the “Españas” in terms of a spiritual and material “equilibrium.” Or as Goyeneche’s 
put it, Hispanidad ought to repeat the Habsburgian “historical miracle” of an “equilibrium between 
reality and ideal.”124  
           Underscoring that the miscalculations of European fascism had been fully studied was 
another salient tendency in these manifestos. Revolutionary nationalism, explained Sol y Luna 
theorist José María de Estrada, can lead to “over defensive” myopia. Alluding to Nazism, he 
explained that what seems as “salvation at start” ultimately propels a “sin of excess” and “hate 
towards Reason.” Estrada even dared to state that Latin America suffers from “tenuous 
nationalities,” and therefore had become the victim of rationalism, liberalism, and communism. 
Hispanidad, and its “universal Catholic culture,” was, for him, the only plausible solution for 
saving nations from communism and destructive chauvinistic inclinations.125 By emphasizing that 
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nations are ethically meaningless unless they discover a “vocation” within universal history,126 
paradoxically the nacionalistas were becoming less “nationalists” and more internationalists as the 
Cold War unfolded.  
          From the few correspondences between these nacionalistas from the late-1940s, it is evident 
that with the fall of the Axis Powers, the debate over a “third position” transcending liberalism and 
communism had changed considerably. “With the fall of the Axis, sank the last the last formally 
ideological political possibility,” wrote the ideologue Máximo Etchecopar to Amadeo in 1947.127 
Returning from a tour in Spain and Italy he expressed his fear of communism, but was even more 
preoccupied with the “Americanization” of post-war Europe. “America is transforming the 
Europeans. Their rich humanity […] is volatilized in a generation,” he wrote.128 Obviously, the 
nacionalistas did not abandon the idea of a “third path” to modernity. They agreed, however, on 
the need to give a new “political shape to this effort” while avoiding “polemical attitudes against 
the USA.”129 That is to say, figures such as Etchecopar thought Latin America’s conservative 
forces should aim towards authoritarian models that would be simultaneously acceptable in the 
USA and protect the Hispanic societies from the detriment of the USA’s cultural influence.  
         Even so, in the 1950s, the nacionalistas were ambivalent over the question of the nature of 
their collaboration with the Western Bloc. On January 29, 1951, Amadeo and Goyeneche 
assembled in the city of Salta, Argentina, with associates from Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and 
Uruguay, to draft a declaration “setting in twenty-five points our hispanista ideals,” in Amadeo’s 
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words.130 The so-called “Declaration of Salta” spoke of mutual historical, spiritual, and linguistic 
origins, and denounced “the intent to unify the countries of Hispanoamerica for the exclusive 
function of material configurations.” Similarly, the declaration flatly rejected the doctrines of the 
United Nations and the Organization of the American Nations as their representative entity. In 
1951 this was a flagrant labeling of the Cold War blocs as Latin America’s enemy. In the ICH 
publications that followed the convention, the nacionalistas expressed a recovered anti-modern 
tone. “Either we let the modern world drag us down in its fall, or we form […] a vanguard of a 
new world in which man does not undergo the abomination of his own existence,” Amadeo 
exclaimed in 1951.131 It was thus he, rather than the reticent Spaniards, who now attacked the false 
“East-West dilemma,” insisting that from a spiritual perspective these blocs are identically sinister. 
Goyeneche, too, mocked the capitalist “civilization of abundance and metaphysical misery.” What 
Latin America needed instead, he said, was to relieve itself from “the solutions of the masses, and 
the vanity of the ego.”132 To avoid any doubt, Amadeo declared: “a Hispanoamerica loyal to its 
own essence could never reach a profound intimacy with the USA.”133  
          The quotations above indicate that the nacionalistas led the interpretation of Hispanidad as 
an anti-imperial struggle. Indeed, the Salta declaration clearly spoke of “decolonization,” and 
advocated a new policy of “regionalism.”134 Equally, the nacionalistas dismissed the principle of 
“individual rights,” branding them foreign “interventionism.” In other words, in Amadeo’s ethical 
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order, the right of collectives to follow their “spiritual hierarchy” held a supreme position vis-à-
vis the emerging global conceptualization of human rights. His intransigence was followed by 
justifying the “use force as a political factor” and means of repression “once if they are used 
justly.”135 And expectedly, the nacionalistas further underscored Franco’s Spain universal role. 
The Hispanic Bloc, Amadeo stated throughout the 1950s, “cannot be conceived without the 
presences of Spain.”136 The role of Francoism in the continent’s future typically appeared through 
the usage of metaphors such as the civilizing “bridge” that could allow Argentina to “participate 
in Europe through Spain.”137 The use of the maternal metaphor was even more common. At times 
the caring “mother,” in other times “the elder sister possessing the old family documents,”138 the 
Francoists and nacionalistas alike portrayed Spain as the key for the Americans’ spiritual revival.  
         In 1954, while Peronism was wallowing in political crisis, Amadeo arrived in Spain to 
propagate the Hispanic Community of Nations.139 The keynote speaker at the Fiesta de la 
Hispanidad in Zaragoza, Amadeo hailed Spain’s “spirit of crusade” and the “unforgettable 
morning of the 18th of July [1936].” More important, his speech was a frontal attack on both 
Eastern and Western Blocs. “We will speak our own language, which is neither the one of ‘the 
declarations of rights’ nor the dialectics of rational liberalism”140 he stated, flagging thereafter that 
Latin America faced a decision whether to “unite under the name of ‘Hispanic Community of 
Nations’ or under the banner of ‘the Soviet Republics of Indo-America.’”141 Amid a period of 
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further Spanish international reintegration - with Franco’s 1953 treaties with the Vatican and the 
USA, and shortly before being reaccepted into the UN in 1955 - flattering as it was, Amadeo’s 
belligerent speech served Franco little. Indeed, this was the last time Spain invited Amadeo, or any 
Argentine nacionalista for that matter, to speak in this type of events.  
          His fascist slogans notwithstanding, in this period Amadeo and his group sought to articulate 
more tangible, and indeed post-fascist, theories of the state. The question of how nations should 
design a modernizing process to achieve maximal economic and technical sophistication, without 
succumbing to an alleged economic dependency, was not to be addressed in novel nacionalista 
platform. Parallel to the cooperation with Spain, Amadeo, Goyeneche, and Etchecopar became 
identified with two new journals: Dinámica Social and Quincena. As the correspondence between 
Sánchez Bella and Goyeneche reveals, the 1953 treaties between Spain and the USA may have 
stimulated the nacionalistas to produce these platforms.142 Breaking away even further from the 
filo-fascist style of the elder nacionalista generation - Meinville’s newspaper Presencia for 
example - these projects set out to propose novel paths for authoritarian modernization.  
         Not surprisingly, Manuel Fraga, then the head of Franco’s IEP, was an eager promoter of, 
and contributor to, Dinámica Social.143 His texts were only one component in yet another 
transnational attempt to offer of an alternative to Peronism. Quincena, and more conspicuously, 
Dinámica Social, reveal how the transition from fascist corporatism to technocratic-
authoritarianism occurred in Argentina. On the one hand, these journals defended the freedom of 
thought and attacked Perón’s “totalitarianism.” They wanted, so they argued, to retrieve the 
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liberties lost by mankind in the world of crisis. On the other hand, they demanded a post-
ideological authoritarian “new order.” Or as Dinámica Social put it: 
It is known that a crisis is a state of disorder between two balances. The equilibrium on 
which modern society is founded emerged from the French Revolution. Given that our 
society is doubtlessly in deep crisis, the moral, political, economic, and social balance 
derived from that great event must be considered surpassed. For society to acquire a new 
balance - and since history never repeats itself but in increasingly higher forms - the need 
for a new order is imperative.144 
 
Amadeo and Goyeneche asserted here that this novel “functional system” depended on the masses 
forsaking their newly gained democratic power for the sake of the common good. An elite-oriented 
regime, this “new order” would prompt “private initiative” but would be also corporatist in its 
social functions, they said. And tellingly, Dinámica Social proclaimed this regime model was to 
adhere to the “primacy of the spiritual.”145 In other words, while promoting an economically liberal 
setup, these publications clearly echoed the 1930s fascist world-view in that they defined 
Argentina’s future “authentic revolution”146 as a spiritual crusade against the ideologies of the 
Enlightenment.147 The ideological foundations for Onganía’s “post-ideological” order had been, 
in many ways, established then and there.  
 
The Chilean “corporativist school” in Franco’s Spain 
         That Francoism was influential for the emergence of Chilean authoritarianism seems 
undisputed in the literature. Not only have historians linked Pinochet and Franco’s regimes in one 
ideological genealogy,148 but this thesis has been a salient allegation of anti-Pinochet activists 
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during the late-1970s.149 Needless to say, Franco’s agents proudly depicted their Chilean 
counterparts as mimetics of Francoism throughout the years.150 The present study aims, however, 
to complicate this picture somewhat. I pose that the Chilean traditionalists did not merely imitate 
the Francoist formulas but, as in the case of the Argentine nacionalistas, struggled to lead the 
Hispanic movement, and along the way, to produce a uniquely Chilean authoritarian formula. In 
order to gain as complete an understanding as possible of Chile’s 1970s authoritarian turn, it is 
thus essential to inspect this ideological production of the 1950s. 
           As in the case of Argentina, to understand the presence of Chileans in Franco’s Spain in the 
1950s one must return to the 1930s, the most formative era for Chile’s Right. A nation ill-famed 
for its social inequalities and ongoing polarization over the meaning of its own liberal legacies 
dating back to the mid-19th century, during the presidency of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1932-
1941) Chile saw the rise of numerous authoritarian ideological groups.151 By the late 1930s, the 
Chilean Right was divided between two distinctive associations: the Chilean corporatist 
traditionalists, centered mainly in Chile’s Conservative Party; and the Falange Nacional - an 
allegedly “non-violent”  filo-fascist movement that nonetheless postulated launching a spiritual 
“crusade” towards an authoritarian “organic democracy.” The Conservative Party leaders, Horacio 
Walker Larraín for instance, drew insights from the work of Maurras and Maeztu, while the 
Falange’s Manuel Antonio Garretón and Eduardo Frei took cue from José Antonio Primo de 
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Rivera’s Falange.152 “We were so enthusiastic about their leaders, their postulates, their methods, 
even the name of the party,” said Alejandro Silva Bascuñan about his Spanish idols in later 
years.153 Briefly put, both associations shared a fascination with anything “corporative,” but were 
at odds when it came to their interpretation of Catholic spirituality and precise amount of inclusion 
of the “masses” in politics.  
          Since the 1930s, the journal Estudios was the epicenter of Chile’s corporative and 
authoritarian thought. Its contributors included Osvaldo Lira, Jaime Eyzaguirre, Julio Philippi, 
Roque Esteban Scarpa, and Ricardo Krebs, who will appear in the following pages. These men 
were also leading figures in the Conservative Party, as well as in other reactionary groups such as 
la Asociación Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos (ANEC) and La Liga Social. Expectedly, 
Estudios firmly supported Franco’s Spain during the Civil War years, and frequently published the 
work of Falange ideologues such as Laín Entraldo.154 In the late 1940s and 1950s, it was here that 
Chile’s so-called “corporativist school” resumed its task of modeling its own brand of authoritarian 
models.155 Rather than land reform, a “sindicalization of the peasants” was, for example, its 
righters’ solution to Chile’s fundamental social crisis.156 However, it would be misleading to argue 
that Estudios was seriously debating a corporatist state-ideology in these years. Rather, mirroring 
the ICH, this was the platform where Chile’s far-right ideologues reiterated the mythological and 
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ethical ground that was to guide the country’s social organization. The crisis of the modern world, 
Estudios stressed, emanated not from the “age of machination” but from parliamentary politics, 
the eradication of the ancien régime’s social hierarchies, and consequent “infantilism” and “male 
impotence.”157 Thus, argued Phillipi, any future political order would comprise of “efficient 
pacifying action.”158 For him, unlike the fascist “totalitarianism,” corporatism did not represent an 
all-intrusive statist apparatus but a subtle spiritual principle - a metaphysical “essence” that would 
oblige Chile’s “inferior” communities to willingly consent to authority, hierarchy, and 
inequality.159 That is to say, the corporative political myth appearing in Estudios proposed a return 
to a hierarchic pre-modern order, based on the family, “guilds,” and most importantly, on a 
benevolent authoritarian peace-keeper. 
         In the late-1940s, the identification with Francoism and Hispanidad further defined the 
borderlines between the Falange Nacional - soon to be renamed the Christian Democratic Party - 
and the Conservative Party. The first to link the latter with Francoism was Father Osvaldo Lira. 
Born in 1904 to a Santiago aristocratic family, he arrived in Spain in 1940 to witness the 
establishment of Franco’s regime first hand. In 1946, he moved to Madrid and became intimately 
acquainted with the ICH circle, as well as with the CSIC’s philosopher and Opus Dei member 
Antonio Millan Puelles. He also met with Franco, and “admired and esteemed” him ever since.160 
In Spain, Lira published most of his early work, which pertained not only to Maritain’s scholastic 
method of St. Thomas (“Tomismo”),161 but also to Spanish authoritarian traditionalism, namely 
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Juan Vásquez de Mella’s anti-modern Carlism.162 Next, Lira became yet another avid promoter of 
Hispanidad, and theorized Chile’s idiosyncratic connection to it. His “Visión de España” from 
1948,163 and later “Hispanidad y mestizaje” from 1952, are illuminating not only because they 
appeared upon the ICH publications,164 but because of the clear transition they offer from 
theological abstractions to political action. Lira too was concerned by the lessons of the Second 
World War, and the meanings of nationalism. In his opinion, the war’s lesson was that the 
European revolutions have failed entirely. The Hispanic “revolution” in America, on the other 
hand, was a consummate success, he held.165 In actual fact, Lira argued that the chasm between 
“Hispania” and the “pseudo-civilization of Europe” cannot ever be bridged. The Hispanic 
“authentic European civilization,” he proposed, should therefore be purged from foreign cultural 
influences - Islam, the Reformation, and 19th century “modern ‘isms’” -166 all the while preserving 
whatever it deems valuable from Europe’s “techno-industrial and experimental sciences.”167 This, 
for Lira, was the true mission for a responsible “directing elite.”168 Laín Entralgo, then Lira’s 
editor, repudiated these theories of Hispanic purism just a year later, as we will see in chapter 2.  
         The second pillar of Chilean authoritarian thought, present in Spain in the 1940s and 1950s, 
was Historian Jaime Eyzaguirre. Born in 1908, he was a key figure at the Catholic University of 
Chile, a member of the Conservative Party, and the editor of Estudios for many years. As his 
colleague and ICH member Hugo Montes noted, Eyzaguirre “endorsed a revision of the history of 
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Spain and its links with the new world.”169 True enough, Eyzaguirre’s texts further articulated 
Chile’s inimitability as the vanguard of Castilian values, and even brought the notion of aristocratic 
rule to the extreme: “There is a firm and sober class in Chile, educated in austerity and effort, as 
the old nobility of Castile […] able to impose a vigorous structuring of society and save it of 
anarchy,” he wrote.170 His text “Hispanoamérica del dolor,” published in the IEP’s Revista de 
Estudios Políticos in 1945,171 is foremost a narrative of a collective Latin American victimhood. 
The Habsburgian era “had striven to live a perfect theological order” and thus gave all social 
classes “a harmonious sense and the whole social body a clear purpose,” Eyzaguirre determined. 
For this reason, “Yankee federalism, French Jacobinism and British parliamentarism,” could never 
replace this “Spanish justice,” which in Eyzaguirre’s words, was an “ascensional, mystical, 
transcendent movement.”172  
         It is commonly argued that Eyzaguirre was an enthusiastic supporter of Franco, Salazar, and 
Mussolini. The correspondences between Sánchez Bella and Eyzaguirre complicate this picture. 
Sure enough, Franco’s agents courted the Chilean intellectual incessantly. Moreover, his presence 
in Madrid meant that Eyzaguirre played a role in the shaping of the ICH history conventions.173 
However, on an organizational level, Eyzaguirre was seldom involved in the ICH activities as his 
Argentine colleagues and maintained an aloof position in respect to the Hispanidad project 
throughout the 1950s. Apparently, in his opinion, the Chilean ICH branch was a problematic 
promoter of Hispanidad, precisely given its noticeable Francoist links.174 
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        Other Chilean intellectuals had fewer scruples when cooperating with Franco. The 1949 
Congress of Intellectual Cooperation saw the presence in Spain of José Luis Lopez Ureta and 
Ricardo Krebs, of the Circulo de Profesionales Hispanicos.175 Others, for example, the Spanish-
born poet and Sol y Luna contributor, José María Souvirón, who had previously been the director 
of the Chilean conservative publishing house Zig-Zag, moved to Madrid in the early 1950s to work 
at the ICH.176 Sergio Fernández Larraín was an even more salient case. A member of the Board of 
Directors Conservative Party, and a key member of Chile’s ICH, he became Chile’s ambassador 
in Spain. Fernández Larraín’s loyalty to Franco was almost without precedent in Chile. In later 
years, he reflected that he “had the honor to fight in defense of Spain, from the very day of the 
National Uprising […] against the error of some and against the bad faith of others.”177 I shall 
examine this figure further in Chapter 5.  
         Next, during the mid-1950s, a cohort of young Chilean authoritarian thinkers emerged as a 
consequence of the Spanish-Chilean cooperation. Born in 1923, Jorge Iván Hübner Gallo 
represented a new type of ideologues who now gave concrete meaning to the Hispanidad rhetoric. 
An ICH fellow, he completed his PhD in Law at the Central University of Madrid in 1950 and 
returned to Chile as an undisputed authority in Francoist state-ideology.178 His texts El nuevo 
estado español and Los católicos en la política - the latter being sent to Franco with a personal 
dedication -179 are  illuminating for they illustrate the incisive fashion in which Francoist ideology 
emerged in Chile’s 1950s public sphere.180 His books present a frontal attack on any Catholic 
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political movement adhering to parliamentary politics. Instead of uniting against the Christian 
civilization’s common enemy, the Chilean Catholics, Hübner Gallo remarked, “are worn out in 
internal quarrels provoked by the appearance of new revolutionary conceptions.”181Arturo 
Fontaine Aldunate is another case in point, of a “corporativist” who, as his correspondences with 
Sánchez Bella indicate, had been the driving force behind the establishment of ICH in Chile. Being 
the editor of the leading conservative newspaper El Mercurio, his responsibility for the 
propagation of Francoist ideology in Chile’s public sphere was even more crucial. His letters to 
Sánchez Bella are typical for an ICH fellow. “Spain still resonates in my soul and I hope it will 
continue resonating all my life,” he wrote of his once-tutor. This spiritual experience, he added, 
was “an accolade, and now you have me proclaiming right and left the good news of the emergence 
of our peoples in the universal history.” Tellingly, in his letters, Fontaine Aldunate also asked 
Sánchez Bella for “political news from Spain” for his upcoming articles in the journals Estanquero 
and Estudios. Additionally, he scorned the Christian Democrats, and predicted that soon all 
Chilean conservatives will “concord with one another and with Spain.”182 This remark was 
consistent with his attacks on the Christian Democrats in Estudios at the time, where he blamed 
them of “falling, without knowing, into the Marxist trap.”183  
         Indeed, by the mid-1950s the official relationship between Franco’s Spain and Chile 
improved. Fontaine’s prophesy materialized as President Ibáñez del Campo renewed Chile’s ties 
with Spain by signing a treaty of “dual citizenship” with Franco. Obscure as Ibáñez’s own 
ideologic orientation was, it is obvious that he saw in Franco a partner. Hence, it was the unique 
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“Ibero-american sentiment of the Chileans” that was highlighted in Chile’s parliament as the 
reason for the granting Spanish immigrants with special treatment. After all, the Spanish regime 
“has demonstrated that sentiments of brotherhood can exist despite all political contingencies,” 
declared the Chilean resolution.184 Following Chile’s 1958 elections, which brought the 
independent Jorge Alessandri to power backed by a formidable conservative coalition, this 
relationship improved even more.185 Being decorated with Spain’s highest honor, the Grand Collar 
of the Order of Isabel la Catolica, Alessandri sent a regal letter to Franco. “My great and good 
friend,” it said: “I appreciate and thank you profoundly for this wonderful distinction.”186 
        The Francoist regime, for its part, saw Chile as the frontline of Hispanidad. It was, therefore, 
genuinely worried with the “communistic influences” in Chile, and afforded much efforts to sway 
the Chilean conservative elites during the 1950s.187 Under the guidance of ambassador and 
Hispanic intellectual José María Doussinague, the embassy sought to coordinate the Chilean 
Right.188 It did so by cultivating intimate connections with the Chilean Foreign Ministry,189 and 
linking with Chile’s conservative media, the Chilean Military, and local ideological groups 
adherent to the Hispanic ideology such as the far-right Instituto de Cultura Ibero-Anericana, 
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Círculo de Estudios Hispánicos,  and Círculo de Profesionales Hispánicos. Moreover, the Spanish 
embassy’s financing of the local ICH was never secret but acknowledged in the ICH’s own 
publications. “Our work” they stated, “has been possible thanks to the generosity of Spain, which 
through its Embassy in Chile, the ICH in Madrid, and the Directorate General of the ICH, has 
placed in our hands important means that have allowed us to stand out in the level of cultural 
diffusion, proclaiming our triple quality as Chileans, Americans, and Hispanistas.”190  
         But Franco aided the Chilean Right in even more direct ways. One memorandum sent to 
Franco from the Foreign Ministry during the late 1950s, even stated Spain’s intentions openly: “in 
order to initiate a successful plan for reconquering the Chilean public opinion, it is necessary to 
send to that country a select Embassy, comprising of young people who have lived through the 
hours of the Liberation War and feel deeply involved in the Spiritual climate respired in Spain,” it 
stated. Furthermore, the report complained about the “Maritainian influence in the Chilean 
Catholic sector” - a trend, it argued, that had not been “compensated with an effective presence of 
the Spanish Catholicism” due to the USA’s labeling the Hispanic culture a “cunning sign of 
fascism.” Thus, the report’s writers advised the following action in Chile’s public sphere: 
supporting Estudios financially, penetrating El Mercurio, and maintaining a presence in the 
Catholic University of Chile. But they also advised caution. Spain’s “Hispanic action,” they 
flagged, cannot be identified with the Chilean right-wing parties, for that would bring about “fatal 
consequences.”191 These recommendations soon became concrete policy, when shortly thereafter 
Spain came to the rescue of the conservative newspaper El Diario Ilustrado, covering its debt in 
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another act of “discrete aid.”192 In short, the Francoist “Hispanidad politics” in Chile took the form 
of covert financing of newspapers and behind-the-scene network building.   
         In sum, during the 1950s, amid growing social and political polarization, a distinctive group 
of Chileans conservatives avowedly linked with the Francoist ideological apparatus. Even so, 
suggesting that ideology simply “transferred” from Spain to Chile would be to overlook the 
interactive character of the ICH operation.193 There is little proof that Lira, Eyzaguirre, or any of 
their younger followers, ever suggested importing the Francoist model of state to Chile; rather, 
these men believed they partook in an evolving international movement wherein Spain was 
perhaps a forerunner, but in which they were to add their own authentic chapter. Despite not 
achieving any noticeable political gains during the 1950s, these intellectuals lay the contours for 
Chile’s far-right movements of the 1960s and 1970s, as we shall see in chapter 5.   
 
The waning of Franco’s “política de Hispanidad”  
         Spain’s treaties with the Vatican and the USA in 1953, complicated Franco’s “Hispanidad 
policy.” On the one hand, the regime was finally politically secure, and self-praising as ever. On 
the other hand, the new strategic ties with the Eisenhower administration meant that Spain’s ability 
to promote an official alternative to Pan-Americanism vanished.194 In addition, by the mid-1950s 
and despite the undertakings depicted above, it had become clear that the ICH was hardly achieving 
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its declared goals. Sánchez Bella’s reports even openly grumbled that of the institution’s twenty-
nine branches “only three have any content.”195 A change of strategy was thus imminent.196   
          The late 1950s hence saw the ICH’s “third phase” of action, as intellectual cooperation gave 
way to more “concrete” operations. For instance, in 1954 Sánchez Bella emphasized the 
importance of spreading Spain’s news agencies EFE and Amunco in Latin America. He also 
shifted his attention to military cooperation with Latin America, given the armies’ “predominant 
role” in the “development of the political life of our sister countries.” However, training the Latin 
American militaries in Spain was not remotely as ambitious a plan as his strategy to impact 
international organizations such as UNESCO and The United Nation’s Economic and Social 
Council. Sánchez Bella suggested a “massive penetration of Spaniards” into these bodies, 
“counting on previous American approval.”197 
          Following Spain’s 1957 political makeover, which will be discussed shortly, the Francoist 
Hispanidad campaign further diminished in its visibility. As a result, the ICH’s 1958 international 
congress in Bogota witnessed the Argentine nacionalistas dominating the event entirely. In the 
“Bogota Declaration,” it was Goyeneche who reiterated the ICH’s commitment to the Hispanic 
Community of Nations and repudiated the “benefitting international monopolies.”198 Ergo, while 
Franco’s Spain was inviting American corporations to invest in Spain, its official state apparatus 
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still collaborated with this effort to oppose the Western Bloc. This notwithstanding, with Matín-
Artajo retired, Francoism was by now clearly exploring more sophisticated strategies to spread its 
spiritual message. A diplomacy of dual citizenship agreements was, for instance, a new approach 
that set out to redefine the physical borders between Spain and the Americas.199 Antonio Iturmendi, 
Spain’s Minister of Justice and the main designers of this program, often presented it as the basis 
for a Hispanic “solid and enduring bloc.”200 And yet, here too the Spaniards let others do the 
propaganda for them. For instance, Colombian law expert Jesus María Yepes was the one to 
promote the dual citizenship as a “Hispanic supranationality.”201 And in any case, by the end of 
the 1950s, also this type of rhetoric disappeared from the Francoist landscape, leaving Mario 
Amadeo to propagated the Hispanic Community of Nations worldwide in almost complete 
solitude.202 
          New apparatuses came into play at this point. Typically, the 1950s ICH congresses 
concluded with resolutions to establish specialized organizations to regulate the Hispanic 
ideological exchange, and which would “adhere to the ICH.”203 For instance, the ICH’s Office for 
Intellectual Cooperation purported to gather Latin America’s hispanistas perennially to discuss the 
Spanish language and cultural patrimony.204 The Hispano-Luso-Americano Institute of 
International Law (IHLADI) was another example of this new strategy. From its inauguration in 
1951, it was here that the legal expertise of Amadeo and Dell’Oro Maini came into display, as they 
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attacked the “pseudo-values” underpinning the emerging global international law.205 This 
institution advocated not only the “de facto” legality of counterrevolutionary regimes in Latin 
America206 but also the possibility of tailoring a legal system solely for the Hispanic hemisphere, 
based on its own spirituality and ethics.207  
          Ultimately, the most prominent organization to emerge from within the ICH was the Office 
of Ibero-American Education (Oficiana de Educación Iberoamricana, or OEI). Another brainchild 
of Sánchez Bella, this body was an astute ideological agency precisely because it denied officially 
operating as one. Its official texts proclaimed that it was as an “intergovernmental body” designed 
to buttress “educational unity, within the Hispanic world.”208 The OEI had “no philosophy or 
political agenda” announced its first director and Sánchez Bella’s close friend, the abovementioned 
hispanista Carlos Lacalle. Still, the OEI’s headquarters were located at the ICH’s building in 
Madrid, and its founding documents stated that its norms and activities would be “regulated by the 
Director of the ICH.” Additionally, the OEI executives were all ICH intellectuals. Last, a closer 
look at the OEI’s inner communications reveals formulations such as the following: “The policy 
that governs the action of the OEI is inspired by the ideology that emerged from the pro-Hispanic 
Community of Nations [...] The OEI has three slogans: inform, document, and coordinate. These 
diverse forms of the same united action, aspire towards Catholic and Hispanist ideals.”209 
Regardless of these words, the OEI achieved some important objectives. Reaching a treaty with 
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UNESCO - “the ‘anonymous society’ of mankind’s cultural interests” according to Lacalle - 210 in 
1957, meant all international pedagogical organizations acknowledged the OEI, thus granting it 
the respectability Francoist institution seldom enjoyed. In other words, Sánchez Bella’s plans to 
utilize UNESCO symbolically and financially materialized in the case of the OEI.  
          At the start, the OEI displayed a hotchpotch of Francoist spiritualist and technocratic jargon. 
Shaping the Latin American youth into obedient and spiritual technicians seemed as its main 
calling.211 In the words of Spain’s minister of education Jesus Rubio García-Mina, the OEI aimed 
to “propose a spiritual and positive mentality [...] comprising simultaneously of idealisms without 
reality, and realities without ideal.”212 This paradoxical mixture of rational and spiritual education 
was further confirmed in the words of the aforementioned nacionalista priest Juan Ramón Sepich. 
Writing for the OEI in 1955, the Argentine theorized the spiritual mission of the Hispanic 
University students. “What shall we do so that young people do not yawn and discover the rigor 
of the discipline of science?” he pondered. The answer, he replied, was to grant them a proper 
“vocation”; a spiritual quest whereby one puts himself “at the service of science” and against 
“speculative values.” By “science,” Sepich meant accepting “the definite essence of all things” a-
priori, or more aptly put, scholastic science.213   
          For the most part, however, by the turn of the decade, the OEI’s officials opted to assuage 
such dogmatic rhetoric. The OEI second director, Rodolfo Barón Castro, merely hinted at 
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Hispanidad when stating that “the mission of the OEI [...] is born from the recognition of the 
existence of a clearly defined cultural community such as Ibero-america.”214 Lacalle, for his part, 
was no less playful in articulating the mission of Hispanidad. In a text published in the Falange’s 
daily Arriba, he explained how he thought of his mission in the upcoming decade: 
The men who in 1946 began the task of promoting cooperation among the Hispanic peoples 
arrive at 1958 truly satisfied […] Hispanidad is reborn as a controversial eruption […]. With 
anachronistic packaging, it is coated with a vague form and rigid sentimentality. Fortunately, 
it was possible to fluidize (“fluidificar”) its conception, to link it to the [modern] historical 
process and to consider it as continuity in time of a vital process born four centuries ago. 
This allowed us […] to avoid - as much as possible - controversial situations, to disregard 
ideologies, and to constitute, in a short while, a group of organizations destined to orient and 
to stimulate the cooperation between the members of the family of nations that we 
constitute.215  
 
Evidently, Lacalle sought to define a more sophisticated, if paradoxical, form of Hispanidad - one 
that would be at the same time anti-ideological but also “fluid” so to harmonize the modern and 
pre-modern worlds of thought.    
          Despite this seeming moderation, the OEI was only modestly successful. By 1964, only 
seven Latin American countries had declared adherence to the organization, indicating that most 
of Latin America still mistrusted Franco’s apparatus.216 Subsequently, in 1959, and just before 
leaving Spain to serve as Franco’s ambassador in the Dominican Republic, Sánchez Bella reflected 
on a decade of activity in frustration:  
In all these countries, we are perceived as too conservative, too right-wing, excessively 
traditionalist […] our Hispanism appears increasingly anachronistic and dated because the 
issues it raises are irrelevant to our times. The Left is winning (“llevando el gato al agua”) 
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not by coincidence, but because they have more imagination, because their political agenda 
is novel, more attractive and stimulating.217 
 
Sánchez Bella, in other words, did not share Lacalle’s optimism. Indeed, the ICH was to experience 
a decline in activity and predominance throughout the 1960s. As for Sánchez Bella, disconcerted 
over the Cuban Revolution, this key Francoist diplomat would continue to hold solid contacts with 
the Latin American Right, in a persistent effort to promote anti-communistic action. 
 
Conclusions 
         The international ideological projects of the early 1950s were a transitional stage between 
the fascist projects of the 1930s and the technocratic-authoritarian state-ideologies, and, on the 
face of it, a somewhat failed endeavor. Neither did Hispanidad yield any concrete authoritarian 
political model in Latin America in these years, nor did the Hispanic Community of Nations 
materialize on a multilateral level. Clearly, as a political entity the so-called Hispanic Bloc belied 
an effort to benefit from the Western Bloc and was, therefore, an untenable political project. This, 
however, does not mean that the 1950s legacies were insignificant. On the contrary: the 
cooperation between the Francoist regime, the nacionalistas, and the Chilean far-right ideologues 
reaffirmed their common ideological ground and sense of shared mission. Moreover, once 
reiterated upon the ICH planforms, the refurbished narratives of Hispanic victimhood - from the 
hands of a coalition of “materialist” internationals - were crucial for the rise of a new generation 
of theoreticians who sought to articulate a more sophisticated “anti-ideological” modernity. 
Moving from the 1950s to the turbulent 1960s, these younger theoreticians would henceforth 
present a change in methodology rather than in their principal objectives. Spain’s “technocracy” - 
                                                             





the topic of the next chapter - was not a break from, but rather a novel interpretation of, the 
Hispanidad ideology, I argue.   
         The second point to be taken from the texts and documents above is that the failures of 
Europe’s fascist order had been studied seriously in Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula. In 
the context of the Cold War, the intellectuals discussed here not only aimed to neutralize their 
international fascist labeling but fundamentally sought to redefine their own nationalist 
revolutions. As we will see in the next chapters, this effort was to lead to crisis, as fissures between 
post-fascist authoritarians and the neo-fascist revolutionaries emerged in all three countries. 
Nevertheless, there is an obvious thread binding the 1930s filo-fascist revolutionaries, the 1950s 
“Hispanidad” projects, and the “technocrats” of the 1960s: All three projects agreed on what 
“ideologies” allegedly were, how they had plagued the Hispanic spiritual domain for more than a 
century, and how they could and should be purged from the state apparatus and society at large.  
         My last point touches on the question of agency and the transatlantic transference of 
knowledge. Franco’s intellectuals clearly enjoyed a leading role in the ICH operations of the 
1950s. Having an entire state-apparatus behind them, the actions and texts of figures such as 
Sánchez Bella could easily give the impression that ideology passed from Spain to the Americas 
in a one-directional manner. And true enough, the Francoist propaganda and apparatus influenced 
the Latin American right-wing audiences profoundly - a process that I will continue to touch on in 
chapter 3 and 5. However, as the nacionalistas and Chilean traditionalists own initiatives and texts 
indicate, they did not merely follow Francoist trends. Rather, they saw themselves, and indeed 
were, a powerful driving force within what was, in essence, a transnational movement of the Right, 
and would remain so throughout the 1960s when Franco’s Spain modified itself considerably and 




Chapter 2: The Opus Dei and the Birth of the Francoist Technocratic-Authoritarian State 
Model 
 
          The Francoist post-fascist ideology of state and society emerged in its most coherent form 
within the intellectual apparatus of the Opus Dei. This chapter seeks to explain the ideological 
panorama of the 1960s “technocratic Spain,” and throughout, clarify what the Opus Dei was and 
how it sought to change Spain, Latin America, and the Catholic world at large. Unlike the Falange, 
the Opus Dei was never a party or a “movement.” While admittedly a “pressure group,” it never 
sought concrete political power, its spokesmen said, but rather lent itself to power holders as a 
possessor of a scientific and spiritual truth. The process this chapter portrays is thus one of a 
dictatorship delegating its ideological production to a vanguard within its civil society. During the 
1960s the Opus Dei was the unmistakable leader of a coalition of reactionary forces seeking to 
replace the Falange’s corporatism with a new technique of spiritual sublime. As importantly, like 
the ICH, the Opus Dei quickly broadened its activity to Latin America and should therefore be 
defined as one of the more sophisticated ideologies to be “exported” from Franco’s Spain to the 
Americas.  
         Along the way, this chapter takes issue with arguments made in the Opus Dei’s own scholarly 
world. Historians affiliated with the Opus Dei tend to confuse emic from etic when analyzing the 
discursive tropes Franco’s technocrats used in the 1960s. That these figures belonged to the Opus 
Dei, wrote one historian recently, “did not imply any unity of political judgment, since this 
institution responds to strictly spiritual criteria.”1 The statement is flawed for two fundamental 
reasons: for one, there was certainly a “political” unity between the Opus Dei members, I argue, 
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at least until the late 1960s; and for another, in Franco’s Spain “spiritual criteria” was at the very 
center of political life and the source of dispute between the Falange and the Opus Dei. While not 
a “political” party - a term irrelevant to Franco’s Spain in any case - the Opus Dei was still a 
coordinated ideological apparatus. In effect, pretending not to be a political actor was at the heart 
of the Opus Dei method of soft power, as it sought to persuade elites to think alike on issues that 
touched on collective action and public morality, and that were therefore fundamentally political.  
         The Opus Dei intellectuals have alleged that their spiritual message changed little with the 
years. This too, I will show, is only partially true. The Opus Dei’s doctrine was a living construct. 
In 1945, the Opus Dei was the most glaringly anti-modern and authoritarian Francoist “family,” 
promoting a global crusade against the Enlightenment. In the late-1960s, however, it presented 
itself as a spiritual movement of “liberty” and exultant “work.” A change of emphasis perhaps, 
this is still a phenomenon worth exploring. But more important, in the 1960s the Opus Dei 
ultimately propagated an authoritarian state-ideology which it believed was bound to lead society 
to a state of social and spiritual perfection. Moving chronologically, the chapter will hence touch 
on the Opus Dei’s basic spiritual message, and explore the formation of its intellectual apparatus 
and arrival in Latin America. Thereafter, I will present a two-part analysis of Spain’s ideological 
panorama of the mid-1960s, within multiple social and cultural contexts.  
 
The gospel of Escrivá de Balaguer: from civil war to spiritual perfection through “work” 
        In February 1947, the Catholic Church’s Provida Mater Ecclesia announced the creation of 
a new type of society.2 The Secular Institution (or “prelature”) was to be an association of 
communal life that, unlike the Catholic Orders, would not contain solemn vows. The Opus Dei 
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was the first Secular Institution to be approved by Pope Pius XII. On this, Spain’s news agency 
EFE reported laconically: 
The first approved Secular Institute, the Priestly Society of the Holy Cross and Opus Dei, 
was founded by the worthy and illustrious Aragon priest D. José María Escrivá de Balaguer. 
[...] Opus Dei comprises of members dedicated to the practice of Christian perfection. Its 
purpose is to achieve this perfecting of life through the sanctification of ordinary work and 
developing its apostolate within the intellectual sphere. […] Opus Dei has spread throughout 
Spain, Portugal, and in other European nations and in some American countries, where it 
works in close connection with the ecclesiastical hierarchy.3 
 
In this manner, the Opus Dei and its leader, Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer, appeared in the Spanish 
press for the first time. “Christian perfection,” and “sanctity in everyday life” would both be the 
cornerstones of the organization’s official description in years to come. Intelligence reports sent 
to Franco were trying to make sense of these slogans. The Opus Dei is “a Catholic Association of 
men and women,” one account stated, “who, living in the middle of the world, seek Christian 
perfection through sanctification of ordinary work.”4 Indeed, from the outset, the Opus Dei sought 
to transfigure the role of lay Catholics by mobilizing them to serve the “evangelization” of the 
Christian world.5 Even at this early stage, there was barely anything secretive about the Opus Dei’s 
tactics: years before the Second Vatican Council and the “Aggiornamento,”6 it sought to update 
the Catholic Church by creating an “apostolate” inside the secular “intellectual sphere.”  
        As its critics have argued throughout the years, the Opus Dei emerged within the context of 
the Civil War. Escrivá de Balaguer (born January 9, 1902), was an ordinary youngster who studied 
Law in Zaragoza and ordained to priesthood in 1925. Upon moving to Madrid in 1928 he 
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established the Opus Dei with a group of followers.7 Here Escrivá linked with groups such as the 
Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas, and encountered those who were to be his most 
intimate followers in years to come: Álvaro del Portillo, his deputy, and Isidro Zorzano Ledesma, 
an Argentinian engineer whose financial backing was crucial for the Opus Dei’s formation.8 
Spending the Civil War near Franco’s headquarters in Burgos, Escrivá wrote his book Camino, 
the founding text of his movement that echoed the belligerent zeitgeist of these years.9 In 909 
stanzas, Escrivá spoke of “a crusade of virility and purity” (verse no. 121), “Caudillos” (32, 365, 
411, 833, 913), the “love of war” (308, 311), of belonging to a “militia” (306, 496, 905), and of 
“the enemies of God” (35, 49, 64, 141, 434, 482, 616, 694, 836).  
        While unmistakably adherent the Francoist cause, Camino is nonetheless puzzling as an 
ideological whole. Like many Catholic orders, Escivá offered his followers a technique of 
“perfection.” Initially, this method relied on the principles of “poverty, chastity, and obedience,” 
and thereafter evolved to glorify “ordinary work” in the “middle of the world.”10 In a more 
profound sense, Escrivá offered his believers a mystical practice of “sanctity” that at times 
stipulated an almost hallucinatory act. Through self-denial and obedience, the thesis went, one can 
“become a saint” and experience the “supernatural” first hand. “No ideal can be materialized 
without sacrifice. Deny it [whatever it is you crave, D.K] from yourself! – It is so beautiful to be 
a victim!” was one of Escriva’s most famous verses (175). With it, came a demand for complete 
infantilization, or “spiritual infancy” in his words. “A child, when you truly are one, you are 
                                                             
7 The amount of narratives describing these events, negatively or positively, is staggering. For two lucid narratives 
from outside the Opus Dei’s own academic sphere see - Daniel Artigues, El Opus Dei en España (Paris: Ruedo 
Iberico, 1971); Jesús Ynfante, El santo fundador del Opus Dei: biografía completa de Josemaría Escrivá de 
Balaguer (Barcelona: Crítica, 2002). 
8 This fact has been presented in some quarters as a sign that the Opus Dei had a decisive Argentine influence from 
the start, see - Antonio Fontán, “Un ingeniero de dios: Isidoro Zorzano Ledesma,” Nuestro tiempo, no. 1 (July 
1954): 115-18. 
9 Artigues, El Opus Dei en España, 36. 




omnipotent,”11 he said.  As Rafael Calvo Serer, the Opus Dei’s first prominent ideologue, testified, 
Escrivá persuasiveness stemmed from his ability to promote the notion of spiritual sublime. In a 
world that was still dominated by fascist slogans, Escrivá proposed instead a “revolution” within 
the interior worlds of its members. “He spoke only of a supernatural vision, of the sublime dignity 
of the Christian apostolate amidst the world, of the joy of feeling as the children of God. [...] Opus 
Dei only deals with the interior life, the supernatural formation of its members,” Calvo Serer 
remembered.12 At no point can we infer that Escrivá spoke in metaphors when demanding 
“sanctification”; on the contrary: his method fundamentally meant abolishing the separation 
between Sacred and Profane. 
        The Opus Dei gained political power thanks to a combination of schemes, which together, 
magnified its appearance as an ideological movement. To begin with, it displayed a public social 
experiment. Unlike other Catholic religious orders, the Opus Dei placed its “sanctified” followers 
tangibly in the middle of society. Its numerary members, who vow to celibacy and live in special 
dorms or “houses” (casas), are otherwise “priests in everyday life,” and work in ordinary jobs.13 
The same goes for the supernumerary members, who marry and lead ordinary lives, and only 
partake in the Opus Dei’s religious routine. Like any Catholic order, Opus Dei members pledge 
loyalty to a “constitution.” The amount of liberty they enjoyed within the organization is still a 
matter of much debate.14 One thing is certain: The Opus Dei was unbashful in its aristocratic 
                                                             
11 For more examples of this tendency see also versus 557, 626, 852- 882; Here I would like to point out to Antoni 
Malet’s short but excellent analysis of Escrivá’s language, see - Antoni Malet, “José María Albareda (1902–1966) 
and the Formation of the Spanish Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,” Annals of Science 66, no. 3 
(July 1, 2009): 307-32. 
12 “Perfil humano de Rafael Calco Serer,” Punta Europa, no. 101 (1964): 8.   
13 Some served as actual priests, others work in their vocations allegedly giving their salaries to the casa, see - Julian 
Herranz, “Sacerdotes del Opus Dei,” Nuestro Tiempo, no. 16 (October 1955): 3-11. 
14 Leaving the Opus Dei entirely was perhaps difficult, but still fairly common. I would argue, however, that one 
should take the Opus Dei seriously when saying that it always has been an association of voluntary believers. For 




leanings, and thus appealed initially to reactionary-elitist societies, from the Carlists in Navarra to 
the British aristocracy. What is more, its message was far less rigidly Castilian, which helped it 
appeal to the Catalonian elites.15 Even so, it is important to note that the Opus Dei was hardly a 
noticeable public association before 1957. The first mention of Opus Dei in ABC, Madrid’s 
prominent royalist daily, was in 1946. And the name Escrivá, for example, appeared barely five 
times in ABC during the entire 1950s, which meant the Opus Dei was hardly at the center of the 
Spaniards’ consciousness then.16  
         Thereafter, the Opus Dei established ties within the Spanish business elites and began 
building its so-called “economic empire.” Tellingly, over the years the mainstream Spanish press 
evaluated the Opus Dei’s power mainly in financial terms, as by the early 1960s it allegedly owned 
several Spanish banks.17 The scholarly world, for its part, has been preoccupied with the question 
of whether the Opus Dei actually controlled these enterprises, which in many cases were merely 
managed or owned by one of its members. Here are two points to take into consideration: The 
Opus Dei obviously could not have established it publishing apparatus, colleges, and universities, 
devoid of resources originating from its financial network. Yet it is also important to note that its 
influence as a financial network should not be overstated as it was far from reaching the size of 
Spain’s four big banking groups.18   
                                                             
15 Intellectuals Juan Jimenez Vargas and businessmen Valls Taberner and Felix Millet Maristany were the ones who 
operated the Opus Dei financial apparatus, for instance during the takeover of Banco Popular Español, see - 
Ynfante, La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei, 233; Moncada, Historia oral del Opus Dei, 42-43, 73.  
16 The same goes for Barcelona’s La Vanguardia, which thanks to its search engines allows us to calculate that 
between 1940 and 1957 Escrivá’s name appeared on this prominent daily merely six times.  
17 The list includes Banco Popular Español, Unión Industrial Bancaria, Banco Europeo de Negocios, Banco 
Atlántico, Banco de Andalucía, La Vasconia, and Banco de Salamanca.  
18 More on the so-called “banking group Opus” see - “Significación religiosa, económica y política del Opus Dei,” 
Horizonte Español 1966, tomo I, 232; García Delgado y Arturo López Muñoz, “El dominio industrial de la Banca,” 
Cuadernos para el Diálogo (número extraordinario dedicado a la Banca), 17; Ynfante, La prodigiosa aventura del 




        The Opus Dei’s power stemmed primarily from its ideological production. In concrete terms, 
Escrivá’s contacts with the regime’s higher echelons soon granted him and his followers to 
positions of power. In particular, his friendship with Minister of Education José Ibáñez Martín 
(1939-1951) brought him into Franco’s inner orbit. In 1945, the Bishop of Madrid wrote Franco 
that Escrivá was a priest “chosen by God for the sanctification of many souls,” to which Ibañez 
added that Escrivá “would do a great service for the armed forces.”19 Indeed, soon thereafter 
Escrivá’s provided private Franco spiritual exercises to Franco, as well as to Admiral Luis Carrero 
Blanco.20 In the 1950s, the Opus Dei leaders actively approached Franco, offering their services 
and asking for favors. For instance, in 1952, Álvaro del Portillo asked Franco for a credit line for 
the purpose of founding a new center in London. His presentation for the Opus Dei’s mission to 
Franco was telling: 
The external action of our members has been directed, primarily, to the intellectual field, 
since the most urgent thing had been to collaborate in the task of putting ideas in order. In 
this terrain, we seek to work […] always through discreet and quiet personal intervention, 
which we consider the most effective. However, to better attend to the education of students 
it is necessary to establish some corporate institutions and today we have ten colleges in 
Spain […] The influence of dark sects and subversive doctrines, [might hinder] the 
achievements of the New State, under the supreme direction of Your Excellency. [In Spain] 
there has been a complete restoration of a more Christian and just social order, and therefore 
we must devote ourselves to this difficult endeavor at all costs.21 
 
There was nothing unusual in Portillo’s request, or the language he used to appeal to his leader. 
And yet, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his aspirations to serve the Francoist New 
                                                             
19 “1945?,s/f Curriculum de D. José María Escrivá de Balaguer Albás, P. Silvestre Sancho y D. Alfonso Ródenaz 
García,” FNFF, Documento 26823, 
20 Moncada, Historia oral del Opus Dei, 62. While we know Little of what these acts contained, Escrivá himself 
mentions them in a letter from 1969, see - “Secreto: febrero 1969, carta de nuestro embajador en la santa Sede, 
Antonio Garrigues: entrevista con Mons. Escrivá,” FNFF, Documento 19244.   





State. His presentation also disclosed the Opus Dei’s main strategy: a discrete infiltration into the 
intellectual elites, on a global level, in order to put “ideas in order.”22  
 
The Opus Dei’s “generation of 48” and the configuration of a post-fascist “third path”  
          During the 1950s, the Opus Dei instituted a web of publications and intellectual forums 
wherein a patently coherent message appeared. What might seem like a “succession of paradoxes” 
to some scholars23 should be read, I maintain, as yet another post-fascist project aspiring to 
harmonize “rational” and “irrational,” the modern and pre-modern. The link between Ibáñez 
Martín and the Opus Dei led to one of the first influential centers of ideological production: The 
Superior Council of Scientific Research (CSIC). The head of this institution, José María Albareda, 
was an Agronomist whose father and brothers had been executed during the Civil War, and one of 
Escrivá’s first “twelve followers.”24 Under his leadership, the CSIC strove, as a part of the 
“spiritual energies of Hispanidad,” to restore of the “Christian unity of the sciences, destroyed in 
the 18th century.”25 In his 1951 text Consideraciones sobre la investigación científica, Albareda 
advocated utilizing science to improve the material condition of mankind, but also to discover 
God’s cosmic order. “Scientific research,” he held, meant discovering “the footsteps that God has 
set for one to discover so that one can elevate himself towards Him.”26 Systematic “speculation,” 
                                                             
22 Some Opus Dei’s members, Miguel Fisac for example, remember that in the 1930s Escrivá spoke of “four goals 
for infiltration,” in the following order: intellectual, economic, political, and ecclesiastical, in Moncada, Historia 
oral del Opus Dei, 92. 
23 Estruch, Saints and Schemers, 260. 
24 Malet, “José María Albareda”, 312-13.  
25 Estructura y normas del CSIC (Madrid: CSIC, 1947). 
26 José María Albareda, Consideraciones sobre la investigación científica (Madrid: CSIC, 1951), 21; here he 
paraphrased his Opus Dei colleague Ruimundo Paniker, see - Raimundo Pániker, “Investigación: En torno a un 




on the other hand, meant, for him, only “anti-social dehumanization.”27 In Short, only laboratory 
work and theological inquiries were allowed in the Opus Dei’s purified scientific project.28             
          Through CSIC Albareda not only controlled the Spanish academic world in an increasingly 
hegemonic fashion,29 but establish solid connections with the American, British, and German 
academy.30 Still, overall the CSIC addressed primarily the Spanish speaking world. With more 
than a hundred different scientific journals, this was one of Franco’s more formidable ideological 
agencies.31 Expectedly, as any ideological apparatus in Franco’s Spain, CSIC declared it would 
foster a “firm presence of [Spain’s] spiritual vitality” in America.32 
         It was in the CSIC’s journal Arbor that the Opus Dei’s first intellectual circle appeared.33 
Established in Barcelona in 1947, the journal was the brainchild of two of the Opus Dei’s most 
prominent ideologues: Florentino Pérez Embid (supernumerary, born 1918) and the 
aforementioned Rafael Calvo Serer (numerary, born 1916).34 Self-labeled the “generation of 
                                                             
27 “José María Albareda, Sacerdote,” Actualidad Española, no. 416 (December 24, 1959), 19.  
28 José María Albareda, “Valor Económico de la investigación científica,” Nuestro Tiempo, no. 1 (July 1954): 15-27. 
29 Taking over the apparatus of the previous Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios, CSIC thus developed a 
hegemonic position within Franco’s state-led university system. The CSIC thus directed funds from the education 
ministry to the university chairs, based on personal connections and loyalties. For more, see - Malet, “José María 
Albareda”, 329-31. 
30 The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences annual meetings included CSIC representatives already 
in 1946. Albareda, was a frequent visitor at the British Council in London and spoke for the German Stifterverband 
für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, and was personally invited as representative of the CSIC to the 55th annual meeting 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, on April 6, 1951, see – (Letter with no tittle), March 20, 
1951, AGA, caja 54/12430; “CSIC y el Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft Bonn,” November 11, 1953, 
AGA, caja 82/09891; see also - José María Albareda, “Die Entwicklung der Forschung in Spanien,” 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Forschung des Landes Nordrein-Westfalen (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956). 
31 The CSIC openly boasted these achievements, see - Octavio Díaz Pinés, ‘Crónica cultural española: XXV 
aniversario de la fundación del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,” Arbor, no. 227 (November 1964) 
247-66; see also - José Ibáñez Martin, “Franco y el Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,” Arbor, no. 191 
(November 1961): 397–403. 
32 “Apuntes sobre el desarrollo de la acción cultural de España en los países hispanoamericanos, Instituto de Antonio 
de Nebrija,” March 1941, AGUN, documento 006.002.0032.  
33 A “General Journal for of research and culture” was its official title. This journal has received much attention in 
the Opus Dei’s own historiography, see for instance - Onésimo Díaz Hernández, Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo 
Arbor (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2011). 
34 Calvo edited the journal until January 1947, when he was appointed the head of Franco’s Instituto de España in 
London. Pérez Embid replaced him as editor from that moment, see - Pérez Embid, “Breve historia de la revista 




1948,” the Arbor writers included the Opus Dei members Ángel López-Amo, Vicente Rodríguez 
Casado, Álvaro d’Ors, Antonio Fontán, and Antonio Millan Puelles.35 In line with the Hispanidad 
projects of the time, Calvo Sever underscored his commitment to “resume the history interrupted 
in the 16th century” - the most “creative moment” of the Occidental civilization.36 Yet unlike the 
Hispanidad projects of the time, these writers gradually rejected Maeztu’s Castilian mythology,37 
embracing instead the more inclusive anti-modern thought of Menéndez Pelayo and Juan Donoso 
Cortés. In this vein, they attempted to popularize Carl Schmitt, highlighting the anti-democratic 
core of his political theory (“decisionism” versus “democratic ambiguity”).38  
         While the Opus Dei cultivated its intellectual apparatus, the Falange ideological world began 
splintering into different segments. The official leaders of the movement were Franco’s so-called 
“collaborationists,” and comprised of figures such as José Luis Arrese, Manuel Fraga, and 
intellectuals such as Francisco Javier Conde and Luis Legaz Lacambra. Building, too, on Carl 
Schmitt’s legacies, these men labored to give meanings to Spain’s “national-syndicalist” 
corporatist model throughout the Cold War.39 To their Right, a new extreme current of Falangism 
appeared in Spain during the late-1950s. Neo-fascist and clerico-fascist, it will be discussed fully 
in chapter 6. To their Left, there was the Falange’s “liberal” branch.40 Led by the Falange’s original 
members, Dionisio Ridruejo and Pedro Laín Entralgo, it presented the regime with one of its 
                                                             
35 According to Pérez Embid, Arbor sold 3500 copies mainly in Argentina, Canada, Chile, the USA, and Mexico, 
see - Florentino Pérez Embid, Ambiciones Españolas (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1953), 184; these men were also 
linked with the ICH, as Calvo Serer’s and Alfredo Sánchez Bella were both natives of Valencia and close friends. 
The two were also the editors of Escrivá Camino, see - Díaz Hernández, Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor, 26. 
36 Rafael Calvo Serer, España, sin problema (Madrid: Rialp, 1957), 107. 
37 Florentino Pérez Embid. “Sobre lo castellano y España,” Arbor, no. 35 (November 1, 1948): 274.  
38 López-Amo and d’Ors work on Schmitt’s own interpretation of Donoso Cortés, exemplified how the Opus Dei 
and Falange were struggling over the legacies of the Nazi theoretician, see - Carl Schmitt, Interpretación europea de 
Donoso Cortes (prologo de Ángel López-Amo) (Madrid: Rialp, 1952). See also, Álvaro d’Ors, “Carl Schmitt en 
Compostela,” Arbor, no. 73 (January 1, 1952): 46–59; Carl Schmitt, “Tres posibilidades de una visión cristiana de la 
historia,” Arbor, no. 62 (February 1, 1951): 237–241. 
39 Francisco Javier Conde, Representación política y régimen español (Madrid: Subsecretaría de Educación Popular, 
1945). 




earliest moments of internal opposition.41 In 1949, Laín published his book España como 
problema, where he stressed that rather than two antagonists struggling to lead the Occidental 
civilization, the pre-modern “Hispanic” and modern “European” civilizations could, and indeed 
should, cooperate and, in time, amalgamate.42 To the question whether “is it possible to connect 
the most authentic and Hispanic with the most modern and […] European?” Laín Entralgo’s 
response was affirmative.43 
         The debate over Spain’s essence (“ser de España”) captivated the Francoist intellectual 
world, as it soon escalated into an enmity between Laín Entralgo and Calvo Serer - the liberal 
Falange intellectual and the reactionary Opus Dei priest. It began with Pérez Embid’s diatribe of 
Laín Entralgo’s work in Arbor that separated the question of Spain’s material problems from its 
new condition of “spiritual unity.”44 Soon thereafter, Calvo Serer published España sin problema, 
a book which validated the ontology of the Hispanic essence and its incompatibility with European 
modernism. For Calvo Serer, Spain was an entity “discordant to modernity,”45 and the Civil War 
- a watershed moment signifying the end of the “liberal century”46 and the start of a “new historical 
cycle.”47 Laín Entralgo, both men thought, simply overlooked the birth of a singular “Hispanic 
                                                             
41 Ridruejo and Laín Entralgo edited Escorial, the most liberal journal of the time. Here they gradually negated the 
validity of Franco’s discourse of “crusade” and questioned Spain’s anti-modern and anti-European purism, see - 
“Historia de la Cruzada,” Escorial, no. 6, (Abril 1941): 159; more on this group see - Jordi García, La resistencia 
silenciosa: fascismo y cultura en España (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2004). 
42 Using Americo Castro’s idea of “historization” (casticismo historicista), he argued that Hispanidad was a 
contingent cultural singularity based on “second-nature habits” that could be changed at will. “The historical identity 
of nations does not exclude the possibility of very important modifications in their functional structures of life,” he 
even said, see - Pedro Laín Entralgo, España como problema (Madrid: Seminario de Problemas Hispanoamericanos, 
1948), 489.  
43 Carlos Castro Cubells, “España como problema,” Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, no. 13 (January-February 
1950): 174.  
44 Florentino Pérez Embid, “Ante la nueva actualidad del ‘problema de España,” Arbor, no. 45 (September 1, 1949): 
150, see also - Florentino Pérez Embid, “Hacía una superación del patriotismo crítico,” Arriba (May 24, 1949). 
45 Calvo Serer, España, sin problema, 27.  
46 Pérez Embid, Ambiciones españolas, 14.  
47 Rafael Calvo Serer, Teoría de la restauración (Madrid: Rialp, 1956), 18; see also - Florentino Pérez Embid, “Mi 




Europeaness.”48 Calvo Serer and Pérez Embid thus suggested an alternative to Laín Entralgo’s 
vision: to embrace the European materiality while denying its ethical and cultural outlooks. In so 
doing, Franco’s Spain, they believed, would teach the world how to spur material progress, under 
the guidance of “the theologist and the philosopher.”49  
         Interestingly, by 1950 Calvo Serer believed he was living in a new era of “managers and 
businessmen”50 and “naive neoliberalism,” which made the articulation of the precise relationship 
between material “technique” and the spiritual domain all the more important.51 Akin to the Cold 
War anti-totalitarian critique, the Opus Dei ideologues consequently underscored two paths for 
modernity: an erroneous “revolution” and a correct “restoration.” The former was a “totalitarian” 
statist solution based on unalloyed nationalism and a fascist workers party. The latter sought to 
“restore” components of the ancien régime, and, in turn, to bestow society with its lost “freedoms.” 
Or as Calvo Serer put it, the latter was to be “a middle-of-the-road” solution between “Fascist 
totalitarianism and a lame democracy.”52 This new state model, added Pérez Embid, would bring 
to closure the nation-state world division that had begun in the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia.53 
Despite rejecting nationalism and fascism, the Opus Dei’s position was by no means non-violent. 
Calvo Serer, for instance, justified “bloodily liquidating decades of errors and sins.”54 Even so, 
                                                             
48 Historians have already fully debated this inner-Francoist “polemic,” see for example - Carme Molinero and Pere 
Ysas, La anatomía del Franquismo: de la supervivencia a la agonía, 1945-1977 (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008), 22-24; 
Díaz, Pensamiento español en la era de Franco, 50-60.   
49 Rafael Calvo Serer, “Europa sin San Sebastián,” ABC Madrid (September 26, 1950). 
50 Calvo Serer, Teoría de la restauración, 21. 
51 His ideas of the “technical” aspects of societal development were followed by a new “reevaluation of politics,” in 
line with Carl Schmitt’s Der Begriff des Politischen, ibid, 18; see also “El espíritu y la técnica,” ABC Madrid (July 
18, 1950).  
52 Calvo Serer, Teoría de la restauración, 106; As he himself argues in his autobiography, the transition of his ideas 
from authoritarianism to democracy was a “gradual evolution” which began already in 1945 and came to their 
conclusion with his visit to the USA in 1958, see – Rafael Calvo Serer, Mis enfrentamientos con el poder (Madrid: 
Plaza & Janés, 1978), 102-3.    
53 “Westfalia is precisely what we are closing now,” he said, see - Florentino Pérez Embid, “Ante la nueva 
actualidad,” 151; see also - Florentino Pérez Embid, “1648-1848-1898-1948,” Arriba (June 10, 1949); “La 
resurección de los vencidos,” Arriba (July 20, 1949).   




while Nazism was “paganism” and carried a “destructive character,”55 in their opinion, Franco’s 
“Christian foundation” meant his regime was compassionate and could not allow the 
“extermination of the adversary.”56 Calvo Serer’s determination to create a “third position” 
between fascism and democracy eventually led him to configure yet another milieu by the name 
of “Third Force” (Tercera fuerza) during the 1950s. Comprising of authoritarian thinkers such as 
José Permartín and Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora,57 it was to be another of technocratic Spain’s 
ideological pillars.  
          Unexpectedly, Calvo Serer’s status in the regime diminished considerably after 1953 
following his eagerness to criticize the Falange upon the French far-right journal Ecrits de Paris.58 
From then on, it was the more perceptive Pérez Embid who continued to define Spain idiosyncratic 
“Europeanism.”59 His body of work included the 1953 Ambiciones españolas where he presented 
the aphorism “Spanish in the ends and European in the means” - a more fitting way for describing 
of hybrid the Opus Dei sought to establish between the “Hispanic” and “European.”60 It meant the 
Hispanic nations were to cherry-pick techniques to “scientifically” improve their material 
condition, thereby making it easier for them to form a protected cultural-ethical sphere. Shortly 
thereafter, in Nosotros, los cristianos, he further defined this allegedly post-ideological society.61 
By now, and as the foremost interpreter of Escrivá’s spiritual message, Pérez Embid turned 
Camino into a comprehensible ideology. The future Spanish state should strive for “Christian 
                                                             
55 Calvo Serer, Teoría de la restauración, 38.  
56 Rafael Calvo Serer, Política de integración (Madrid: Rialp, 1955), 193 
57 Calvo Serer, Teoría de la restauración, 105.  
58 More on the intricate struggles in the Spanish Catholic media that led Calvo Serer to feel “jaded by the 
censorship” and publish his controversial text “La politique interieure dans l’Espagne de Franco,” see - Díaz 
Hernández, Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor, 529-35 
59 Calvo Serer, España sin problema, 343-44.  
60 “Españolización en los fines y europeización en los medios,” see - Pérez Embid, Ambiciones españolas, 12.  




perfection, supernatural life of surrender, and life of holiness,” he stressed.62 The society Pérez 
Embid envisioned assumed an ideological interpellation devoid of “coercion, fear, or 
demagoguery;”63 a society where one freely abides by a strict social hierarchy and yields his 
powers to a trusted spiritual ruling elite.64 These formulas echoed Escrivá’s own notion of 
“liberty,” wherein one must be free to discover the truth, thus exploring one’s own unique path to 
Christian perfection. Or in Pérez Embid’s words: 
A man before God needs to act freely to fulfill his destiny, and God has given, reconquered, 
and defended his freedom. […] In the liberal century, when we talked about freedom, we 
spoke of freedom of association, of expression, of thought, of printing, of choosing political 
programs and ideals, of choosing parliament deputies […] Today we see clearly that the 
world is not a massive juxtaposition of independent, autonomous, disjointed microworlds, 
but an organic architecture of interdependent men, […] directed - according to objective and 
universal norms - towards the free realization of their individual and collective destinies.65 
 
Additionally, going against the “pessimism of the 98 generation,” the Opus Dei promoted an 
“optimistic” Christian,66 who would replace melancholia with a different sublime experience. 
“Affirmation of optimism,”67 and “supernatural joy,” were, for Pérez Embid, the true weapons of 
this future crusader.68 
         “Liberty” aside, for the Opus Dei ideologues parliamentary democracy was anathema and 
deemed the “murder of culture”69 and a “regression to pagan society.”70 What is more, Pérez 
Embid held strictly Manichean world-views and a staunch intolerance to any left-wing orientation 
within the Catholic Church.71 The Opus Dei will have absolutely no dialogue with the moderate 
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left, he said.72 Not surprisingly, the Opus Dei ideologues also admired the military as such. For 
Pérez Embid it represented a “determined, passionate, violent defense if necessary, of our eternal 
metaphysics.”73 Similarly, he spoke of “the weapon of letters and weapon of arms” as the two 
forces serving “hierarchy, honor, unity, patriotism, and discipline.”74 While the military ensured 
the victory in the “defensive” civil war, the “militant Catholics,” he stressed, were a further 
guarantee of “peace, joyful work, understanding among nations, and effective service to their 
respective homeland.”75   
          By late-1950s, the Opus Dei ideologues aligned decidedly with the Monarchist camp within 
the Francoist regime, and set out to outline what they thought was to be a “popular monarchy.”76 
Ángel López-Amo (numerary), now proposed replacing the Falange’s “irrational” fascist political 
myths with a novel configuration of the authoritarian monarchy. His theory appeared in a text 
written especially for Prince Juan Carlos, the son of Don Juan and second heir to the throne of the 
displaced Bourbon monarchs. Here López-Amo depicted a regime wherein an “aristocracy of 
blood,” guided by the enlightened monarch, would finally solve Europe’s modern “social 
problem.”77 This King, he insisted, was not a particular person but a general principle. In fact, for 
him, the King’s authority derived not only from the Grace of God, but from his constructive 
influence on “men of government, administrators and technicians” and, as a result, from his 
“popular authority.”78  
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         The Opus Dei’s elite-oriented ideology soon made its way to its expanding intellectual 
apparatus. One of Pérez Embid’s first actions in the 1950s was reestablishing the elitist 19th century 
institution Ateneo de Madrid, with the intention to stimulate international dialogue with ultra-
conservative intellectuals in Europe and Latin America.79 Between 1951 and 1956 the Ateneo 
hosted prominent figures such as Gabriela Mistral, Cristopher Dawson, Gustave Thibon, Carl 
Schmitt, and Otto von Habsburg.80 More important, in the late 1950s the Opus Dei established a 
publishing industry unparalleled to any far-right organization in the Spanish speaking world at the 
time. Initially, it was the Opus Dei’s book publishing Rialp that disseminated its ideology to global 
audiences.81 Pérez Embid, the head of the board of administration, personally directed two of the 
publishing’s prestigious series.82 Additionally, the Opus Dei’s penetration into the academic world 
was further aided by the establishment of Navarra General Studies Center. Directed by Ismael 
Sánchez Bella (numerary), Alfredo Sánchez Bella’s brother, in 1960, this center transformed into 
Spain’s only private university: The University of Navarra (UNAV).83  
          Ultimately, for Pérez Embid, the most urgent task of all was generating a truly “catholic 
press,”84 in the Spanish speaking world, a mission for the purpose of which the Opus Dei founded 
a special corporation in 1951.85 Throughout the 1950s, the journals Actualidad Española and 
Nuestro Tiempo were the platforms where the Opus Dei ideology now appeared in a more cohesive 
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manner,86 followed by a particularly sycophantic brand of praising of Franco.87 Antonio Fontán, 
the director of the UNAV’s Institute of Journalism, edited both journals.88 As importantly, the 
Opus Dei now formed alliances with other newspapers, for instance the Monarchist daily ABC,89 
and the journal Punta Europa, which despite denying “belonging to Opus Dei,”90 gave ample stage 
to its key intellectuals as well as to Argentine nacionalista thinkers such as Sepich.91 
         While the Falange still conceptualized “politics” as an “organic” system of representation 
within a revolutionary one-party system, by the late-1950s the Opus Dei spoke of “politics” quite 
differently. Andrés Vázquez de Prada (numerary) for instance, spoke of “the politics of the 
disinterested interest,” which meant, in reality, sustaining politics through partnership rather than 
antagonism. To achieve this type of harmonious politics one must render unto Caesar, he thought, 
but also deny the state absolute power. “Politics from within,” he held, derived not only from the 
dictator’s charisma but from an autonomous altruistic elite.92 In a more profound sense, Vázquez 
de Prada alleged that political action must stem from the spiritual individual: 
The political effort must be born within the individual, as a family man, as a professional 
[…] If men and women do their duties well, quietly, we will see a miracle: a nation rising to 
its feet […] external change must be the product of inner renewal. There will be no advances 
via revolutionary bursts if transformation does not occur ‘from within.’ The secret of 
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maturity is continuous perseverance that will give us the metamorphosis from the chrysalis 
to a butterfly. [...] monarchy or republic, authoritarianism or liberalism - these are all empty 
shells once the fruit goes inside.93  
 
The Opus Dei thus advised moving the spiritual revolution from the battlefield - where the Falange 
thought it should be - into man’s home and even his own body. And while the Falange idolized 
Don Quixote’s “poetic” madness, the Opus Dei believed the Hidalgo from La Mancha reached a 
spiritual sublime through pure “elite” servitude. “Against this healthy idea of madness,” said 
Vázquez “we should talk about what is known as the elite politique […] where a few people deal 
with public chores while the rest graze as a flock of sheep.”94 These words are indicative that, by 
the end of the 1950s, the Opus Dei had begun voicing an increasingly holistic theory of the elite 
Christian man, beginning from the harmonized home and ending with optimal political agency.  
 
The Opus Dei in Latin America 
        The Opus Dei’s international expansion began, officially at least, in 1946 with Escrivá’s own 
relocation to the Vatican. Despite willingly promoting an international image by then, until the 
mid-1960s the Opus Dei was nonetheless a predominantly Spanish organization.95 As such, and in 
direct continuation to the Hispanidad ideological projects, the Opus Dei intellectuals underscored 
the likeness between Spain and Latin America’s social realities, and thus saw in Latin America a 
more urgent ideological battlefield.96 Calvo Serer, Pérez Embid, and Vicente Rodríguez Casado 
(numerary) were all historians of the Spanish Empire by training. Not surprisingly, they too 
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stressed Spain “must orient its life […] towards Hispanoamerica, not for a mere egoistic instinct 
of self-salvation, but because all the Spanish-American countries need to be fused into a third great 
bloc.”97 For Calvo Serer, this meant establishing a truly independent third “international of 
minorities.”98 Pérez Embid agreed. “The projection towards America,” he said, “is more than an 
anecdote in our international relations but a constant effort born of the very roots of our selfhood 
as it had developed historically.”99  
         In fact, the Opus Dei intellectuals proposed a broader and more inclusive interpretation of 
the Hispanidad mythology.100 This was evident in the way they approached the 18th century 
Bourbon Reforms. A period previously disdained in the Hispanidad narratives, the Bourbons - and 
in particular, the reign of King Carlos III - returned in Rodríguez Casado’s texts as “modernizing 
traditionalists,” who skillfully merged scientific “technique” and Catholic spirituality, thereby 
modernized their imperial administration and adapting it “to the progressive growth of the middle 
classes.”101 Tellingly, by paralleling the Falange’s 1940s nationalist-syndicalist autarchic economy 
to the failed Hapsburgian 16th century mercantilism, Rodríguez Casado further identified the 
Bourbon reformers with Spain’s upcoming neoliberal opening, the Opus Dei, and the forthcoming 
restoration of the Bourbon King.  
          More concretely, like the ICH the Opus Dei sought to link with the Latin American elites 
through multiple channels. For example, it too designed an apparatus to accommodate Latin 
American students in Spain. Under Rodriguez Casado’s direction, the Universidad 
Hispanoamericana de Santa María de la Rábida, and later in the 1960s the UNAV, served this type 
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of function. However, it was the opening of the Opus Dei branches in Latin America that was to 
prove crucial for its ideological operation. The Opus Dei’s method of international expansion was 
simple: First, it opened “houses” throughout the continent; second, it established publishing 
apparatuses identical to those operating in Spain.102 Mexico, Argentine, and Chile were to be the 
first countries for this type of penetration. In the case of Argentina, according to the Opus Dei’s 
own narratives, Cardinal Antonio Caggiano, a Franco sympathizer who had made his pilgrimage 
to Spain already in 1946, upon becoming archbishop of Rosario in 1949 encountered Esrcivá in 
Rome and readily helped the Opus Dei open a center in his town.103 Ismael Sánchez Bella, the 
person chosen by Escrivá for this mission, arrived in Buenos Aires in March 1950 with a 
diplomatic passport, and sponsored by the ICH,104 albeit with limited financial resources. Thus it 
was Caggiano’s network of Catholics and Hispanistas105 that enabled Sánchez Bella to finance the 
first Opus Dei residency in Argentina, in 1950.106 The story repeated itself in Chile, where Adolfo 
Rodríguez Vidal (numerary) arrived to be embraced by Archbishop José María Caro Rodríguez, 
paving the way to the Opus Dei’s operation in the country.107 Like Caggiano, Caro Rodríguez had 
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encountered Escrivá in Rome and approved the Opus Dei’s arrival beforehand.108 A similar 
process took place in the early 1960s when Escrivá decided to establish the first Opus Dei 
university in Latin America. Here it was the bishop of Piura, Erasmo Hinojosa, who endorsed the 
Opus Dei.109 In short, Escrivá’s networking at the Vatican with figures sympathetic to Franco’s 
Spain facilitated the establishment of the Opus Dei’s Latin American centers, based on the 
assistance of local elites, and with further support by the ICH and the Spanish government.110 
         By 1960, the Opus Dei already operated an international publishing network that brought the 
Francoist intellectual production to broader audiences. The journals Istmo (Published in Mexico) 
and Arco (Published Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador) appeared simultaneously in the Spring 
of 1959. Resembling Nuestro Tiempo stylistically, they published the texts of the Opus Dei’s key 
intellectuals.111 Apart from attacking Marxism and calling to “Christianize society,”112 these 
writers elucidated Francoist authoritarianism to the Latin American readers, many of whom still 
lived under parliamentary democracies. The Opus Dei ideologue Álvaro d’Ors, for example, spoke 
of authority “regaining its privileges” and of the “authority of men of science” curbing political 
rights within the context of a blessed motion towards “decentralization and denationalization.”113 
Political parties were detrimental to the liberty of thought, he further stressed, since they become 
irrational groups of “pressure and conquest.” But more fundamentally, for him “the technification 
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of the modern state” meant the need to compromise political “free will.” His authoritarian vision 
was not totalitarian, he said in his defense, but Christian. “The Church offers us an effective 
doctrine to overcome this difficulty - a pluralistic structuring, in which freedom is constituted as a 
discharge of natural powers, instead of a concentration of power by a necessarily totalitarian state,” 
he wrote. 114 To put it simply, Álvaro d’Ors promoted a non-democratic state wherein technology 
and Christian “pluralism” guarantee man’s material and spiritual development, without having to 
resort to violence. In the same vein, Francoism appeared in these texts as a place where the public 
had freely chosen to commit to a Christian spiritual order. According to the Opus Dei priest José 
Orlandis, Spain was a place where “extensive sectors of the population,” freely live “a fully 
Christian existence.” Tellingly, he also stated that “there are also many members of Opus Dei […] 
who are in open opposition to the Franco regime.”115 In 1959, this was a false statement, which 
nonetheless attested to how the Opus Dei promoted its “apolitical” image by then: first, its 
spokesmen praised the achievements of Francoism; then they implied that the Opus Dei is not 
political and even opposes Franco.  
          Eventually, these journals brought to the fore the Opus Dei’s Latin American recruits. The 
next chapters will explore the activities of two of them: Chilean José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois and 
Argentine Ernesto García Alesanco. Barely twenty years old when they encountered Escrivá, the 
two soon enthusiastically joined their leader in Rome. Or as Ibáñez Langlois wrote his mentor and 
ICH director, Roque Esteban Scarpa: “It will be difficult for you to imagine what it is like to be 
here: the immense joy of living the spirit of the Opus Dei fully. From Chile, I saw things clearly 
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but here in Rome, together with the founder, they look wonderful.”116 As for García Alesanco, his 
inclusion into Opus Dei was a “supernatural deed” he says. His story went as follows:  
 As the Founder of Opus Dei wanted to have at his side many of the first vocations that were 
arriving from the countries where, at that time, [the Opus Dei’s] work began, Francisco Polti 
and I went to the Roman College of the Holy Cross. I met José Miguel Ibáñez in Rome, as 
he too was one of the first vocations from Chile. […] I continued to the University of Navarra 
to pursue a career in Communication Sciences […] During the years in Navarra, José Miguel 
Ibáñez and myself formulated the project, which later crystallized in the journal Cuadernos 
del Sur. In those years, I cooperated a lot with Antonio Fontán and Rafael Alvira, who were 
my teachers in Communications.117  
 
What emerges from this narrative is a fairly simple system of ideological training that began with 
Escrivá’s promotion of Argentine and Chilean students and continued with their education at 
UNAV, where they acquired the skills that were to serve them later upon returning to their native 
countries.    
          After being ordained to priesthood at the Opus Dei’s Moncloa collage in 1960,118 the two 
began publishing on the pages of Nuestro Tiempo. García Alesanco analyzed the political 
instabilities in Argentina, while Ibáñez devoted himself to prose and issues of public morality. In 
his writing, García Alesanco repeatedly contested parliamentarism. “Democracy,” he said “is only 
a myth in the name of which different groups interfere with the government’s freedom of action. 
It produces a profound economic, political, and military crisis.”119 In a review to Oralandis’s book 
la vocación cristiana del hombre de hoy, Ibáñez Langlois, for his part, criticized the modern “homo 
tecnicus” who “refuses to worship anything” and is thus committing a sin of “idolatry of man.” 
The message of the church, he inferred, could answer this crisis by becoming intertwined with 
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“earthly realities” and “the sanctification of the profane.”120 In short, by the early 1960s, the Opus 
Dei’s ideology began making its way to the Latin American public. A seemingly freewheeling 
discussion over the technological age and the role of the Christian elite within it, this corpus of 
texts was still striking in its unequivocal rejection of parliamentary democracy and overall demand 
to design a novel system to replace it in Latin America.  
 
In power: The Opus Dei and the turning point of the Francoist regime (1957-1961) 
         The Opus Dei’s road to political power was not easy at the outset. Despite allying with the 
cause of the Bourbon monarchs - who by the mid-1950s had further aligned with Francoism -121 
the Falange still held its centers of power in the Movimiento. In addition, the appointment of the 
ideologically moderate Joaquín Ruíz-Giménez as minister of education instead of Ibáñez Martín 
meant a setback for the Opus Dei. Whereas Pérez Embid, and another Valencia Opus Dei affiliate 
named José Luis Villar Palasí, did manage to obtain prominent positions in the Ministry of 
Information and Tourism,122 overall during the mid-1950s, the Opus Dei failed to undo the 
Falange’s ideological and political grip over the regime.  
        This changed in 1957 due to a conjuncture of economic and political crises. While Western 
Europe saw its speedy economic recovery thanks to the Marshal Plan, in 1956 Spain’s economy 
was on the verge of bankruptcy. Worse yet, Francoism saw its first - and definitely not last - student 
unrests. Following years of animosity between the Falange and the new authoritarian and Catholic 
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elements in the academy, an initiative to democratize the Falange’s Student Syndicate (SEU) led 
to unprecedented manifestations in Madrid, which were, in turn, violently crushed by Franco’s 
brutes. The subsequent sacking of Ruíz-Giménez and Laín Entralgo (then the rector of the 
University of Salamanca) signaled the end of the regime’s “liberal” trends.123 Next, pressured to 
produce an original state-model, the Falange leadership initiated the regime’s “re-
falangistization.”124 In February 1957, José Luis Arrese, the Secretary-General of the Movimiento, 
declared a new “constitutional phase” wherein he and his followers were to draft “Fundamental 
Laws” in hope to lead Spain back to its nationalist-syndicalist path. Dialectically, it did just the 
opposite: led by Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the Falange’s antagonists quickly articulated an 
alternative authoritarian project. As a result, it was this reaction that was to design Francoism’s 
new constitutional base. The Catholic Church had an important role in frustrating the Falange’s 
new project, equating it with “totalitarian” programs of National Socialism and Peronism.125 
Indeed, against the backdrop of the downfall of Peronism in Argentina, the Catholic elements in 
Franco’s society, too, had been wary of any further statist and autarchic experiments.126  
          At this crucial point in the struggle over Franco’s heart, it was Carrero Blanco and the Opus 
Dei who won the upper hand. “Arrese,” reflected then a relatively anonymous Opus Dei numerary 
by the name of Laureano López Rodó, underestimated the Admiral’s “unique position with 
Franco.”127 In November 1956, even before Arrese announced his constitutional project, López 
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Rodó met with Carrero Blanco to discuss this alternative ideological path.128 Born in 1920, the 
Opus Dei priest in everyday life was a son of Barcelona industrialists and an apt example of a 
Catalonian who, following the Civil War, found Escrivá’s message appealing. Influenced by 
Salazar’s Portugal’s Estado Novo,129 in the 1950s he made a reputation for himself as a theorist of 
“administration.” Building on his friendship with Carrero Blanco, López Rodó was thereby to 
embody the quintessential Francoist technocrat of the 1960s. On December 20, 1956, he was 
appointed General Technical Secretary of the Presidency of the Government - a body created 
especially for the sake of a profound “administrative reform.”130 A few months later, Franco 
reshuffled his government entirely, appointing Opus Dei members Alberto Ullastres (Minister of 
Commerce) and Mariano Navarro Rubio (Minister of Finance) to lead Spain’s economic reform 
along with López Rodó. Thus, began the Opus Dei’s technocratic-authoritarian era. 
         A word is due on Luis Carrero Blanco. More than merely an éminence grise, this navy 
Admiral was the most powerful man in the Francoist regime from the mid-1950s.131 He was also 
an exceptionally authoritarian figure, who believed wholeheartedly in the “divine will” sustaining 
Francoism,132 and in the need to “capture and annihilate” any subversive elements.133 Additionally, 
he too promoted a “Catholic-nationalist” monarchic restoration.134 From 1957, he and the Opus 
Dei worked as one unit, along with other closely tied allies such as Alfredo Sánchez Bella, against 
the Falangist power centers in the regime. Interestingly, some have gone as far as labeling Carrero 
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Blanco an Opus Dei member.135 This assertion cannot be substantiated. But undeniably, he and 
the Opus Dei worked in a symbiotic manner: they gave him a coherent ideological platform, while 
he granted them vast executive power to put ideas into practice - ideology into a state ideology.  
           Upon assuming office, the Opus Dei team reorganized the regime around their 
administrative center. López Rodó’s 1957 Law of the Juridical System of the Administration, 
aimed to grant supreme executive power to the administrators of Spain’s forthcoming economic 
plans. It established a “special article” giving the last word to the Head of the Government, “who 
incarnates with the Head of State the unity of the Administration, and for that reason channels and 
coordinates the activity of the remaining Ministries, keeping them within the limits of the common 
government program.” López Rodó would thereby have the final word over much of Spain’s future 
legislation, with only Franco having the power to veto his actions.136 Next, on May 17, 1958, 
Spain’s Principles of the National Movement Law (Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional) 
was finally published. Written under the supervision of Carrero Blanco and López Rodó, it was 
the definitive blow to the Falange’s ideology. Including no remanence of the José Antonio Primo 
de Rivera’s “points,” it instead declared Spain as “traditionally Catholic, social, and representative 
Monarchy,” where a corporatist-sounding system of “political participation via family, 
municipality, and unions,” was to supersede parliamentarism. Expectedly, the law also redefined 
Spain as the “spiritual axis of the Hispanic world.”137 
           It was at this moment that Escrivá wrote Franco a personal message from Rome, expressing 
his satisfaction with the law: 
With the perspective acquired in Eternal Rome, I have been able to better observe the beauty 
of that beloved daughter of the Church that is my Fatherland, […] serving on so many 
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occasions as an instrument for the defense and propagation of the Catholic faith in the world. 
Although removed from all political activity, I have been able to rejoice, as a priest and as a 
Spaniard, [your] proclamation that ‘the Spanish Nation regards as a sign of honor the 
compliance with God’s Laws, akin to the doctrine of the Holy Catholic Roman Church […]. 
Our nation’s fidelity to the Catholic tradition - together with the divine blessing of the 
persons now in position of authority - is the best guarantee of the government’s success, as 
well as the security of a just and lasting peace within our national community.138 
 
The letter reveals that despite his seeming “apolitical” position Escrivá fully endorsed the Francoist 
regime, and even acknowledge Franco divine inspiration. The undertones of the letter, however, 
are no less important: obviously, both Escrivá and Franco knew that there was an exceptional 
meaning to the presence of the Opus Dei ministers in the new government, as well as to the fact 
that López Rodó had drafted the law. Arguably, the letter is Escrivá’s expression of gratitude to 
Franco for choosing his men for positions of leadership.   
          The international press was quick to grasp the meaning of the 1957 political change. 
Ullastres, in later years, said he and his companions “benefitted from the impossibility of labeling 
us politically.”139 This was perhaps true during their first months in office. Yet no sooner had the 
Opus Dei ministers been appointed than the international press began scrutinizing the nature of the 
mysterious “cult” running the Spanish state. The New York Times reported that “the influence of 
the movement over the strictly censored Spanish press and inside the government agencies that 
control public opinion is steadily growing.”140 And the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera 
added that “one of the aims of Opus Dei is to achieve through its members a moralization of 
Spanish public life.”141 By 1962, the British journal The Statist declared that Opus Dei was “the 
                                                             
138 “1958 mayo 23. carta de José María Escrivá de Balaguer felicitando a Franco por los Principios de Movimiento 
Nacional,” FNFF, Documento 957. 
139 López Rodó, Memorias vol. II, 91.  
140 Benjamin Welles, “Franco’s posts go to church group,” New York Times (March 7, 1957). 
141 “1959, febrero 26 Copia de un artículo del periódico italiano Corriere della Sera,” FNFF, Documento 23297; 
Another report worth mentioning is The Times article from of August 20, 1959 titled “Spanish Founder of Opus 
Dei” - a flattering coverage taht was to be debated by the Opus Dei intellectuals in the following months, see - 




power behind Franco’s throne,” alleging that Franco’s daughter, Carmen, “is a leading member on 
its women’s branch.”142 Hitherto a seemingly anonymous society, in a fairly short period of time 
the Opus Dei markedly captivated the imagination of tabloid readers worldwide. 
          Somewhat reluctantly, thus began the Opus Dei’s period of public relations management. In 
April 1957, Julián Herranz (numerary) published an article titled “the Opus Dei and politics,” 
which for a long time served as the Opus Dei’s official narrative. Appearing simultaneously in 
Istmo, Arco, and the French journal Table Ronde,143 the text stated that the Opus Dei “is not 
involved in the public life of any country,” as it is concerned only with training its members to a 
“supernatural goal of holiness.”144 Still, with the founding of UNAV in 1960, the Opus Dei’s 
unique status in the regime became even more apparent. One of the only bodies officially 
belonging to Opus Dei, this university represented the Opus Dei perfectly: a “Christian 
University,” it symbolized both novelty (with its School for Journalism) and spirituality (the school 
for Canon Law and theology). Its inauguration hence saw a wave of Opus Dei public-relations 
publications.145 In fact, Pérez Embid now took it upon himself to explain the Opus Dei to the 
public. Being Escrivá’s “official biographer,” he tailored a new image for his spiritual leader, 
portraying him as a modest man living a joyous life of self-denial.146 Defending the Opus Dei on 
every possible platform, Pérez Embid went as far as approaching American journalists 
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complaining about their negative coverage.147 In 1961, he ultimately appeared upon several 
magazines with answers to the question “what is Opus Dei?”148 There are “no secrets,” no 
“infiltrations,” and no “ownership of newspapers,” was the gist of his presentations. On the 
contrary, he said: Opus Dei members are “free to follow any ideological path they so choose,” as 
the movement does not coerce an “ideological stance” on anybody.149  
         The defense of the Opus Dei was an endeavor taken upon all affiliates internationally. For 
example, when in September 1962 British historian Hugh Thomas reported the struggles within 
the Francoist dictatorship, is was García Alesanco who immediately responded upon the Argentine 
conservative daily La Nación. “That Opus Dei is identified with a political position, is an erroneous 
assertion,” he said, adding that the Opus Dei was just an “association of faithful […] committed 
to an intense spiritual life.”150 With these remarks, García Alesanco neatly changed the question 
from ideological production to political agency. That is to say, he diverted the debate from the 
precise beliefs of the Opus Dei ministers to whether they operated according to guidelines of their 
spiritual leader.151 True enough, there is little evidence to sustain the claim that Escrivá, or Álvaro 
de Portillo, influenced Franco’s ministers from Rome. Yet stating that the Opus Dei had no 
“political position” was clearly a misguiding statement.  
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         The media’s attention to the Opus Dei changed its members’ behavior if not ideologically 
then strategically. According to some reports, Escrivá was “shaken by the international critique of 
the Francoist politicization,” of his movement.152 In tandem with the opening of the Second 
Vatican Council, he and his followers began shifting the Opus Dei’s public message from 
“obedience,” to that of “work” and “freedom.” More striking, in the 1960s Escivá calculatingly 
refused to partake in any public political discussion - to the surprise and dismay of Antonio 
Garriguez, Spain’s ambassador to the Vatican. In a secret memo, the latter reported to Franco on 
what Escrivá allegedly told him: 
“I want to know nothing of politics. Priests must not be involved in politics […] I have had 
and still have a good friendship with the Caudillo, who calls me frequently and speaks to me 
with great confidence. This had been precisely one of my reasons not to be involved in 
Spanish politics, to move my residence from Madrid to Rome. […] Opus Dei has preceded 
the Second Vatican Council in many things, although our enemies do not recognize it - on 
the contrary, they want to put the Opus Dei in the opposite position of the spirit of the 
Council […] Opus Dei is not founded on ‘cadaverous obedience’ but on freedom.”153  
 
By the late-1960s, these words of frustration reveal the true scale of Escrivá’s anguish of being 
identified with Francoism and consequently becoming a pariah at the very moment of the Catholic 
Church’s most history transformation.  
         At any rate, in complete contrast to the 1950s, in the 1960s Escrivá appeared in public as an 
international luminary. Embarking on international tours and giving elaborate interviews to the 
press, he conveyed a simple spiritual message of personal liberty, joy, and above all, love of work 
“in the midst of the realities and interests of the world.”154 On authoritarianism and obedience, 
Escrivá spoke evasively: “there can be no such thing as truly Christian obedience unless it is 
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voluntary and responsible,” he said. When The Times reporter Peter Forbarth asked him whether 
Francoism ever “contributed to Opus Dei’s growth in Spain,” Escrivá responded that the opposite 
was true: “In Spain we have had the greatest difficulties in making the Work take root,” he 
exclaimed, given “the opposition of the enemies of personal freedom.”155 I will return to Escrivá’s 
figure later in this study, but for the moment one should highlight the following point: while the 
Opus Dei ideologues changed the regime’s identity Escrivá publicly denied any connection to it. 
This notwithstanding, only a tiny few of his followers ever chose to side with Franco’s democratic 
opposition as I will explain in chapter 6.  
 
Franco’s “technocrats”: the technocratic-authoritarian state-ideology in 1960s Spain 
        The Opus Dei economic team worked swiftly. In 1958, they incorporated Spain into the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, thereby receiving substantial credits from these 
international agencies and even of the US government itself. Soon thereafter, they orchestrated 
Spain’s 1959 Stabilization Plan.156 This included several aggressive economic measures, which 
were later to be repeated in Latin America, and which began with anti-inflation measures 
(devaluation and a salary freeze) and continued to the raising of interest rates and slashing of 
tariffs. “There can be no development without eliminating the drug of inflation,” declared López 
Rodó throughout the years.157 More important, the reforms lifted most limits on the movement of 
foreign capital into the country. From now on, Spain was to become a haven for foreign 
investment, “comprising of low taxes, a disciplined and inexpensive workforce, and a captive 
                                                             
155 Escrivá de Balaguer, Conversations with Monsignor Escrivá de Balaguer, 48. 
156 Officially named “Decreto-Ley 10/1959, de 21 de julio, de ordenación económica,” BOE (España) no. 174, (July 
22, 1959): 10005-07. 




consumer market,” in the words of historian Antonio Cazorla Sánchez.158 Or as López Rodó’s 
himself explained this neoliberal turn: 
No economy can cook in its own sauce. I believe that integration into the supranational 
economic sphere is a great factor of development and, furthermore, that this development, 
this intensification of growth rate, is done without detriment to any of the countries that are 
integrated into a supranational zone […] According to the well-known phrase that ‘the big 
fish eats the little one,’ one could think that Germany was going to eat in Italy. However, the 
Italian economy has not suffered from integration into the Common Market.159 
 
Indeed, with a working-class devoid of the legal right to strike, low taxation, a booming touristic 
economy, the geographic proximity to Europe’s industrial centers, and, important of all, the USA’s 
blessing and special treatment, Spain soon became the industrial backyard of the European 
continent.160 But before this shift could take place, the Spanish society would need to endure the 
more traumatic aspects of “stabilization,” namely the termination of any unprofitable form of 
production and the laying off thousands of public workers. With sky-rocketing unemployment, 
1960s Spain thus saw a massive exodus of its young workforce to rest of Western Europe. The 
hard currency these men sent back home further contributing to the country’s GDP hike.161 
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         It is worthwhile noting that there was no separation between the Opus Dei “technocratic” 
ministers and its intellectuals. While not appearing often in public together, they still cooperated 
intimately towards mutual political goals. In 1960, Franco’s agents reported on one such meeting:  
There was a large number of Opus leaders with current political influence, including 
Fernández de la Mora, Pérez Embid, Rodríguez Casado, López Rodó and others. They 
addressed the next meeting of [Don Juan’s] Private Council in Estoril, and the current 
internal political situation. As we know, Hotel Richmond is controlled by the 
aforementioned Institute [Opus Dei]162  
 
Hence, in the next pages, when discussing of the “technocrats” I will be referring to this group of 
Opus Dei members and allies who consciously strove to produce a novel state model, and who 
included López Rodó, Navarro Rubio, and Ullastares, as well as Pérez Embid, Villar Palasí, 
Rodríguez Casado, and last, the theorist Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora. 
         Spain’s economic “miracle” is a phenomenon that should be read primarily through the 
lenses of Francoist propaganda.163 Whereas Spain merely followed, grosso modo, the footsteps of 
similar economic reforms in Italy, France, and Germany, Franco’s technocrats merged components 
from Europe’s nascent neoliberal jargon with the Francoist political mythology, thereby producing 
a hybrid that was to captivate the imagination of Latin American elites at the time. This language 
took several years to develop fully. In 1960, for instance, Ullastres did not seem entirely sure about 
his own agenda: “It is impossible to say exactly what the situation is now, and what will be the 
policy after the first stage of the stabilization plan,” he said. Advising integration with the Western 
Bloc, he nonetheless contended that “Stabilization is not a rigid concept.”164 It was only from 1961 
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that the technocrats’ rhetoric was to reach its fullest form, within the context of Spain’s 
“Development Plans.” 
         The social costs of the “stabilization” notwithstanding, the technocrats stressed they were 
creating a new reality of “social peace.” In the 1960s, few terms were as important in Franco’s 
Spain as this trope. “Peace,” stated López Rodó, was the “starting point” of any development 
plan.165 In 1964, peace eventually became associated with Franco’s “25 years of peace” 
campaign.166 Rather than the outcome of political violence, “social peace” almost always appeared 
as an accolade of the Spanish people, for their readiness to endure economic strains for the 
common good. “This peace that we enjoy, this expansion and this development,” said Franco in 
1967, “demands the unity of the Spaniards, […] that we all sacrifice something.”167 Yet “peace” 
was ultimately the paramount achievement of authoritarianism. López Rodó readily brought W.W. 
Rostow’s development theories into the Francoist context to make this point clear. The American 
economist, he argued, conditioned any “economic take-off” on the presence of “an exceptional 
man who knows how to catalyze the latent energies of a people and give them confidence in 
themselves.” Needless to say, for López Rodó, it was “the Caudillo” who alone “succeeded in 
getting us Spaniards regain our confidence.”168 Briefly put, “social peace,” for López Rodó, was 
an outcome of an authoritarian leader de-politicizing the nation and thus uniting it into effective 
collective action.  
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          The other side of the coin of “social peace” was “rationalization” (or alternatively, 
“realism”).169  Again, while taking inspiration from the texts of French economists such as Pierre 
Masse and Jean Monnet, to name a few, the Opus Dei’s motivation to deconstruct the Falange’s 
statist corporatism imbued this term with a distinctive meaning. The point was simple: given that 
capitalist development has no alternatives, any arrangement that includes the direct intervention 
of the state in economic activity is dysfunctional and therefore “irrational.” López Rodó’s 
“administrative rationalization” thus merely meant “taking the state out from where it is not called 
for.”170 In practical terms, this meant a paradoxical “decentralization” of the state bureaucracy 
through the swift operation of a “central coordinating body.”171 López Rodó expected each 
ministry to work for its own objectives, disconnected from any Government deliberation over the 
course of the economy, thereby granting optimal executive power to his elite of specialist. In a 
dictatorship where separation of powers barely ever existed, this arrangement was, for the Opus 
Dei technocrat, the epitome of the abovementioned “politics without rivalries.” In short, López 
Rodó’s theory of administration rationalization was dictatorial as it was anti-bureaucratic and de-
regulatory.172  
          There was another reason “rational” administration was important for the Opus Dei, and this 
was the alleged “vertigo” of technological “complexity.”173 “With the steam engine, electricity, 
telegraph, aviation, biochemistry” modern man, stressed Pérez Embid, was, in 1960, a “very 
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different human than before.” This leap forward, he warned, posed formidable spiritual problems, 
as the flawed human nature cannot keep pace with technology. That is to say, the more 
sophisticated technology is, the less one could rely on the masses to opt for the right path of 
collective action, Pérez Embid thought. Modern life, warned López Rodó similarly, in its “dizzying 
pace of new collective needs, demands from the administration executing the national policy an 
increasing efficiency.” This unique state of affairs, he said, required from the administration to be 
“aerodynamic” - a “simple and modern organization” that would throw away “as scrap, outdated 
and useless mechanisms.”174 
          But who was the apt agent to navigate society through this supposed tempestuous technical 
era? The Opus Dei’s response to this question was, at times, mysterious. On the one hand, this 
person must be a specialist. On the other hand, effective governance depends on “the intelligence 
predominantly of the directing minorities,” said Pérez Embid,175 who acknowledge the “business 
sense of the administration,” but also are not “aristocratic” by definition.176 Here López Rodó 
evoked the mythology of the Bourbon reformers and pre-Napoleonic administration: “for good or 
bad, the administration of the 18th century was homogeneous,” he noted.177 Similarly Pérez Embid 
spoke of a person “who does not depend on any social faction - neither the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, nor the dictatorship of the aristocracy, nor the dictatorship of the capitalist bourgeoisie 
- and who is also Christian and willing to do justice.”178 In the 1960s, as López Rodó became 
Franco’s main speech-writer, one could locate this enigmatic agent even in the Caudillo’s rhetoric. 
“For Spain to stay a living organism,” stated Franco, “there must be a minority […] who has faith 
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and enthusiasm for the job, who decides to become the channel where the ideals and aspirations 
of the people reach the duties of the state.”179 This statement was indicative of how 
commonsensical the technocratic language had become by then in Spain. For Franco in 1967, 
Spain’s future depended on altruistic agents who adhered only to the laws of “science,” 
“technique,” and the “spirit.”   
          Remarkably, Franco’s technocrats were rarely renown specialists in their field. And when 
asked about the role of the state in modern terms, López Rodó tended towards rather rudimentary 
formulations: “The state must provide infrastructure, because the private productive system cannot 
stay hanging in the air […] This is, in my opinion, the one thing the state should do,” he said in 
1971.180 Spain’s Development Plan of 1964-67 added several other concepts to this naïve point of 
departure, such as “regionalism” and “poles of growth” (or “poles of development”). Inspired by 
the French precedent, in this case, the technocrats aspired to direct investments to Spain agrarian 
countryside, thereby creating “new nuclei of manufacturing and service companies.”181 This 
scheme, which in the Francoist case also echoed traditionalist notions of the cantonization of the 
state, was not only simplistic but also paradoxical in that it stripped the state from much of its 
regulatory authority, while at the same time insisting the industrial “poles” were to be the 
embodiment of social engineering.182 
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           Curiously enough, with these deregulations, the technocrats purported to transform Spain 
into a “welfare society.”183 Given Spain’s ongoing GDP hike, its population, they thought, was 
soon to undergo a technical and mental metamorphosis. López Rodó stated repeatedly that, for 
him, economic growth was just a means to an end. “As Raymond Aron has written, the creation 
of the new man matters much more than the construction of factories, although these are also 
necessary,” he said humorously.184 But this was no joke. For this Opus Dei numerary, spiritual 
perfection was the definite goal of Spain’s economic progress. “Once one underestimates the 
spiritual values economic development must serve, many societies react to it with 
disenchantment,” he still warned in 1972.185 Conversely, for him, spiritual work was hardly a 
passive byproduct. In some cases, it was the answer to the alleged alienations of industrial society 
- the crux of Marxist theory if we will. This unique mental degradation could be effectively 
answered through “a revalorization of the life of the spirit that, in the end, always implies the same 
thing: sacrifice,” López Rodó said.186 
          López Rodó’s Development Plans dovetailed with yet another unique ideological trend, 
namely the Francoist narratives of “the end of ideology.” A trite already in the 1960s, this did not 
prevent Francoist intellectuals to reclaim the term thus granting is fresh meanings.187 As we have 
seen, the technocrats agreed that Franco’s success stemmed from having “neutralized the political 
passions of the Spaniards and creating a policy based on a broad national ‘consensus.’”188 In the 
mid-1960s, it was the work of Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora that stood out as the most 
conspicuous effort to theorize Francoism as a global “post-ideological” state-model. Fernández de 
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la Mora’s point of departure was that while democracies “atomizes” the individual and 
communism “terrorizes” him, there exists a global demand for a novel concept of the state. The 
masses, he argued, are at last willing to exchange political agency for “security.”189 
          Fernández de la Mora criticized the dialectic motion from secularization back to mythical 
thought in ideologies such as communism, liberalism, and fascism. Then, he too highlighted the 
need for “scientific treatment of public affairs” and motion from “the hegemony of intellectuals” 
to the one of “administrators and economists.” The masses, for their part, he believed, “are no 
longer asking for ideologists, but experts.”190 That is to say, Fernández de la Mora thought one 
should act democratically and grant the masses what they want: security and prosperity. In his 
1965 bestseller, El crepúsculo de las ideologías, this thesis reaches its apex. Published by the Opus 
Dei, the book opens with the outright rejection of any alleged Quixotic Spanish mystical 
irrationality, announcing that Cervantes’s book was indeed “ironic and absurd.”191 Additionally, 
Fernández de la Mora portrayed the Enlightenment’s ideologies as products of “mass 
consumption,” a pure “emotion”, and therefore, intrinsically violent.192 To make matters worse for 
parliamentary democracies, the masses, he stressed, are marked by political apathy, which belies 
collectively deciding on the correct path for modernization.193 Therefore, he argued, they should 
be given full freedom of expression, but be denied universal suffrage.194 With these notions, 
Fernández de la Mora thus turned the notion of freedom on its head: the masses should be granted 
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freedom from the burden of politics and ideologies. The fantasy at the bottom of his proposition 
was one of an infantile regression and a return to a life of carefree leisure.195   
          Fernández de la Mora’s book was thoroughly discussed in the Francoist public sphere.196 
This occurred in tandem with the beginning of the appliance of the term “tecnocrats” to depict the 
Opus Dei ministers. Interestingly, Fernández de la Mora took issue with these labels. In an opinion 
column from 1965, he said that this old American coinage merely qualified to a more sophisticated 
way to manage the economy. This rationalization of the state was the “active” technocratic theory, 
he said. Yet he agreed that those technocrats who cannot define what economic growth “is good 
for” in the first place are merely “substituting politics for technology.” This, he stated, was “a-
moralism,” and a “passive” technocracy.197 In a word: for him, the Spanish spiritual technocrat 
was fundamentally dissimilar from the western a-moral capitalist one.  
         At any rate, neither Fernández de la Mora nor López Rodó identified themselves as 
“technocrats” but as the authentic spokesmen of the Francoist regime. Given that Spain’s 
development now relied on the political nexus between Carrero Blanco, López Rodó, and 
Fernández de la Mora, they might have been correct to assume so. In the mid-1960s the three 
proceeded to formulate Franco’s final “constitution,” or more accurately, the state-model that 
would replace Franco after his death.198 Again within the context of the power struggles between 
Carrero Blanco’s group and the Falange’s moderate Minister of Information and Tourism Manuel 
Fraga, Spain saw the beginning of new age of reforms. Fraga’s Press Law of March 1966 was one 
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of the regime’s most notable instances of liberalization. While lifting Franco’s censorship only 
slightly,199 it nonetheless positioned Fraga as the champion of the Spanish political opening, once 
again forcing Carrero Blanco to act.200 The result was Spain’s State Organic Law (Ley Orgánica 
del Estado). Arguably mirroring the French Fifth Republic, the technocrats were the obvious 
authors of this law, approved by yet another referendum in 1966. “The State’s Organic Law is 
really our Constitution,” reflected López Rodó. The referendum, he even suggested proudly, 
clarified there was an “overwhelming majority in favor of the law.”201 In truth, the law’s 
importance stemmed from the fairly more concrete meaning it gave Franco’s “organic” 
democracy, as it allowed a limited electoral process on the municipal level and for the Cortes - a 
system of representation I will debate briefly in chapter 6. On this, López Rodó said that he too 
believed in “grassroots politics, with participation […] but ensuring continuity.”202 
           Behind the scenes, however, Carrero Blanco’s team began laying the foundations for 
Spain’s future authoritarian monarchy. Fernández de la Mora and López Rodó were the main 
designers of this ideological project, along with Luis Sánchez Agesta - an Andalusian jurist who 
was associated to neither of the prominent ideological Francoist families but cooperating mostly 
with the Opus Dei monarchist network.203 For Sánchez Agesta, by 1966 it was clear that in Europe 
there were indeed three types of regime-models: “the liberal,” the “totalitarian,” and the 
“pluralist/corporate,” the latter referring to the Iberian regimes, and the only ones to nourish the 
“natural character of the intermediary associations.” That is to say, Sánchez Agesta believed in an 
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authoritarian model that nurtured a spectrum of liberal civic activity beneath it. But was this regime 
a final condition? For these theorists the answer was clear: Francoism was not a transitional entity 
but the definitive stage of perfection. Sánchez Agesta even said that by allowing “pressure groups” 
to operate within it, Francoism is “more pluralist than liberal democracies.” Unlike the atomizing 
liberal regimes, in Spain such free associations allow the “social nature of man” to develop more 
fully, he stressed, since “liberal individualism gives every man the task of creating his own entire 
world” whereas Franco’s “pluralism situates man in the concrete world in which there are already 
certain channels for his activity.” Hence, he alleged that since authoritarianism provides its citizens 
with a firm theoretical grounding, it serves their creativity better, and therefore has “a great future 
ahead of it.”204  
          While openly critical to both communism and parliamentarism, in the mid-1960s 
technocratic Spain did endorse a more apolitical façade, and even established friendly relationships 
with socialist regimes across Eastern Europe, with Castro’s Cuba, and Allende’s Chile - a topic I 
will return to in chapter 5.205 This approach facilitated the investments of Spanish firms and banks 
in Latin America,206 most saliently Spanish car companies (Seat and Pegaso). At the same time, 
under the guidance of the moderate Falangist Gregorio Marañon Moya, the ICH too turned to 
propagating Spain’s “development.”207 In fact, by then Spanish diplomats openly demanded a 
replacing Hispanidad politics with a more pragmatic approach. Spain’s ambassador in Chile during 
the late-1960s, Miguel de Lojendio, went as far as demanding his superiors that considering the 
                                                             
204 Luis Sánchez Agesta, Principio de teoría política (Madrid: Editorial Nacional, 1966), 499-503. 
205 For more on this change of diplomacy see - Celestino del Arenal, Política exterior de España hacia 
Iberoamérica. (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1994), 47-57.  
206 A process analyzed already by several historians, see for instance - Oriol Malló, El cártel español: historia 
crítica de la reconquista económica de México y América Latina (1898-2008) (Madrid: Foca, 2011); Pollack, The 
Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy. 





“well-deserved admiration” for Spain’s economic miracle worldwide, the regime should relax its 
“anachronistic line of conduct” and find a “more flexible, broader, and more generous formulas” 
for dealing with Latin America.208 His complaints notwithstanding, in truth by 1970 little had 
remained of the pompous Francoist pathos of the 1950s ICH events.  
 
Producing spiritual subjects: The Opus Dei morality in the 1960s 
          According to one familiar argument in the literature, during the “long-1960s” the Spanish 
population underwent a rapid cultural transformation, caused by urbanization, consumerism, 
western tourism, and profound secularization.209 The picture, however, might have been more 
complex. In truth, during the 1960s Franco’s Spain witnessed the surge of spiritual agencies and 
extreme far-right movements that did not obey the deterministic causality between economic well-
being and secularization. Certainly, the Opus Dei’s own spirituality represented the conscious 
effort to prove this thesis wrong. The effort to influence the subjectivity of the Spanish public in 
an age of economic growth did not occur only in the Opus Dei’s intellectual platforms but upon 
its youth and women publications and television programs. Here, its ideologues confronted the 
1960s youth rebellion for the first time, offering instead its own alternative “rebellion.”     
         The Opus Dei was far from being the only Spanish spiritual agency with international 
aspirations. As we will see in chapter 6, in the 1960s Spain saw a wave of clerico-fascist activity. 
In other cases, these were spiritual movements more adapted to the context of middle-class 
consumption. The Cursillos de la Cristiandad (Short courses in Christianity) was a good example 
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of this new type of associations. Established in 1944, it offered a method of “spiritual exercises” 
for laymen in everyday life. The genealogy of the Cursillos was, in truth, intimately linked to the 
Opus Dei as its founder, the Bishop of Mallorca Juan Hervás, was a close friend of Escrivá and 
admittedly inspired by him. Hervás and his followers saw the potential of mobilizing the “lay 
apostolate,” and hence imitated the Opus Dei in Spain and in Latin America.210 “Without 
messianism, but also without conformism,” they offered yet another technique for achieving a 
spiritual sublime and overall “evangelization and conversion of modern man.”211 In the words of 
Hervás, the Cursillos “comprise of three days of joyful, fraternal, and intimate Christian 
coexistence.”212 As the Opus Dei, the Cursillos sought “ascetic, pastoral, and apostolic principles.” 
Its method of “mystical rolls” was likewise an exercise in obedience and servitude. While 
seemingly having little political content, the Cursillos clearly adhered to Franco’s state and even 
celebrated their first National Congregations of Ecclesiastical Directors at the Valley of the Fallen 
- Francoism’s utmost monument. In short, like the Opus Dei, the Cursillos were yet another sub-
genre of Francoist mysticism.213 Recognized by the Vatican in 2004, this “prelature” published 
little and had negligible influence within Spanish politics. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, it 
would achieve notoriety during Onganía’s dictatorship, as I will discuss in chapter 4.  
        The Opus Dei, contrariwise, had an overwhelming presence in Spain’s public sphere in the 
1960s. By now, it owned or controlled intellectual journals (Arbor, Atlantida, Nuestro Tiempo), 
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dailies (Madrid, Diario Nuevo, El Alcázar), weeklies (Actualidad Española, Actualidad 
Economica, Mundo), religious journals (Mundo Cristiano, Palabra) and student journals 
(Moncloa, Gazeta Universitaria). Along with its publishing houses Rialp and Pomaire, and 
presence on Spanish national Television (TVE), this apparatus is suggestive that the Opus Dei 
sought to address many audiences, within Spain’s elites and middle-class alike.214 In particular, 
the Opus Dei now aimed to impact three interconnected dominions: the youth, women, and public 
morality at large.  
        Indeed, 1960s Spain displayed a paradoxical cultural sphere. On the one hand, Manuel Fraga 
promoted the country as a site of free speech, cultural effervescence, and leisure. As some have 
argued in the past, the “change of skin” the country presented to the outside world aimed to show 
that the regime had become both pluralist and popular. On the other hand, Franco’s ideologues 
aggressively opposed the 1960s cultural trends, believing they had already formed a new “Spanish 
consciousness.” According to Pérez Embid, “the Spaniards of twenty, forty and sixty years” 
appeared as a “differentiated strata of collective conscience.”215 To their disappointment, 
throughout the 1960s it was becoming apparent that this was perhaps true, but not in the optimistic 
sense insinuated in Pérez Embid words: the Spanish youth was not dissimilar from any youngsters 
in the 1960s and rebelled against authority, especially on the university campuses. In turn, the 
Opus Dei set out to configure the phenomenon of the global youth “rebellion.”  
         In Pérez Embid’s opinion, Spain’s 1956 student riots were a sign not of political unrest but 
of spiritual deficiency.216 “Rebellion,” he argued, is an attitude typical of youth, but “when it 
                                                             
214 It is almost impossible to produce an entire mapping of the texts such as “what is the Opus Dei?” here. Ever since 
Pérez Embid launched the self-defense campaign in 1961, the newspapers contained almost weekly references to 
Escrivá’s message and the mission of the prelature that ultimately made it to the edited volume Conversaciones con 
Escrivá de Balaguer.  
215 Pérez Embid, Libertad, tradición y monarquía, 7. 




crystalizes in combative violence, it is only positive if it is directed against an illegitimate order.”217 
Vaguely echoing the fascist cult of youth, Pérez Embid envisioned instead a society of constant 
spiritual checks and balances. There are two cultures in Spain’s history, he explained: One follows 
the Catholic tradition and the “truth”; the other, is “a small discrepant tradition” filled with 
“flashes, instrumental values, but also of successes and nuances, to which we cannot give up and 
do not want to do without.” Therefore, he opined, what was needed were spiritually vigorous 
“bridge keepers” (hombres-puente) to decide which western components should be integrated into 
the Hispanic spiritual realm, as had been done in the past “to the great reality of paganism.” After 
all, bridges can be crossed in both directions, and “when the enemy attacks - aided, as always, by 
silly collaboration who conform to any peace […] – there is no time to apologize to the friendly 
peacemakers.”218  
         The youth, and the university students in particular, were now given a new mission. The 
Opus Dei expected them to “freely” choose their vocation in society, and in doing so, to serve a 
global crusade. “Fascism unleashed a strange political mythology of Youth: heroism, impulse, 
songs of war […] personal messianism, the revolutionary thaumaturgy of dark impulses and 
prerational intuitions. […] this must end,” Pérez Embid confirmed.219 Instead of the fascist cult of 
youth, the Opus Dei proposed a seemingly tolerant discussion on “liberty in education.” José María 
Albareda, Ismael Sánchez Bella, and Álvaro d’Ors220 all contributed to this paradoxical effort to 
both “liberalize” the university and mobilize the youth into a spiritual movement. By now, they 
had agreed that the youngsters of the 1960s were strikingly different to those of the 1940s and 
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should be treated with novel approaches. Víctor García Hoz (numerary), a pedagogue and an early 
Arbor member, was to become the key theoretician of the 1960s youth rebellion. In previous years, 
he had promoted theories of “Pedagogy of the ascetic struggle,” akin to the Opus Dei theory of 
sanctity.221 Man must “live armed” he maintained, “even in periods of apparent peace,” since the 
enemies “wages different types of battles.”222 By the 1960s, he proposed a somewhat less 
belligerent method for creating a “new man” through “obedience power.” Putting Escrivá’s 
theology to practice meant García Hoz demanded from the 1960s youngster to “become a child; 
because the child is simply the new man.”223 Whether it was for God or for society, subordination, 
pledged García Hoz, “serves man’s freedom best.”224 It might seem an utter irony that this 
pedagogue would later become an international theorist of “personalized education,” promoting 
“singularity and creativity.”225 But there was no contradiction: he, and the Opus Dei at large, aimed 
to channel the global youth rebelliousness towards a crusade of obedient and spiritually elated 
technicians.226  
          But what were the actual objectives of this crusade? For one thing, it meant impeding any 
communist infiltration into the intellectual domain. In the struggle against communism, opined 
Ismael Sánchez Bella “we cannot aspire to compete with other more economically or technically 
powerful nations, but we can undertake missions of a spiritual nature such as the formation of the 
university elite.”227 Indeed, the Opus Dei student journals derided anything from Marxism to 
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Darwinism,228 and exhibited pugnacious manifestos of Francoist fidelity.229 In the same vein, 
intellectuals such as Álvaro d’Ors were truly bothered by the rise of the 1960s anti-war movement. 
“Love peace, and be truly peaceful, but beware of professional pacifism, of this murky pacifism 
in which ‘all cats are gray.’ Know that there are still worse things than war: the [communistic] 
checas for example,” he advised his young students.230 On top of that, the Opus Dei was perceptive 
of the changes in global youth culture. By 1960, its thinkers agreed that the Western Bloc was not 
possessed by any ideologically-driven rebellion but rather by “a rebellion without a cause” marked 
by neologisms such as “Teddy boys,” “Teen-agers,” and “blousons noir.”231 Nihilism, bitterness, 
apathy, and irreverence to heroic pathos, appeared in these analyses as the direct outcomes of the 
1960s youth culture and as immediate threats to society.232 Juan José López Ibor, a psychiatrist 
and an Opus Dei ally, was one of the most vocal critics of the youth’s disrespect to its mission. 
“What is constructed on one side is destroyed on the other by irony. We must encourage 
enthusiasm and erase skepticism,” he proclaimed.233 In other words, López Ibor demanded to turn 
apathetic and ironic youngsters into reverent and “restless” crusaders.234 The following opinion 
column, published by a student named Julián Aznar, suggests that some Opus Dei students were 
fairly receptive to this message: 
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The knowledge of the transcendental truths gives a firm, total, and harmonic vision of the 
objective world. From this solid starting point, a restless march begins, with joyful eagerness, 
towards the contingent truths, towards the knowledge and mastery of what God has left to 
the free deliberation of men. This search is not strict, and admits, with pleasure, dialogue, 
and collaboration. It has no problem in recognizing that the argument of a colleague is more 
exact and objective and, then, endorses it, incorporates it quietly […] be restless, but not 
rebellious (“inquietudes si; inquietorros, no”).235    
 
This statement is striking in its plainness: Franco’s Spain, and the Opus Dei’s as its spiritual 
vanguard, hold the evangelical “truth,” it argues; Only once accepting this ontological ground, 
could one pursue perfection through dialogue with those who agree on the same philosophical 
setup. Or as another student wrote: “Rebellion is good,” as it is a “proof of vitality” - a quality 
greatly needed for victory against communistic “treason.”236 
          In a parallel vein, the Opus Dei perceived western feminism as an unmitigated threat to the 
Hispanic spiritual domain. Needless to say, technocratic Spain still perceived women through a 
strictly patriarchal prism. In fact, one of the sole channels for women’s political agency in this 
period was the Falange’s Feminine Section. Led for decades by Pilar Primo de Rivera, this was a 
somewhat anachronistic propaganda organ that nonetheless served the regime faithfully with 
publications such as Revista para la mujer and Medina, wherein it advocated women’s 
participation in society within the household and in the education system.237 The Opus Dei, on the 
other hand, believed itself to be the promoter of novel forms of womanhood. In its quest to oppose 
the global influence of feminism - a movement it believed sought to fundamentally alter Hispanic 
gender hierarchies - it therefore advocated a more sophisticated conception of feminine 
participation in society and at the workplace. One of the most successful publications the Opus 
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Dei controlled in the 1960s was the women’s magazine Telva. Under the direction of numeraries 
Covadonga O’shea and Pilar Salcedo, Telva promoted itself as the forefront of feminine 
empowerment, and a platform where women spoke exclusively to women on topics that were an 
absolute novelty:  
Winds of renovation are blowing throughout the world; of economic development; new 
horizons open up to women and it is necessary to live up to the circumstances. That of 
“Women’s rights” sounds good but one has to be the tough ones, the mature ones. You need 
to be well informed so that when you learn your rights you will see in them the duty to work 
- at a European level - with greater seriousness.238 
 
Telva thus purported to make women “serious” - unlike the western feminists who demanded 
“rights” without meriting them. It therefore constantly pondered on women’s unique psychological 
condition, and their aptitude to mentally straining vocations. Even more so than the youth, the 
Opus Dei treated women as melancholy beings, who need to be “joyful” and perceptive of their 
surroundings.239 
          Sure enough, Telva advocated women’s professionalization as a means to develop their 
spirituality, and the nation’s economic productivity as a whole. Contemporary women “cannot live 
waiting for a mythical prince charming,” argued its editors.240 The intellectual and journalistic 
arenas, appeared in Telva as new optional spheres of women agency.241 Still, women were also to 
realize the delicate balance between their roles as mothers and their vocational ambitions. “Men 
and women have equal civic rights, but different missions,” Telva stated, as women are the 
“collaborators” of their husbands.242 The first volumes in Telva included a section by the name 
“Una familia.” Clearly a fictional representation, this was nonetheless a transparent image of the 
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modern gender roles as the Opus Dei saw them. At the center of the family stood a man and his 
wife, who embraced “whatever children God had given them.” Interestingly, the family’s 
daughters were already different from their mother: they had been given a choice to a career path. 
“Paloma,” said the report, “wants to be a writer, but practical people tell her that it would be more 
lucrative owning a pharmacy.”243  
          Despite these alleged novelties, the Opus Dei also idolized the housewife, and took special 
pride of its Feminine Section’s centers for “housework education.” This so-called 
“professionalization of housework,” it proclaimed, comprised of “an academic structure that brings 
education of the house to the levels that today’s life requires.”244 In this vein, guiding women on 
how to find enjoyment in serving others through daily chores eventually became the Opus Dei’s 
specialty. A Mundo Cristiano section by the name “Carlota open her doors for us,” was a case in 
point of a fictional stereotypical housewife who lets the journal’s readers join her through her daily 
routine. In the face of dull domestic work, she was told to remember that “knowing that the 
smallest most hidden task can give life value, once it is done with a spirit of service - to God, to 
those around us” was the “antidote to routine and boredom.”245 In short, whereas the Opus Dei 
ideologues claimed to advance women’s social agency, as an alternative to the ill-advised western 
“women’s rights” movement, they nonetheless questioned women’s psychological abilities,246 and 
even offered them spiritual techniques for coping with their inferior positions in society.    
          Lastly, the Opus Dei texts betrayed a profound concern over changes in public morality. By 
the mid-1960s, the global cultural revolution, and more concretely the palpable changes in sexual 
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norms, where on everybody’s minds. The case of the Beatles can serve as one example of such 
anxieties. At first, in 1963-64, Telva barely mentioned the rock-&-roll phenomenon. When it 
finally did, in April 1964, it ridiculed the Liverpool band for being ugly “as bugs” and the “result 
of a good advertising.”247 In 1965, another arguably fictitious “report” appeared in Telva. It told 
the story of “Michael and Patricia,” an unmarried couple dwelling in a deserted beach club in 
Catalonia. She was twenty-five years old, he only eighteen; she was the “normal” one, he was a 
“Beatle mimetic” who “neglected the basic rules of hygiene.” This imitation of the Beatles, Telva 
taunted, “is spreading alarmingly among the strong sex.” Notably, Telva’s concern was primarily 
with male feminization, which called, it said, for further “psychological study.”248 Last, in 1965, 
once the members of the respectable Spanish pop group Los Pekenikes endorsed the Beatles,249 
the Opus Dei media relax its assaults. And once the Beatles performed in Franco’s Spain in July 
1965, Telva and Actualidad Espanola depicted the band members as self-made-men, who now 
honored the regime with their presence.250 Briefly put, the British rock-&-roll group was first 
ignored, then mocked, and finally, acclimatized and cherished. 
         Curbing the popularity of rock-&-roll was a perhaps lost battle. However, the Opus Dei’s 
struggle to protect public morality has just begun. That the Spanish population, and the Catholics 
at large, were changing attitudes towards sexuality and family planning was no secret. In what 
would become its trademark, during the 1960s the Opus Dei hence led a crusade against this new 
sexual “promiscuity.” It began with the affirmation that the modern “Christian family” was a 
“school of perfection,”251 and the basic kernel upon which societal harmony depends. In 1963, the 
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Opus Dei then launched its campaign against “birth control” (always in English, derogatively) and 
neo-Malthusianism as its theoretical basis.252 Divorce, birth control, and abortion - all strictly 
illegal in Franco’s Spain - were not only frequent themes on the Opus Dei popular publications: 
they were now their main leitmotifs. There was nothing particularly original in the theological 
arguments the Opus Dei priests presented: “fill the earth,” they said, was the “command of our 
Lord.” Yet the fight against “birth control” was primarily ideological and carried out through 
sociological and psychological argumentations. “Today, sociologists and economists are already 
backing from the benefits of Malthusianism,” announced Telva. The reason? Low growth rates 
and a shortage of labor force.253  
         Drugs, delinquency, and pornography, were other vices that the Opus Dei made its foremost 
preoccupation. Playboy magazine, also banned under Francoism, is a case in point of an object 
that the mere reports on its smuggling into Spain spurred an outcry in Gazeta Universitaria. “Now 
begins the sexual-economic colonization of Spain,” declared one of its writers, and explained:  
One could give endless statistics of the consequences of the sex-economic invasion in the 
USA in 1966: at least a third of the Middle School students who were married were pregnant 
at the wedding. Girls aged 16 and under contribute a quarter of illegal births. Nearly 500,000 
abortions in 1965 among girls of school age. About a million Americans are infected with 
venereal diseases every year, [...] The rate of suicides is increasing […] What we ask for is 
[…] less sex-economic imperialism and more creative freedom. They are here knocking on 
the door. And an irrepressible cry comes from our throats: ‘Go home!254 
 
This campaign appeared as one cohesive formula in the exhortations of Spain’s most prominent 
spiritual actor of the 1960s: Jesús Urteaga. Known as the “television priest,” he was the more 
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charismatic of Escrivá’s followers and presented a particularly extreme call for battle against 
western morality. In his books and articles, he sought to guide the sexuality even of married 
couples. Interfering with natural procreation, for him, deserved nothing but contempt. “They are 
transforming marriage - blessed by Christ - into a poor, vulgar, and creeping flesh trade. […] 
Should God not throw them from the bed, and whip them? Calculators! Cuckoos! Cowards! 
Selfish! Complimentary! Greedy! Lustful! Lazy!” he ranted.255 This outrage was, once again, 
coupled with a demand for a spiritual revolution through “joy.” On Spain’s national television, 
Urteaga delivered Escrivá’s gospel daily as he spoke of willing servitude “for the other.” Or as 
Urteaga himself suggested: “Put to work this advice of the founder of Opus Dei - this is the order 
of benevolence: God, others, and me. Try it and see - I assure you that you will glow with joy.”256 
In short, in Urteaga’s world, there was barely any place for restlessness - only for sexually abstinent 
joyful willing servants.257 
 
Conclusions 
          What began as an abstract post-fascist ideology in the 1950s was translated in the 1960s into 
one of the more sophisticated state-ideologies of the Cold War era. Technocratic Spain did not, 
however, present a complete break either from the corporatist political myths of the 1930s or the 
traditionalist theory of Hispanidad - as noted before, the two ideological pillars of the regime. For 
one thing, from a mythological perspective, technocratic-authoritarianism presented a direct 
continuation to Hispanidad, as it constantly evoked and further developed the Spanish pre-modern 
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imperial mythologies, in order to justify its dual method of economic modernization and spiritual 
perfection. For another, the technocrats perhaps derided the fascist pathos but readily readjusted 
the corporatist “organic” jargon for the neoliberal era. They were also avid supporters of principles 
such as civil war and the urgent need to retrieve spiritual sublime into the modernizing process. 
The novelty of the Opus Dei technocrats was, therefore, the spiritual technique they presented as 
a substitute to fascism’s revolutionary violence and virility; a holistic setup whereby man’s most 
intimate deeds become meaningful and “enjoyable” within the context of a collective “internal” 
crusade of willing subordination. Thus, ironically, while alleging to being “anti-totalitarian,” the 
Opus Dei fundamentally sought to revise the western perception of individual liberty, thereby 
controlling every aspect of its followers’ behaviorisms.  
          As mentioned throughout the chapter, the theories Franco’s ideologues tailored in respect to 
the crisis of modernity were hardly novel for the mainstream western reader. As Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer, they pointed to the dialectic motion from the 19th century of rational 
secularization back to irrational mythical in fascism.258 And similar to one other Frankfurt School 
member, Erich Fromm, the technocrats believed the masses were willing to give up their 
“freedom” for economic benefits and security.259 The innovation in the texts López Rodó, Pérez 
Embid, Fontán, Fernández de la Mora, and Sánchez Agesta disseminated was how they answered 
the crisis of totalitarianism with a tangible new state-ideology. Rather than a ruthless dictatorship, 
the “post-ideological” state these men envisioned was to be a silent and sagacious modernizer, 
conscious of both the economic and spiritual rudiments of mankind, and thus, entirely different 
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from that the capitalist technocrats operating in Europe at the time. There is no question that the 
technocrats changed the Spanish economy and society in a most profound way. I will debate the 
economic and social consequences of these policies in chapter 6. The important point is, however, 
that the emergence of technocratic Spain, and the Opus Dei as its ideological vanguard, meant 
Francoism acquired an entirely new foundational narrative. As we shall observe shortly, to the 
Latin American spectators Spain represented a country that skillfully dismantled its own statist-
totalitarian ideological impediments, thereby demonstrating that an sovereign post-ideological 
society of consumption - “European in the means; Spanish in the ends” - was indeed possible 
within the Cold War system. Amid a period of growing anxieties over the pace of technological 
and economic complexities, Spain’s state-ideology further presented Latin America not only with 
a political myth about an anti-communistic “crusade,” but with a distinctive toolkit of tropes such 
as “social peace,” “rationalization,” “twilight of ideology,” “regionalization,” “polls of growth,” 
“intermediary societies,” etc. The ensuing chapters will indicate just how significant this image 





Chapter 3: The Emergence of Argentina’s Technocratic-Authoritarian Ideologies, 1956-
1966 
 
         Between the downfall of Juan Perón in September 1955 and the rise to power of Juan Carlos 
Onganía in June 1966, Argentina witnessed the emergence of its own unique technocratic-
authoritarian ideologies and intellectual milieus. While this post-fascist phenomenon appeared in 
a very different context than in Franco’s Spain - namely a liberal democracy known in Latin 
America for its vibrant free press - the two ideologies nonetheless shared several basic traits. As I 
have mentioned earlier, Peronism and Falangism lost political power simultaneously in the 1950s. 
The reason for this was analogous: the contexts of the Cold War and the evolving power of the 
global economy did not favor statist protectionism, whether it was “nationalist-syndicalist” or post-
fascist Peronist. It was the question of what ideological project should replace this economically 
corporatists state, however, that would become the defining conundrum of the post-Peronist era. 
This third chapter explores the intellectual projects that paved the way for Onganía’s technocratic-
authoritarian experiment. As I have mentioned in the introduction, Guillermo O’Donnell used 
Onganía’s regime as a key case study of “Bureaucratic Authoritarianism,” understood as the 
moment when a well-defined oligarchy, frustrated from its inability to integrate into the global 
markets due to the populist manipulation of the political arena (what O’Donnell defines as “el 
pueblo”), decides to eliminate parliamentarism and embrace authoritarianism.1 This chapter sets 
out to complicate this narrative. I will show that Onganía’s regime was not merely an improvised 
reaction to Peronist mobilization but the materialization of a well-defined post-fascist theory of 
the state. Developed between 1955 and 1966, this ideology promoted replacing Argentina’s 
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democracy with a final post-ideological society of technological development and spiritual 
perfection.  
        Onganía’s dictatorship emerged against the background of a parliamentary democracy 
entangled in an unsolvable conundrum. Despite Perón’s exile, his outlawed movement did not ebb 
form Argentine politics after 1955. Rather, through his control of the labor unions, and thanks to 
the earnest leadership of Augusto Vandor, Perón successfully influenced the Argentine electoral 
system from afar.2 For the post-Peronist democracy, the question was thus a philosophic one that 
touched on the very essence of parliamentarism: could one protect democracy from 
authoritarianism by preventing a vast portion of the population from partaking in the political 
game? Behind this question lay other essential challenges, which defined the borderlines between 
Right and Left during the 1960s, in Argentina and Latin America as a whole. The most obvious 
one was the question of Argentina’s integration with, and possible complete reliance on, global 
financial markets. Argentina’s Economic Plan of 1955 was to be first of several attempts to solve 
the paradox of stimulating economic growth without succumbing to “dependency” on foreign 
capital.3 Thus, unable to reconcile their corporatist political myths with market-oriented 
modernization, and against the backdrop of their still ambivalent attitudes towards the Peronism - 
a movement with which many had cooperated intimately - during the 1960s the nacionalistas 
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thereby splintered into distinguishable neo-fascist and post-fascist camps. It is the latter that is the 
subject matter of this chapter.  
 
Argentina’s right-wing ideologies in the Post-Peronist era (1955-1962) 
         Following an acute economic crisis, a bitter clash with the Catholic Church, and a state of 
near-civil war, in September 1955 the Argentine Armed Forces ousted Juan Perón, sending him to 
eighteen years in exile.4 Branded the “Liberating Revolution,” the coalition of forces sustaining 
this new regime agreed upon one enterprise: purging Argentina from Perón’s idiosyncratic 
movement. But what was the type of state that was to overcome the popular Peronist mobilization? 
For a brief moment, the nacionalistas, who had actively conspired against Perón in recent years, 
assumed the answer was to be a revolutionary military dictatorship.5 Indeed, Argentina’s new 
interim president, General Eduardo Lonardi, was everything a nacionalista nostalgic of the 1930s 
could wish for. An authoritarian leader from a traditional Catholic orientation, he disclosed his 
ideological leanings by appointing Mario Amadeo as Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Atilio 
Dell’Oro Maini as Minister of Education, and Juan Carlos Goyeneche as his own Press Secretary.  
          Ever since the 1920s, the Argentine Armed Forces favored nacionalista and ultra-catholic 
attitudes. León Justo Bengoa, Juan Francisco Guevara, and Eduardo Señorans, were merely the 
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more salient examples of Generals avowedly supporting the nacionalistas, and who would play a 
role in Argentine politics in later years.6 What is more, the generals truly believed they were the 
purest and most loyal servants of Argentina’s common good. Yet Lonardi’s government was to 
reveal precisely how profoundly the Cold War context had altered Argentine politics and the 
Armed Forces within it. The historical affinity of Lonardi’s ministers with Nazism and Francoism 
was met with discomfort in the USA. Worse yet, his conciliatory attitude towards Peronism - 
embodied in his “generous” pledge to reunite “winners” and “losers” -7 prompted a powerful anti-
Peronist and economically-liberal fraction in the military to act. On November 13, 1955, a group 
led by General Pedro Aramburu unseated Lonardi without resistance.8 The Argentine press reacted 
to this chain of events by ridiculing Lonardi and Amadeo’s “Francoist” leanings. “Gladly”, they 
confirmed, the latter was “Argentina’s Foreign Minister no more”9  
         Despite his personal disappointment, for Amadeo there was a valuable lesson to be learned 
from these events. A simple Deus ex machina military intervention, as in the 1930s, had become 
unfeasible in the Cold War circumstances, he concluded. Rather, a profound intellectual work was 
due, he thought, to prepare Argentina’s ruling elite for its future mission. When circumstances 
would be ripe, Amadeo believed, it would be civilians rather than generals who will replace 
democracy with an entirely original “popular” authoritarian system. A week after being ousted, 
Amadeo spoke of Perón as an “irresponsible despot,” but depicted Aramburu’s liberals in even 
worse terminologies: they represented a “tyranny of ideologues,” he said. Amadeo, in short, now 
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began entertaining the vision of a post-ideological regime, and saw Peronism as a misguided yet 
potentially valuable ally.10         
         Lonardi’s downfall made it obvious that the Armed Forces would not engage in a military 
dictatorship, but rather design a political system to their liking through intimidation and sporadic 
surgical interventions. “The Revolution does not seek to win votes or sympathies. It simply wants 
to avoid illusions, and save the country from moral and material chaos,” said Aramburu once in 
power.11 Despite murderously purging the country from Peronism,12 Aramburu’s tenure still saw 
a growing consensus within the Armed Forces that the days of the 1930-styled dictatorship were 
over; “The current Argentina is not the one of 1943 nor of 1930,” Aramburu stated.13 Liberated 
from “a totalitarian system,” added vice-president Isaac Rojas, meant Argentina could only return 
to being a protected democracy, purged from communism and Peronism.14 In short, as far as the 
Armed Forces were concerned, at this period at least, their role was to buttress the control of groups 
that could navigate Argentina away from these two ideological aberrations.  
          In 1955, nacionalismo thus entered a new era in its history, characterized by increasing 
ambiguity over the movement’s ideology in a post-Peronist age. In his 1956 book Ayer, hoy, 
mañana Amadeo began raising doubts whether there was a point in reviving the 1930s fascist 
fantasy. According to his follower Cosme Beccar Varela, by then he had abandoned the 
nacionalista camp entirely. “The time has come for synthesis [...] nationalism must disappear,” 
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was his interpretation of Amadeo’s message.15 Similarly, José María de Estrada depicted 
nacionalismo as “superb but confusing volksgeist” and announced the arrival of “the hour of 
synthesis and unity.”16 What type of regime did Amadeo and Estrada envision at this point? The 
answer was twofold. Primarily, they attacked Aramburu’s pledge to retrieve the parliamentary 
system. Political parties are “aggressive and bellicose” and thus “responsible for the failure of the 
national unity,” argued Amadeo.17 Secondly, Amadeo made a new crucial emphasis: Argentina 
must rid itself from revolutionary “messianism” and instead choose a “new force of national 
hierarchy.”18 While identifying this new agent with “technique,” Amadeo further advised replacing 
a “confessional” regime with a more moderate one, loyal to Argentina’s “Christian physiognomy.” 
More important, a military government, he stressed, “could be nominally presided over by a 
civilian, just as a purely civilized government could be headed by a senior military chief.”19 In 
1956, this was a preliminary forecast of Argentina’s 1966 technocratic experiment.  
         Other nacionalistas joined Amadeo in attacking the revolutionary jargon and contemplating 
on Argentina’s historical “ruling elites.” According to Carlo Scorza, an Italian fascist exile and the 
editor of Dinámica Social, only these elites could “make and demolish dictatorships.” Peronism, 
he further implied, was the failure of the ruling elites who neglected their duty. “The ruling class, 
when it feels powerless to solve a situation of crisis, delegates to one leader the responsibility of 
government that belongs strictly to its own historical function,” he said.20 Máximo Etchecopar 
added much to this discussion. His 1956 Esquema de la Argentina outlined what he thought would 
be Argentina’s novel third position. Nacionalismo, he said, originally had three goals: “1) a 
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concrete sense of the Argentineness vis-à-vis the anachronistic ideological vagueness of the so-
called democratic parties […] 2) recognition and evaluation of our Spanish past; 3) revision of 
Argentine history.” In other words, anti-Enlightenment, Hispanidad, and a historical revision of 
Argentina’s Federalism were, for Etchecopar, the basis for any future state.21 Relying heavily on 
Ortega y Gasset, Etchecopar then described Argentina’s elites as a “latently social aristocracy” 
that could assume a role as the agent of development.22 Indeed, what concerned Etchecopar most 
was material progress. Rather than putting ideology “in a supreme position over functionality,” it 
was time, he said, for a “technological and functional organization of the society.” This meant 
discarding the illusion that parliamentary democracy can function in Latin America and moving 
from a “political” to a “social” democracy.23 “Today, democracy is the technological organization 
of society,” stated Etchecopar,24 in what was, in essence, yet another preliminary technocratic-
authoritarian scheme.  
         Amadeo and Etchecopar’s post-fascist “synthesis” was far from being either intelligible or 
trendy in the late 1950s. Meanwhile, Perón’s downfall signaled a renaissance of several 
revolutionary-corporatist nacionalista platforms, in newspapers such as Bandera Popular and Azul 
y Blanco. Edited by Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, the latter began as an integrative effort and even 
presented, if for a while, Amadeo and ICH fellow Mariano Montemayor.25 As a result, Azul y 
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Blanco became one of the most popular nacionalista publications of its time.26 It is difficult to 
establish whether the nationalists then attracted a “substantial popular constituency” as some 
historians have argued, 27 but with Perón gone they were as vocal and conspicuous in the public 
sphere as they had ever been. Soon thereafter, however, things went awry, as a public feud 
appeared between Sánchez Sorondo and Amadeo within the context of the rise to power of one 
man: Arturo Frondizi.  
         While the nacionalistas attempted to define their ideological brand, other ideological projects 
appeared on Argentina’s political horizon offering alternative configurations for both neutralizing 
Peronism and integrating Argentina into the global economy. Ricardo Balbín’s party Unión Cívica 
Radical del Pueblo (UCRP) and Arturo Frondizi’s Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (UCRI) 
were the two obvious examples. Once elections were called in 1958, it was Frondizi’s model of 
“developmentalism” (“desarrollismo”) in particular that captivated the imagination of the 
Argentine public. Ostensibly acknowledging the prevalent Dependency Theory, Frondizi’s 
political platform offered an intricate formula for state-sponsored industrialization, presenting it 
as a guarantee for Argentina’s modernization and national sovereignty.28 More specifically, he 
envisioned a market-based formation of heavy industries, buoyed up by a government intensively 
investing in infrastructure.29 The way Frondizi saw it, only thereby was the Argentine society to 
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transcend its condition of “under-development” towards a “cultured” society where Peronist 
despotism could not reappear.30 
          His seeming sophistication notwithstanding, on May 1, 1958, Frondizi won a landslide 
victory in the general elections only after receiving Perón’s official endorsement.31 By then, 
Frondizi was also clearly catering to the traditionalist sector of the Argentine society. Periodically 
echoing corporatist themes, he pledged a “unity of workers,”32 “nacional pacification,” and the 
restorations of “social peace.”33 His official secular policies aside,34 and perhaps resonating the 
tradition of Hipólito Yrigoyen, Frondizi constantly evoked Christian symbolism, for instance by 
proclaiming that the Catholic faith “has been one of the fundamental factors of Argentina’s 
national unity”35 as well as the source of its “primordial” mission.36 It is no wonder, then, that his 
ideology attracted some nacionalistas. Once Amadeo joined Frondizi’s staff as Argentina’s 
ambassador to the UN, this sympathy became a political bond. There are many reasons to speculate 
why Amadeo chose this path. As his correspondence with Alfredo Sánchez Bella reveals, his main 
goal was political reputation. The nacionalistas had not abandoned their “cause,” he wrote, but 
were in need of an “increase of prestige,” as statesmen with proven governmental record.37 Like 
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the Spanish dictatorship, by now Amadeo and his followers accepted the rules of the Cold War 
and the USA’s hegemony. “Our old ideal of friendlier relations with the USA, while committed to 
mutual respect, now does not seem to be a utopia,” he told Sánchez Bella elsewhere.38  
          The clash between Sánchez Sorondo and Amadeo erupted immediately. As Amadeo aligned 
with Frondizi, Sánchez Sorondo attacked the new Argentine President’s policies, demanding 
instead an “organic” fascist-oriented state. As mentioned in chapter 1, Sánchez Sorondo perhaps 
admired Franco; yet he was absent from the Hispanidad projects of the 1950s. From this moment 
he became Argentina’s key theorist of revolutionary-syndicalism, as well as of the mythology of 
Juan Manuel de Rosas - in his words, Argentina’s sole moment of “authentic physiognomy.”39 In 
other words, the animosity between Amadeo and Sánchez Sorondo was symptomatic of the 
growing abyss between a neo-fascist revolutionary and a post-fascist authoritarian technocrat and 
touched on the political myth of the “corporative” society. For Sánchez Sorondo, corporatism was 
synonymous with a “national-syndicalist” revolution, wherein the state militantly mobilizes the 
working-class into a “front” - “clear, nationalist, and popular, beyond all parties”40 - towards a 
totalized “new order.”41 For Amadeo, “corporatism” meant a traditional elite retaking its historic 
role and organizing society around autonomous - if licensed by the state - guild-based associations, 
thereby fostering rapid market-oriented growth. In short, while both men aspired for a post-
ideological order, they disagreed profoundly over the strategy to achieve this goal. 
        Sánchez Sorondo’s circle never reached positions of political power.42 Nevertheless, these 
men were highly important in the public sphere in particular when it came to shaming Frondizi 
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and stirring the anti-Peronist generals (known as the “Gorilas”) against him.43 With the start of 
Frondizi’s December 1958 Stabilization Plan, which comprised of austerity measures in exchange 
for loans from the International Monetary Fund, Sánchez Sorondo deemed him an illegitimate 
president, portrayed him in caricatures with an elongated nose in a sickle shape, and brazenly 
demanded the Armed Forces to overthrow him.44 Now the fissure in the nacionalista movement 
separated those who were once close friends. Goyeneche sided with Sánchez Sorondo, thus 
breaking apart from Amadeo, and for a while, also from Franco’s Spain.45 International events 
were henceforth to exacerbate Frondizi’s economic and political distresses. 
 
The Cuban Revolution and the revitalization of the Argentine far-right, 1959-1963 
         There is a consensus among historians that the 1959 Cuban Revolution was a turning point 
in the course of the Cold War in Latin America.46 This is particularly true in the case of the 
Argentine Right. The fact that this revolution had been led by an Argentine nourished even further 
the Argentines’ anxieties over the possibility of his revolutionary movement reaching Southern 
America.47 In the words of historian Tulio Halperín Donghi, this event thus “spurred the political 
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climate that brought the Frondizi experience to its end.”48 While the Armed Forces and 
conservatives expected Frondizi to take a bold stance against communism, others - the Peronists 
for instance - expected him to express his sympathies with the Cuban struggle against the USA’s 
“imperialism.” In Amadeo’s opinion, Fidel Castro’s victory damaged Frondizi’s administration 
simply in that it gave Sánchez Sorondo’s nacionalistas further ammunition to attack the President. 
“The Cuban revolution, was the only reason for the revolutionary nacionalistas to stay in 
opposition to Frondizi; [thereafter they became] a much more violent opposition, devoid of any 
objectives,” he lamented.49 Indeed, from 1959 Azul y Blanco portrayed Frondizi as an outspoken 
communist.50  
         The Catholic church, under the leadership of the aforementioned Cardinal Caggiano, seized 
the opportunity to promote its own “combat against communism.”51 While addressing the first 
Inter-American Marian Congress in November 1960, Caggiano dedicated his pastoral message to 
attacking Marxism - the “Church’s total antithesis.”52 Frondizi attended this event. Here, he too 
sounded like a nacionalista, when stating the following: 
The unalterable union of the Cross and the Sword is the basis of our long and difficult 
national epic […]. In the face of communism’s ‘confusionist’ propaganda, which under the 
pretext of a real need for social justice introduces into nations the seed of hatred and of 
disintegration, the Christian social doctrine exhorts all men to unity and peace.53  
 
The pressure to appease the Armed Forces, while at the same time depending on Peronist voters, 
drove Frondizi further to the right. This could be clearly seen in 1960, as he embarked on his first 
European trip and decided to visit Francisco Franco. On July 7, 1960, Frondizi arrived in Madrid 
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in what was the first official visit of an Argentine president to Spain in history. The Argentine 
press was delighted rather than appalled. Clarín’s editor Renato Ciruzzi, for example, stated that 
“if Arturo Frondizi embodies Italy, Francisco Franco is Spain; and Italy and Spain are nothing 
more and nothing less than the Argentine self.”54 On this visit, Frondizi behaved like a true 
Francoist: he paid tribute to the Alcazar in Toledo and the Valley of the Fallen, the regime’s key 
monuments, compared Don Quixote to Argentina’s fictional gaucho character Martín Fierro, and 
stated that the Spanish essence had set the Latin American nations on “the general process of 
civilization.”55 Franco, for his part, again gave Frondizi what only he could grant a Latin American 
leader: a right-wing stamp of approval. In the case of Frondizi, it came in the shape of Spain’s 
highest honor: The Grand Collar of the Order of Queen Isabel.56 Reflecting on this event, Sánchez 
Bella confirmed that “the Grand Cross […] which the Generalisimo consider very appropriate, 
was the only way to maintain [Frondizi] spiritually with us,” and demanded that Frondizi united 
with Spain and Portugal, to “stop the demagoguery from Cuba.”57  
          Nevertheless, Frondizi’s rule began to deteriorate soon thereafter. Despite the anti-
communistic slogans, his appointment of the conservative Álvaro Alsogaray as Minister of the 
Economy under the military’s pressure, and even his anti-communistic Law of National Defense, 
the inconstancies in his ideology were obvious.58 For starters, he was unable to maintain a balance 
between the Peronist mobilization and the economic stipulations of the global markets. Worse yet, 
in August 1961, his insistence to meet with Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Buenos Aires, and his 
refusal to partake in the American embargo on Cuba, further angered the nacionalistas and the 
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generals.59 Hereafter, the more Frondizi emphasized development as the “antidote against 
communist penetration,”60 the more the nacionalistas attacked him. “Frondizi is like the portrait of 
the Dorian Gray,” Sánchez Sorondo wrote sarcastically, and demanded he be replaced by a 
“pending revolution” and a novel “organic democracy” - authentic movements that would undo 
Frondizi’s “petroleum contracts and the stipulations of the IMF.”61  
         The military coup d’état that ousted Frondizi, it is important to note, had little to do with 
Sánchez Sorondo’s neo-fascist slogans, but rather with the persistent power of Peronism.62 In 
reality, by the time of the Cuban Revolution began, the original filo-fascist nacionalista movement 
of the 1930s - whose members included Virgilio Filippo, Gustavo Franceschi, Carlos Ibarguren, 
and Leonardo Castellani, to name but a few - were either dead or barely visible in the Argentine 
public sphere.63 Aside from Sánchez Sorondo, the other ideologues to voice any coherent neo-
fascist ideology then were Julio Meinvielle and Jordan Genta. A neo-fascist and director of the 
journal Combate, in 1963 the latter published a seminal book by the name of Guerra 
contrarrevolucionaria: doctrina política - a text directed at the Armed Forces that divided the 
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world into simple “positive” and “negative” “doctrines” and that voiced proposals for a 
“corporativist or syndicalist” state and staunch anti-Semitic assertions.64 
         Argentina’s more noticeable neo-fascist phenomenon appeared during Frondizi’s tenure but 
within different milieus: the neo-fascist paramilitary bands.65 Established in 1957, and led for the 
most part by two youngsters named Ignacio Alberto Ezcurra Medrano and Joe Baxter, the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara (MNT) in particular achieved notoriety for its attacks on 
members of the Argentine Jewish community. Allegedly inspired by neo-fascist figures such as 
the French fascist and future member of the neo-Nazi movement CEDADE Jacques De Mahieu,66 
Tacuara propagated, however, a rather insipid neo-fascist ideology, comprising of appeals for a 
“national-syndicalist revolution.” It is almost redundant to speak of a link between Tacuara’s 
“basic revolutionary program” and the Falange’s Twenty-six Points as the former quite obviously 
plagiarizes the latter, in a genealogy leading back to Mussolini.67 A somewhat short-lived episode 
in nacionalista history, Tacuara was nonetheless important as it was symptomatic of the urge 
within a younger conservative generation to reintroduce both the nationalist-syndicalist lexicon 
and the fascist cult of violence into Argentine politics in the early 1960s.  
         As the neo-fascists turned to street violence, other figures on the Argentine Right pursued 
more respectable ideological affiliations. Ciudad Católica, Cursillos de la Cristiandad, and Opus 
Dei, were several examples of international associations that arrived in Argentina at this point, 
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offering new approaches to elite political action. In the early 1960s, the Cursillos opened several 
centers for “spiritual exercises” in Argentina that quickly attracted conservatives and Military 
personnel alike. Ciudad Católica (Cité Catholique) assumed a more aggressive role. Founded in 
France in 1946 by Jean Ousset, this anti-modern movement was introduced in Argentina in 1959 
by George Grasset and Roberto Gorostiaga. Upon their journal Verbo, they promulgated the work 
of various traditionalists, including the abovementioned Vásques de Mella.68 By obeying the 
“rights of God” rather than the “right of man,” they vowed to eradicate what they believed was an 
interconnected revolution that included “Renaissance, Reformation, The French Revolution, and 
Communism.”69 Strikingly, whereas the Catholic Church and its conventional organizations 
(Acción Católica, for instance) moved increasingly towards progressive stances,70 these three 
spiritual affiliations posed a clear call for immediate “elite” anti-revolutionary militancy.71 Thus, 
rather than the revolutionary nacionalistas, it was they who attracted members of Armed Forces 
the most, frequently serving as a new nexus between the generals and “civil” intellectual world. 
          In the same vein, other youngsters sought to lead nacionalismo towards new directions. 
Cosme Beccar Varela (Jr.) and Federico J. Ezcurra are a case in point. Since 1956 the two edited 
the journal Cruzada (to be joined by Reconquista in 1962). Not by coincidence, these men were 
also intimately linked to the Francoist apparatus. Cosme Beccar Varela senior, a nacionalista 
himself, was a friend and business partner of Sánchez Bella,72 and as a result, in 1957, Beccar 
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Varela Jr. and Ezcurra arrived in Madrid as the ICH’s guests of honor.73 Unlike Tacuara, the 
Cruzada youngsters were anti-revolutionary to the extent that they accepted neither Perón’s 
Constitution of 1949 nor Argentina’s Constitution of 1853 as valid texts, since “neither conformed 
to the Hispanic and Catholic spirit of our Nation.”74 As far as they were concerned, they abided 
only to “the Spanish way of life” and its unique vision of the “Orthodox Catholic Cosmos.”75 
Similarly to Amadeo, Beccar Varela believed that Argentina was witnessing a rise of new spiritual 
youth. Suddenly, in this “country dormant in its secular liberalism,” he said, a young generation 
arises that “speaks of something else, that speaks of God, […] a generation that rescues its 
authentic ancestry from the past.”76  
          Tellingly, Cruzada did not identify as a nacionalista group but as yet another third position,77 
seeking a “synthesis of the national and the social.”78 And like Amadeo, they too parted company 
from Azul y Blanco in the late 1950s. “By no means would we want to join the long list of their 
fanatical and unpopular detractors,” they said.79 As a new source of inspiration, the group aligned 
with the work of Brazilian intellectual Dr. Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira, and his movement, Tradição, 
Família e Propriedade.80 Having found his ideology equivalent to Hispanidad - as a transnational 
anti-modern movement that would save Argentina from revolution “caused by an explosion of 
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pride and sensuality”81 - the Cruzada group and Amadeo would be thereafter central in sponsoring 
the opening of a Tradición, Familia y Propiedad branch in Argentina.  
          Sánchez Bella, by then Franco’s ambassador in Rome, watched these activities with delight. 
Writing Beccar Varela, he said:  
I just received last May’s Cruzada and I wish to convey my cordial congratulations to you 
for the excellent ideology it contains […] You cannot imagine how much we appreciate this 
orientation and the clear defense of our principles, which the anachronistic and rambling 
liberalism has been trying to remove from the history and the life of our nations. [...] your 
task is essential and must be continued, possibly extended to the whole continent […] The 
Yankee takeoff has begun, as has the decline of the USSR, but our America cannot become 
either. The revolution of the middle-class, which seems inevitable, must be done on the basis 
of firm respect for the Catholic religion and Hispanic traditions.82  
 
Clearly, even before the rise of the Cold War Détente, this quintessential Francoist thinker was 
urging his confidants to commit to a market-oriented “revolution of the middle-classes,” adherent 
to Hispanidad principles.83 Sánchez Bella was therefore bothered by Amadeo’s ongoing affiliation 
with Frondizi. These “false democratic scruples […] lead nowhere,” he told him.84 Amadeo 
agreed. His working with Frondizi, he replied, was not a break from the nacionalista values but 
from coup d’état tactics (“golpismo”). Sánchez Sorondo’s “impotence to consolidated into 
something solid and organic seems irremediable,” he said - “their ‘golpismo’ has no horizons.”85 
Nacionalismo, in other words, was to discover “solid and organic” ways to attain power, Amadeo 
believed. These changes in Amadeo’s positions could further be seen in 1960 as he returned to 
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Madrid, now as an Argentine official, and met with Franco,86 an encounter that left him 
unimpressed. “The interview with the Caudillo lasted exactly 4-3 minutes,” he reported to Sánchez 
Bella: “[Franco] spoke almost exclusively [and presented] a severe criticism of demo-liberalism 
with an exposition of a somewhat anachronistic corporatist thought.”87 Apparently, Amadeo felt 
he had transcended the Caudillo’s own corporatist rhetoric by then.  
         The schism between Argentina’s far-right ideological positions became more severe as 
Frondizi’s regime began swirling into crisis in 1961. Amadeo and Sánchez Sorondo were now 
conducting a battle of words. When it was revealed that Sánchez Sorondo had been a part of a 
Peronist plot to topple Frondizi, it was Amadeo who, despite their rivalry, helped to discharge his 
colleague. Ungratefully, “Marcelo [Sánchez Sorondo] responded with a press article ‘disowning’ 
my administration and personally criticizing me for ‘selling out’ the country,” Amadeo complained 
to Sánchez Bella.88 Evidently, by then Amadeo could not conceal the fact the movement he had 
once led had splintered into two antagonistic camps. Reflecting on Azul y Blanco he then 
concluded: “I think that the hatred of Frondizi blinds them so that they refuse to see the obvious: 
[…] the government will not fall by a military coup, but if that happens it would be a disgrace.”89 
        Amadeo’s predictions were erroneous. Frondizi’s inability to incorporate the ever-powerful 
Peronist movement meant that by then the Armed Forces began doubting to the democratic order 
altogether. More specifically, when Frondizi allowed the Peronists to run for office in the March 
1962 municipal elections, a faction within the Armed Forces finally decided to act, as we shall see 
in the next section. The point to be taken from the Frondizi-Amadeo relationship is that ultimately 
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Frondizi was a conservative politician who maintained intimate links with authoritarian leaders 
such as Franco, and later, even with Sánchez Bella personally.90 Frondizi was neither a communist 
nor a zealous democrat. If anything, he was the Argentine middle-classes’ faint response to Perón’s 
intrinsic ideological fluidity. Ultimately, Sánchez Bella was more insightful than Amadeo when 
observing that Frondizi lacked “a doctrine and political mysticism.” Therefore, Argentina’s future, 
he told Amadeo, “does not belong to this type of democratic freedom.” His letter ended with yet 
another advice: “If our nations aspire to live they will have to accept authority as a lesser evil and 
as the only means to preserve their true liberties.”91  
 
Ateneo de la República, and Argentina’s “Hispanic” revival 
         On March 29, 1962, the commanders of Argentina’s three Armed Forces overthrew Dr. 
Arturo Frondizi from the presidency, placing instead an interim government designed to lead the 
country through a new electoral process. Shortly thereafter, the Argentine public became 
acquainted with two epithets that represented two sides of an ideological struggle within the Armed 
Forces: Azules (“blues”) and Colorados (“reds”). Save for a few exceptions, ever since 1955 the 
generals agreed that the Peronist movement was an aberration from Argentina’s national spirit. 
They differed considerably, however, over the question of whether they themselves should 
permanently take over the state, or rather sustain a “legalist” protected democracy instead. 
Ideologically, the Colorados were the extreme faction, and vaguely reverberated the attitudes of 
the neo-fascist nacionalistas. Their precise far-right leanings would become apparent in 1976, as 
members of this very group took over the state. The Azules, for their part, were no less 
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ideologically nebulous, and agreed mainly on the principle of keeping the Armed Forces “out of 
politics.” As their emerging leader, Juan Carlos Onganía, explained in later years: “the army 
supported the thesis that ‘the people want to vote’ but, at the same time, [wanted to achieve] a truly 
democratic system that would ensure peace, freedom, and well-being.” The Azules, he insisted, 
believed in “a right to vote but not to restore a criminal regime.”92 Following two deadly 
showdowns, in September 1962 and April 1963, the Azules finally overpowered the Colorados. 
From this moment, with the parliamentary system as their mercy, further authoritarian 
interventions lay in store for the Argentine democracy.93 
         There was an immediate sense of mutual recognition between the Azul faction and Amadeo’s 
technocratic-authoritarian affiliation. During the 1963 general elections, the two sides partook in 
a failed initiative that, at one point, considered endorsing Onganía as a candidate against the 
Radical Party candidate Arturo Illia.94 Yet it would take three more years for this collaboration to 
finally coalesce into solid political action. From Amadeo’s letters, it is clear that rather than 
communism, the Colorado’s “golpismo” was the more immediate threat he saw to the Argentine 
society. “I wish to point out to you that my preference for a constitutional regime is not based on 
any fetishism towards liberal institutions, but because I believe that the rule of law is the only 
element that can preserve us from chaos,” he explained to Sánchez Bella. Then he noted:   
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The struggle is not between those who are for ‘representative democracy’ and those who are 
against it, but between those who understand that what is necessary is a profound renovation 
of collective consciousness under an essentially Christian insignia, and those who want to 
maintain, violently, the old economic-social structures.  
 
Dictatorship, he thus contended, must be market-oriented and spiritualist in order to thrive.95 
        Even before the 1963 elections, Amadeo and his group had begun designing an alternative to 
Argentina’s fifty-years old parliamentary system. For this purpose, towards the end of 1962, they 
founded a colloquium by the name of Ateneo de la República. Like Pérez Embid’s Ateneo de 
Madrid - albeit doubtfully inspired from it - Amadeo’s Ateneo was, in the simplest terms, an elite 
forum designed to outline Argentina’s authoritarian future, and comprising of technocratic-
authoritarian nacionalistas such as Máximo Etchecopar, Santiago de Estrada, Eduardo Roca, and 
Basilio Serrano. To the press, the Ateneo presented itself as a body that would not serve “any 
political sector but rather the superior interests of the Argentine public, always identified with the 
unalterable Christian tradition and national sentiment.” It aspired, it stated, for a “democratic” 
future, “through elections,” but also believed that “important political, social, and economic 
transformations must be undertaken before that.”96 In its opening session, on December 21, 1962, 
Amadeo was even more candid about the fundamental right “to be ruled by a dictatorship,” along 
with a “civil government.” This regime, he assured, will be a legal one given its “authentic and 
realistic” pledge. In contrast, he stressed that “parliamentary systems” are not authentic, and 
therefore should be jettisoned. Only this new integrative movement could successfully incorporate 
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Peronism, he predicted optimistically. In short, Amadeo’s nacionalismo had transformed into a 
call for a civic post-ideological dictatorship.97  
         The Ateneo featured a new brand of young technocratic thinkers, many of whom were 
Amadeo’s disciples. Mario Díaz Colodrero was the more striking example. Not only was he 
Amadeo’s declared “protégé,”98 but he was also an ICH fellow who studies in Madrid in 1949, 
and who along with intellectuals Mariano Montemayor and Cleremiro Ledesma, befriended 
Sánchez Bella.99 Another similar case was Nicanor Costa Méndez, the Ateneo’s future director 
and another ICH fellow. Then, there were the young publicists Enrique M. Pearson, Enrique 
Peltzer, Jorge Mazzinghi, and Samuel W. Medrano - all of whom studied at the ICH in Madrid 
and were to serve as functionaries in Onganía’s regime. Not by coincidence, Díaz Colodrero, 
Mazzinghi, and Medrano joined the Opus Dei as supernumeraries. Thus, there was a recurring 
pattern in these men’s biographies, starting with an early Francoist political education and ending 
with a distinctive pattern of political activism in the 1960s.  
          In 1963, the Ateneo reached out to other ideological groups overseas with new initiatives. 
In one case, Amadeo contacted Sánchez Bella asking for assistance in organizing a “two-week 
symposium in Buenos Aires, with Italian and Spanish specialists” to discuss the “process of 
economic and social recovery, held in their countries.”100 The event’s planners, Díaz Colodrero, 
Dr. José Rafael Trozzo, and Monsignor Gerónimo Podesta, were  “especially interested in Mr. 
López Rodó,” Amadeo wrote.101 Trozzo, a banker from a prestigious Argentine family, was 
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another Ateneo affiliate, who had been ICH fellow in the past and Opus Dei supernumerary in the 
present.102 That he and Díaz Colodrero sought the knowledge of Franco’s key Opus Dei 
“specialists in economic development,”103 was illuminating as it was predictable.  
          By then, Amadeo had no illusions that the future of Argentina lay in the hands of the Azules. 
“When the military process is over,” he said to Sánchez Bella, “the political process will begin 
[…] This means that the next president must be the leader of the triumphant group [the Azules], 
or the person he designates.”104 Hence, Amadeo and Etchecopar resorted to the tactic of presenting 
their association as a think-tank in the service of the Azules in the eventuality of a military 
takeover. It is difficult to assess what type of intellectual activity took place at the Ateneo, since 
many of its meetings where not documented or published. Speaking later of the Ateneo’s 
“magnificent achievements” Amadeo told Sánchez Bella that it began with a “ghostly existence,” 
but later on, displayed “a remarkable cultural and social activity.”105 Amadeo, for once, was not 
exaggerating. With the incisive Etchecopar as its director, by 1965 the Ateneo de la República was 
one of the more respected think-tanks in Argentina’s far-right intellectual panorama.  
         The Ateneo’s activity cannot be understood disconnected from the further upsurge of 
Hispanidad ideology in Argentina at the time, and the new bridges between Argentina and 
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Francoism. If in the 1950s a politician visiting Franco was considered a political outcast, then 
following Frondizi’s celebratory visit to Spain the relationship between the nations blossomed. 
Two things demonstrate this. The first was the establishment of Argentina’s Nuestra senora de 
Lujan College in Madrid. On February 5, 1963, Spain and Argentina’s vice-ministers of Education, 
Luis Legaz y Lacambra and Francisco Eduardo Trusso, signed the delivery of this institution in 
Madrid.106 Later named “Casa de la Argentina,” it was designed to accommodate hundreds of 
Argentine students in Madrid.107 Next came the opening of the ICH center in Buenos Aires, in 
November 1965. Argentina’s top officials and the ICH director, Gregorio Marañon Moya, all 
attended this event.108 That the Ateneo was intimately linked with the new ICH center can be 
inferred from the fact that Mazzinghi served as one of its General Secretaries, while Amadeo, Díaz 
Colodrero, and José Mariano Astigueta were its board members.109 In 1965, these men were even 
the guests of the ICH in Madrid. As Mazzinghi recalled in later years, “in January of 1965, several 
friends had resolved to participate in the trip: Astigueta, Goyeneche, Díaz Colodrero, Pearson.” 
There they experienced “conferences, night walks, and a climate of great joy and friendship.”110 
The Madrid dailies, for their part, praised Mazzinghi’s “fervent pilgrimage” to Spain, and spoke 
of his mission to “reinvigorate traditional relations with the Mother Nation.”111 The Buenos Aires 
ICH branch presented its students with a host of activities, ranging from nacionalista indoctrination 
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to “proper” pedagogical training. The courses taught at the ICH were overall a reflection of the 
Ateneo’s priorities and included lectures by Amadeo, Sepich, Serrano, José Maria de Estrada, and 
Catholic pedagogues such as Luis Zanotti and Alfredo Van Gelderen.112  
          What is more, the Ateneo and the ICH both held a direct contact with the Spanish embassy, 
which as in the case of Chile, had become a nucleus of Francoist ideological and military education 
by the mid-1960s. Significantly, Spain’s military attaché in Argentina during the 1960s was Jaime 
Milans del Bosch, the planner of Spain’s February 1981 failed coup d’état. And tellingly, the 
ambassador, José María Alfaro, and the embassy’s cultural attaché, José Ignacio Ramos, were both 
active members on the Buenos Aires ICH board.113 Additionally, the embassy attracted several 
Argentine generals - General Sánchez de Bustamante, for instance - to whom Amadeo referred to 
as a “great friend of Spain.”114 Briefly put, while publishing fairly little, the Ateneo played a crucial 
role in Argentina’s elite politics, as a promoter of novel ideologies of the state, and as importantly, 
as the nexus with the ICH and technocratic Spain.  
 
Cuadernos del Sur: The design of a post-ideological state and society  
        In 1964, the Opus Dei initiated one of its most ambitious intellectual collaborations: The 
Argentine-Chilean journal Cuadernos del Sur. Officially a “Southern Cone” project, it brought 
together Argentine, Chilean, and Spanish intellectuals with the avowed intention of crafting a 
comprehensive “development” strategy for Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Retrospectively, 
critical voices have spoken of the Opus Dei as a “mysterious group” promoting a military coup 
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against the democratic regime.115 As I will demonstrate shortly, there was hardly anything 
mysterious about the way Cuadernos del Sur disseminated its ideology. Still, it is important to 
examine the intellectual work of this journal for two essential reasons. For one, here we can assess 
the similitude and the differences between the Opus Dei’s ideology inside and outside of Franco’s 
Spain. After all, Cuadernos del Sur shrewdly suggested undoing the democratic order in the 
countries in which it appeared - a context dissimilar from that of Franco’s dictatorship. Secondly, 
as the Cuadernos del Sur editors were to become Onganía’s ministers and functionaries, it is 
worthwhile comparing their hypothetical theories of state with the actual state-ideology they put 
forward later, once in power.  
        Cuadernos del Sur was the brainchild of the two aforementioned Opus Dei priests José 
Miguel Ibañaez Langlois and Ernesto García Alesanco. Returning from Spain, the two sought to 
launch an original Argentine-Chilean intellectual project that would assemble, and hopefully unite, 
the right-wing networks of the Southern Cone. Ibañez Langlois maintained a close relationship 
with his tutor Florentino Pérez Embid, who encouraged his disciples to broaden their activities in 
Chile.116 On May 7, 1964, Ibañez Langlois turned to Pérez Embid with an unusual request. “A 
cultural magazine of contemporary problems will soon appear, […] in the area that includes 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. The ‘South American Europe’, not?” the letter opened. Then, 
Ibañez Langlois expressed his desire to borrow texts from Perez Embid’s own journal Atlántida, 
given the “whirlwind blowing in these cultural areas” of Latin America. His appeal is revealing as 
it indicates not only that the initiative to establish ideological publications originated at the Opus 
Dei’s Latin America branches, but also that under the guise of “cultural journal” its intellectuals 
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aspired to solve “problems” that were political in essence. Ibañez Langlois concluded his letter 
with a pledge to “shock the bourgeois” (épater le bourgeois); referring to the 19th century 
Decadence Movement, he thereby sought to define his own spiritual crusade against America’s 
middle-class moral decay and apathy.117  
          Like Arco and Istmo before it, Cuadernos del Sur was identical to Nuestro Tiempo and 
Atlántida structurally and aesthetically. While never officially admitting its linkage to the Opus 
Dei apparatus, it tellingly published the work of Opus Dei intellectuals such as José Orlandis, 
Antonio Fontán,118 García Hoz, Amadeo de Fuenmayor,119 Frederick Wilhelmsen,120 and even 
Escrivá de Balaguer himself.121 Later, the journal’s readers were further introduced to the work of 
Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Jesús Urteaga.122 In this sense, this was by far the most visible 
Opus Dei intellectual project in Latin America at the time. 
         Despite being Ibáñez Langlois’s initiative, wealthy Argentine families financed and directed 
Cuadernos del Sur, and according to Ibáñez’s own recollections, it was therefore essentially an 
Argentine publication.123 Its chief editor was Eugenio Antonio Brusa, one of Ismael Sánchez 
Bella’s first recruits at the Opus Dei’s Argentine center.124 Its board of directors comprised of Díaz 
Colodrero and Carlos Mendioroz, as well as other Catholic intellectuals such as Enrique Mario 
Mayochi, Thomist thinker Raul Echauri, and Chilean intellectuals Fernando Orrego Vicuña and 
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Carlos Ruíz-Tagle. Being Ateneo members, Díaz Colodrero and Mendioroz were the obvious tie 
between the two associations.125 Nicanor Costa Méndez, while not contributing to Cuadernos del 
Sur, was linked to the Opus Dei apparatus as the head of Argentine Editorial Pomaire, and could, 
therefore, be included in this network.126 As always, the Opus Dei sought to assemble different 
far-right elements into one ideological and political action. Its collaborators included, on the side 
of the Chilean far-right, the hispanistas Arturo Fontaine,127 Hugo Montes, Guillermo Blanco, 
Ricardo Krebs, and Julio Phillipi. They were joined by the Opus Dei’s historian Bernardino Bravo 
Lira (numerary) and ultra-conservative ideologues such as Armando Roa. On the Argentine side, 
the journal presented a collaboration with La Nación. Argentina’s leading conservative daily, its 
columnists Carlos Alberto Floria and Jorge Brinkmann often appeared in Cuadernos del Sur.  
         From its opening declaration, it was obvious that high culture was not entirely what this 
journal fostered. Rather Cuadernos del Sur took upon itself to answer the “great conflict” of 
contemporary society. More concretely, it spoke of the “Catholic’s paradox” wherein one is 
“immersed in one’s period and country,” but is at the same time is a “universal citizen par 
excellence.” Cuadernos del Sur hence aimed to bring together “all those who sincerely yearn for 
the effective unity of the countries of Southern America, whose cultural integration must be 
pursued, given the moral and ethnic kinship that binds them.”128 This assuaged version of 
Hispanidad a la Opus Dei, presented the Catholic as a universal crusader, only then to stress that 
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the South Americans should unite due to their ethnic singularity. But Cuadernos del Sur did not 
only speak to conservative elites. Instead, it was one of many publications addressing what 
historian Sebastián Carassai has labeled the “non-Peronist middle classes” - those who had 
abandoned the “hope of a country […] governable without a Peronist majority.”129 In the last 
section of this chapter, I will touch on the new types of journalism that appeared in the mid-1960s 
in the Argentine public sphere. For now, suffice it to say that Cuadernos del Sur was original in 
the way it replaced the nacionalista textuality with a “civilized” debate over what was, at heart, a 
roadmap for an authoritarian regime.   
          From the outset, Cuadernos del Sur honed in on two aspects of state ideology as it saw it: 
the political-economical arrangement of society and the spiritual order that should guarantee its 
social harmony. Again, political action appeared here as an altruistic “service:” the technocratic-
authoritarian agent serves society through efficiency, was the thesis. “The vocation of the politician 
implies the wish to serve a community. The service of the politician is not only a renunciation but 
the social utility of that surrender,” proclaimed Carlos Floria. “The political leader must justify his 
ideology with effective action. If it fails in practice, the very justification of his rule is upset,” he 
clarified. Next, Floria spoke of economic “development” in the following manner: 
This is more than a necessity: it is a collective belief and, in the end, a form of legitimation 
of power. Beyond the rhetorical mentality, today a technical mentality is imposed on us. […] 
politics has been rationalized. And the political leader is concerned with the conciliation 
between that high level of humanity that personalized power implies, and this 
demythologization of power that rationalized power assumes.130 
 
Thus, Cuadernos del Sur espoused two positions: first, only an exceptional and ideologically 
neutral leader can serve the “rational” and “technical” common good; second, this agent obviously 
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is a spiritual Catholic, aware of his universal duty. Gradually, Cuadernos del Sur also detailed the 
specifics of its development “technique.” A special volume dedicated to the topic saw Opus Dei 
and traditionalists figures advising future governments on the “purposes of development” and the 
“most appropriate ‘techniques’ to produce it.” On the one hand, Amadeo and Phillipi underscored 
a Hispanic spiritual and hemispheric unification as the basis of economic progress.131 On the other 
hand, Díaz Colodrero, Santiago de Estrada, and Ibáñez Langlois promoted a technocratic-
authoritarian mindset, whereby “planning requires power - a centralized power to a degree which 
the old absolutisms would envy” - a unique condition that unfortunately “will certainly undermine 
personal freedom.”132     
          In a similar fashion, Ibáñez Langlois stated that ideologies, or the “classical isms,” have been 
“transformed and blended to an indefinitely complex and subtle point.” Subsequently, the 
technician, he said, was to be the “true author of the material progress of our days.” Yet Ibáñez 
Langlois also posed a caveat: this agent might also “bring to the social order his professional 
deformation […] wanting to apply to society the mechanical concept of his world.” Therefore, 
what is needed, suggested the Opus Dei priest, was a regime that would transcend the duality of 
“technocracy” versus “statism.” Ultimately, he thought, technocracy is futile without spiritual 
guidance. In his words:     
The future of freedom depends on the spiritual force capable of teaching us to use the tools 
of power and technology without self-destruction. […] But who will inject into the souls of 
the masses who drive machines, […] who exercise technical or bureaucratic functions, that 
inner space of freedom, warning, deliberation, of intimacy that redeems humanity from the 
immense machinery? The problem is, ultimately, religious.133  
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This was, by far, one of the more cunning texts to be written by an Opus Dei ideologue, as Ibáñez 
Langlois clearly anticipated the anti-capitalist critique. Therefore, he himself scolded the “empty 
specialist” and capitalist “dehumanization,” only thereafter to propose adding the “spiritual force” 
to the neoliberal formula, as the precondition to any successful social development.   
          Cuadernos del Sur often debated the very essence of mankind. Primarily, its intellectuals 
afforded much effort to deconstruct both the crux of Marxist historical materialism and the 19th 
century capitalist “homo economicus” commonsense. “Human nature suffers an intrinsic tension, 
a kind of intimate dialectic [...] anchored and compelled towards the community, by an imperious 
necessity of the spirit,” observed Argentine pedagogue Marcos Ronchino, a numerary and yet 
another original member of the local Opus Dei branch. This traumatic dependence on society, was, 
for Ronchino, the core of the human “spirit.” Next, Ronchino suggested that this very ontology of 
the human spirit should become the basis for the design of modern economies. Alienation can be 
answered, he said, through spiritual “improvement” (perfeccionamiento), wherein production of 
material goods “serves to improve the spiritual nature of man.” Failing to do so, he warned, would 
mean, “technology or economic development cease to be human.”134 Ronchino’s spiritual 
alternative to the Marxist and capitalist materialisms was never answered here in programmatic 
terms. The only hint to what this so-called “development” meant came from Díaz Colodrero, who 
similarly to French and Spanish technocrats of the time, theorized “development” in terms of 
administrative “rationalization” and territorial “integration.”135  
           Cuadernos del Sur’s writers were somewhat more lucid when rebuking parliamentary 
democracy as an inauthentic “fiction,” thereby presenting the post-ideological dictatorship as its 
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indisputable substitute. Brussa, for example, plainly denounced Argentina’s parliamentary system 
and pinned its crisis not on military interventions but on the “political immaturity” of the masses, 
which, by 1965, has created an “exclusively formalist” democracy.136 Other “anti-ideological” 
undertones soon followed. García Alesanco, like Fernández de la Mora, advocated “freedom” as 
an opposite to “ideology.” “In Latin America we pay a high price for an ideological political life 
[...] a theoretical fabrication that sought visions of infallibility often without connection to reality. 
This is a dictatorship of abstractions [...] the totalitarianism of ideologies,” he proclaimed.137  
          In turn, the Opus Dei spokesmen presented themselves as mediators who could transcend 
this ideological dreadlock. “Technology, economic development, the awakening of the proletariat, 
are facts,” Ibáñez Langlois admitted. However, under the guise of “Christian social reform,” what 
he in fact advocated was a regime that would replace parliamentarism altogether.138 The future 
demands, he said, “a political regime of undoubtedly authoritarian but not despotic character, 
which renounces the formal values of democracy and preserves its essential content, thus purifying 
the socialist state from aphorisms and assimilate its technical efficiency and planning 
dynamism.”139 To complement what was essentially a call for technocratic-authoritarianism, he 
explained that only Christianity possess the “secret of that fragile and precious balance.”140 In a 
word: the Southern Cone’s authoritarian technocrats believed themselves to be technicians of the 
economy and of the spirit, simultaneously.   
           Cuadernos del Sur also spoke of education, a field the Opus Dei felt confortable providing 
its abundant pedagolgical theorization. The recurrent appearance of Víctor García Hoz upon the 
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journal’s pages was a clear indicator of who their main point of reference was.141 As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, this Opus Dei pedagogue epitomized the enterprise of producing a 
balanced theory of “liberty” within “order” in Spain’s education system. By the late 1960s, García 
Hoz had also become one of UNESCO’s chief executives and, as a result, an even bigger authority 
on matters of education. His interlocutors in Cuadernos del Sur were Ronchino and Samuel 
Medrano, once a Cursos de Cultura Católica member and a historical revisionist in the present, 
who was famous for demanding to rediscover Argentina’s “spiritual principles.”142 With them 
came other reactionary educators, who, in the late 1960s, would serve as a distinctive pedagogical 
think-tank in Onganía’s regime. One example was Jorge Luis Zanotti, a La Nación commentator 
and a fierce Catholic. These figures all contributed to a debate over the formation of reverent, 
obedient, and technically-efficient men.143  
          Above all, Cuadernos del Sur was exceptional even for an Opus Dei journal for struggling 
in the name of public morality. In so doing, it touched on issues that until the mid-1960s had been 
relatively overlooked in far-right publications. The 1960s brought with them, the Opus Dei 
thought, extraordinary moral threats, inseparable from the political debate. Given that Chile and 
Argentina were democratic societies and unquestionably more pluralist than Franco’s Spain - and 
thereby more susceptible to the influence of 1960s cultural trends - the campaign Cuadernos del 
Sur waged is understandable. Yet interestingly rather than a religious crusade, public morality 
appeared on its pages as a crucial component in a quasi-scientific, psychological, and even 
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environmental debate.144 For the Opus Dei, children were a societal, economic, and spiritual 
blessing, and therefore the mere option to contain human reproductions was not only a sin but 
counterproductive for society at large.145 True, these were not unusual positions for a Catholic 
journal. Only that Cuadernos del Sur never presented itself as one. “Divorce is problematic in the 
light of faith, and also in the light of pure natural law as well as social hygiene,” declared its 
editors.146 Later in 1967, a special volume dedicated to “marriage and family today” saw Ibáñez 
Langlois leading the pseudo-scientific discussion on the destruction divorce could inflict on 
modern society. Under the guise of a “cultural journal” Cuadernos del Sur hence debated 
extremely polemical issues in a monolithic voice, and in the name of science and economic 
progress. “Development is inseparable from the increase in population,” were the telling words of 
Brazilian Opus Dei affiliate Isídoro D. Cuervo.147   
          As could be expected, Ibáñez Langlois used his own journal to attack the use of 
contraceptives.148 Even more so than in Spain, his anti-Malthusian rhetoric betrayed a powerful 
sense of self-victimization. “Family planning in Latin America is an act of ‘cultural colonialism,’” 
he opined. In a world sensitive to the rights of “self-determination,” Latin America’s “cultural 
substratum” was nonetheless invaded “with all the weapons of science and technology,” he further 
explained.149 Put differently, Cuadernos del Sur depicted birth control as a crisis of regional 
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sovereignty. To this, Ibáñez Langlois added even more cunning feminist argumentations. 
Women’s “redemption by contraception,” he said, was false:  
It does not solve the problem of abortion, and possibly tends to exert it; contraception does 
not solve world hunger; contraception does not liberate women nor promote a happier 
motherhood: contraception erodes the foundations of the family institution: contraception 
promotes the spiritual aging of a society, gerontocracy, and premature sclerosis; 
contraception has the effects of a classist, monopolistic, colonialist, paternalistic policy.150 
 
One can notice here feminist theory - as Ibáñez Langlois perceived it at least - blending with anti-
colonial rhetoric in a rant against what had been, in essence, a private matter between adults. Again, 
Cuadernos del Sur was not the only middle-class journal at the time questioning the impact of 
birth control on society.151 Yet it was the particular sense of being ill-treated by an “other” 
modernity that was the Opus Dei’s emotional device, and the basis for a concrete call to legally 
and politically protect Latin America idiosyncratic spirituality.  
          Sexuality in and of itself concerned Ibáñez Langlois even more than the limitation of 
population growth. Unlike Urteaga, he treated the separation of sexuality from procreation not in 
theological terms but in psychological and sociological ones. Man’s interference with sexuality is 
an “intervention in the metaphysical structure of the psyche,” he argued, which led to “social and 
psychic mutations.” By breaking the “biological laws that envelop their metaphysical origin,” man 
is not freed from anything but becomes a “slave” to the “pressures of desire,” was Ibáñez’s 
intransigent stance. For him, even sexual liberation within wedlock was harmful. Or in his words: 
“what is really unleashes, is not love but pleasure - a sexual energy liberated from responsibility, 
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which revolves around itself in a closed circle of delight and leads to selfishness.”152 This pointless 
sexuality, he implied, could cause immense confusion and, subsequently, homosexuality.153 Again, 
these were not surprising words coming for a Catholic priest. What was extraordinary were 
Ibáñez’s conclusions: that any misgivings regarding “demographic explosion” or 
“underdevelopment” should be ignored in the name of this alleged spiritual “economy.”154 In 
confronting the 1960s sexual excess, the Opus Dei also proposed concrete strategies. Fernando 
Jacobelli, one of the first Opus Dei priests in Chile, suggested eliminating sexual education in 
schools, fostering instead “education for purity.” By accepting chastity, he suggested, one becomes 
a participant in a universal “total war.” In other words, for Jacobelli the Latin American youngster 
was nothing less than a crusader of the modern age, with his own body as the battlefield, and with 
“work” and “sacrifice” as his weapons.155   
         As in Spain, Cuadernos del Sur familiarized its audience with young and ambitious female 
publicists, predominately from Chile, who rapidly took the lead in theorizing women’s role in the 
future modern and technological society. This evolving brand of Catholic feminism was to become 
identified with the intellectuals María Elena Aguirre (supernumerary), Elena Vial Correa 
(numerary), Lilian Calm (supernumerary), and Carmen Echeverría - herself a graduate of the 
Navarra school for journalism.156 Ibáñez Langlois’s recruits, for the most part, these thinkers began 
their careers in Cuadernos del Sur, writing on issues concerning women, education, and the youth. 
In the case of María Elena Aguirre, her inspiration from Telva was blatant.157 “This wonderful 
                                               
152 José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “El pronunciamiento católico sobre la natalidad,” Cuadernos del Sur, no. 50 
(September 1968): 762. 
153 Ibid, 787-8.  
154 José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Matrimonio y fecundidad,” Cuadernos del Sur, no. 30-31 (January 1967): 37, 42.  
155 Fernando Jacobelli, “Sobre la educación sexual,” Cuadernos del Sur, no. 24, (July 1966): 584. 
156 On the position of these women in the Opus Dei, see - Mönckeberg, El imperio del Opus Dei en Chile, 604, 644,  





women’s age,” she quoted the Spanish journal, meant that it was time for women to “raise their 
head from their pots, and stick their nose out of the house.” From this ostensibly “feminist” point 
of departure, Aguirre’s continued to exclaim that women must “reclaim the work of the 
housewife.” To put it succinctly, these Opus Dei feminists believed woman must be able to choose 
and then freely opt for the household as their social epicenter. “First, your home, your husband, 
your children. But ‘first’ does not mean ‘only,’” Aguirre clarified. What she meant was that women 
could be “interesting” without becoming men; rather than being like a “beautiful Cadillac without 
gasoline,” women could read the news, have a “hobby,” and ultimately become vivid social 
actors.158 “Margaret Sanger announced the birth of a new age with the entry of women into the 
social nucleus,” said Aguirre elsewhere, and immediately chided the British thinker’s feminist 
theories: 
None of this has happened, because women made it impossible when trying to seize all the 
professions and jobs men. Against their nature, they worked as men and lost the battle. It is 
time for women to realize that there are hundreds of small unknown jobs for them to 
discover.159 
 
These texts reveal, for one, how seamlessly the ideology produced in Madrid inspired writers in 
Chile. As importantly, Aguirre’s texts indicate that she was answering directly to what she believed 
was the intrusive western feminist ideology. To be sure, Aguirre supported women’s right to social 
agency and, overall, praised the “economic value” of their work. Still, in the Opus Dei’s feminism 
women were given the free choice to agree to a strictly patriarchal order of things.  
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          Aguirre and her colleges had even more to say on the youth and its cultural and moral 
inclinations.160 While the Opus Dei pedagogues discussed spiritual education of “liberty” within 
order, Aguirre, Vial Correa, and Calm led an aggressive exhortation against the 1960s youth 
culture, as can clearly be seen in the following report:161  
It is Saturday midnight […] tiny miniskirts in purple, green, orange [...] Boys dressed in 
same colors but wearing pants. Long, sloppy hair. […] A different youth, scandalizing, walks 
on Providencia Avenue on Saturdays to shop, walk, and show off. [...] they have no other 
rebellion to learn from the magazines, the TV, the movies, the tapes used on Carnaby Street. 
In that mass of youngsters dancing there is no age, no difference between one and the other, 
no gender. [...] youth of abundance […] of boredom, of dullness, of nothingness.162    
 
Evidently, multiple factors brought Aguirre to a state of outrage. The feminization of men, 
nihilism, and irreverence, were, for her, even more bothersome than the prospects of the Chilean 
youth leaning towards ideological rebelliousness.163  
         In summation, Cuadernos del Sur was a journal that catered to conservative elites and 
middle-classes, rebuking both parliamentary democracies and the various ills of 1960s culture. 
The Opus Dei ideologues truly believed that they were at the verge of “total war” against the most 
disastrous forms of excess, and were ready to act in order to defend the spiritual “health” of their 
national communities. Furthermore, Cuadernos del Sur was clearly more than a propaganda tool; 
rather, it the mid-1960s this was Argentina’s second major post-fascist think-tank, designed to 
articulate an authoritarian state-ideology in the broadest sense of the word. Once in power, Juan 
Carlos Onganía hence turned to the alleged expertise of these very intellectuals when forming his 
regime of development.  
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The tenure of José María Guido and Artur Illia, and the groundwork for Onganía’s regime 
(1963-1966) 
           Following the Azul-Colorado confrontation of April 1963, Argentina’s de-facto center of 
power moved decidedly to the Azules headquarters. José María Guido (UCRI), once Frondizi’s 
deputy and the pragmatic interim Prime Minister, was to lead a delicate transitional phase under 
the eerie eye of the so-called “legalist” generals Juan Carlos Onganía, Julio Alsogaray, and 
Alejandro Agustín Lanusse. Guido’s official declaration of purpose tellingly stated that “an 
attempt had been made to make Peronism disappear through the absorption of its supporters into 
different political parties” and that “this original sin destroyed the possibility that the resumption 
of institutional life would be authentic.”164 Hereafter, restructuring yet another political system 
purged from Peronism would mean ever more restrictions on Argentina’s democratic process.165  
          A reluctant president, Guido appeased the Azules with several gestures. To start with, like 
Frondizi, Guido approached Francisco Franco via a personal letter spotted with flattery. “The 
essence of Argentine nationality finds its spiritual, cultural, and historical roots in the Mother 
Nation, Spain” he told the Caudillo. Franco’s answer was also expressive: “Your words […] has 
made me emotional,” it said.166 Despite ongoing disputes over Spain’s alleged debt to Argentina, 
going back to the Franco-Perón treaties, the relationship between Francoism and the UCRI 
politicians was, by now, warm as ever. Additionally, Guido’s administration provided the Ateneo 
with a valuable opportunity to put its “knowledge” to practice. This goes for Education Minister 
José Mariano Astigueta, and foreign minister Bonifacio del Carril - an ICH collaborator and a 
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“passionate hispanista” -167 who publicly rejected Argentina’s return to democracy. In Astigueta’s 
case, the ideological differences between him and Guido ultimately led to the former’s dismissal. 
“You do not seem to share [my] way of directing this process, and even express what seems as a 
lack of positive conduct leading to a deterioration of the electoral process,” Guido wrote Astigueta 
angrily.168 A somewhat more successful promotion was that of Costa Méndez. Guido’s 
ambassador in Chile, his entry into Argentina’s diplomatic arena was symptomatic of the Ateneo’s 
growing prestige and its ties with the Azules generals.  
          Despite efforts to persuade Onganía to partake in Argentina’s 1963 elections, he rejected the 
offer not believing that he could assemble a coalition large enough to overcome both Peronists and 
the Radicals.169 In April 1963, Perón granted his support to candidate Vicente Solano López 
thereby making the election of Onganía virtually impossible. With the formal prohibition of the 
latter’s candidacy and the Peronist voters casting blanc votes, subsequently the UCRP’s candidate, 
Arturo Umberto Illia, won the October 12, 1963 elections with only twenty-five percent of the 
popular vote. Illia, a physician from Córdoba province, was neither unfit politically, nor did he 
lead Argentina into a colossal economic crisis, as many Argentine’s still believe today.170 His 
misfortune was primarily ideological: he was trapped between the power-craving Peronists on one 
side, and ever-more authoritarian conservatives on the other, both voicing the fantasy of overtaking 
Argentina’s political system. That is to say, the image of Illia’s impotence, as the antithesis of the 
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“strong leader” Argentina needed, was pure fiction, originating from the Peronists and 
authoritarian elites.171  
         Between 1964 and 1966 a prevailing narrative thereby appeared in the Argentine public 
sphere wherein Argentina was on the verge of being “left behind” in the global modernization 
race.172 As Díaz Colodrero put it, “countries that do not commit to rapid transformation ultimately 
become mere satellites of the big world powers.”173 Or as Onganía’s future Economy Minister 
Adelbert Kreiger Vasena further explained it, Argentina could have easily been “a rich country, 
one of the most important in the New World,” but “fell aback” after 1945.174 Therefore, by 1966, 
Kreiger Vasena contended, “there was a sensation of a huge frustration […] in all sectors of 
society” so that when democracy vanished in 1966 “nobody shed a tear.”175 The narratives of 
Argentina’s so-called “frustration” were perhaps not entirely new; still, tellingly this peculiar sense 
of paranoia - of lagging behind and being “enslaved” - would be a central feature in Onganía’s 
own rhetoric.  
         If the ousting of Frondizi threw Argentina into more than a year of political uncertainty, then 
Illia’s victory in the July 1963 elections represented, for many, a breakdown of the Argentine 
democracy’s very legitimacy. Naturally, the Peronists were vastly responsible for this state of 
affairs. And yet, as Guillermo O’Donnell also admitted later, “the crisis that preceded the 1966 
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Argentine Bureaucratic Authoritarianism was quite mild […] if by no means insignificant.”176 The 
crisis O’Donnell described was, too, essentially ideological and concerned the discrepancy 
between the Argentines’ actual material condition, and what they thought it should be under 
stronger leadership. Unlike Frondizi, Illia owed nothing to Perón, and on the face of it, respected 
the Azules by maintaining Onganía as his Chief of Staff. Illia also rolled back some of Frondizi’s 
legislation in the oil industry, hence acquiring a more “nationalist” image in the public eye.177 This 
notwithstanding, throughout 1964 Illia’s government tumbled from one crisis to another, 
destabilized by the Peronists, nacionalistas, and Frondizists.178  
          The further the popularity of Illia waned, the more Juan Carlos Onganía appeared as 
Argentina’s chief statesman. A person who wanted to talk about issues “of power,” reflected Díaz 
Colodrero later, “wasted time not speaking with Onganía.”179 Not only did the fifty-year-old 
General not bother denying his influence over the political establishment, but he refused to pledge 
allegiance to his President. On August 6, 1964, in a speech at West Point before Latin America’s 
heads of armies, Onganía proclaimed that his army will be loyal to “the Constitution and the laws” 
and “never to political parties who could circumstantially hold power.” Indeed, by pledging to 
defend Argentina from “exotic ideologies” Onganía further established himself and the Armed 
Forces as agents of realism and economic progress.180  
         This message was commensurate with the ideological climate emerging by this time amongst 
members of the Argentine media, who despite being “liberal” in their own minds, did not conceal 
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their fascination with authoritarian hiatuses. Within the panoply of these figures, the striking 
example is that of Mariano Grondona. An eccentric La Nación columnist, and later the key 
columnist of the immensely significant magazine Primera Plana, Grondona was an anti-Peronist 
and avidly supported Frondizi in the early 1960s. He had also studied at the IEP in Madrid and 
was a friend of Mario Amadeo’s circle. This is not to say that Grondona was a traditionalist or a 
Franco sympathizer; it does mean, however, that he could be fairly ambivalent when debating the 
legitimacy of parliamentary systems. His concept of the “political” revealed both contempt to mass 
politics and adoration of elite-oriented action. “Primera Plana was born as a joint idea between 
Timerman and the members of the Azules […] Timerman had been Frondzista, […] an Azul, and 
very anti-Illia,” he maintained in later years.181 Evidently, ideology mixed with personal intrigues 
flared the political climate that preceded Onganía takeover. Grondona’s role in preparing the 
Argentines for their authoritarian future was considerable. After serving as Deputy Minister of the 
Interior under Guido - where he sought “the return of the constitution and the incorporation of 
Peronism”182- by October 1963 his opinion changed radically. “One said to himself, is this country 
going to wallow in this terrible mediocrity?”183 he tried to justify his actions later. For him, 
Onganía, who he knew was “greatly influenced by the Cursillos de la Cristiandad,” was the 
country’s “last reserve.” In later years he further confessed that “everyone, myself included, 
contributed to creating a kind of myth with Onganía. [...] this attitude was almost childish, as if he 
were a father who would solve all our problems.”184 
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         Bernardo Neustadt was another example of a journalist captivated by the notion of 
authoritarian leadership. Perhaps Argentina’s most famous television host and publicists of the 
time, in the 1960s he directed the magazine Todo, from where he frequently juxtaposed the 
efficiency of the military with “the political parties.”185 Next, appeared the magazine Confirmado, 
which fiercely attacked Illia’s supposed political ineptitude. The aforementioned ICH fellow 
Mariano Montemayor was one of Confirmado’s more prominent columnists, and could be seen 
here implying that Argentina is ready to “cross the Rubicon, leaving behind its fictitious 
legitimacies and incompetent management.”186 In the same mold, Confirmado occasionally 
complimented Franco’s Spain economic achievements.187 The anti-democratic sentiments in 
Primera Plana, Todo and Confirmado are noteworthy since these were journals that by stylistically 
copying the Newsweek model, and by presenting a cunning non-ideological image, appealed to 
much broader middle-class audiences than, say, the nacionalista platforms.  
         As for Onganía, some of his followers have argued that he conspired to take over the state as 
early as 1963. The primary challenge, as he saw it in 1963-64, was preventing the return of 
Peronism, “without being gorilas,” recalled Costa Méndez.188 And yet, even Onganía understood 
that there was still much work to be done before he could take over the state apparatus legitimately 
and without repercussions. More than anything, Onganía knew he needed to present the public 
with a swift and effective economic and ideological program. He also believed he needed to attain 
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international prestige and backing. His visits to the USA, Japan, China, and Europe in 1965 aimed 
to achieve just that. Apparently, even before taking off, he ordered General Alejandro Lanusse to 
begin contacting and mobilizing civilians in the eventuality that the government would fall.189  
         Onganía opened his European tour with a week-long visit to Franco’s Spain. On July 13, 
1965, he arrived in Madrid, apparently for the second time in his life.190 There, he encountered 
several of the regime’s highest figures, most importantly Franco’s vice-president Agustín Muñoz 
Grandes. The commander of Franco’s Blue Division during the Second World War, and a neo-
fascist in the present, Muñoz Grandes clearly impressed Onganía. “Spain,” the latter told his host 
candidly, “is the essence of Argentina’s interior and exterior politics.”191 Significantly, Onganía 
made the same type of declarations to the Spanish press. “An authentic Argetineness,” he said 
prior to his arrival, is “inconceivable without Spain’s essence.” He also confessed that his “entire 
spiritual formation is fundamentally Spanish” and that he would rather think of himself as having 
“Basque blood running through the veins [rather than Italian].”192 In turn, Onganía demanded that 
the Argentine, Spanish, and Brazilian Armed Forces form a pact to defend “the unity that exists 
between the spirits of their people.”193 Identifying himself with Hispanic values and anti-
communistic action was, in 1965, Onganía’s simple but effective public relations strategy.  
          These international activities fascinated the Argentine press. Primera Plana reported that in 
a press conference, held at the War Secretariat on August 31, 1965, Onganía remarked that he 
“found in Spain and Brazil, anxiety identical to ours” and pledged that their armies will make the 
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“necessary bonds, in order to safeguard […] the unity existing in the spirit of our nations.” The 
Argentine Army, Onganía said, “is open for this major bonding,” as a part of an alleged 
“assemblage of forces to oppose communism.”194 It is not clear whether Onganía really believed 
that Argentina is facing a communistic revolution. Even so, it is obvious that he saw in Franco’s 
Spain and the newly-born Brazilian dictatorship his immediate allies. While Primera Plana and 
Confirmado deconstructed the image of Illia, La Nación and Cuadernos del Sur further established 
Onganía’s image as an “austere and lonely strong Basque.” Referring to La Nación’s depiction, 
Antonio Brusa highlighted the General’s moral high ground. Onganía could have “taken power by 
force at any point,” he said, but instead decided to retire, and was thus the utmost Argentine 
leader.195 For Primera Plana, this diplomacy meant there were now “two Onganías:” the “Azul 
strategist” and the “Latin American strategist,” who upon meeting General Costa e Silva in Brazil, 
“consolidated a political-military front between Argentina and Brazil.” 196 For Grondona, these 
deeds meant Onganía had turned himself into an independent leader: “Who rules then in 
Argentina? And, even more, who is going to rule it over the next few years? Because the country 
resembles a body with two heads,” he wrote.197 
          Onganía’s retirement from the Military on November 22, 1965, did not produce any major 
political shock, however. The reasons for his leaving have been well documented over the years 
and stemmed from Illia’s irritation of his disobedient General.198 Immediately thereafter, Onganía 
began designing contingency plans for his future regime. By the end of 1965 and early 1966, his 
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own home had become the center of recurrent consultations. The content of these meeting is a 
matter for much speculation. We can say for a fact that Onganía was probing the most consistent 
and coherent ideological actors in the Argentine right-wing intellectual world. “These were not 
strictly conspiratory meetings, but a gathering of people who understood that the situation was 
already unsustainable,” remembered Díaz Colodrero.199 Conspiratory or not, the more concrete 
meetings took place in the first months of 1966 and were dominated by the Ateneo de la 
República.200  
         In essence, Onganía aimed to recruit two teams. Aided by General Julio Alsogaray, he first 
went in search for a person in the business sector who could design an economic “take-off,” and 
who was likewise spiritually trustworthy. Through General Señorans, and his own membership at 
the Cursillos de la Cristiandad, Onganía came to choose the relatively anonymous businessman 
Nestor Salimei.201 Señorans was, according to some, active in the Opus Dei and the Cursillos - 
possibly both.202 To design his social policies, Onganía’s chose a team comprising mainly of 
Ateneo members. In January 1965, he met with Mario Amadeo and Nicanor Costa Méndez, a 
seminal encounter where the actual content of the new regime was debated. “I think some Catholic 
groups had influence on him […] at that time I considered the Ateneo group as the direct influence 
on Onganía” said Costa Méndez, then the Ateneo’s chairman. “Mario Amadeo was the person who 
spoke,” he recalled, and was the one promoting the idea “that a coup was necessary,” and that this 
government “of mediocracies” should be replaced by “capable men.”203 Costa Méndez’s memory 
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matches what Amadeo wrote Sánchez Bella at the time. “I believe that the Ateneo can fulfill a 
great role of nucleation and of civil orientation in the uncertain times that are coming,” he told his 
friend, and elaborated:  
I personally am not a ‘golpista’ and I contemplate cautiously […] any use of force because 
it is difficult to predict the course of events that such a scenario would take. But not wanting 
something does not mean refusing to see the facts, which clearly indicate that the Argentine 
crisis does not have a solution within the framework of the current formats. Juan Carlos 
surely spoke to you about it during his recent trip to Rome.204  
 
Seemingly, a meeting even took place between Sánchez Bella and Onganía during his summer 
1965 visit to Rome - an encounter of which we know nothing more.  
         In short, when designing his future state ideology, Onganía sought the faculty of various 
types of “spiritualized” members of Argentina’s elite, almost solely from the post-fascist 
ideological strata, while completely eschewing neo-fascist revolutionary nacionalistas of any type. 
Whenever considering previous authoritarian models, Onganía’s inclinations were clear to his 
followers. “Onganía’s ideal was Franco, but he realized quite well that Argentina was not Spain 
and that Franco was anachronistic,” said Costa Méndez.205 Indeed, despite being inspired by the 
Spanish state model, Onganía’s regime was to be consciously a more updated brand of Hispanic 
technocratic-authoritarianism. By June 1966 Onganía’s dictatorship was ready on paper. Soon 
thereafter, his Azules companions were to grant him the “presidency,” launching Argentina’s 
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        By June 1966, a decade of political struggle between the Peronists and the anti-Peronist had 
brought vast portions of Argentine political elite and middle-class to lose hope in their 
parliamentary system and willingly embrace alternative “solutions.” By convincing the Argentine 
public that democracy could easily be replaced with a modernizing authoritarian regime, the 
theorists debated in the pages above propagated, so they thought, a noble vision. Yet the Ateneo 
de la República and Cuadernos del Sur intellectuals envisaged not merely a brief period of 
economic and technological modernization. Rather, they thought they could at the same time 
change the mentalities of the Argentine population via distinctive spiritual guidance. In other 
words, stating that the 1960s Argentines merely suffered from an alleged “authoritarian 
mentality,”206 does not suffice entirely to explain the formation Onganía’s coalition. A generation 
of conservative men and women believed that unless they devised novel models of the state, their 
country would imminently become subjugated to foreign economic powers, or worse yet, be ruined 
by the intrusive forces of international communism and the 1960s western culture.   
         The second point to be taken from the texts and correspondences above is that in the early 
1960s, Argentine fascism witnessed a distinctive split into two ideological schools, which, more 
often than not, relied on different mythologies and perceptions of the enemy. Whereas the neo-
fascist nacionalistas became increasingly isolated within the realm of gangs and intransigent 
journals, a clearly more respectable technocratic-authoritarian milieu managed to bring its scheme 
for a post-ideological authoritarianism to the center of the public eye, and more crucially, to the 
Armed Forces’ attention. That the label nacionalista could not encapsulate both neo-fascist and 
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post-fascist positions by now, was obvious. Nonetheless, and almost identically to the case of the 
Falange and the Opus Dei, these two groups shared a common denominator: the utmost 
commitment to replace parliamentary democracy - and the Peronist aberration it had allegedly bred 
- with a post-ideological spiritual “revolution.” By focusing on this technocratic-authoritarian 
coalition, this chapter has provided several clues as to their Francoist ties and sources of 
inspiration. This relationship was soon to unfold into a conspicuous dialugue between the Spanish 






Chapter 4: The “Argentine Revolution” as a State Ideology, and its Francoist Lineages 
 
          On June 28, 1966, Army General Pascual Pistarini, Air Force Brigadier Adolfo Álvarez, and 
Navy Admiral Benigno Varela, overthrew Arturo Illia in a bloodless coup d’état. Hours later they 
granted complete extra-constitutional powers to Juan Carlos Onganía, with no stipulations. 
Therefore, technically Onganía did not seize power militarily but was given the presidency from 
his colleges from the Azul Army, making this one of the more bizarre takeovers in Latin American 
Cold War history. It allowed Argentina’s retired Chief of Staff to perform as a civic “President” 
who did not answer to neither to a Junta nor to a constitution. Still, Onganía’s regime was, by all 
standards, a military dictatorship, and, one may add, one of the more ideologically sophisticated 
Argentina had witnessed up until this point.  
         While Onganía’s non-lethal takeover of the state took inspiration from the Brazilian 
dictatorship of 1964, his state-ideology showed stark lines of continuation with the ideologies 
promoted in technocratic Spain as the time. This notwithstanding, deeming Onganía a forthright 
mimic of Francoism would be an exaggeration too. This chapter will underscore that despite its 
initial inspiration, the Argentine Revolution aspired to design its own unique technocratic-
authoritarian regime model. Moving chronologically, I will explain how Onganía defined his 
regime as a post-ideological phase of economic modernization. Thereafter, I will examine how 
under the auspice of the Ateneo de la República and Cuadernos del Sur intellectuals, the regime 
sought to alter the subjectivity of the Argentine population, and further debate the nature of its 
relationship with Franco’s technocrats. Last, the chapter will explain the contexts and reasons for 
the calamitous failure of Onganía’s technocratic-authoritarian experiment.  




The Argentine Revolution: defining the Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian foundation 
          From reading the mainstream Argentine press from the first days of Juan Carlos Onganía 
power grab one may induce that he led one the most popular regimes in Latin American. Whilst 
not pleased with military interventions as such, the newspapers’ editorials could barely hide their 
spirit of optimism, in expectation for economic stagnation and Peronist ploys to be replaced with 
decisive executive action. La Nación, for instance, launched a series of purely technocratic 
editorials, justifying the dictatorship from an economic and technological point of view: 
In merely fifty years, man’s living conditions have changed so radically that the present 
world bears only a slight resemblance to that of 1920 […] Today’s political mentality […] 
has very little connection to that of the immediate past […] Science and technology have 
revolutionized our collective habits creating needs that no one could conceive in the first two 
decades of the century. […] [they] force politics and the economy to go in different 
directions from those that have been there until recently.1 
 
Therefore, concluded La nación, Onganía “has a wide scope of action” to “rectify any process” 
within the political, social, and economic spheres, without constraining the labor unions.2 
         More supportive commentaries ensued. On August 5, 1966, the exiled Spanish philosopher 
Salvador de Madariaga published an open letter to Onganía in the daily La Prensa, in which he 
declared that the Hispanic character was not suitable for democracy. A liberal thinker, albeit 
evidently no big democrat, he stressed that the intervention of the Armed Forces in politics may 
be “indispensable” in certain cases. The new regime Madariaga portrayed was a third path of a 
new sort. “The employer’s anarchy, or the workers’ anarchy, will be replaced with a regime of 
authority,” was the gist of his vision of this new revolutionary order “from above.” With a new 
constitution and a system of “federation of federations,” Onganía, he promised, could now 
“profoundly transform Argentine life” merely by recognizing the “demand of our time and 
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structure the economic life.” Thus, he thought, Onganía could rescue Argentina from the “vicious 
cycle in which it has been suffering for more than a generation.”3 Madariaga’s words exemplify 
even further the consensus amongst liberals that democracy in Argentina could be suspended for 
the sake of a modernizing leap forward. 
         In the first days of August 1966, Laureano López Rodó arrived in Buenos Aires, a visit that 
immediately disclosed the new regime’s ideologic inspiration. The meeting between the Argentine 
dictator and Franco’s chief technocrat began with López Rodó granting Onganía an edition of 
Spain’s 1964-69 Development Plan.4 López Rodó’s memorandum indicates the Onganía was full 
of pathos. After reminiscing his encounter with General Muñoz Grandes in Madrid, Onganía spoke 
of Spain’s role in Latin America: “Spain has compensated the leadership of the Spanish-American 
nations. I know that you do not want to be leaders, but simply sisters. […] but the fact that once a 
daughter leaves her mother […] does not mean that the mother leaves her daughters,” López Rodó 
reported him saying. Similarly, Onganía explained that “nations need more than just material 
progress. They require spirit to inspire them. Here they need Argentinidad. Spain must give this 
spirit its form.”5 López Rodó thanked his host “for the thrilling words” and immediately went on 
to express his enthusiasm to “discussed the various problems that affect economic cooperation 
between the two countries.” Yet Onganía could not stop praising the Spanish regime, as López 
Rodó’s hand-written minute continues to account: 
[Onganía] mentioned his interest in the Spanish formula of the Economic and Social 
Development Plan. “Modifying the structures of the government,” he said “is relatively 
simple, but the participation of the community in the current situation in Argentina is very 
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difficult. The political parties,” he continued “are absolutely artificial and their leaders, 
although in many cases they were unobjectionable people, live totally separated from reality. 
 
At this point, Onganía even suggested sending senior officials to Spain to “study the Argentine 
problems with the Spanish experts.” The leaders concluded their meeting with debating an “anti-
imperial” collaboration against the British occupation of Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands.6  
          The activities of López Rodó in Buenos Aires during these days are also noteworthy. For 
instance, he met with Argentina’s economic staff, led by Deputy Finance Minister Evaristo Piñón 
Filgueira and Alejandro Lanusse, the Minister of Transportation. López Rodó presented the two 
with “operation Pegaso,” which included immediate exportation of Spanish trucks to Argentina 
and their eventual production there. The Spanish minister also promised funds for the research of 
the “agricultural diversification” in Tucumán.7 The visit continued to include a television interview 
with Bernardo Neustadt, where López Rodó advocated “the economic liberalization and the 
consequent elimination of controls and obstacles in foreign trade.”8 Mario Amadeo, then 
Onganía’s newly appointed Ambassador to Brazil, commented that “Rodó’s presentation was 
extraordinarily brilliant […] and made a great impression on everyone.”9 
         These events, went hand in hand with Onganía’s efforts to establish a symbolic nexus 
between Franco’s regime and his. The Argentine Revolution published several texts detailing its 
missions. While the so-called “Revolution Acts” were vague texts that said scarce little of the 
character of the new regime - pledging instead, for instance, the “consolidation of spiritual and 
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moral values and raising of [Argentina’s] cultural, educational, scientific and technical levels”10 - 
the one concrete international policy declaration came on July 13, 1966 when Onganía published 
the text “National Government Policies” stating his objective to “strengthen Argentina’s traditional 
relations with the Mother Nation and with the other European nations that have nurtured the 
Western Christian culture.”11  
        Next, on October 21, 1966, Onganía delivered a “personal letter” to Francisco Franco to be 
handed to him personally by his Education Minister, Carlos María Gelly y Obes - the only letter 
he wrote to foreign leaders in his first months in power that we know of. In less than three-hundred 
words Onganía defined his regime to Franco:  
The Argentine Revolution has emphasized in its initial documents the singular value it 
attributes to the spiritual community with the Mother Nation, and its willingness to translate 
this appreciation into the concrete lines of its foreign policy, which will be characterized by 
a growing linkage with the countries that constitute the Hispanic American community, and 
with Spain, the key to that community. The trip of the Secretary of Culture and Education 
has as its object [to pronounce] the adhesion of my country to the Ibero-Ameican Office of 
Education. We believe that this initiative will contribute to the orientation of our youth in 
line with the spiritual tradition that has guided the formation of our nation, and will 
contribute to the identity, values, and goals that are typical of our cultures. But I think that 
we should strive to constitute an increasingly richer relationship between Spain and 
Argentina also in other respects. The spiritual essence requires the support of economic and 
political means, […]. I am convinced that Your Excellency will interpret the meaning of this 
message, dictated by the desire […] that the substantive values that have given meaning to 
our national movements would translate into the effective action of our governments.12 
 
Markedly, in his letter, Onganía barely asked Franco for anything concrete. In a sense, he explained 
his regime to Franco, and in so doing, to himself. Onganía wanted the Spanish dictator to know 
that he was a believer in the spiritual crux that is Hispanidad, and sought to define novel ways to 
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merge this essence with tangible economic techniques. Yet since Onganía could not simply state 
that he identified with Francoism ideologically - after all, the letter was sent to the Argentine press 
- he declared his adherence to Franco’s aforementioned OEI instead, for the sake of the “spiritual 
orientation” of the Argentine youth.13  
         Despite these suggestive words, from the outset, it was clear that Onganía had no intentions 
to imitate Franco. For one thing, he neither saw himself as a traditionalist autocrat sensu stricto 
nor established a cult of personality by referring to his authority as stemming from “Grace of God,” 
as Franco had done in the past. As importantly, Onganía refrained from initiation a new 
constitutional process, but saw himself as a part of the “order within the law.” Even years later he 
proclaimed that “it would have been easy for the Revolution to use force, to ignore the law and 
sweep away justice. But this was not our way.”14 Hence, paradoxically Onganía was at the same 
time the writer of the law, and above it entirely, loyal only to his spiritual principles. On the one 
hand, he made no effort to pledge allegiance to the Constitutions of 1868 or 1949, dismissed the 
Supreme Court, outlawed political parties, and ousted the governors in the provinces. On the other 
hand, he refrained from officially declaring a State of Emergency, outlawing the unions, or purging 
the press. This was a part of a calculated move to give the public the impression that the “people” 
were not the regime’s enemy but rather the political “elites.” Again, in his own eyes, Onganía’s 
was legitimate modernizer against a “fraudulent” democracy.15 In a country famous for its vibrant 
public arena, presenting himself as the guardian of the “free press” was an essential component in 
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his theory of popular authoritarianism. “A constructive press,” Onganía declared, “helps the 
common man understand contemporary processes and contribute to world peace.”16  
         In his first months in office, Onganía defined his regime primarily in terms of efficiency. A 
response to the “debilitation” and “chronic frustration” plaguing Argentina, it was to be led, he 
said, by “a group of men willing to give the country the best of themselves, homogenous in their 
conception of national interest and outstanding for their intelligence and qualities.”17 Soon 
thereafter, however, he began describing the regime in more teleological anti-modern terms. 
Commemorating hundred-fifty years to Argentina’s Declaration of Independence, Onganía told 
his fellow generals that “a cycle of Argentine history has now reached its conclusion.”18 Traveling 
to Tucumán, on July 9, 1966, he further explained what the Argentine Revolution meant for him: 
a future of “political and social peace […] so that a harmonious solidarity can be possible without 
subaltern divisions.”19  
         In the case of his regime, it was to become patently clear that the price of “social peace” was 
to include police brutality. In what came to be known as “night of the long batons” (La noche de 
los bastones largos), on July 29, 1966, the federal police stormed the University of Buenos Aires 
violently repressing protests against the regime’s decision to revoke academic freedom. While 
Gelly y Obes maintained in later years that this incident was, in fact, a haphazard instance of local 
“policing” getting out of control, there is little doubt that Onganía saw the universities as one of 
                                                             
16 “Discurso pronunciado por el Excmo. Señor Presidente de la Nación en la XIV comida anual de la asociación de 
la prensa extranjera,” August 18, 1967, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 104.  
17 “Mensaje del presidente de la nación, teniente general Juan Carlos Onganía al pueblo de la republica,” June 30, 
1966, AGN, PN.SPD.pp, caja 100.  
18 “Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la Nación teniente general Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida de la 
camaradería de las fuerzas armadas,” July, 6, 1966, AGN, PN.SPD.pp, caja 101. 
19 “Discurso del presidente de la Nación pronunciado hoy en la casa de Tucumán,” June 9, 1966, AGN, PN.SPD.pp, 




his regime’s utmost ideological foes, and showed no sign of remorse over of this somewhat 
redundant use of violence and the international outcry that followed it.20 
         In his “Directive for the Planning and Development of Government Action” of August 4, 
Onganía further illustrated the meanings of the “spiritual development” he had in store for the 
Argentine population. Here he vowed to purge the nation from both “erroneous individualism” 
and “dangerous ideological infiltration,” and even revealed several of his own technocratic 
formulas. For example, like López Rodó, Onganía rebuked any form of “statism” that might “limit 
the creative spirit.” In the future, he stressed, the Argentines could expect “integral rationalization” 
and “participation of the citizenship through the basic organizations of the community,” all the 
while enjoying a substantial “spiritual development.”21Amadeo, too, was planning ahead: “We are 
in an extremely critical moment for the implementation of a democratic and representative 
system,” he wrote Sánchez Bella, “based, not on political parties […] but on natural institutions.”22 
         With the appointment of his cabinet of ministers, the ideological identity of the regime was 
further clarified. After appointing Nestor Salimei as Minister of the Economy, Onganía chose the 
moderated Catholic Dr. Enrique Martínez Paz for his Minister of the Interior and Gelly y Obes as 
Minister of Education. By committing to a particularly small government, Onganía thereby aimed 
to achieve maximal centralization of executive power. His next appointments were all Ateneo and 
ICH members. Costa Méndez became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Mazzinghi as his 
deputy minister. “Members of the Ateneo de la República continue to occupy important positions. 
Now they have appointed Minister of Interior to a disciple of mine - Mario Díaz Colodrero,” wrote 
                                                             
20 According to Gelly y Obes, “the intervention in the University of Buenos Aires […]  came undoubtedly from the 
local military commands.” Still, Onganía’s University law (16.912) was the official legitimation of this action, see - 
Carlos María Gelly y Obes oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984, Robert A. Potash Papers, Special Collections 
University Archives Umass Amherst, 4; for more on this event and its repercussions see - Sergio Morero, La noche 
de los bastones largos: 30 años después (Buenos Aires: Editorial La Página, 1996). 
21 “Conferencia de prensa,” August 8, 1966, AGN.DAI/ PN.SPD.pp, caja 101.   




Amadeo to Sánchez Bella, in excitement.23 Amadeo was somewhat mistaken: Onganía appointed 
Díaz Colodrero Secretary of Government (Secretario de Estado de Gobierno). A seemingly less 
important sounding position, it was, in truth, crucial. Echoing López Rodó’s title from 1957, Díaz 
Colodrero, an Opus Dei member too as we saw, was to be Argentina’s invisible administrator, 
bringing together the different branches of the government towards effective development. “The 
philosophy was that the ministers are some sort of managers within their domain, but that executive 
power stayed is in the hands of the state secretaries,” he explained later. In other words, the 
deputies of the social ministries were to operate in a coordinated manner under Díaz Colodrero 
supervision. Thus, in his words, “the State Secretariat was to take over everything that had to do 
with executive action from the Interior Ministry.”24 This concentration of executive power was to 
be fundamentally anti-bureaucratic, as its main objective was to deregulate the state, thus freeing 
Argentina from its alleged excessive red tape.  
         Onganía’s government only fully stabilized, however, half a year later with a significant 
minister reshuffle. With little to show for from an economic standpoint, in January 1967 Onganía 
replaced Salimei with the more capable Adelbert Krieger Vasena. Moreover, he replaced his 
Education and Interior ministers with the Ateneo’s own José Mariano Astigueta and Guillermo 
Borda, respectively.25 For Amadeo, this action meant that Onganía finally fathomed the Ateneo’s 
ideological cohesiveness. “Most of the new officials are personal or political companions of mine 
- Borda, Krieger, Medrano, Puigbo, […] apart from Díaz Colodrero, Pearson, Mazzinghi, and 
                                                             
23 “He knows you, even if you do not remember him, he was a fellow in your time. On the other hand, poor 
Goyeneche has not received any ‘piece of the action,’” Amadeo wrote Sánchez Bella, indicating further that 
Onganía did not favor revolutionary nacionalistas such as Goyeneche, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo 
Sánchez Bella, November 1, 1966, AGUN, documento 15/35/264. 
24 In his exact words, “todo lo que es la faz de conducción ejecutiva,” see - Mario Díaz Colodrero oral history with 
Robert A. Potash, 8. 
25 “Evidently ideologically I was not a useful person for the regime’s future,” Gelly y Obes said later, see - Carlos 




others who were before,” he wrote. “The revolutionary government, because of its political, social, 
and spiritual orientation, could not find a more suitable and coherent team in the civil sphere than 
ours,” he even told Sánchez Bella, and added:  
Argentina suffers a spiritual - almost psychic - crisis which is manifested in a state of 
collective spirit of discontent, frustration, and a destructive attitude to every established 
thing. [...] Argentina is a country that has been stuck without collective energy, and through 
sacrifices that our people were not accustomed to bare. […] this government - with a civilian 
list of the best that the country has to offer - has the essential conditions to fulfill its mission 
of order (misión ordenadora) which, if fulfilled properly, might take years to accomplish.26  
 
That is to say, now that the Ateneo and Cuadernos del Sur intellectuals were in charge, Amadeo 
saw the restoration of the Argentine society and spirit as imminent.  
        From this moment onward, Onganía’s administration was divided into two sectors: an 
economic team directed by the Krieger Vasena; and the “social” ministries in the hands of the 
spiritual technocrats. With General Señorans as Secretary of State Information (SIDE) and even 
Cuadernos del Sur editor Eugenio Brusa in a high-ranking position in the Ministry of Interior, the 
latter ministries were entirely the domain of the Ateneo, Cursillios de Cristiandad, and the Opus 
Dei. Whereas Krieger Vasena and his fellow economic “technicians”27 labored to stimulate 
economic growth, the latter group was in charge of both deregulating the state and altering the 
“mentalities” of the Argentine citizens through spiritual guidance.   
 
The “economic phase”: Krieger Vasena’s neoliberal economic reforms 
          Krieger Vasena’s previous affiliation with the Ateneo was an important factor for him being 
offered the position of Minister of Economy to begin with.28 While not a zealous Catholic, he still 
                                                             
26 Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, January 28, 1967, AGUN, documento 15/35/266. 
27 According to O’Donnell, this was their nickname, see - O’Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, 55.  
28 I disagree with Paul Lewis, who has argued that Onganía chose the Ateneo “to balance Krieger Vasena’s 




adhered to the work of ultra-conservative ideologues such as Carlos Moyano Llerena - a neoliberal 
economist, a devoted Catholic, and coincidentally a Cuadernos del Sur commentator.29 Inspired 
by the French and Spanish precedents, Krieger Vasena’s neoliberal economic plan aimed to rapidly 
open the economy to foreign investment, primarily by curbing inflation and “putting the country 
into a state of mind of austerity.”30 The workers, Krieger Vasena believed, would willingly endure 
this period of economic “rationalization” for the sake of economic growth, better-paying jobs, and 
“modernized” manufacturing.31 Persuasion and harsh, albeit always “legal,” anti-strike methods, 
Krieger Vasena said proudly, would save the Argentine economy from ruin, without “taking 
anybody prisoner and without casualties.” If to ask Krieger Vasena, his plan worked brilliantly. 
As he himself stated years later:   
For more than two years inflation fell to normal figures not seen in Argentina in decades; 
the budget was balanced, and so was the payment ratio. Foreign investment began pouring 
into the country […] This was a miracle […] the IMF was ‘very pleased’ (in English) with 
our balance and spoke of an “Argentine Model.” […] by the end of 1968 one could change 
Argentine pesos in Zurich or New York. It seemed like a miracle and the country lived in 
peace, there were no bombs, no state of emergency.32  
 
Even years later, Krieger Vasena still sounded surprised that despite such achievements so many 
in the Argentine society rebuked his economic policies. This was an ideological struggle he 
decided; Argentina’s economic opening faced solely the unwarranted resistance of neo-fascist and 
                                                             
place, see - Paul Lewis, “The Right and Military Rule, 1955-1983” in McGee Deutsch and Dolkart, The Argentine 
Right, 163. 
29 “His thought was very influential on me. [...] he also offered me the collaboration of all his students from the 
faculty,” Krieger Vasena admitted, see - Adelbert Krieger Vasena oral history with Robert A. Potash, 1984; Others 
on Onganía’s economic team, for instance, the head of the Argentine National Bank Pedro Real, were also renown 
Ateneo members.  
30 As in France and Spain, his plan consisted of “one big devaluation” and thereafter, “leave it as is and not move 
anymore,” thereby hoping for currency stabilization, see - ibid, 43; for more on these initial economic policies see 
William C. Smith, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1991), 74-90. 
31 This, at least, is how the Argentine financial press presented things then, see - “Pasos en el camino de la 
racionalización,” La Cronista Comercial (February 10, 1968); “La racionalización y las expectativas,” La Cronista 
Comercial (February 15, 1968). 




post-fascist statist (or “corporatists”) elements in society, namely the Peronists and the 
nacionalistas. “Sánchez Sorondo […] made a lot of noise,” he complained.33  
          There is no question that from a narrow economic point of view Krieger Vasena’s policies 
were a success. Between 1967 and 1970 his reforms stabilized the Argentine currency, thereby 
producing a steady flow of foreign investment into the economy and a hike in the country’s GDP. 
That the Argentine workers paid the price for this reform, due to the devaluation of the peso, wage 
freeze, and unemployment, was a part of a calculated move to propel the country’s alleged 
modernization.34 Yet by attributing any opposition to his policies to “ideological” groups, Krieger 
Vasena conveniently disregarded both the oppressive character of the regime and the dire social 
consequences of his own strategy. If Spain had its 1959 Stabilization Plan, then Krieger Vasena’s 
equivalent was the 1967 “Plan of Ordering and Transformation” - a phase that even Onganía 
admitted then comprised of “drastic solutions” and hit the lowest strata in society the most:  
 The economic recovery plan demands sacrifice from the humble sectors, especially those 
who have little economic power. You must understand, and I know you understand, that it 
is not an isolated and meaningless sacrifice. It is a sacrifice that hurts us and we would have 
wished we could have avoided it. But you cannot do distributive justice when there is nothing 
to be distributed […].35 
 
          Yet underpinning the justification for the allegedly temporary sacrifices of the working class 
was a far more ambitious vision than an immediate influx of foreign investment. In Borda’s words, 
                                                             
33 “I believe Frondizi’s desarrollismo of was ultimately a political attitude, because my program had many 
similarities to his,” he said, in Adelbert Krieger Vasena oral history with Robert A. Potash 67; “The only ones to 
oppose my plan were desrrollistas, nacionalistas, and Peronists […] who all had political aspirations still,” Ibid, 70. 
34 For more on the economic transformations Argentina underwent throughout this period, see - Juan Carlos de 
Pablo, La economía argentina en la segunda mitad del siglo XX (Buenos Aires: La Ley, 2005); Aldo Ferrer, La 
economía argentina: desde sus orígenes hasta principios del siglo XXI (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2004); Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1990); Geoffrey Maynard, “Argentina: Macroeconomic policy, 1966-1973,” in Guido Di Tella and Rudiger 
Dornbusch (eds.) The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83 (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1989), 166-89; see also - Argentina Building for the Future; Economic Programme for 1968 (Buenos Aires: 
Ministry of Economy and Labour, 1968). 
35 Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía, en el acto de 




ridding Argentina of “all that is expired,” was to make imminent the emergence of a “highly 
technified and complex society” and, in turn, Argentina’s motion from the “under-developed” to 
the “developed” world.36 The concrete implications of this rhetoric were the elimination of all 
statist protectionism. As in 1959 Spain, the first measure of “stabilization” was abolishing 
economically “declining industries,” most infamously the sugar industry in Tucumán Province.37 
That is to say, to “rationalize” meant to expurgated any economic activity that did not immediately 
serve the GDP statistical criteria, by deeming it “anachronistic” and making it a symbol of failure.38  
          For Onganía, “rationalization of the administration” also meant eliminating the 
“bureaucratic burden,” and “decentralization.” Akin to the nacionalista revisionist commonsense, 
he declared that the Argentine Revolution seeks “the authentic exercise of federalism.”39 However, 
to achieve maximal administrative effectiveness, Díaz Colodrero simultaneously purported to 
coordinate an act of national “integration.” As in López Rodo’s plan, this meant a paradoxical 
method of centralized decision making, for the purpose of eradicating “unwanted” state regulations 
and services. “The decentralization of national services is one of the key aspects of the territorial 
integration policy assumed by the Argentine Revolution,” Díaz Colodrero stated.40 Thereafter, tax-
free “development poles” supported by a “territorial integration fund,” were to be the main 
stimulant for regional modernization. These poles, assured Díaz Colodrero elsewhere, will 
                                                             
36 “Discurso pronunciado por el doctor Guillermo borda el 24 de Abril de 1968, ante la asociación de Prensa 
extranjera,” Cinco discursos y una revolución (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Movimiento Humanista de Derecho, 1968).  
37 On the struggle of the sugar mills in Tucumán, see - Roberto Pucci, Historia de la destrucción de una provincia: 
Tucumán, 1966 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Pago Chico, 2007); Silvia Nassif, “La lucha obrera en Tucumán: del 
ingenio Los Ralos a la fábrica Textil Escalada (1966-1973),” Coordenadas: Revista de Historia Local y Regional, 
vol. 3. no 1, (2016): 30-52. 
38 Discurso pronunciado por el Señor presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida 
de camaradería de las Fuerzas Armadas realizada el 6 de julio de 1967 (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 
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39 Ibid. 
40 “Discurso pronunciado por el doctor Mario Díaz Colodrero el 16 de Mayo 1968 en la unión industrial Argentina,” 




“drastically correct the concerted growth distortion in the metropolitan area.”41 That Díaz 
Colodrero’s formulas echoed the Spanish development plans - with its “poles of growth” and 
“regionalization” - is fairly clear.42 In an interview to Spanish journalists in 1967, he even admitted 
that his administration had devised its development plan “taking into account the modules used by 
the Spanish development plan, especially the system of industrial promotion and development 
poles.” On this occasion, he also mentioned his visits to Spain and praised “the impressive Spanish 
industrial development of recent years.”43  
         While theorizing Argentina’s development, Díaz Colodrero was one of the first officials to 
hint on the nature of the country’s political future, when in May 1967, Primera Plana featured him 
explaining his “political plan.” Despite vaguely mentioning an “electoral” process in the future, 
for now, he said, Argentina was in a status of “rest-cure” against its political “anachronisms.” This 
unique condition, he explained, was to allow “modernizing the country in a profound sense, 
making an example to the world with new, realist, revolutionary concepts.”44 His formulas were 
analogous with the ones used in Cuadernos del Sur, now virtually the regime’s mouthpiece. Opus 
Dei theorist Adolfo Isoardi, stated here that the regime was not a simple coup “but something much 
deeper […]  that affects the institutional structure of the country.” Reflecting on Cuadernos del 
Sur - as noted before, Díaz Colodrero’s own journal - Isoardi assured his readers that insinuating 
that the Opus Dei is “intervening in the process of the Revolution” is based on “ignorance 
                                                             
41 Dos políticas, dos argentinas, 32.  
42  For more on these plans see - Wolf Grabendorff, “Perspectivas y polos de desarrollo en América Latina,” 
Estudios Internacionales, vol. 13, no. 50 (1980): 252–78; Patricio Narodowski, La Argentina pasiva: desarrollo, 
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43 “Argentina necesita grandes contingentes de mano de obra latina y especialmente española,” La Vanguardia (June 
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regarding this association.” Catholics like him, he said, merely partake in the “new order” 
believing it to promote a more just, prosperous, and “moral society.”45 These words exemplify yet 
again how the Opus Dei operated as an intellectual apparatus: while denying collaborating with 
the regime, it theorized the latter’s guidelines and praised the militant Catholics who served it.  
          The Ateneo’s ideological backing of the regime was even more direct than this. As his 
correspondences indicate, by mid-1967 Amadeo believed he and his followers were the ideological 
understructure of the new order. “Although it is by no means the ‘power behind the throne,’” he 
said, the Ateneo “is fulfilling, under the direction of Maximo Etchecopar, a very fine cultural work 
and maintains quite well the cohesion of our group.”46 Amadeo also maintained intimate contacts 
with Onganía, and openly discussed the unique role of the Ateneo within the regime. “We have 
come to a clear understanding of the role of our institution, on the basis of coinciding objectives 
[with the regime], that rigorously preserve our independence and freedom of action,” he told 
Sánchez Bella of these conversations.47 In short, unlike Sánchez Sorondo’s powerless nacionalistas 
the Ateneo was the ideological group closest to Onganía. Tellingly, in March 1967 it even received 
the status of a “legal association.”48   
         Unfortunately for Onganía, by then his regime gradually came under public criticism. While 
a new liberal magazine by the name of Inédito started labeling him a “fascist,”49 ironically the 
nacionalista Combate and Azul y Blanco moved from support to harshly attacking Onganía, even 
leading Borda to close the latter for months.50 Officially, the neo-fascist nacionalistas turned 
                                                             
45 Adolfo Isoardi, “Los católicos y la Revolución Argentina,” Cuadernos del Sur, no. 25 (August 1966): 665-69; see 
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46 Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, July 14, 1967, AGUN, documento 15/35/269. 
47 Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 22, 1970, AGUN, documento 15/35/291. 
48 Resolución 460/1967, BOE (Argentina), no. 21139 (March 2, 1967).  
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see - “Plagio?” Inédito, no. 11 (January 25, 1967): 2-3. 
50 “Si se va Onganía…” Azul y Blanco, no. 58 (October 23, 1967): 1; Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez 




against the regime due to Onganía’s liberalization of the economy and treaties with the IMF and 
the World Bank. In Amadeo’s opinion, they did so out of sheer envy. The “hard-liners,” he said, 
were a group of frustrated men, “less valid even than the traditional political parties.”51 Be that as 
it may, after one year in power Onganía’s future objectives were finally questioned upon most 
media platforms. With the unions still collaborating with the regime,52 and feeling self-confident 
given the first signs of economic growth, Onganía thus made public his general plan for the future. 
It comprised of a three-phase (or “tiempos”) evolutionary process: “economic phase, social phase, 
political phase.” The first “phase” was synonymous with Krieger Vasena’s economic stabilization; 
the second one, with a profound “social” metamorphosis; and the third, with the advent of yet-to-
be-decided original model of popular representation. 
         On July 6, 1967, Onganía gave a speech to his generals, this time ideologically unequivocal. 
While promising to “restore democracy in its true values” he also exclaimed that the “spiritual 
unity of the country” demands the “renunciation of a political generation.” Strikingly, he even 
presented himself as a leader chosen by the people, when stating that “the whole citizenry had said: 
Enough! and thus, without violence, a worn-out order of things disappeared into history.” Here, 
for the first time, Onganía alluded to his perception of the “political phase.” Democracy, he said, 
“should not be confused with the mechanical act of voting nor with the political parties now 
dissolved.”  Indeed, he stressed, the “political phase” would consist of neither an “electoral plan” 
nor of a “party system,” but of a new “concept of community” aimed solely to “efficiently” raise 
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the Argentines’ living standards. In short, for Onganía, the “spiritual process of rebuilding the 
unity of the nation” meant that a new generation of Argentines would discover entirely novel ways 
to conduct politics through “community participation.”53  
 
Argentina’s technocratic state-ideology: the “social phase” and the “change of mentalities”  
         The precondition of political participation was, however, that the Argentines undergo a 
profound, if enigmatic, “social” transformation. As Guillermo Borda - a Peronist in the past, and 
Ateneo member in the present - put it: “we cannot settle for mere economic prosperity, because in 
its deep essences the Revolution is spiritualist, and has as supreme goals justice and solidarity.”54 
Strikingly, the “social phase” represented a fantasy of dramatically changing the Argentine 
“mentalities,” i.e. reconstructing the habitus of men, women, and youngsters, thereby making them 
not only more “spiritual,” but also obedient, productive, and, in turn, “unified.” There was, of 
course, a deterministic sociological thesis at work here: consumption alone, Onganía suggested, 
was bound to change the Argentine’s mindsets. Even so, his ideologues held diverse ideas as to 
what this “change of mentalities” really entailed. For Borda, this meant actively altering public 
morality. Paternalistically protecting society of its own moral “decays” were the key motivation 
behind his new Civic Code (Law 17.711), setting new restriction on marriages and divorce.55 For 
the Opus Dei, even this law was too liberal.56 In turn, in 1968 Borda announced his “Cinema Law” 
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- the regime’s assuaged method of cultural censorship.57 “One thing is art,” he said, “and the other 
is commerce with pornography.”58 Hence, despite hailing “free press” the regime regularly 
undermine expressions of thought in the name of public morality.  
         Still, the main effort to change the Argentine mentalities was to occur in the education 
system. Following the 1966 “night of the long batons,” the regime continued generating “anti-
communistic” initiatives. It began with Carlos Gelly y Obes’s University Law, which drastically 
limited the universities autonomy.59 As he himself put it, “the mistaken concept of autonomy, 
which transformed the university into a separate territory, segregated from the entire national life, 
has to be overcome.”60 In March 1967, the Argentine public learned that the regime decided to 
gradually shift from a mixed-schools to a gender-separated public-school system.61 Other reforms 
were the privatization of Argentina’s higher education, which sought to transfer students from 
secular “ideological” public universities, to private and elite-oriented establishments. Throughout 
this period, Onganía and Astigueta laid bare their intentions to “spur awareness of duty in the 
citizens” through the alteration of their “conscience and habits of religious and moral life.”62 In 
December 1966 Onganía exclaimed that he wanted to “correct the orientation of the Argentine 
behavior,” or better - raise their “intellectual condition” as a source of “peace and social 
harmony.”63 Other members of his regime soon followed suit in describing the mental 
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metamorphosis in store for the Argentine youth. “Our country,” said Gelly y Obes, was forming 
“a man conscious of his place in the world,” who sought, “physical perfection and improvement 
in the technical and economic [fields].” Following years of “anarchy” and “inefficiency,” now was 
the moment, he argued, to return to “Christian and Hispanic roots,” along with a “normative 
centralization and operational decentralization of the school system.”64 Once again, the spiritual 
technocrat espoused ideological cohesion, while paradoxically demanding to liberalize society 
from the grip of the “centralized” state apparatus.  
        The most ambitious reform the regime orchestrated was its 1967 “education reform.” Titled 
the Organic Law of Education, it targeted Argentina’s century-old Law 1420 of Common 
Education, as well the youth’s rebellious tendencies, through a mixture of spiritual and technical 
methods. José Mariano Astigueta, as we know, was a key member of the Ateneo and ICH, and had 
intimate ties with Spain. Ever since his short tenure in Guido’s administration, he had been the 
propagator of an educational reform and the advocate of a mandatory Argentine “mentalities 
change.”65 Following the January 1967 minster reshuffle, the education reform was to be his 
brainchild. In tandem with Díaz Colodrero’s rhetoric, Astigueta constantly advocated 
“administrative rationalization,” which, for him, meant the purification of any 19th century 
ideology from Argentina’s education system.66 To the Argentine youth, Astigueta offered a simple 
ideological interpellation: “It is now imperative that man and especially the young man return to 
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interiority,” he said.67 At the regime’s first educational convention, he was even blunter about his 
aspirations. “We must teach the value of austerity, of manhood, which is the heritage of our 
ancestors,” he proclaimed.68 Besides echoing the ethical principles of Hispanidad, Astigueta also 
often quoted Opus Dei theorists Millan Puelles and Víctor García Hoz, while theorizing his own 
notions of “bio-psychic and spiritual development.”69 Man, he stressed, is a “substantive 
compound of body and spirit,” and therefore is “realized in fullness once he transcends towards 
God.”70 It is telling that Argentina’s Education Minister could move from debating 
“rationalization” to pondering over the human spirit’s linkage to God. It was this ubiquitous hybrid 
language of “technique” and “spirituality” that was the crux of Onganía’s “social phase.”  
         Vague mysticism aside, Onganía’s educators addressed several concrete issues: Gender roles 
for instance. Juan Rafael Llerena Amadeo, Astigueta’s deputy and Cuadernos del Sur 
commentator, held a firm opinion on separated education for men and woman: “Essential equality 
between men and women does not mean functional sameness,” he said, and further explained:    
An education […] that does not mark this difference, would create perfectly interchangeable 
humans who, by assuming a functional identity, are the cause of the paralysis of the social 
process. It is necessary that the feminine potential remains intact: its contribution must be 
made by functioning in a differential and complementary character, starting from the 
qualities that make woman distinct from men. […] The complexity of knowledge and self-
discipline involved in home management make the role of the housewife an authentic 
profession, whose preparation is like that of any other profession […] women can enrich 
science, technology, and the arts, especially when working in a team.71  
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A personal friend of García Hoz, Llerena Amadeo thus voiced stances that were not dissimilar to 
the Opus Dei’s feminism. Women, he suggested, should be educated to celebrate their “difference” 
and “complementary character,” either as housewives or assistants to men. 
          With the passing of Law 16,981 of October 14, 1966, Onganía’s pedagogical point of 
reference officially shifted from collaboration with the Inter-American education institutions to a 
collaboration with the OEI.72 Carlos Gelly y Obes’s speech at the OEI’s Madrid headquarters 
clarified early on what this collaboration meant. “Argentina seeks the common good by focusing 
on the ‘primacy of the spiritual,’” he opened. Then, he spoke of technocratic Spain: 
Spain is once again our example. As an expression of a strong and prolific nation, it is reborn 
from its crises with new vigor and impulse. It is the trajectory of the ruling western countries, 
which, after moments of search or restlessness, take their ideal position in their own right. 
The spiritual cohesion of Spanish America is enhanced by having as a contemporary 
example the means of development performed by the Mother Nation.73 
 
It is interesting to note that despite praising the Spanish regime, Gelly y Obes did not refer to 
Hispanidad in particular, but to Spain’s economic and social achievements. Replacing him in 
office, Astigueta too maintained intimate contacts with the OEI and even met with Villar Palasi 
and the OEI Board of Directors in Madrid.74 Tellingly, in 1967 Argentina hosted the OEI’s II 
Ibero-American Conference of Technical Education. It saw Astigueta lecturing on the need to 
“train technicians” for the benefit of development, and Onganía advocating an education system 
that would buttress both “spiritual and moral values” along with science and technology.75  
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        Astigueta’s reform relied on the groundwork of several prominent Catholic pedagogues, 
identified with the elite association Superior Council of Catholic Education (CONSUDEC).76 
Featuring figures such as the abovementioned Mayochi and Van Gelderen, the reform commission 
also included Catholic educators such as Luis Jorge Zanotti, Gustavo Cirigliano, and the Opus 
Dei’s own Marcos Ronchino. In the writings of these men, Argentina’s universities appeared not 
as a place of critical thought but as an apparatus designed to educate technicians for the sake of 
rapid economic growth. Ronchino even suggested a “human resources policy” whereby each 
student “fulfills his social role according to development plans.”77  For him, “democratization” 
merely meant that the youth could choose freely how to serve the economy best.78 Backing the 
University Law, the foregoing men consequently advised ridding Argentine from academic 
autonomy, thereby cleansing the campuses of those who allegedly “use the academic prestige for 
the benefit of ideologies.”79  
          Astigueta’s think-tank ultimately appeared in a special Cuadernos del Sur issue, dedicated 
to the reform.80 Víctor García Hoz, then the director of CSIC’s Institute of Pedagogy, was given 
the honor of presenting an introductory message. Contemporary education, he maintained, “does 
not satisfy the needs of contemporary times” given that technology “accelerates the process of 
change,” he said. Expectedly, his pedagogical overview soon developed into a spiritualist 
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exhortation. One must “stimulate the spiritual development of man so that he does not become a 
mere means of production or a numerical unit,” he explained. For him, this meant to “fulfill the 
[divine] call to perfect and dominate the world, and the divine command to work.”81 These typical 
Opus Dei formulas resonated in Cuadernos del Sur in the next years. For example, in 1969 the 
Opus Dei’s female intellectual Delia Brusa stated that “when education emphasizes development 
[…] stoical men, even great technicians, are created.” On the other hand, a pedagogical emphasis 
on sheer “intelligence,” could result in “theoretical intelligences, unable to cope with the practical 
sides of life,” and thus, a “caricature of man,” she warned.82 Noticeably, Brusa reduced the Opus 
Dei’s theology to a slogan: education should create efficient technicians, not abstract thinkers. 
         Ultimately, despite this intensive intellectual work, Astigueta’s reforms failed to achieve 
most of their goals, for various reasons. To begin with, in a mostly secular society, the regime’s 
effort to change Law 1420 by means of persuasion rather than coercion was delusional. The 
Argentine mainstream media, unions, and even some of Onganía’s own ministers were taken aback 
by these clear Catholic and spiritualist undertones, deeming them “confessionalism.”83 For 
another, the crisis in the Argentine universities did not end in August 1966 and was clearly a reason 
for the regime’s reluctance to further agitate the student body with polemical legislation. Thus, by 
1970, teacher strikes, and the overall sense of crisis in the education system brought the reform to 
its end.84  
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         A change of mentalities aside, the more Onganía opened his economy to foreign investment 
the more he sought to visibly instigate a new sense of Argentine leadership in the South American 
hemisphere by evoking Hispanic spirituality. It was therefore that he handpicked some of the 
Ateneo’s most conspicuous “hispanistas” to lead his Foreign Ministry. With Costa Méndez as 
Foreign Minister, and with Mazzinghi, Enrique Peltzer,85 and Máximo Etchecopar (Director of 
Cultural Affairs) at his side, the ministry now put the ICH concepts to practice. Or as Costa Méndez 
put it, Argentina was to become “the bridge” between Europe and the unified “Hispanic sphere.”86 
Again, the Argentine Revolution defined “Argentina’s continental mission” in spiritual 
terminologies.87 While dining with Bolivian dictator Alfredo Ovando, Onganía even spoke 
amenably about Spain’s “highest spiritual heritage” as the basis of “fraternity between the 
continent’s nations.”88  
        Publicly, Onganía treated the USA with respect. Even Costa Méndez, who had been 
antagonistic to the Washington-led Organization of the American States (OAS) in the past,89 
presented a more pragmatic attitude towards Linden Johnson’s administration as a Foreign 
Minister, thereby inciting a fissure inside the Ateneo between him and Amadeo.90 True, at times it 
seemed that Onganía built on Mario Amadeo’s 1950s rhetoric of “regionalism” when warning that 
“new groups of minor states can be seen emerging around one or the other superpowers. These 
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nations seem to want to amalgamate with the nearest one to them […] emulating them […] and 
thus abandoning their own national character.” However, immediately thereafter, Onganía 
tellingly reassured that “luckily, Latin America is supported by Anglo Saxonian America in a 
pledge to establish a world of elementary norms of coexistence for a great society.”91  
        The same cannot be said about the United Kingdom. From the outset, Onganía displayed a 
stark antagonism towards this foreign power, by elevating the Falkland Islands dispute to the top 
of Argentina’s diplomatic priorities. He did so among other things by tying together the Argentine 
and Spanish disputes with the United Kingdom.92 “There is no issue that is important for our 
country than claiming back the territory of the Republic,” Costa Méndez announced.93 The 
September 1966 Operativo Cóndor - a peculiar incident wherein eighteen nacionalistas kidnapped 
an Argentine Airlines airplane to the Falkland Islands - was a further indication of the mounting 
anticipations Onganía spurred among nacionalistas to recover Argentina’s territories.   
          No sooner had Onganía instituted his regime than he began presenting concrete schemes for 
a Latin American political “unification” to his fellow statesmen. Speaking in various Latin 
American forums he demanded “new juridical bases” for Latin American cooperation.94 Most of 
all, Onganía and Costa Méndez spoke of integrating the Plata Basin states, in what they thought 
could be an “organic and realistic multinational project of physical integration.”95 Their seemingly 
earnest relationship with the Brazilian dictatorship, and even friendlier ties with Peru, were to be 
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the basis of this amalgamation. This integration, explained Grondona at the time, did not 
necessarily mean full economic integration, but merely an ideological “approximation.”96 The 
main obstacle for this diplomacy was evidently Chile, whose Christian Democratic government 
had previously declared Onganía a persona non grata.97 Onganía’s correspondence with Eduardo 
Frei is noteworthy in that respect. While the Argentine and Chilean leaders clearly shared an anti-
communist sentiment, they differed substantially on their idea of Latin America’s integration and 
democratic culture. To put it mildly, Frei’s Revolution in Freedom did not coincide with Onganía’s 
authoritarian “revolution.” As a result, Chile opposed Argentina’s efforts to institutionalize the 
Inter-American Defense Board, defiance that further exacerbated the territorial dispute between 
the neighboring Southern Cone nations.98 In August 1966, Onganía contacted Frei with the 
intention of solving the Beagle Straits dispute - a letter which Frei answered immediately 
suggesting the countries turn to the mediation of an international court.99 Consequently, the 
Argentine Revolution’s one diplomatic achievement was the Onganía-Frei meeting in 1970, 
leading to the 1971 agreement to turn to international arbitration.  
         In short, Onganía’s “Hispanic” foreign policy was marked by contradicting trends. On the 
one hand, he was astute enough a leader to ignore the anti-American provocations arising from 
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Azul y Blanco and fully collaborated with the USA’s financial sectors. Seeking to distance himself 
from any “fascist” labeling also meant that Onganía’s Argentina saw official visits of respectable 
world leaders such as Japanese Crown Prince Akihito.100 On the other hand, his somewhat 
exaggerated intransigent diplomacy towards the United Kingdom and Chile meant Argentina’s 
two future territory-related crises, the Falkland Island War and the Beagle Straights conflict, were 
set in motion during this period.           
          To conclude, overall Onganía’s “social phase” comprised of several parallel ideological 
projects that aimed to prepare the Argentine population at large, and the youth in particular, for 
their new role in Argentina’s emerging post-ideological society. The “mentalities change” Onganía 
and his ideologues sought to propel comprised of a prominent return to a “spiritual” and “Hispanic” 
style of living, along with a commitment to equip the population with tools that would allow it 
contribute to bolster the country’s technological modernization. Only jointly, they thought, could 
these processes make “non-ideological” and “unified” a nation of otherwise hopelessly politically-
mobilized (and Peronist) citizens.  
 
The dialogue between the Argentine Revolution and Franco’s Spain  
        As I believe is by now clear, Franco’s Spain and Onganía’s dictatorship were not only similar 
but, to a large degree, ideologically interrelated. As we have seen earlier, Onganía exalted Franco’s 
economic and social policies and granted positions of power to intellectuals who adhered to similar 
ideologies. And yet, given Onganía’s letter to Franco of October 1966, one should ask: how 
intimate was the link between the two regimes in reality? To answer this question, we must first 
                                                             






consider that there were ad hoc economic motivations for Argentina seeking Franco’s amity. 
Pursuing and Argentine economic miracle, Krieger Vasena’s team explored new markets for 
Argentina’s agricultural products, as well as new sources of machinery and technologies. That the 
British government closed its market to Argentine beef in 1967, made Argentina efforts to link 
with countries such as Spain, Italy, and France even more urgent.101 Indeed, Spain came to 
Onganía’s assistance, in what became to be known as the Onganía-Franco “meat treaties” of 1967. 
César Ignacio Uríen, the Argentine ambassador in Madrid, told the Spanish press that Spain’s 
commitment to buy Argentine products meant that the Mother Nation was now “teaching the world 
that it evaluates the high quality of our meats.”102 
        Beyond this economic interchange, there was a ceremonial aspect to the Franco-Onganía 
relationship that should be underscored here. For instance, the two dictatorships exhibited 
conspicuous efforts to acknowledge one another through honors. Early in 1967, Franco honored 
Onganía and Costa Méndez with the Spanish Navy Medals of Honor, an occasion that brought 
Onganía to sheer pathos. “You all know by now,” he said, “how great my love for Spain is […] 
Iberia, a magnificent melting pot of races, upon fertilizing the arrogant American continent, has 
inherited us its glory, the spiritual temple of its greatness.”103 In return, Onganía honored three 
Spanish ministers: Adolfo Díaz-Ambrona Moreno (1967), Vicente Mortes Alfonso (1970), and, 
tellingly, Laureano López Rodó (1970).104 No German, French, Brazilian, British, Mexican, or 
USA officials received any such honors from Onganía.105 Additionally, apart from the OEI the two 
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dictatorships soon signed several other cooperation treaties, such as the one between Argentina’s 
National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICT) and Franco’s CSIC.106 Onganía 
had little to gain materially from this cooperation. Arguably, this treaty was thus yet another 
“ideological adherence” of some sort. Furthermore, Argentina did not merely join the OEI but 
aspired to lead it. As it happened, it was Juan Carlos Goyeneche who was particularly keen to 
become Secretary General of the organization,107 demanding for this purpose the assistance of 
Carrero Blanco, his “very close friend.”108As in the case of UNESCO, where during the 1960s the 
nacionalistas had a presence in the shape of Atilio Dell’Oro Maini,109 by joining the OEI Amadeo 
and Goyeneche aspired to direct Latin America’s educational apparatus. 
         Gradually, Onganía’s Argentina began attracting the attention of Franco’s intellectuals. 
Following López Rodó and García Hoz,110 in 1967 Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, too, visited 
Argentina. In a series on conferences, the Francoist theorist presented El crepúsculo de las 
ideologías to a sympathetic audience, before moving on to Chile as I will further detail in chapter 
5. He was merely one of many “visiting professors” who arrived in the Buenos Aires ICH that 
year, and who included Carlos Robles Piquer and Ismael Sánchez Bella.111Another visitor from 
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Spain, although not a Spaniard himself, was Fredrick D. Wilhelmsen. A reactionary thinker, 
UNAV faculty member, and Opus Dei ally, in September 1967 he gave a series of lectures in 
Buenos Aires and drew the suspicion of the liberal media. The “opusdeísta Wilhelmsen” they 
alleged, “spoke at the Ateneo de la República, in parishes, and Catholic universities. […] the new 
forerunners of communitarianism, cursillismo, corporativism - or all the names behind which 
clericalism and extreme rightwing fascism are hidden.”112 Yet not only right-wing figures visited 
the Ateneo. Even Franco’s successor, Prince Juan Carlos dined there,113 indicating again that this 
was a distinguished institution and not a merely fanatical hub. Taken together, let us grant the 
following: The Argentine public sphere saw a presence of Francoist thinkers propagating what 
seemed as an array of technocratic-authoritarian ideologies. 
         The Argentine ICH was the site of several other Argentine-Spanish collaborations. On May 
6, 1968, Buenos Aires hosted the ICH’s Congress for Scientific, Cultural, and Economic 
Development of Latin America. “Organized conjointly” by the ICH of Madrid and Buenos Aires, 
it was directed by Gregorio Marañon, and the President of the Argentine ICH Alberto Obligado, 
and attended by Onganía, Borda, and Costa Méndez. The opening declaration emphasized that the 
ICH is “willing to comply with the demands of [Latin America’s] respective nations, and jettison 
its ‘Spanish’ tinge […] - a burden of the ideology that dominated their first half of our century.”114 
These words are revealing in that they clarify how the Spaniards apologetically replaced 
Hispanidad with allegedly ideologically neutral cooperation.115 No less informative were the 
declarations made at the end of this session on Education and Economic Development in Latin 
                                                             
112 “La banca del señor Palanca o la palanca del señor Labanca,” Inédito, no 28 (September 27, 1967): 3.  
113 Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, November 19, 1970, AGUN, documento 15/35/298. 
114 Desarrollo, no. 1, 5-6. 
115 Alberto Obligado, even complimented the Buenos Aires ICH asserting that its system “has created a broad base 
of social linkage that is not directly related to the Spanish community, or to a specific ideological or denominational 




America. “The national educational effort must be closely linked to the needs of the economic and 
social development of our countries,” said the ICH declaration, and concluded that primary and 
secondary education “should create new consumption habits for the population.”116 Rather than 
Hispanidad, the ICH conference was thus a showcase of neoliberal formulations, which 
nonetheless attested to the technocratic-authoritarian theories that bonded the two regimes in 1968.     
         Simultaneously, Onganía’s ministers traveled to Spain to closely study the Spanish model. 
As noted earlier, Ateneo members such as Díaz Coloderero, Astigueta, and Mazzighi were 
frequent guests of the ICH in Madrid, later to be joined by Basilio Serrano (as the Ateneo’s new 
Secretary General)117 and Guillermo Borda.118 Three visits, however, should perhaps be 
underscored here as indicative of the Argentine fascination with Francoism. The first was Krieger 
Vasena’s visit in November 1967. A part of his European tour, in an attempt to gather foreign 
credit,119 the Argentine Minister of the Economy met not only with Franco but with the entire 
technocratic team including López Rodo, Gregorio López Bravo (Minister of Industry, and an 
Opus Dei member), and Manuel Fraga. Speaking to the local press, Krieger Vasena stated that 
“like Spain,” Argentina had been overcome by “a false policy of autarkic posturing” that had made 
it “lose traditional ties, such as the ones we had with Spain.”120 With Krieger Vasena came a team 
of experts, aiming to explore “the functioning of Spain’s system of administrative decentralization, 
                                                             
116 Ibid, 28. 
117 “He is a man of remarkable dynamism and (rare thing among us) capable of doing things,” said Amadeo to 
Alfredo Sánchez Bella, see - Carta de Mario Amadeo a Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 22, 1970, AGUN documento 
15/35/291. 
118 Who after being sacked in 1969, he arrived in Madrid as “consultant to the OEI”, see - November 3, 1969, 
AMREC, Embajada en Madrid II, caja 81.  
119 According to the news agencies and Spanish governmental correspondences, Spain granted Argentina a credit of 
“up to twenty million dollars of the Spanish banks” after only receiving ten million from the French banks, see - 
FNFF, Document 20159: November 14-15 1967, “Telegramas del Embajador en Buenos Aires, Alfaro: La prensa 
argentina da un gran relieve; also- “El ministro argentino de economía esperado hoy en Madrid,” ABC Sevilla 
(November 12, 1967). 
120 “Las exportaciones españolas gozarán en Argentina de mayores facilidades que hasta ahora,” La vanguardia, 




which is already applied as an initial experience in the Argentine province of Córdoba.” Among 
these guests was Minister of Social Security, Alfredo Manuel Cousido,121 and the head of 
Argentina’s Social Security Technical Council, Guillermo Bravo. “The Spanish social security 
system can serve as a basis for the application of some management methods related to risk 
coverage in Argentina,” stated Cousido.122 As we will see shortly, these declarations are telling 
given the work his ministry implemented in Córdoba, Argentina.  
         Next, came the official visit of Argentina’s Minister of Tourism and Press, Dr. Federico 
Frischmacht, who, in February 1968, spent an entire week in Spain. Hosted by Manuel Fraga, and 
meeting Franco in person - indeed, after receiving Spain’s Grand Cross of Civic Merit - the 
Argentine minister visited the touristic area of Costa del Sol, where he studied the Spanish 
“development” first hand.123 “I must admit that I feel overwhelmed by the weight of trying to 
emulate the deeds developed by the Spanish Ministry of Information and Tourism,” he later wrote. 
The encounter with Spain’s chief expert in matters of “free press,” brought Frischmacht to other 
more expressive conclusions: 
Effective social communication depends on two conditions: effective means of 
communication, and a common language that allows mutual understanding [...] i.e. that 
words have the same meaning for everyone. [...] the one concept necessary to guide the 
politics of governments and private activity is Christianity […] I beg God to continue 
enlightening our respective leaders, General Franco, and Lieutenant General Onganía, who 
have done so much to lead our peoples together in the path of our historic destiny.124 
 
The “freedoms” of Franco’s Spain - as the liberty to express one “common language” of 
Christianity and authority - unmistakably impressed Frischmacht.  
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         Lastly, Nicanor Costa Méndez visited Spain in April 1969. The Argentine Foreign Minister 
met Franco and discussed, according to a Spanish intelligence report, the “identity of views of 
Spain and Argentina in relation to the national problems of Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands,” 
which, more specifically, meant “the need for the respective governments to continue to lend each 
other mutual and unyielding diplomatic support until they have obtained the justice that is due to 
them.” Thereafter, the two signed a Spanish-Argentine dual-nationality treaty.125 On this occasion, 
Costa Méndez was, to put it simply, the most eloquent orator of Hispanidad in the room. “I hope 
we will outline the enterprises that the future of Hispanidad demands from Argentina and Spain,” 
he announced upon arrival.126 “It is up to us [Spain and Argentina] to divulge the Hispanic truth,” 
he declared upon meeting with Franco.127 Noticeably, for him, this encounter symbolized a 
moment of profound affinity.  
        A no less important ideological dialogue between the two regimes’ intellectual apparatuses 
took place in private. The correspondence between Amadeo and Sánchez Bella is a case in point, 
as it had become much more ideologically detailed in the late-1960s. The two men were 
juxtaposing their ideological projects constantly,128 deliberating on how to bring their respective 
regime models to their final state of perfection. As always, the Francoist ideologue was trying to 
persuade his Argentine counterpart to walk in Spain’s path. Reflecting the Francoist political 
changes of the 1960s, Sánchez Bella too believed that Spain’s 1966 referendum had confirmed the 
regime’s popularity. A “pluralist, democratic, and representative democracy” should function 
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without political parties, he told Amadeo, but based “on natural institutions, in order to make a 
‘politics of things,’ pragmatic rather than ideological, closer to concrete problems than any abstract 
utopias.” By now, Sánchez Bella clearly mastered the Francoist technocratic jargon. “It is 
important that the Ateneo does not break or dissolve once in power,” he continued advising, so 
that it could propel a “new mentality, more appropriate than the present one to the technological 
society in which we live.”129 As for Spain, he believed Franco would be succeeded by an 
authoritarian “presidentialist” monarchy, wherein the president is “appointed by a parliament, after 
being suggested by the Council of the Kingdom.” In short, he assured, “Franco will be succeeded 
by Francoism, as de Gaulle will be succeeded by Gaullismo.”130  
         Amadeo, for his part, reverberated similar formulas. For the ICH’s 7th Congress of the 
Hispano-Luso-America of International Law in Buenos Aires, he invited a list of Francoist 
ideologues - Luis García Arias, Pepe Yanguas, Alfonso Valdecasas, and the above-mentioned 
Legaz y Lacambra - to discuss precisely these ideas. “We worked hard for fifteen days [...] 
analyzing extensively Franco’s recent transcendental act of succession. [...] the belief that a regime 
lasts the life-span of its leader, is no longer sustainable,” Amadeo told Sánchez Bella. Then, turning 
to Onganía’s imminent “political phase” he stressed that of all the model available - “extreme 
nacionalismo, philo-marxism, or anachronistic liberalism” only Frondizi and Onganía had ever 
fashioned a regime model with any “viability.”131 In short, throughout their dialogue Amadeo and 
Sánchez Bella bolstered each other’s belief in the sustainability of a technocratic-authoritarian 
future in both Spain and Argentina.  
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         Taken as a whole, these activities illustrate that by the late 1960s, Onganía and Franco’s 
dictatorships were associated economically, diplomatically, and important of all, ideologically.  
Onganía’s ministers and intellectuals, let it be said, traveled to many other countries and spoke to 
a myriad of leaders. Still, that Onganía’s ministers met with Franco and his technocrats in person, 
and in some cases, even uttered declarations that exhibited an eagerness to build on what they had 
seen in Spain, leaves little doubt that technocratic Spain was a key source of inspiration for the 
Argentines. On the other hand, the correspondence between Sánchez Bella and Amadeo also 
confirms that the technocratic-authoritarian project was a vibrant transatlantic dialogue, wherein 
the Argentine and Spanish post-fascist thinkers constantly sought to define their alternative system 
of “representation” to one another. Indeed, it was Ongania’s inability to give concrete content to 
this theory that would signify the end of his regime, as I will inspect now.  
 
1969-70: the pending “political phase” and Onganía’s downfall  
         As the Argentine Revolution entered its fourth year there seemed to be no question that the 
“political phase” was nowhere in sight. Already in 1968, the public debate on the regime’s mission 
shifted slowly from the economic realm to the political and “ideological” one. It was at this point 
that Onganía and his ministers began revealing what the “political phase” entailed in actuality. 
Like in Spain, Argentina was to become an “organic” democracy with corporatist-sounding forms 
of social “representation.” Much of this theorization appeared, once again, in Cuadernos del Sur. 
For Edmundo Carbone, the journal’s editor, by 1968 ideologies were already a thing of the past in 
Argentina. While Illia’s “administrative chaos” fully justified the “movement of June 28, 1966,” 
he said, now, in 1968, Argentina lived in a period of “partisan asepsis,” where “old divisions have 




generations,” Carbone answered, to design a “new country” based on the operation of 
“autonomous councils and commissions, with representatives of the different sectors of the society 
extracted from their freely constituted groupings.”132 Identically, a young Opus Dei publicist 
named Roberto Bosca advised “ridding democracy of disgraceful parliamentarism,” thus replacing 
it with an “organic entity” capable of “alleviating the errors […] of liberalism, neoliberalism, and 
statism.”133 The final destination of the Argentine Revolution, for Bosca, was a system of 
representation identical to that of the Francoist model, based on the family and the municipality; a 
“Democratic Corporative System” which is “neither fascist nor medieval” and supported by a 
“change of mentality through education.”134  
         Unlike the Opus Dei, Onganía was neither keen to elucidate his “political phase,” nor to 
legally frame a system of corporative representation the way Franco did in 1966. But did he ever 
allude to a return of the previous parliamentary democracy to Argentina? Markedly, he did not. In 
fact, even fifteen years after the event, Onganía could not bring himself to say that retrieving 
parliamentary democracy was ever on his mind. As far as Costa Méndez recalled, Onganía’s 
“political phase” was a confused mixture of unfathomable phrases. “I never understood them […] 
I think the nearest thing to his vision was Franco’s Spain,” he said in the 1980s.135 Sure enough, 
his regime did set in motion several projects that seemingly intended to foster “participation.” The 
Ministry of Social Welfare, for instance, promoted the Secretary of State and the Promotion of 
Community Assistance (SEPAC) designed to institute new forms of “social participation.” But 
overall, these initiatives remained mostly a propaganda device.136 Ultimately, the two official 
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bodies Onganía considered truly necessary “councils” were his civic councils: The National 
Security Council (CONASE) and The National Council of Development (CONADE). “Through 
laws 16,964 and 16,970, the two interrelated systems […] of inorganic participation of individuals 
and groups enabled the gradual improvement of information, intelligence, and thereby the capacity 
for decision making,” he wrote.137  
         In the Spring of 1968, Onganía’s rhetorical vagueness eventually led to a crisis, as Borda and 
Díaz Colodrero had both been quoted raising the possibility of “replacing” Argentina’s electoral 
system with another better arrangement.138 Additionally, Onganía’s inaction was an invitation to 
the local levels of the regime to take the initiative. In one local “pilot” project, Carlos Caballero, 
the nacionalista governor of Córdoba, announced in August 1968 the creation of an Advising 
Council (or “consejo comunitario”). This is “a preamble for a proper fascist-like corporative 
chamber,” observed Inédito in contempt. In the opinion of this liberal biweekly, Córdoba had by 
now become a symbol of “fascist” ideology. “It is no coincidence that from this province the main 
causes now arise to be alarmed by fascist corporatism,” it stated.139 Mariano Grondona was of a 
different opinion. He said that despite being seemingly “corporatist,” there is no contradiction 
between this project and democracy, assuming Caballero’s initiative is a temporary rather than 
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permanent solution.140 In any event, not coincidentally it was in the ideologically polarized city of 
Córdoba that the movement that would bring down the regime began.141  
         At any rate, in late 1968 Argentina witnessed a persistent public debate over the perplexing 
terminology of “participationism,” “communitarianism”, and “councilism,” drawing much 
confusion, if not ridicule.142 In a parallel vein, the more the regime moved towards cooperation 
with American and European financial corporations, the more the nacionalistas in Azul y Blanco 
attacked the regime’s loss of identity. It was at this period that Sánchez Sorondo, with the Vatican’s 
recent Populorum Progressio in mind, led his own socially-oriented turn to the Left, advocating a 
revolution against what he saw as the growing inequality between the rich and poor nations.143 For 
him, Krieger Vasena’s economic model was “submissive” to the western financial order.144 While 
not precisely allying with Peronism, Sánchez Sorondo also did his best to rehabilitate Perón in the 
public sphere. Peronism, he said, “was not a solution, but there is no solution without Peronism.”145 
As Onganía was reluctant to restrain the press, the latter’s criticism eventually enveloped not only 
the regime’s policies but the ideological groups serving it. This began already February 1967, as 
an elaborate report on the Opus Dei’s role in Onganía’s regime appeared in the Buenos Aires 
weekly Análisis.146 By far the most damaging publication to date, the report depicted the Opus 
Dei’s relationship with the Ateneo, as well as with many other of its allies - including Mayochi’s 
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newspaper El Pueblo and Alberto Floria, allegedly the Opus Dei’s La Nacion “contact man” - and 
discussed Escrivá’s “penetration” tactics.147 By 1969, pamphlets of all kinds were circulating in 
Argentina alleging that the Opus Dei is behind the move towards the “communitarian” model and 
that “the future state will be based on bodies similar to those existing in Spain and Portugal.”148 
Later, in 1969, Primera Plana joined Inédito in revealing the Cursillos de la Cristiandad’s control 
over the city of Tucumán.149 An utterly negative account, it indicated that Primera Plana had by 
then turned against the regime. Joining those who spoke, sotto voce, of the inexistence of a political 
plan, in January 1969 Arturo Frondizi broke his silence and publicly questioned Onganía’s 
objectives.150 In short, by Spring 1969 the legitimacy of Onganía’s regime, and the spiritual 
agencies directing it, were openly put into question in the public sphere.  
         Ultimately, it was a combination of tax raises, anti-union policies, continuous student unrest, 
and Peronist activism, along with the inaction of several disenchanted Azul generals,151 that ignited 
Argentina’s 1969 student uprisings. Many explanations have been given in historiography for the 
events of May 29, 1969, in the city of Córdoba.152 There is a consensus among historians that the 
uprising was, initially at least, of a haphazard nature - an outcome of an alliance between students 
and the city’s unions Fiat Materfer and Fiat Concord. Opting to protest despite the banning of 
political marches, the demonstrators took over the city for hours, later to be overrun by the police 
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causing several fatalities. In fact, Córdoba was only the more salient case among several other 
uprisings, in Rosario (“el Rosariazo”), Tucuman (“el Tucumanzo”) and Corrientes, indicating that 
this was, indeed, a grassroot uprising of a national scale.   
         The events of May 1969 established that Onganía was neither a popular dictator nor capable 
of sustaining his regime without violence. In a deeper sense, they showed that three years of 
ideological interpellation of the Argentine middle-class had been an unmitigated failure. The 
ambiguous language of “political reform,” which in essence meant waiting for Peronism to 
disappear only thereafter to practice an “organic democracy,” led Argentines of all ages to the 
conclusion that the Argentine Revolution could only be ousted through active rebellion. Onganía’s 
ministers perceived the events differently. For Díaz Colodrero, for instance, even in the 1980s it 
was still oblivious that “Marxist activists” were behind the uprising and that Governor Caballero 
was merely the “pretext” for subversive activity.153 Krieger Vasena, was of a different opinion and 
admitted that he had thought the events were an outcome of unnecessary nacionalista ideology. 
Onganía, for his part, blamed both “Castro-inspired communists” and his own Commander in 
Chief, Lanusse, for undermining him.154 On the other side of the Atlantic Franco’s agents were 
interpreting the events their own way. Stating that the “effervescence” had been carried out by 
youngsters “lacking a political orientation,” their report explained the uprising by underscoring 
Onganía’s austerity measures as well as by pointing out fact that “everyone here enjoys freedom 
of the press, absolute and total.”155 In brief, the Spaniards stated what was, for them, obvious: by 
not oppressing Argentina’s free press, Onganía doomed his regime to a slow death.    
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        The ensuing Cuadernos del Sur editorial could not have sounded more disappointed from the 
course of events. Arguing for the singularity of Onganía’s regime, it maintained that the Argentine 
Revolution had “created a supra-constitutional order, placing above the Magna Carta the Act of 
the Argentine Revolution.” While reiterating the notion that the regime relied on a “tacit consensus 
of the population,” the journal did admit, however, several recent “economic mistakes” (the 
increase of seven pesos in the tax levied on petrol) and demanded from Onganía to reveal his 
political plan. “There is one issue on which we all agree: we cannot go back to the system 
concluded on June 28, 1966. The traditional political parties […] are unable to carry out the 
colossal task that the country needs,” said the editorial.156 In other words, the Opus Dei’s chief 
intellectual platform in Latin America articulated what was by then self-evident: it never believed 
in parliamentary democracy in Argentina. 
         In June 1969, Onganía sacked his entire cabinet, the dynamic Krieger Vasena included, 
replacing the Ateneo members with a less coherent assembly of ministers. Arguably, Onganía had 
identified by then that this authoritarian milieu was not earning him popularity. On August 5, 1969, 
Onganía also acted against the press by closing Primera Plana - an action that illustrated even 
further the profoundness of the Argentine Revolution’s crisis. As replacements for the Ateneo 
ministers Onganía appointed intellectuals of similar ideological hues. For instance, as Education 
Minister, he assigned Dardo Pérez Guilhou, a jurist who had earned his PhD in the University of 
Seville and was a founding member of the ICH in the province of Cuyo.157 Unlike Astigueta, Pérez 
Guilhou saw himself less as a nacionalista and more as a moderating factor.158 With Minister of 
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the Economy José María Dagnino Pastore on board, Onganía also moved towards a more 
protectionist economic strategy, publicly demonstrating that he was responsive to the surge of civic 
unrest. Yet strikingly, he insisted to sustain his solemn connection with Spain, by sending Pérez 
Guilhou to meet Franco and study the new Spanish Education reform. Indeed, Pérez Guilhou 
traveled to Spain in January 1970 and met with Franco and Luis Villar Palasí, after which he 
declared that the latter’s White Book (discussed in chapter 6) may be the basis for educational 
reforms “in other countries in the Spanish-speaking community.”159 In other words, the Argentine 
Revolution perhaps altered the course of its economic policies somewhat, but when it came to its 
ideological inspirations little has changed.  
          It took the Armed Forces several months to fully grasp the meanings of the 1969 events. In 
May 1970, the Azul high command sent Onganía a bold memorandum, wherein it attributed the 
uprising to “the absence of concrete ideas about the culmination of the revolutionary process and 
its exit.”160 That is to say, the Armed Forces had concluded that by barely provided the economic 
“miracle” it had promised, deploying unpopular authoritarian ideologues, and never presenting the 
public with a coherent political horizon, the Argentine Revolution had, in essence, reached the 
limit of its effectiveness. The abduction and murder of General Pedro Aramburu on May 29, 1970, 
was yet another grim sign of the uselessness of Onganía’s regime in the face of left-wing 
mobilization turning to violence. It was then that the Armed Forces finally decided to force 
Onganía into action, demanding he presented the public with a concrete political plan. When 
Onganía finally returned to his generals with his “political theory,” on June 5, 1970, it was an 
evasive mixture of technocratic-authoritarian jargon that ignored entirely the essential question of 
separation of powers and the principle of a party system. Led by General Lanusse, on June 8, 1970, 
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the Azul generals ousted Onganía. The Argentine Revolution was now entering its last and 
humiliating phase of reckoning.161 
 
Lanusse’s dilemma, and the end of Argentina’s post-ideological experiment 
        The events of June 1970 were a humiliating moment for Onganía and the Azules alike, and 
the biggest setback to Argentina’s technocratic-authoritarian process to date. The Argentine 
Revolution did not end with Onganía, though. Under Lanusse, it took three more years for the 
Azules to finally abandon their pipe-dream to set the controls on a future democratic process to 
their liking. Not willing to become Argentina’s de facto President, Lanusse appointed the 
inexperienced General Roberto Levingston for the job. Doubtfully a nacionlista as the press 
portrayed him, this somewhat enigmatic figure vouched to bring Argentina back to more Frondizist 
economic protectionism. But his statements were mostly empty words. The economic strategies of 
his Minister of Economy, Carlos Moyano Llerena, were identical to those of his disciple Krieger 
Vasena and included a failed fourteen percent devaluation attempt at the end of 1970.162 
        In truth, very little has changed in the regime’s state ideology following Onganía definitive 
retirement. For one thing, the Education and Interior ministries were strictly in the hands of 
traditionalist and Catholic figures. For another thing, the Argentine Revolution did not abandon 
the effort to produce its own Development Plan. Once published, Argentina’s 1970-1974 
Development Plan even purported to be the materialization of the “Argentina Revolution Act” and 
Onganía’s 1966 Development and Planning Directive. Indisputably, it thereafter declared the 
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overcoming of “the anachronistic political, social, and economic structures that, opposing the 
realization of a modern and powerful country,” and spoke optimistically of nation “integrated 
spiritually, economically and physically.”163  
         That being said, 1970 saw the withdrawal of several of the far-right ideological groups of the 
1960s, for multiple reasons. Disheartened with the results of the Argentine Revolution, Cuadernos 
del Sur was the first to close down. Banned by the government in 1969, Azul y Blanco followed 
suit. The Ateneo de la República, for its part, reduced its activities and ceased to be the central 
intellectual platform of the previous years. To make matters worse for these affiliations, the 
Argentine press continued attacking the ideological groups that had backed and sustained Onganía. 
Hit hardest was the Opus Dei itself. Following recent defamatory publications in Spain, which will 
be debated fully in chapter 6, left-wing intellectuals such as Gregorio Selser and Jorge Perez Rocco 
disparaged the Opus Dei by highlighting its involvement in recent financial scandals (MATESA 
in Spain and ADELA in Argentina). These writers also stated that the Opus Dei, with its “Rialp y 
Pomaiere editorials, publications such as Cuadernos del Sur” had sought a “conquest of power,”164 
and further highlighted the work of intellectuals such as “Professor Ronchino,” who they accused 
of printing militaristic educational books in Madrid.165 In 1971, Confirmado and Timerman’s new 
newspaper La Opinion joined this trend.166 While shedding little light on the political operation of 
the Opus Dei in Argentina, these publications were nonetheless important as they indicated that 
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now, that Onganía was gone, his supporting ideological apparatus was helplessly harassed by the 
mainstream press, accused of connections to Franco’s Spain and of financial collusion.167 
           On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the Spaniards observed the downfall of their 
intimate ideological counterpart with alarm. In June 1970, the Spanish ambassador informed his 
superiors that Levingston was “distancing himself from Hispanismo, half disavowing [Onganía’s] 
message addressed to Spain, the only one of its kind.”168 As a part of the effort to ensure that the 
economic and ideological ties between the countries remained intact, on February 28, 1971 
Laureano López Rodó arrived in Buenos Aires for another short visit, and met with Levingston 
and with Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the nacionalista Luis María de Pablo Pardo.169  
          While this visit left little to no imprint on the relationship between the countries, it did yield 
an unusual interview of López Rodó with Bernardo Neustadt on national television. By now, those 
in the Argentine media who had supported Onganía in 1966 were not pleased with the way the 
“revolutionary process” was going. One of them was Bernardo Neustadt, who even followed 
López Rodó to Madrid for his report. It is worthwhile examining this interview for several reasons. 
Published in a special edition on Neustadt’s new journal Extra, it is illuminating primarily since 
Neustadt’s adoration for López Rodó clearly did not diminish with the years; and second, because 
the Argentine publicist was now “angrily” deconstructing the Argentine technocratic-authoritarian 
ideology for his audience. Unlike the Spanish “development plans,” which are marked by 
“authenticity” he said, the Argentine equivalent was “made up of easy slogans, ideological 
formulations that are neither effective nor practiced, […] and of men - ruling classes - who have 
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decided with every effort to delay progress.”170 In short, this interview touched on the very core of 
the technocratic-authoritarian model and its botched Argentine implementation.  
         Neustadt asked López Rodó several hard questions. “Do you believe that ideologies have 
died?” he inquired for instance. “I do not believe in the end of the ideologies, although one must 
ask what we meant by ideologies,” answered the Spaniard and explained:  
In politics, there are no dogmas, but there are ideals. I do not understand politics as pure 
management; I do not think that politics can be done without moving the support of the 
people towards a great national project that constitutes its destiny. It is the ideals that move 
people […] I understand the freedom that is a fundamental value of man. I want freedom.171 
 
“But you do not believe in parliaments institutions,” Neustadt further pressed. “I believe in a 
legislative chamber,” was López Rodó’s predictable answer. “Parliamentarism,” he added 
defiantly, “is a degeneration of democracy” since its fundamental activity is the “diversion to 
overthrow governments.”172 Alternatively, López Rodó advised the following model:   
I believe in popular grassroots politics, with broad participation, which, at the same time, 
ensures continuity. [...] And continuity can only be achieved with institutions that relate to 
the needs of each nation. But I do not believe in a universal formula […] The importation of 
formulas from other countries has always given us very bad results.  
 
Next, López Rodó lampooned Levingston’s “outdated” Economic nationalism by alleging that 
GDP hikes cannot possibly “cause detriment to the countries integrated into a supranational area.” 
Briefly put, on Argentine national television, López Rodó appeared both as a staunch advocate of 
the global neoliberal economy, and a believer in an idiosyncratic Hispanic regime model. By 
renegotiating the very term democracy, and eluding constantly to “organic” participation, López 
Rodó was thus, in 1971, still Franco’s quintessential technocratic-authoritarian theorist. 
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         The nine months of Levingston’s tenure saw the Argentine Revolution gradually losing the 
ideological component that had held Onganía regime effectively together for four years.173 “The 
cabinet is excessively heterogeneous and the distribution of powers between the President and his 
three Commanders in Chief complicates to the maximum the governmental task,” reported 
Amadeo to Sánchez Bella in 1971. In contrast, the conduct of the Peronists,” he said surprisingly, 
“has matured and they are spiritually very independent from [Perón in] Madrid.”174 Two months 
later Amadeo wrote again. “Levingston,” he said, “lacked prestige and authority,” and therefore, 
“there is a great emptiness of power and an almost total absence of authentic political thought.” 
By now, Amadeo revealed that he had been in touch with “leading Peronist figures” and was 
“optimistic about the prospects of reaching solid and stable understandings with them.”175   
         By mid-1972 little had remained from Onganía’s ideological apparatus. Amadeo, by then, 
was persuaded that a mature, Catholic, and anti-Marxist version of Peronism was better than any 
Azule-led regime. In his wishful thinking, he believed that Perón “does not really want to return 
and that he is no longer capable of assuming the heaviest burden […] of the Presidency.” 
Moreover, Amadeo lost all hope in further military intervention in politics. If such a thing were to 
happen, he predicted, “it would be a reactionary and ultraconservative attempt that would not last 
long and would only serve to ‘radicalize’ the process.”176 Hence, for him and his few remaining 
followers, only by supporting Perón’s electoral “Front,” and “fighting alongside the popular 
sectors” could one fight effectively against the emerging “Marxist enemy.” Even Héctor Cámpora, 
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the head of Perón’s political Front (FREJULI), turned out, in Amadeo’s opinion, to be a “decent 
fellow,” his orientation being purely “Christian and anti-Marxist.”177 
         Once the more qualified General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse finally replaced Levingston, in 
July 1971, he and his staff had neither a plan for a spiritual makeover of the Argentine population, 
nor did they think they could bring about a profound change of attitudes of the Argentine polity 
towards Peronism. Perhaps one of the more reluctant presidents in Argentine History, if to judge 
from his memories at least,178 from the moment Lanusse came into office what preoccupied him 
the most was retrospectively defending the image Argentine Military’s deeds since 1962, trying to 
persuade the Argentine public that the upcoming democratic opening was to be carried out thanks 
to the Army’s intervention rather than despite it. Thus, he declared his strategy of Grand National 
Agreement (“gran acuerdo nacional”) which in essence meant establishing a consensus on the 
democratic rules of the game, thereby aiming to establish a protected democracy to avoid Perón 
from returning to power. In an act of desperation, Lanusse even contemplated changing the 
Argentine Constitution, as the only measure possible for gaining the foregoing objective.179  
         But more fundamentally, Lanusse was now confronting the unintended consequence of the 
very resistance to his dictatorship, namely the rise of Argentina’s so-called revolutionary “urban 
guerrilla.” In particular, the dramatic upsurge of deadly operations from the hands of The People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ERP) and Peronist movement Montoneros, tarnished whatever had been left 
of the Argentine Revolution’s respectability, and complicated even further the democratic 
transitional process.180 As a result, Lanusse’s tenure was marked by mounting oppression, as first 
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reports of torture, and later the reinstalling of capital punishment shocked the mainstream press.181 
In short, Lanusse, who was not unfamiliar to nacionalista theory and who had been a frequent 
Cursillos de la Cristiandad participant himself,182 refrained from ever trying to instigate his own 
ideological movement. Likewise, by this time he had little interest in the services of the 
nacionalistas, the Ateneo de la República, or other intellectual groups of that ideological hue, as 
he sought to retrieve Argentina peacefully to a parliamentary system, with the Armed Forces 
saving as much of their dignity as possible. Alas, Argentina’s 1973 democratic transition was to 
be anything but peaceful and dignified, as I will explore in chapter 6.  
 
Conclusions  
        The Argentine Revolution of 1966-1970 was one of the first glaring examples of an effort to 
establish a Hispanic technocratic-authoritarian regime in Latin America. With the newly born 
Brazilian dictatorship at his side - though hardly a source of ideological inspiration - Juan Carlos 
Onganía turned to technocratic Spain, as well as to the post-fascist milieus operating in Argentina 
since the 1950s, for ideological guidance. By offering their service to him at the right moment, and 
by constantly explicating and theorizing his regime in the public sphere throughout the 1960s, the 
latter decided the ideological character of the Argentine Revolution. Assuredly, through a process 
of trial and error, Onganía and his ideologues pursued, at times clumsily, their own updated model 
of a post-ideological state. Still, Argentina’s technocratic-authoritarian experiment was never 
haphazard or improvised, but the outcome of a genealogy of ideological production that led back 
to the 1930s and the rise of European fascism. It is important to note that it would take Argentine 
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scholars and publicist several decades to begin reflecting on Onganía’s Francoist inspirations, at 
which point some went as far as naming him the “Argentine Franco.”183 One possible explanation 
for this is that despite Onganía’s dialogue with Spain, he and his followers never avowedly 
acknowledged Francoism was their model. Even so, as this chapter has now clarified, Onganía’s 
eagerness to opt for the services of ICH, Opus Dei, and Cursillos de la Cristinadad affiliates, meant 
that Francoism and the Argentine Revolution were linked through networks of theorists, 
administrators, and educators. Moreover, the regimes displayed a public collaboration that was in 
no way secret.  
         Overall, however, the story of Onganía’s failed technocratic experiment was that of 
Onganía’s own interpretation - or better, misinterpretation - of the Francoist regime, under the 
enduring pressures to undo twenty years of Peronist mobilization. By believing his dictatorship 
could seamlessly implement a handful of “techniques” employed at the time in Spain, Onganía 
grossly overlooked the crucial importance of the memory of the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s 
ongoing state-led terror. In turn, his regime ultimately spurred a severe backlash, in the shape of 
civil uprising, and soon thereafter, in urban guerrilla. As a result, by 1971 little had remained of 
Argentina’s 1960s technocratic-authoritarian state-ideology. Nevertheless, the post-fascist 
ideologies of the 1960s did not entirely disappear in the 1970s, and would continue to play a role 
in the Argentine economic and political spheres. The sixth and last chapter of my analysis will 
touch on the lines of continuation between Argentina’s authoritarian projects of the 1960s and the 
Argentine military dictatorship of the late-1970s.  
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Chapter 5: The Chilean Road to Technocratic-Authoritarianism, 1964-1977 
 
          On September 4, 1964, Eduardo Frei Montalva won a landslide victory in the Chilean 
General Elections. Under his leadership, Chile’s Christian Democrats, who had once been the 
admirers of José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s Falange, were, thirty years later, to implement what 
they dubbed a “Revolution in Liberty.” In essence, it meant that by mobilizing Chile’s working-
classes within this sui generis political movement, Frei aimed to carry out an unprecedented 
redistribution of the country’s wealth. A paramount turning point in modern Chilean history, it 
was also a moment of immense distress for the conservative political elites who had been ruling 
the country firmly since the 1930s.1 Above all, it was the socially-conscious spirituality of the 
Christian Democrats - based on the writing of Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson - that made 
their “revolution” anathema in the eyes of the traditionalist Chileans. As a result, from this moment 
on Chile saw an ideological radicalization of its far-right polity, and the emergence of new 
technocratic-authoritarian groups. In 1970, in the wake of Salvador Allende’s tenure and the so-
called “Chilean Road to Socialism,” these groups proposed replacing Chile’s democracy with a 
definitive authoritarian state model. In turn, once General Augusto Pinochet overthrew Allende, 
in September 1973, his regime was to build on this decade-long ideological production.  
         That Franco’s dictatorship was a source of inspiration for Pinochet and his ideologues is no 
secret. In fact, unlike in the case of Onganía’s regime, it was an inseparable part the regime’s 
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public history.2 Indeed, historians have already highlighted Pinochet inclinations towards 
“Hispanic” spirituality and his evocation of the memory of the Spanish Civil War when 
legitimizing his regime.3 This chapter builds on this literature but also seeks to broaden this 
narrative by pointing to the unexpected aspects of both the Francoist and Chilean ideological 
projects. While perhaps using Francoism as a reference, the Chilean intellectuals I examine 
cultivated their own highly original version of technocratic-authoritarianism. They did so amid a 
period when the Francoist dictatorship itself was undergoing deep crisis, and once again, within 
the framework of a stern competition against a neo-fascist countermovement. This chapter thus 
follows a structure similar to the ones preceding it. First it explores Chile’s post-fascist associations 
in the late-1960s and the presence of Franco’s technocrats in Chile during that period; next, the I 
elucidate the role these intellectual apparatuses played in the campaigns against Allende; 
thereafter, the chapter debates how these groups served the dictatorship in its first year of existence, 
and touches on Pinochet’s dialogue with Franco’s regime; and lastly, it examines the early 
Pinochet years as the embodiment of a third technocratic-authoritarian regime model. 
 
Chile’s 1960s post-fascist authoritarianism: from the Francoist presence in Chile to the 
advent of the “gremialista” movement 
        Over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, Chile did not witness the rise of any influential 
neo-fascist movement alike the Argentine nacionalistas. Being in power for decades, Chile’s 
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conservative elites ostensibly had no immediate incentive to support a revolutionary movement of 
the Right.4 True, the authoritarian theorists discussed in chapter 1 remained active throughout this 
period. While Oswaldo Lira edited the journal Aesthesis Eyzaguirre coordinated Finis Terrae - 
both belonging to the Catholic University of Chile and hosting ICH theorists such as Esteban 
Scarpa, Ricardo Krebs, and Hugo Montes. Yet Lira was hardly an influential ideologue in the 
1960s. His most salient work at that period was his 1965 Ortega en su espíritu - a book that set out 
to repudiate the theories of the late Spanish philosopher. In the face of the miracle of creation, Lira 
thought he himself offered “answers,” whereas Ortega proposed the “virus of logic.”5 Similarly, 
Eyzaguirre quietly receded from public life. The only noteworthy aspect regarding his journal 
Finis Terrae is that from 1964 its entire editorial board was comprised of the exact same Chileans 
collaborating in Cuadernos del Sur: José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, Carlos Vial Correa, Juan de 
Dios Vial Correa, Raúl Urzua, and Raul Tomassini. That is to say, it was here that the Opus Dei’s 
penetration into the Catholic University of Chile took place. Expectedly, Finis Terrae thus touched 
on issues of public morality and spirituality in everyday life.6 While one cannot be evangelical “on 
an empty stomach,” it stated, economic development nonetheless must serve to “Christianize 
society” and lead to “spiritual salvation.”7 Overall, however, Lira and Eyzaguirre neither left a 
substantial imprint on Chile’s right-wing thought during this period, nor did they serve as a link to 
Franco’s Spain as they had done previous decades. 
         Consequently, by the mid-1960s a young and dynamic generation of Chilean thinkers 
replaced the authoritarian thinkers of the 1950s. This process went in tandem not only with 
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Eduardo Frei’s rise to power but with the ever-growing presence of Francoist technocratic-
authoritarian thought in Chile. As mentioned before, the Spanish embassy and ICH were 
cooperating in this period in an effort to coordinate political movements aligned with the Francoist 
worldview. Led by Roque Esteban Scarpa, Hernán Godoy Urzúa, and Arturo Fontaine, by the mid-
1960s, Santiago’s ICH branch was indeed one of the most energetic far-right circles in Chile’s 
public sphere, and the most loyal to Franco in Latin America. An anecdote to support this claim 
was a letter sent by Chile’s ICH director Raul Bazán to Alfredo Sánchez Bella in 1966 demanding 
a concrete ideological “action” from Madrid; to which Sánchez Bella responded that to achieve 
spiritual development “the institute in Madrid should stay behind curtains, promoting action, 
suggesting it, in some cases if necessary, financing it, but without appearing as its leader, because 
once it appears as such, 80 or 90 percent of its effect would be lost.”8 Sánchez Bella’s suggestions 
notwithstanding, Chile’s ICH hardly operated “behind curtains.” In fact, its members were 
noticeable public intellectuals - and this includes Sara Phillipi Izquierdo and Gisela Silva Encina, 
the heads of the ICH women’s section - and hardly concealed their linkage to Spain. In his 
campaign against global family planning, ICH member Jorge Iván Hübner (discussed in chapter 
1) even openly met with Franco in Madrid.9 Noteworthy in this respect is Sergio Fernández 
Larraín. Born in 1909, and trained as a historian, he was one of few who could rightfully consider 
themselves Franco’s intimate friend.10 As Chile’s Ambassador in Madrid in the early 1960s, 
Fernández Larraín witnessed the emergence of technocratic Spain first hand and was clearly 
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impressed with what he saw.11 By the mid-1970s, he boasted that his life’s pride was his 
“permanent campaign against communism and ardent defense of the eternal values of Spain.”12  
        The presence of Francoist thought in Chile’s conservative media was, by then, also 
noticeable. Apart from El Mercurio,13 Estanquero, and El Diario Ilustrado, other outlets, for 
instance, the publishing house Zig-Zag, now came under the aura of Spain’s ideological 
production. The chief publishing house for Chile’s conservative thinkers, in the 1960s, Zig-Zag 
held exclusive rights over the Francoist CSIC and IEP publications.14 Moreover, as in Argentina, 
Chile saw the arrival of prominent Francoist ideologues in the mid-1960s. Following Sánchez 
Bella’s regular visits, Pérez Embid too arrived in Santiago de Chile. Reflecting on his journey, he 
stated the following anti-ideological authoritarian assertions. “I believe that in our time Western 
liberties can only be guaranteed by an authority with social effectiveness […] this requires a 
formula that overcomes the political dialectic of the last century: oligarchies, elections, 
demagoguery, barracks,” he wrote.15 
        Likewise, López Rodó arrived in Santiago before meeting with Onganía. Convening with 
Frei and his economic cabinet, the soft-spoken Opus Dei technocrat made several statements to 
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which the Chile’s conservative media responded favorably. El Mercurio, for example, retold the 
Spaniard’s propaganda in its entirety: 
The central purpose of the Development Plan is to make Spain raise its standard of living, 
develop its culture, and provide greater well-being to its inhabitants, within three conditions: 
maximum speed, economic stability, and exaltation of the dignity and freedom of man. […] 
López Rodó highlighted the assistance that Spain could provide Chile to establish vocational 
training centers, training courses for women, and artisan courses.16  
 
El Diario Ilustrado further quoted him for saying that “Spain is not a miracle since these do not 
exist in the economy, but, fundamentally, the fruit of a collective effort of a nation determined to 
reach a better destination within [proper] standards of the justice.”17 In a word: Spain’s economic 
liftoff was, by now, openly debated upon Chile’s conservative platforms.   
         The most prominent visit of all was that of Gonzalo Fernández de las Mora. Being the 
Director of Cultural Cooperation at Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and hailed by El Mercurio 
as an agent of “scientific rigor and pure rational effort,” in 1967 he gave a series of lectures in 
Chile.18 Spain’s philosophies, he opined then, had thus far suffered from “improvisation, 
contradiction, [and] ‘machismo,” whereas what Latin America needs is the opposite: “science, 
invention, rigor, method, pragmatism, efficiency.” Given the contemporary global economic 
moment, he insisted, ideologies have become redundant in the West, thus “taking refuge in the 
most underdeveloped areas of the world.” Next, he made an example of the Spanish case:    
Forty years ago, it was a country of scarce development and today it is only a short distance 
from the developed nations. In that period, it has gone from 200 dollars per capita to 700. I 
remember that, in my childhood, in a town in Pontevedra, sugar was bought in pharmacies 
and was a luxury item. Currently, people commute on motorcycles and have televisions. 
Spain has experienced, in a very short time, the industrial revolution, the economic 
democratization, and the change of mentalities that in Great Britain took a century. We are 
                                                             
16 “El plan de desarrollo español da primacía a la empresa privada: declaraciones exclusivas para El Mercurio del  
Ministro español Laureano López Rodó,” El Mercurio (August 14, 1966).  
17 El Diario Ilustrado (August 12, 1966); see also - “Reseña de la rueda de prensa celebrada en la embajada de 
España,” August 11, 1966, AGUN, box 005/480. 
18 “El desarrollo económico deja atrasa las ideologías: Entrevista al profesor español Fernández de la Mora,” El 
Mercurio (September 29, 1967).  
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a nation of 30 million habitants whose only “ideology” is economic development, that is, no 
longer an ideology proper, but a rational and realistic impulse.19 
 
These words were technocratic-authoritarianism in its purest form. A teleological narrative, it 
spoke of an invisible agent “developing” a nation, bringing it from poverty to consumption in 
astounding speed, and consequently, liberating it from the “ideologies” plaguing it through a 
deterministic “change of mentalities.” The masses, Fernández de las Mora clarified, were 
completely out of the equation as historical agents: “there is no development without social reform, 
but this cannot be done either by paying attention to the street or from the street,” he warned his 
hosts.20 That these words challenged Eduardo Frei’s democratic mobilization was fairly clear.   
         By the mid-1960s the direct influence of Francoist technocratic thought could be seen in the 
work and activism of a new generation of Chilean youngsters. Nothing exemplifies this better than 
the early texts of Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz. Unquestionably Pinochet’s most prominent ideologue 
in the 1970s, his intellectual trajectory echoed Francoism’s ideological shift between 1957 and 
1976. Guzmán began his career sounding much like a “revolutionary” Falangist, only later to 
reemerge as Chile’s quintessential technocratic-authoritarian thinker, and last, as a theorist of 
“protected” democracies. Thus, his ideology, I argue, was not “marked by a remarkable conceptual 
unity and harmony,” as some historians have argued, but saliently changed throughout the years.21  
         A student of Lira and Eyzaguirre at the elitist Catholic school Colegio de los Sagrados 
Corazones, Guzmán was sent to Spain in 1962. Barely sixteen years old, he wrote his mother the 
following words: 
I am already in Spain. I am already bursting with hispanism and Francoism [...]. I am an 
arch-Francoist because I have felt that the Generalissimo is the Savior of Spain, and have 
                                                             
19 “El crepúsculo de las ideologías: conferencia de Fernández de la Mora,” El Mercurio (October 1, 1967).   
20 Ibid.  
21 Renato Cristi, El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán: autoridad y libertad (Santiago de Chile: Lom 
Ediciones, 2000), 7. 
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noticed his illustrious personality, how happy people are with him, how well he works, and 
what economic progress he created. And let it be known that in Spain today there is absolute 
freedom, […] oriented towards the Common Good and not to satisfy the absurd principle of 
the French Revolution - “Liberte” that ends up in debauchery. […] The Valley of the Fallen, 
the greatest work of the twentieth century. Mama: a country that builds a monument like 
this, is the greatest country in the world.22 
 
Many have already cited these words as the definitive proof of Guzmán’s admiration of Franco.23 
That might be the case. Conversely, one should refrain from reducing his future work to this 
moment of exuberance. What we can definitely learn from this letter is how Franco’s 
indoctrination dazed the youngsters visiting Spain in the 1960s. One can also clearly notice here 
how the “economic miracle” had become an integral part of the Francoist teleological narrative 
regarding Spain’s universal mission against the French Revolution. Similarly, a text Guzmán wrote 
in his school’s journal, tellingly titled “Viva Franco, Arriba España,” implies that his visit to Spain 
equipped him with updated corporatist ideological outlines. “National-syndicalism,” he preached, 
“stands for a corporate organization of society, based not on political parties, but on the Family, 
the Municipality, and the Unions - intermediary bodies with authentic natural right, situated 
between society and the State.”24 Indeed, some of these formulas would resonate in Guzmán’s 
texts at least until 1980.  
        But Guzmán was neither a Falangist nor a neo-fascist. Unlike Tacuara, and like Beccar 
Varela’s Cruzada affiliation, he quickly identified the reactionary Catholic ideological ground at 
the heart of the Francoist hierarchic order. In 1962, it was also clear to him that José Antonio Primo 
de Rivera was not the main ideological point of reference for Chile’s future political project. While 
                                                             
22 “Carta de Jaime Guzmán a Carmen Errazuriz, 10 de marzo de 1962,” in Rosario Guzmán, Mi hermano Jaime, 
(Santiago: Editorial VER, 1991), 79-80. 
23 See for instance - José Manuel Castro, Jaime Guzmán: ideas y política 1946-1973, 37; Weld, “The Spanish Civil 
War and the Construction of a Reactionary Historical Consciousness in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile”, 94.  
24 “Viva Franco, Arriba España!” La Revista Escolar: Colegio de los Sagrados Corazones, no. 436 (I trimester, 
1962): 17 
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an acolyte of Eyzaguirre and Lira, he was neither a “corporatist” as his teachers, nor did he speak 
of Hispanidad much. Rather, in his effort to define a novel post-fascist horizon he too was attracted 
to the message of Corrêa de Oliveira. Thus, by the mid-1960s, Guzmán voiced a hybrid of 
intellectual influences that ultimately yielded a unique Chilean version of technocratic-
authoritarianism. While clearly, albeit not admittedly, inspired by Fernández de la Mora and 
Sánchez Agesta, he was to propose his own path for a “post-ideological” society.  
         Guzmán eventually became a prominent figure in the recently-opened Chilean Tradición, 
Familia y Propiedad branch, notorious for its journal Fiducia. Corrêa de Oliveira’s conception of 
the enemy appeared here unapologetically: Marxists are “the enemies of God,” he told his Chilean 
audience.25 Still a teenager, Guzmán added to this line of argumentation. The Détente, he wrote 
then, was an unacceptable reality. “Communism is still atheist and materialist, and therefore, a 
monstrous enemy of God and his church,” he maintained.26 Defining private property as “natural 
law,”27 he also fiercely attacked Frei’s reading of the Church’s gospel,28 and, in turn, the Christian 
Democrats’ upcoming 1965 Land Reform.29 By then, Guzmán reached one other important 
conclusion: whether it was fascism, or “communitarianism,” there was no liable revolutionary 
“third position” to be sought.30  
                                                             
25 “La verdadera paz exige la lucha de los seguidores de Cristo contra sus enemigos,” Fiducia, no. 14 (December-
January, 1964): 54. 
26 “Relaciones diplomáticas con los países comunistas,” Fiducia, no. 13 (November 1964): 9. 
27 “El derecho de propiedad y el proyecto de reforma constitucional,” Fiducia, no. 13 (November 1964): 12. 
28 “El diálogo, la socialización y la paz utilizados como slogans de la Revolución,” Fiducia, no. 17 (May-June 
1965).  
29 Or what Fiducia labelled Frei’s “economic and political dictatorship,” see - “Declaraciones frente a la reforma 
constitucional y la reforma agraria: en defensa del derecho de propiedad privada,” Fiducia, no. 15 (Febraury-
March1965); Guzmán also justified the Brazilian dictatorship, labeling it an “uprising that avoided an imminent 
communist aggression”, see - “Respondiendo a FEUC sobre el alzamiento en Brasil, 1964, Archivo Federación 
Jaime Guzmán; also in - Castro, Jaime Guzmán: Ideas y política, 80. 
30 “Behind the slogan ‘neither capitalism nor communism’ […] hides socialism,” he said, see - “El capitalismo y los 
católicos de tercera posición,” Fiducia, no. 20 (October 1965).  
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         Guzmán’s first actual political activism was the establishment of the Movimiento Gremial 
de la Universidad Católica de Chile, better known as “gremialistas.” There was very little 
“unionism” in the gremialista program, as the Spanish word might suggest. The “gilds” to which 
gremial alludes were rather the pre-modern “intermediary groups” that had allegedly operated in 
the times of the Spanish Empire. The legends surrounding the gremialistas and their supposed 
influence on Pinochet’s dictatorship have shaped the ways in which historians have depicted the 
prominence of the group also in the 1960s - a tendency we should at least be aware of at this point 
of the analysis.31 The gremialistas were merely a student organization devoid of a publishing 
apparatus. Consequently, they were noticeable perhaps in the social circles of the Catholic 
University. Yet even by the end of the decade Guzmán and his colleagues were still relatively 
anonymous figures in Chile’s public sphere, known mostly of battling the Christian Democrats’ 
higher educational reform, and, like the Opus Dei, proposing their own version of Catholic science 
by harmonizing “the natural with the supernatural.”32 
         At any rate, during this period Guzmán and the gremialistas explored both the economic and 
spiritual aspects of collective action. On the one hand, Guzmán theorized private property not 
merely as a key for market-oriented economic development but as society’s essential ethical 
ground. Thus, Frei’s Land Reform, Guzmán thought, was a “violation of a basic principle of 
                                                             
31 For more historical analyses on this period see - Belén Moncada Durruti, Jaime Guzmán: una democracia 
contrarevolucionaria: el político de 1964 a 1980 (Santiago de Chile: RIL Editores), 200; Cristián Gazmuri, Quién 
era Jaime Guzmán? (Santiago de Chile: Ril editores, 2013), 33-61; Cristi, El pensamiento político de Jaime 
Guzmán, 69-74; Castro, Jaime Guzmán: ideas y política, 101-135.  
32 “The Gremialistas resolutely defend the Catholic character of our University [...] the Revelation does not harm the 
autonomy of each science. […] all science - properly conducted - must be in accordance with the revelation’s 
principles; otherwise, it will be pseudo-science, unless it is intended to deny the harmony of the natural with the 
supernatural”, see – “A la escuela de derecho: declaration de principios del movimiento gremial,” in Castro, Jaime 
Guzmán: ideas y política, 208-216; see also - Jaime Guzmán, Teoría sobre la Universidad (Santiago de Chile: 
Universidad Católica, 1970). 
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natural law,” and the beginning of a “socialist and totalitarian” turn.33 On the other hand, Guzmán 
was also a spiritual technocrat. “It is not enough to be technical professionals,” he touted, as “life 
has no worth if it is not utilized in the service of a larger cause.” Quoting José Antonio Primo de 
Rivera, he even suggested merging capitalist development with a “spiritual cause.”34 José 
Antonio’s references aside, Guzmán and his followers presented a platform considerably 
dissimilar to that of the Falange’s forefather. Indeed, in their founding documents the gremialistas 
developed their technocratic-authoritarian language, as they now advocated the societal “de-
politicization” and distinguished between “social” and “political” types of power. Markedly, the 
ideology they promoted was an anti-statist type of authoritarianism, wherein the regime, after 
purging society from its “enemies,” invites “intermediary” civic agencies to work in autonomy.35  
         Graduating from the Catholic University of Chile, Guzmán continued to delineate this future 
“liberal” dictatorship. In 1969, he spoke of three types of states: the “liberal/ individualist,” the 
“socialist/statist,” and the Catholic “subsidiary state.” Given that “Socialism is the son of 
Liberalism,” and in a search for rapid economic efficiency, one must opt, he believed, for the third 
model, as it is the only one conscious “of the transcendent purpose of man.” In a typical post-
fascist turn, Guzmán expounded next that by “subsidiary state” he meant that the state apparatus 
“is secondary not only with respect to man as such, but also regarding the family, the 
municipalities, and the unions - the only possibility of forming a truly organic society.”36 Guzmán 
                                                             
33 Jaime Guzmán, “El derecho de propiedad y el proyecto de reforma constitucional,” Fiducia, no. 13, (November 
1964): 9; see also - Jaime Guzmán, Escritos personales (Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1992), 153. 
34 As Castro has pointed out, the sentence “la vida no vale la pena si no es para quemarla al servicio de una empresa 
grande” is a direct quotation from Primo de Rivera’s speech on February 25 1934 in Carpio de Tajo; see - Castro, 
Jaime Guzmán: ideas y política, 105; also - “Discurso a nombre de alumnos nuevos Facultad de Derecho, ceremonia 
de inauguración del año académico de 1969, la Facultad de Derecho,” Fundación Jaime Guzmán; José Antonio 
Primo de Rivera, Textos de doctrina política (Madrid: Sección Femenina de la FET, 1971), 176.  
35 “Discurso a nombre de alumnos nuevos Facultad de Derecho, ceremonia de inauguración del año académico de 
1969, la Facultad de Derecho,” located at Fundación Jaime Guzmán. 
36 Jaime Guzmán, “El miedo, síntoma de la realidad político-social chilena,” Portada, no. 2 (1969): 5-7, 14. 
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failed to clarify whether he still believed in the separation of powers, for instance. In a sense, he 
did not need to: the model he was depicting was Franco’s Spain in 1969.  
        While the gremialistas set the initial contours for Chile’s post-ideological regime, the Opus 
Dei became ever more noticeable in Chile’s public sphere. Following the Cuadernos del Sur 
project, with the aid of Zig-Zag and El Mercurio in the late 1960s, the Opus Dei intellectuals 
discussed in chapter 3 became ever noticeable in Chile’s media. María Teresa Alamos became, for 
example, a prominent writer in El Mercurio. Another affiliate of the Opus Dei publicist network 
was Gonzalo Vial Correa.37 Born in 1930, in the 1960s this young historian, himself a disciple of 
Eyzaguirre and a keen interpreter of Hispanic spirituality, began making a name for himself for 
his media savviness. As we will see shortly, he too would be a crucial actor in the early 1970s 
campaigns against Salvador Allende. Above all, Ibáñez Langlois himself now became a public 
intellectual, primarily as El Mercurio’s literary critique and publishing under the pseudonym 
Ignacio Valete. Thus, for more than two decades it was an Opus Dei priest who mediated the 
modern literary world to Chile’s conservative readers. This did not mean that Ibáñez necessarily 
criticized secular literary work; it did signify however the frequent appearance of ultra-
conservative writers in his work.38 Ibáñez Langlois also become known for his poetry. In 
particular, it was his 1971 Poemas dogmáticos that attracted public critique. Apart from its alleged 
                                                             
37 The brother of the aforementioned Opus Dei supernumeraries Elena Vial Correa and Juan de Dios Vial Correa, his 
wife was María Luisa Vial, an Opus Dei supernumerary and founder of the Colegios de la Fundación Barnechea, see 
- Mönckeberg, El imperio del Opus Dei en Chile, 215. 
38 For instance, he praised the work of his friend Armando Roa, who Ibáñez Langlois said was “educated in the 
manner of those Renaissance doctors and sages, capable of [...] combining rigorous modern study with the ancient 
ideal of humanities.” Roa was a psychiatrist known for blending psychiatry with Catholic spiritualism and was 
married to an Opus Dei supernumerary, see - Ignacio Valente, “Armando Roa: Psiquiatría y destino,” El Mercurio 
(October 24, 1971).  
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misogyny,39 the book ridiculed the Christian Democrats and derided birth control.40 Yet the most 
important role Ibáñez Langlois played in those years was his public “debate” with Marxist thought. 
More accurately, in his books Marxismo y cristianismo41 and El Marxismo: visión critica, as well 
as in numerous other articles, Ibáñez Langlois set out to refute Marxism and the Liberation 
Theology with it. He did so by stressing that Marx’s theory is “a secularized and atheist version of 
the Judeo-Christian hope, of mysticism, of theology, and of the Catholic apocalypse,” and by 
certifying that only the Christian faith “can do justice to Marxism.” Of course, he did not merely 
point to the semblance between Marxism and the Christian theology; he insinuated that the former 
is the ontological truth while the latter is a perilous imitation.42  
         Through Zig-Zag the Opus Dei was granted accessed the prestigious women’s magazine Eva. 
Published also in Argentina and Peru, between 1967 and until the mid-1970s this platform was 
thereby to become strikingly similar to the aforementioned magazine Telva. With María Elena 
Aguirre and Carmen Echeverria as editors (both discussed in chapter 3), the Opus Dei’s toolkit of 
spiritual indoctrination was paramount here. Whether it was campaigning against divorce,43 or 
ridiculing the 1960s youth culture,44 warning against drugs,45 or scolding birth control46 - Eva was 
                                                             
39 “No tengo nada contra ti, mujer. Me pareces sagrada y misteriosa y más próxima al cielo que a la tierra. 
y que amarte es más dulce que la miel. No tengo nada contra ti, si no es que un día se te caerán los dientes, que no 
eres Dios, que engordas, que te mueres,” José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, Poemas dogmáticos (Santiago de Chile: 
Editorial Universitaria, 1971), 64. 
40 See for example - “Diálogo demócrata cristiano con la luna”, 121; “Karl Marx se encerró una noche a leer las 
Sagradas Escrituras”, 102; “La madre de un hijo, esa mujer,” 59, all three in Ibáñez Langlois, Poemas dogmáticos.  
41 Some of his writings were published in Spain, in Jesus Urteaga’s Mundo Cristiano booklet series, see - José 
Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, Marxismo y cristianismo (Madrid: Mundo Cristiano, 1974).   
42 “El demonio es una verdad incómoda,” Qué Pasa, no. 153 (March. 29, 1974):18-19; “El marxismo ateísmo en 
forma de religión,” El Mercurio (April 7, 1974); “Utopía del tercer milenio,” Ercilla, no. 2346 (July 16, 1980); 
“Teología de la liberación traiciona la causa de pobre,” La Tercera (July 30, 1985). 
43 “Hasta que la muerte nos separa?” Eva, no. 1278 (October 24, 1969): 96-97; “La fidelidad,” Eva, no. 1239, 
(January 24, 1969): 76-79; María Elena Aguirre, “A propósito de Fidelidad,” Eva, no. 1243 (February 21, 1969): 18.  
44 “Eva opina: la juventud y sus dioses,” Eva, no. 1227 (November 7, 1968): 9-11.  
45 “Viaje a la incertidumbre,” Eva, no. 1267 (August 8, 1969): 54-64.  
46 “La píldora de la discordia,” Eva, no. 1250 (April, 11, 1969): 30-35; “¿Qué es lo que cambia con la píldora?” Eva, 
no. 1383 (November 26, 1971): 30-33.  
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the showcase of the Opus Dei’s vision of middle-class womanhood.47 It even published a series of 
articles by the name of “Eva’s Sex education encyclopedia” where it stressed that only within 
wedlock can one “take sexuality to a higher level, that which is really human.”48  
          In the case of Chile, the Opus Dei’s peculiar logic of feminism appeared in an even fuller 
form. The 20th century has presented women with two immoral positions, Aguirre alleged: Hitler’s 
“Church, Kitchen, Children” ideal, and the 1960s progressive movement, which demanded from 
women “to be like men.” Both resulted, she said, in appalling consequences. “Women have their 
own nature,” she argued and gave the ensuing pseudo-scientific analysis to support her claims: 
Women suffer from emotional instability, due to the vulnerability of their glandular and 
neuro-sympathetic system. Therefore, they aspire to balance and harmony. Men, on the other 
hand, are made for adventure. They are not content with stable situations, are revolutionary, 
and dissatisfied. Women, as general elections have shown, are much more conservative. [...] 
women are less gifted for abstract speculation but have a much richer sentimental life than 
man. […] when a woman begets a child, she becomes the happy slave of that child [...] A 
woman subordinates her work and intellectual activity to her home, her husband, her 
children. She will never be able to focus on her career fully [...] Her role in future society is 
vital for its development, as she fulfills the plea made by all men, old people, and children, 
to humanize, to transform and to fill them with love.49 
 
Despite not admitting it, Aguirre’s stance was not entirely dissimilar from the Nazi chauvinism, 
as she too implied that women are mainly functional as housewives. To suggest otherwise was to 
go against their biologic “nature.” Strikingly, women empowerment, for the Opus Dei, thus meant 
tailoring a “scientific” theory around the difference between the genders. In evaluating the 
“complexes” of womanhood, Eva frequently evoked other “psychological” features, for instance 
by accusing women of having a “Diana complex.”50 Men, also received their share of schooling, 
                                                             
47 Promoting the “cursos de empleadas del hogar,” see - “Otra mujer en su casa,” Eva, no. 1235 (December 26, 
1968): 55-57, see also - “Sí, soy burguesa,” Eva, no. 1270 (August 29, 1969): 22-27. 
48 “Educación sexual,” Eva (April, 17, 1970), 31.  
49 “1968, la mujer busca su destino,” Eva, no. 1234 (December 20, 1968): 55-57. 
50 “Es usted una mujer acomplejada?” Eva no. 1223 (September 19, 1968): 26-32; “Soy sentimental?” Eva, no. 1269 
(August 22, 1969): 16; “1969: doce meses para ser feliz,” Eva, no. 1235 (December 27, 1968): 56-62. 
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as Eva presented them with an anti-revolutionary ideal type, who is “not immoral,” does not “even 
smoke,” believes to “hold the truth,” does “not like hippies,” and who is a leader “without looking 
for it.”51 Even homosexuality was admitted into the discussion at this point - more often than not 
lesbianism - only to be deemed an “evil spreading in giant steps.”52 Arguably, for the Opus Dei 
homosexuality was not a cultural issue but a psychiatric one, and thus not worthwhile explaining.   
         The relationship between Chile’s different post-fascist affiliations was intimate, but not 
always harmonious. In 1966, a dispute between TFP and Opus Dei even became apparent. It began 
when Ibáñez Langlois disapproved of the TFP’s cherry-picking of episcopal texts for what he 
thought was a fundamentalist approach. Being the Opus Dei’s spiritual leader in Chile, he believed 
the TFP discourse might harm the urbane spiritual movement he and his followers disseminated 
in the Southern Cone. Jesus Christ, he said, should not be brought into what essentially was a 
political “quarrel.”53 And yet, this dispute between the companions for the road did not last long. 
As we will see shortly, by the early 1970s Guzmán and the Opus Dei would cooperate 
harmoniously. The point not to be missed is that, in the late-1960s, these post-fascist ideological 
networks were all mobilizing to produce a militant countermovement against the mobilization of 
Chile’s left-wing parties. Overall, when it comes to penetration into the public sphere, the 
gremialistas and the Opus Dei were to demonstrate more ideological sophistication and political 
cunning than the TFP.  
 
                                                             
51 “Por qué soy líder,” Eva, no.1236 (January 3, 1969): 84-96; the “anti-hippie” approach came to its acme in 1970, 
when Eva’s special report from the island of Ibiza, where is stressed that the hippies were a dying species, see - 
Ignacio Vicuña L., “Honorosa Hippilancia?” Eva, no. 1296 (February 27, 1970); see also - “Londres: furibunda 
rebelión anti-hippie,” Eva, no. 1300 (March 27, 1970): 24- 27.  
52 Gloria Urgelles, “Lesbianismo: un mal solo para discretas,” Eva, no. 1380 (November 5, 1971): 33. 
53 “Respuesta al R. P. José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois,” Fiducia, no. 22 (February-March 1966): 9-11; see also - 
“Fiducia y los pecados del mundo,” Portada, no. 7 (1969): 27.  
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The struggle against Salvador Allende and the Popular Unity, 1970-1973 
         After nearly twenty years in Chilean politics, Salvador Allende won the September 1970 
elections with only 36.6 percent of the general vote. In broad strokes, his political alliance, the 
Popular Unity, aimed to restructure Chilean politics through mobilization of the working classes, 
at all levels of society. Thereafter, the so-called “Chilean Road to Socialism” was to comprise of 
a unique combination of governmental and private economies. By nationalizing Chile’s mining 
industries and other private enterprises, Allende aimed to establish areas of “social property” (área 
de propiedad social) operating side by side with a restricted private economy.54 For the Chilean 
far-right polity the Christian Democrats had been a misguided, yet respectable, opponent.55 
Allende and his program, on the other hand, were, for them, an illegitimate phenomenon. The 
process of delegitimizing Allende publicly, to the point of deeming him an external enemy worth 
eradication, was an intricate process however. As we will see shortly, this defamation campaign 
depended on peculiar narratives of victimhood and words games, using much Francoist mythology 
along with crafty improvisations.  
          For the Chilean Right the 1970 elections and the turbulent years that followed them were a 
period of restructuring. The electoral failure of Jorge Alessandri (or “alessandrismo”) was not 
accidental: the seventy-four-year-old leader of the National Party alliance had fairly little to offer 
the Chilean society in terms of novel economic and social plans. He too was, the argument went, 
a “man without ideology.” Vial Correa even promoted this as his talent: “For Alessandrismo […] 
                                                             
54  For several lucid analyses of Allende’s program of nationalization, see - Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-
American Cold War,107-49; Angela Vergara, Copper Workers, International Business, and Domestic Politics in 
Cold War Chile (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 155-78; Víctor Farías, La 
izquierda chilena (1969-1973): documentos para el estudio de su línea estratégica (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher 
Verlag, 2000); Claudio Llanos, “El gobierno de Allende y la UP frente al ‘Poder Popular’ 1970-1972: Las bases 
radicalizadas y su dinámica,” História Unisinos, vol. 16, no. 1 (March 27, 2012): 28–42.  
55 Indeed, the language of the Chilean Right became particularly acrimonious Frei began implementing his Land 
Reform in 1967, also known as Laws 16.640 and 16.625. 
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authority stands for the end of the ideologies, the end of doctrinal theorists disconnected from real 
life,” he opined.56 These types of technocratic superlatives apparently had but limited value in the 
poles. Thus, from 1970 a young generation of intellectuals was to take over the far-right’s 
ideological identity, while the figures of the 1950s - Jorge Prat and Alessandri for instance - were 
relegated to a secondary role in Chile’s right-wing politics.57   
          From 1970 onward, the gremialistas propagated their alternative regime model openly. In 
the same vein, Guzmán led the effort to conceptualize “Marxism” in and of itself as a revolutionary 
threat. A social theory in essence, Marxism, for Guzmán, had become a historical agent. “Nothing 
is better for Marxism than the generous idealism of certain democrats,” he said in 1971.58 In turn, 
he attacked the alleged naiveté of the Chilean liberals who never thought that the day would come 
when one “will use democracy to configure a totalitarian state that violates the essential freedoms 
of citizens.”59 Juxtaposing the Armed Forces with Marxism, he also argued that the former was 
“professional” and “not at the service of any ideology,” whereas the latter did not believe in the 
“character or professional of anything.”60 In Guzmán’s opinion, holding Marxist views meant, by 
definition, perceiving the state as a device for a communistic takeover.  
         Alongside the gremialistas, new platforms now appeared that conveyed even more coherent 
alternative visions of economic and social development. One of them was Vial Correa’s new 
journal Portada. While publicly promoting a coup d’état was somewhat risky, one could still 
suggest that Allende has ceased to serve the common good, and thus, was illegitimate. Portada 
                                                             
56 Gonzalo Vial Correa, “Alessandri y alessandrismo,” Portada, no. 10 (1970): 2. 
57 Prat, to whom Vial Correa served as a personal secretary, died in 1971, while Allesandri would return to serve 
Pinochet’s regime in the late-1970s. For more on the Alessandri decline, see - Patricia Arancibia, Alvaro Góngora, 
and Gonzalo Vial, Jorge Alessandri 1896-1986. Una biografía (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1996). 
58 “Dos grandes equívocos e un momento decisivo,” Portada, no. 342 (December 17, 1971): 4.  
59 Ibid, 3. 
60 Jaime Guzmán, “Dos Grande equívocos en el momento decisivo,” PEC, no. 432 (December 17, 1971).  
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did precisely that. Featuring a mix of far-right ideologues,61 even before the 1970 elections, the 
journal proposed an alternative authoritarian order, which will not be “identified with any party, 
re-establish authority, and crush the threatening anarchism,” and in so doing, “reestablish social 
peace,” and “national unity.”62 Portada also invited Guzmán to explicate the hazards of 
“fundamentalist statism,” and promote his idea of “state subsidiary,” as the model best-suited to 
the Chilean metaphysical condition.63 In turn, Portada was one of the most callous attackers of 
Allende, deeming him a “Marxist-Leninist,”64 and a “Soviet penetration of Chile.”65 Towards the 
end of 1971, Vial Correa was also convinced Allende was on the brink of eradicating free speech 
in Chile, by threatening to nationalize of the “most powerful Chilean publishing house Zig-Zag” 
and threatening to put El Mercurio under the “supervision of Workers’ United Center (CUT).”66 
These were generally exaggerations. They are indicative, however, of the prominence Vial Correa 
attributed to these publications as the frontrunners of Chile’s anti-Marxist “resistance.”67  
         By March 1972, once Allende began realizing his nationalization policies, Portada declared 
itself a “nationalist” platform with a “doctrine of national reality”68 and vowed to protect Chile as 
the “heir of the Greco-Roman world, Christianity, and Spain.” It now featured Arturo Fontaine 
(presented in chapter 1) who defined Chile’s “nationalist ideals” using deterministic ecological 
theories. “The true nationalist is not a developmentalist,” he suggested, and added, in the spirit of 
                                                             
61 The journal openly supported the Opus Dei, see - Fernando Orrego, “El Opus Dei y la política,” Portada, no. 9 
(1970): 30. 
62 “Crisis de autoridad,” Portada, no. 5, May 1969, 17.  
63 “El miedo. Síntoma de la realidad político-social chilena,” Portada, no. 2 (1969): 14.  
64 “El fenómeno gremialista,” Portada, no. 22 (June 1971); Richard Cox, “La situación chilena ante la doctrina 
marxista,” Portada, no. 30 (April 1972): 9-13. 
65 “Dos años de penetración soviética en Chile,” Portada, no. 39 (May 1973). 
66 “365 días de vía chilena,” Portada, no. 25 (November 1971): 5.  
67 For further debates on Allende’s struggle with the right-wing media, and El Mercurio’s cooperation with the CIA,  
see - Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, 59, 154; for a more biased narrative, see also - 
René Silva Espejo, El Mercurio y su lucha con el marxismo (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1975). 
68 Editorial, Portada, no. 29 (March 1971).  
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Hispanidad, that “Chilean nationalism postulates that Chile is not born in Chacabuco or Maipu but 
with Don Perdo de Valdivia.”69 By now Portada propagated “realism” and “state subsidiary” as 
its own ideological stance.70 And as Allende’s regime entered a dramatic phase of economic crisis 
in 1973, Portada freely debated the prospects of civil war as if in 1936 Spain.71 To further evoke 
this parallel it presented Álvaro d’Ors’s Arbor article “Silent leges inter arma” (in times of war, 
the law falls silent), a text condoning civil war. As I have mentioned, Álvaro d’Ors was known for 
his anti-pacifist approach (page 120). In this text, he advocated a “state of exception” in which 
“the validity of the laws is suspended, […] making way for a martial law of security.”72 Evidently, 
in this case, Carl Schmitt’s theory arrived in Chile through the particular Francoist lens of an Opus 
Dei theorist. In short, in a matter of months, Portada exhibited a mounting radicalization, 
promoting a blend of bellicosity, Hispanidad, and technocratic-authoritarian schemes of an 
“intermediary” state-model.   
         More fundamental for the delegitimization of Salvador Allende was Vial Correa a new 
journal Qué Pasa. Launched in 1971, unlike Portada it aimed to be the somewhat more 
sophisticated voice of the “opposition.”73 With himself serving as editor, and with Diego Ibáñez 
Langlois (supernumerary) on the editing board, the journal had a clear Opus Dei imprint.74 Like 
his brother, Ibáñez Langlois studies in Navarra, was an ICH fellow, and returned to Chile a 
specialist in matters of education and youth morality.75 Other contributors from Cuadernos del Sur 
                                                             
69 “Ideas nacionalistas chilenas,” Portada, no. 29 (March 1971): 12. 
70 “El destino de Chile y Portada,” Portada, no. 29 (March 1971): 3-6. 
71 “En la Araucanía se atiza la guerra civil,” Portada, no. 18 (February 1971): 1-2. 
72 Editorial. Portada, no. 41 (June 1973): 32-36. 
73 “La oposición: temperaturas distintas y armas a elegir,” Qué Pasa, no. 36 (October 32, 1971): 1; “El futuro de la 
oposición,” Qué Pasa, no. 54 (April 27, 1972): 5.  
74 More on this, see - Mönckeberg, El imperio del Opus Dei en Chile, 264. 
75 He also wrote spiritual poetry, see - Diego Ibáñez Langlois, Las manos afligidas (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones del 
Joven Laurel, 1959); Diego Ibáñez Langlois, Sentido común y educación en la familia (Santiago de Chile: 
Universidad Católica de Chile, 1989). 
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- Sergio Contardo Egaña, Hermógenes Perez del Arce, Arturo Fontaine, and Lilian Calm - also 
joined Qué Pasa as collaborators,76 along with Jaime Guzmán. Despite its alleged moderation, 
Qué Pasa openly praised Franco’s “dictablanda,” and his “resisting” of the western blockade in 
1945.77 And as other Opus Dei publications, its editors enjoyed debating the alleged “mystique” 
surrounding the journal’s very nature. “What are we?” pondered one editorial in 1973, and replied: 
“For some Qué Pasa is a ‘mummy,’ for others, Christian Democratic; for some, we belong to Opus 
Dei, for others, we represent international and national fascism. This eagerness to categorize us is 
a fine example of what we want to combat: the Chileans’ unhealthy need to divide themselves into 
irreconcilable factions.”78 These pluralist statements notwithstanding, Qué Pasa displayed a 
consistent ideological line, as it fundamentally sought to retrieve Chile to its “traditional values,” 
purge it from “false calls for social revolution,”79 and, as Armando Roa said, along the way, 
“liquidate the menace of professional pornographers.”80 More important, Qué Pasa propagated 
Guzmán’s gremialismo, now fully developed into a post-fascist model of authoritarian rule and 
civic “participation.” Or as he himself wrote in Qué Pasa in 1972:  
I think that the Chilean Gremialismo is the antithesis of fascism. We must not forget that 
fascism is a totalitarian and statist doctrine. The phrase “everything within the State and 
nothing outside it” belongs to Mussolini, [..]. On the other hand, I see Gremialismo as a 
modern manifestation of a nascent social democracy in which authentic participation can be 
achieved. Perhaps its “doctrinal backbone” can be sought in the old philosophical principle 
of subsidiarity, the key to every libertarian regime, by which the State should not directly 
coordinate civic activities that can be carried out by intermediate or grassroots 
organizations.81 
 
                                                             
76 Asked in a Qué Pasa interview what he thought of those who label him an “Opus Dei and a Nazi,” he replied that 
he was “not an Opus Dei member, and am not planning to become one, nor am I a Nazi or a fascist,” see- “Arturo 
Fontaine, un acero preciso,” Qué Pasa, no. 73 (September 7, 1972): 18.  
77 “Un tercio de siglo de ‘dictablanda,’” Qué Pasa, no. 76 (September 28, 1972): 22-24.  
78 “¿Que somos?” Qué Pasa, no. 100 (March 15, 1973): 5.  
79 “Nuevas idolatrías,” Qué Pasa, no. 8 (June 8, 1971): 3.  
80 “Que hacer frente a la pornografía?,” Qué Pasa no. 28 (October 28, 1971): 14. 
81 “Jaime Guzmán y el desafío gremial,” Qué Pasa, no. 80 (October 26, 1972): 38.  
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In brief, not only was Guzmán’s model post-fascist and anti-statist, but it belonged, in his own 
opinion at least, within the perimeters of libertarian theory.  
          Parallel to Guzmán’s theories of the state, Chile saw the emergence of its own neo-fascist 
brand of “nacionalismo” in this period. Of course, the term “nationalist” was hardly new in Chilean 
right-wing politics. Among those who labeled themselves “nacionalistas” in the 1960s were 
anyone from hispanistas such as Arturo Fontaine, Mario Gongora, and Jorge Iván Hübner, to Jorge 
Prat, the leader of the party Nacional Action. Nevertheless, Chile’s 1970s nacionalistas betrayed 
more obvious neo-fascist undertones. A case in point was Juan Antonio Widow’s journal Tizona. 
Appearing in 1972, this platform not only attacked Allende but featured several neo-fascist 
Spanish ideologues such as Francisco Elías de Tejada,82 Agustin de Foxa, and Blas Piñar.83 As I 
will detail fully in chapter 6, the neo-fascist networks between Spain and the Southern Cone were 
forming in this very period. 
         Ultimately, however, it was Pablo Rodríguez Grez’s movement Frente Nacionalista Patria y 
Libertad that was to define Chile’s emerging “nationalismo.” Demarcating Rodríguez Grez’s 
movement ideologically is a fairly intricate endeavor if only because he distinctively denied being 
either neo-fascist,84 or traditionalist.85 At a minimum, Patria y Libertad was an anti-communistic 
and anti-liberal association, “of the spirit” and against “materialisms.”86 Arguably, Rodríguez Grez 
                                                             
82 “La rebelión y sus fines”; “El derecho de la rebelión”; “La resistencia al tirano: cartas desde Sevilla,” in Tizona, 
no. 44 (June 1973): 4-8.  
83 “El peso de la purpura”; “Hipócriticas”; “Como cayo Portugal,” in Tizona, no. 53 (April 1974); Blas Piñar also 
hosted Widow on his journal Fuerza Nueva, see - Juan Antonio Widow, “El comunismo y los católicos,” Fuerza 
Nueva, no. 17 (May 6, 1967): 26.  
84 “If historically there have been totalitarian nationalisms (fascism, Nazism) no link can attributed us to them,” he 
said, see - Manifesto nacionalista: frente nacionalista Patria y Libertad, 9. 
85 “Chilean nationalism cannot be confused with traditional positions or ‘politickers’; it is a new vanguard that 
aspires to reform our expired institutions,” in Patria y Libertad, no. 1 (1971).  
86 “El problema de la juventud,” Patria y Libertad, no. 4 (1971).  
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also echoed the Falange’s formulas when propagating an “integrated company of workers,”87 and 
a non-parliamentary organic “functional democracy.”88 Still, the importance of Patria y Libertad 
stemmed not from its ideological sophistication but from its violent presence in the public sphere. 
The first to identify this were non-other than Guzmán and the gremialistas who collaborated 
intimately with Patria y Libertad, indicating that the ideological differences between the 
movements were not profound, at least as start.89 By and large, if Patria y Libertad ever used 
Falangist symbolism it was in the context of its allusions to the Spanish Civil War. Demanding the 
Armed Forces’ intervention in politics, they constantly referred to José Antonio Primo de Rivera, 
for instance by publishing his infamous text “A Letter to the Spanish Military” of May 1936,90 or 
by having “José Antonio” writing directly to the readers of their journal Patria y Libertad.91  
         With the advent of Allende’s nationalizations, and within the context of the emerging 
economic setbacks caused by the USA’s embargo on Chile in 1971, these far-right groups took to 
the streets. On December 1, 1971, the most memorable campaign against the Popular Union began 
with the “march of the empty pots” (La marcha de las cacerolas y canastas vacías). Scheduled to 
coincide with Fidel Castro’s visit to Chile, this was the most significant achievements of the anti-
Allende “opposition” to date. Organized by a coalition of right-wing feminine organizations, the 
                                                             
87 “Una economía social de mercado,” Patria y libertad, no. 25 (October 1972): 10; see also - Pablo Rodríguez Grez, 
Entre la democracia y la tiranía (Santiago de Chile: 1972), 110-21.   
88 Ibid, 92. 
89 While Guzmán apparently belonged to Patria y Libertad’s “political council,” it is questionable whether he 
actively influenced the direction of the movement, see - Manuel Fuentes Wendling, Memorias secretas de Patria y 
Libertad: y algunas confesiones sobre la guerra fría en Chile (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Grijalbo, 1999), 126; for 
more on the relationship between the two movements see - Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Nacionales y 
Gremialistas: el “parto” de la nueva derecha política chilena, 1964-1973 (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 
2008); for more on Patria y Libertad see - José Díaz Nieva, Patria y Libertad: el nacionalismo frente a la Unidad 
Popular (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2015); José Díaz Nieva, Breve historia del 
neofascismo y de la derecha radical (Santiago de Chile: Akhilleus Ediciones, 2017). 
90 “Carta a los militares de España,” Patria y Libertad, no. 28 (Novermber 1972): 9. 
91 José Antonio, “Se ve un camino más fácil,” Patria y Libertad, no. 33 (December 7, 1972), 2; José Antonio, “Una 
lucha que nos engrandecerá,” Patria y Libertad, no. 31 (November 22, 1972): 2; José Antonio, “El drama de la 
inteligencia en el socialismo,” Patria y Libertad, no. 35 (December 21, 1972): 2.  
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march was the brainchild of Nina Donoso, head of the National Feminine Unity (UNAFE), Maria 
Morandé, and Carmen Saenz, an Opus Dei affiliate. Patria y Libertad’s paramilitaries, for their 
part, safeguarded the march.92  
         That the protests of Santiago de Chile’s respectable housewives presented an utter 
humiliation to the men in charge of Chile’s economy is undeniable. This gendered message added 
a distinctive vitality to the overall narrative of self-victimization that circulated within the 
conservative elites in this period, and that encouraged their members to feel “under attack” by 
external ideological forces. The political myth of communist brutes attacking the defenseless 
“cacerolas” at the time of the march was born not on the streets of Santiago but in the pages of El 
Mercurio93 and Qué Pasa, the latter stating that “tens of thousands of women willing to face unjust 
violence” encountered MIR activists who attacked them “with stones, sticks, and even potatoes 
covered in shaving knives.”94 The “political symbol of the cacerola” was the telling headline Qué 
Pasa used merely a week after the event, indicating further how this media outlets was crucial for 
fashioning the narratives surrounding these events.95 Not surprisingly, Pinochet was to make ample 
use of this ready-made tale. It is safe to say that in 1974, as several of its organizers published their 
accounts, the march even became the regime’s foundational political myth. “The march of 
December l, 1971 marked the beginning of the slow end of the Allende Government,” declared 
then Teresa Donoso in pride.96 By this she meant to say that this event was a watershed moment 
in the process of Allende’s de-legitimation; as housewives, the argument went, Chile’s women 
                                                             
92 Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende, 1964-1973. 
(University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 153. 
93 “Las mujeres protestamos!!” El Mercurio (December 5, 1971).  
94 “Poder y violencia al límite,” Qué Pasa, no. 34 (December 9, 1971): 7-8.  
95 “Como nació el símbolo de la cacerola,” Qué Pasa, no. 33 (December 2, 1971): 8.  
96 Teresa Donoso Loero, La epopeya de las ollas vacías (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1974). 
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were not merely the victims of Allende’s economic policies but rejected his masculine 
“materialism” as such, thereby leading to his demise.97  
          By the beginning of 1973, the intellectuals presented in the pages above began to actually 
plot a coup d’état against Allende. Headed by El Mercurio editor and Qué Pasa founder Hernán 
Cubillos, one of these “committees” assembled weekly in the offices of the Lord Cochrane 
Publishing House and included Arturo Fontaine, the abovementioned ICH director Raúl Bazán, 
Roberto Kelly - later the designer of Pinochet’s development plans - and Jaime Guzmán.98 Another 
forum of a similar nature saw Sergio Silva Bascuñan working to formulate an alternative regime 
for Chile - a collaboration that included Christian Democrats and traditionalists and that drew the 
attention of the left-wing media.99 Present at the scene were Enrique Campos Menéndez, Sergio 
Fernández Larraín, Arturo Fontaine, Jaime Guzmán, José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, Julio Philippi, 
and Gonzalo Vial Correa - all of whom were to become the dictatorship’s future key ideologues. 
As in the case of Onganía, these figures awaited a military leader to eradicate the parliamentary 
order and then offered themselves to him as his most loyal and skillful civic administrators. Unlike 
the Argentine Revolution, however, there was no concrete collaborated military-civic groundwork 
in the early months of 1973.  
 
 
                                                             
97 “It was their spiritual power that debunked - by surprise - the failed weapons of materialism,” see ibid, 71, for 
other similar narratives see - María Correa Morandé, La guerra de las mujeres (Santiago de Chile: Editorial 
Universidad Técnica del Estado, 1974). 
98 According to the testimony of Orlando Sáenz, Jaime Guzmán participated in a “gremialista opposition command” 
with the “purpose to produce a destabilization of the government with a view to a coup d'état” see - Patricia 
Arancibia, Conversando con Roberto Kelly (Santiago de Chile: Biblioteca Americana, 2005), 128-29.  
99 Carta de Sergio Silva Bascuñán a Jaime Guzmán, February 10, 1972, Fundación Jaime Guzmán; see also -. 
“!Conclave golpista!” Puro Chile (March 5, 1972); “Gobierno: ‘Reunion de Chinigue es sediciosa,’” El Siglo, 
(March 7, 1972). 
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The Pinochet dictatorship and its late dialogue with the subsiding Francoist regime 
         On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military acted upon the vocal demands of the Chilean 
conservative elites and overthrew Allende. Led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the Military 
Junta’s contingency plans were strictly military and “counter-insurgency” oriented.100 As the men 
partaking in the events testified in later years, few knew on the day of the uprising what future the 
Armed Forces envisioned for Chile. That is to say, the regime was initially defined in negations: 
it sought to purge Chile from “Marxism” and retrieve it “to its people,” it claimed. What is more, 
unlike Argentina, where the military had been an inseparable part of politics since 1930, in Chile 
the military seldom intervened in politics during the previous decades. Hence, in 1973 it was up 
to Pinochet and his men to design a novel ideology of the state and the Armed Forces’ agency 
within it.101   
          Pinochet and his generals studied the lessons of the Argentine Revolution, Francoism, and 
the Brazilian dictatorship. Their regime was to be, in Carl Schmitt’s terms, a proper “state of 
exception” understood as the outdoing of the rule of law in “self-defense” against a foe who had 
transgressed all legal boundaries within a “global civil war.”102 Indeed, Pinochet instantly defined 
his struggle in terms of “civil war,” and his regime - a movement of “national liberation.” Or in 
his own words, Chile “had been driven to an objective situation of civil war through the destruction 
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of the fundamental bases its coexistence and national sentiment.”103 Yet with the exception of a 
handful of armed clashes in September 1973, there was no civil war in Chile; there were barely 
any significant instances of urban combat after October 1973 either.104 This did not prevent the 
Junta from evoking the language of civil war in the ensuing years, with clear Francoist 
overtones.105 “That this civil war has not materially exploded with all its [worst] possible 
consequences, was thanks to Divine Providence, which, with its mysterious hand, gave the Armed 
Forces the fluidity to carry out its pacifying action quickly and opportunely,” stated Pinochet.106 
In other words, even for him, this had been a civil war in potential rather than in reality. 
Nevertheless, like Franco, he believed himself to have saved Chile from this war through “divine” 
guidance, and therefore accountable for his actions only “before God and history.”107  
          The regime was most deadly to its ideological opponents in its first weeks.108 And unlike 
Argentina’s dictatorship of the 1960s, Pinochet quickly purged the Chilean press from any left-
wing tendencies.109 The remaining news outlets, and more specifically the ideological groups 
detailed in the pages above, unanimously legitimized the new regime by presenting it as the 
preventer of anarchy and civil war. El Mercurio, expectedly, was the first to praise Pinochet and 
even invited Osvaldo Lira to deride the antecedent parliamentary system. Criticizing the Church 
                                                             
103 A seis meses de la liberación nacional: mensaje al país del presidente de la justa de gobierno General Don 
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte pronunciado al día 11 de marzo 1974 (Santiago de Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1974), 33 
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for not going against Allende in the first place, he maintained that “one cannot equate the violence 
of the one who illegitimately attacks you with the violence of he who defends himself with the 
appropriate means.” Pinochet, he further argued, enjoyed the legitimacy of “origin and exercise,” 
since, “as St. Paul says, whoever resists authority, resists God.”110  
         Other ICH intellectuals immediately joined Lira in the ideological whitewashing of the 
regime in its first year of terror. Using the pseudonym “Veritas,” Hübner Gallo, for instance, 
became the regime’s spokesman in ABC.111 Qué Pasa was another center stage of a sophisticated 
legitimation of the dictatorship. A week after the coup, it published the following text: 
The Popular Unity has fallen in a Wagnerian finale […] In this period Chile has dissolved 
into economic and political demagogy, laziness, and the preaching and practice of violence. 
[…] Only the imminence of a bloody Civil War forced [the Military] to take the supreme 
decision to their hands. […]  It is impossible to go back to yesterday. The outcome of 
September 11 must be a foundational act of institutionality and - even more so - a new 
conception of Chile. Thus [the regime] should banish forever politicization, divisionism, and 
sectarianism. […] Now, the traditional values of the country must be preserved.112  
 
Besides alluding to a post-ideological society, Qué Pasa presented its readers with a full version 
of what would become the myth of Allende’s plan of “self-coup” (auto-golpe), only then to clear 
itself from any possible guilt for the violent events: “there were no civil participants in the planning 
of the coup,” argued its editors.113 Two weeks later the journal held an exclusive interview with 
Pinochet who stated that “at the moment there is a team of law professors working on a new 
constitution.”114 The interviewer asked him “for names.” Pinochet did not respond, although it is 
well documented that Qué Pasa’s own Jaime Guzmán was the leading “specialist” in these early 
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conventions. As other conservative platforms, Eva was no different in instantly praising the 
“restoration of peace” and protection of women’s rights.115 The journal even published a list of 
left-wing politicians and their whereabouts, perhaps to indicate that they are unharmed.116 
Furthermore, by portraying the “Pinochet home” as a zone of harmonious collaboration between 
Pinochet and his wife Lucía, Eva established him as an agent of civility.117 
         Thereafter, more derogatory historical narratives of the Allende years ensued. In 1974, Zig-
Zag published Hernán Millas and Emilio Filippi’s Anatomía de un fracaso,118 followed by Chile 
70-73: cronica da una experiencia.119 Teresa Donoso Loero, for her part, published Breve historia 
de la unidad popular.120 These books presented Pinochet’s heroic narrative as the indisputable 
historical truth. Another case in point was Florencia Varas and José Manuel Vergara 1974 
Operación Chile. Printed in Barcelona at the Opus Dei’s Pomaire editorial, this book was even 
“balanced” enough to anger Pinochet’s ambassador in Madrid.121 Last, and important of them all, 
was Gonzalo Vial Correa’s own creation, The White Book of the Change of Government in Chile. 
Published merely a month after September 11, this text aimed to establish that Allende had let 
murderous “foreign extremists” rule Chile and that he had drafted a plan (the infamous “plan Z”) 
for the assassination of his political opponents.122 In short, in a matter of months, the intellectual 
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apparatus discussed thus far in this chapter took it upon itself to both vilify Allende and legitimize 
the new dictatorship. 
         In turn, between 1973 and 1975 Chile witnessed a return to Hispanidad rhetoric. 
Undoubtfully, Pinochet’s regime revitalized and gave new meaning to the intellectual movements 
of the 1950s, retrospectively. Once the regime published its founding texts, they betrayed a clear 
Hispanic sentiment. An outcome of a “nationalist-gremialista collaboration,”123 the Declaration of 
Principles of the Honorable Governing Junta, pledged, for example, to protect Chile’s “Christian 
and Hispanic” tradition. Yet tempting as it is to align with Pinochet’s opposition in exile and 
contend that his regime was a materialization of Hispanidad ideology from day one,124 one must 
also underscore that the “Hispanic” component in this declaration was rather secondary to the 
assortment of authoritarian-technocratic formulas appearing in it. Strikingly, the declaration 
emphasized “subsidiarity” and pledged to a truly “libertarian” society.125 It even advocated 
“morality over the letter of the law,” and “shrewdness over ideology.”126 In brief, unlike in 
Franco’s Spain, Pinochet’s Catholic and Hispanic mythological element was initially implied 
rather than celebrated.   
        Only once the regime began to form its own ideological apparatus, did some of its public 
intellectuals begin presenting Hispanidad as the new ethical core of the new state. The director of 
Pinochet’s Cultural Department, author Enrique Campos Menéndez, in particular, evoked the 
Hispanic mythology, as his following manifesto indicates:  
No one can deny […] that we are who we are because of that day when the Spanish arrived, 
and with their deeds granted unity and life to our country by conjoining the multiple races 
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that inhabited its territory, thus leading to a third reality that, without being Spanish, is 
constitutively Hispanic. As indicated by the Declaration of Principles of the Government of 
Chile, it was the Christian conception of man and society “that gave form to the western 
civilization of which we form part, and it is their progressive loss or disfigurement that has 
caused, to a large extent, the moral breakdown that today endangers that same civilization.” 
That conception was the fundamental legacy of Spain.127 
 
Next, Sergio Fernández Larraín joined Campos Menéndez in editing España y sus siglos de oro, a 
book which further clarified that by 1974 Hispanidad was not a coincidental reference in the 
regime’s declarations but a conspicuous element in its system of justification.128 Another telling 
example of this type of ideological production was the 1974 book Pensamiento nacionalista, 
which featured Menéndez Campos, Arturo Fontaine, and Osvaldo Lira theorizing Chile’s 
idiosyncratic Hispanic spirituality. In this book appeared the following telling depiction of 
Allende’s era:  
A successful Spanish essayist has spoken of ‘the twilight of ideologies.’ He was completely 
right. […] doctrines and programmatic labels had lost their meaning and served only as 
shreds of hopes and failed experiences. This is how Chile came to allow an adventurous and 
corrupt minority to overtake the Government disguised in the sheepskin of a false 
democracy.129  
 
Unmistakably, for Pinochet’s thinkers, Fernández de la Mora’s theories were a central point of 
reference when explaining the futility of Allende’s experiment.   
         Beyond the legacies of the Spanish Civil War, and the “end of ideologies,” Franco’s Spain 
inspired Pinochet in several other ways. While being well informed with the USA’s National 
Security Doctrine by 1973, the Chilean Army’s theoretical toolkit included Francoist military 
publications. This was the case of La funcción del ejercito. Published by the Spanish law specialist 
Hermann Oehling Ruiz, and originally a dissertation directed by Luis Sánchez Agesta and Ismael 
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Sánchez Bella, this book theorized the global role of militaries, depicting them as the “last 
hierarchical group of society capable of saving it from dissolution.”130 Significantly, it portrayed 
the military as an “apolitical” body that depends neither on civic rule nor on a constitutional order 
and that defends the body of the nation both “externally” and “internally” - thus solving rather than 
stimulating its inherent “civil wars.”131 
          Pinochet also contacted Franco. September 11, 1973, was a chaotic day, in which Salvador 
Allende found his death, and where countless military operations took place. It is therefore 
surprising that on the following day Pinochet found time to write a letter to none other than Spain’s 
aging dictator. “My great and good friend,” it opened, and then read: “Having deemed it necessary 
to relocate Mr. Oscar Agüero Corvalan, Chile’s Ambassador in Spain, we have agreed to end the 
mission that had been entrusted to him at your excellence’s side. Please accept my sincere vows 
for the welfare of your excellence and for the greatness of Spain. Your loyal and good friend, 
Augusto Pinochet, the Moneda Palace.”132 Pinochet’s letter said fairly little and was, in a way, 
unneeded. Its significance stemmed from its timing and flattering tone. Pinochet merely illustrated 
to Franco that he was Chile’s de facto leader, sitting at the Moneda Palace - Chile’s emblem of 
executive power.  
          How did the Spaniards react to Pinochet’s signs of fraternity? As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, in the 1960s technocratic Spain had changed its attitude towards the Latin 
American Left. On the background of thriving economic cooperation with Chile, Franco was 
cautious not to label Allende either communist or Marxist. Given his familiarity with Chilean 
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politics, Fernández de la Mora - in 1970, Franco’s Minister of Public Works - even represent 
Franco personally at Allende’s inauguration.133 Despite the ideological differences between the 
regimes, Fernández de la Mora recalled later, it was Franco himself who wanted to make a point: 
given the tradition that “a minister of the Government attends all transmissions of command in the 
sister republics of Spanish America” the presence of Fernández de la Mora was to dispel any 
“doubts about our conception of the [Chilean] State.”134 In the next two years, a bilateral trade 
agreement between Spain and Chile further enhanced Franco’s bond with Allende, who, pressured 
by the USA’s embargo, had motivations of his own to invite Spanish companies such as Pegaso to 
manufacture heavy vehicles in Chile.135  
         Besides economic motives, what could have drawn Franco to treat Allende affably? Trying 
to answer this mystery, Pinochet’s men proposed several hypotheses of their own. Mariano 
Fontecilla, a high-ranking diplomat at the embassy in Madrid, had the following theory:  
Spain was interested in showing Europe, which until today does not treat it with much 
confidence, that it has ceased to be a country full of dated dogmas and that it is progressively 
opening up to the contemporary moment. Hence its relations with Cuba, its opening to 
Eastern Europe, and also […] its friendly and generous attitude towards the Government of 
President Allende. […] The Spaniards […] vowed to help providing our country either 
through credits, scholarships, and sustained a pro-Chilean position […] at the Paris Club.136  
 
Seen this way, eager to normalize the dictatorship internationally and integrate into the European 
Community, Franco both collaborated with communist regimes and avoided appearing to back 
right-wing dictators. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile noting that the relationship between Franco 
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and Allende was a theme that, between 1970 and 1973, was discussed incessantly and positively 
in the Spanish media, which, for its part, reported on Allende’s adherence to Hispanidad, and his 
pledge to “learn from Spain’s development.”137 Subsequently, the September 1973 coup d’état 
was greeted in Spain with initial hesitation, rather than immediate rejoicing. 
         The Chilean historian Isabel Jara Hinojosa has suggested that Pinochet sought Franco’s 
friendship for the sake of “external legitimation.”138 This, I argue, is only one part of the story. As 
in the case of Onganía, Pinochet’s dialogue with Spain should be read primarily as a regime trying 
to define itself to its own immediate followers. Before advancing further, let us first address this 
alleged collaboration. True enough, the Spanish dictatorship did aid Pinochet in several ways. For 
one thing, Chile’s new ambassador in Spain, the retired General Francisco Goigoitía, had a key 
role in deploying the Spanish media for Pinochet’s purposes. With Carrero Blanco supporting the 
new regime, by the end of November 1973, the ambassador reported to his superiors that his 
operation in Madrid had yielded “good results” as that he had “silenced numerous attacks,” in the 
Spanish press.139 For Pinochet, Franco’s Spain was thus one of the only sympathetic platforms for 
propagating his dictatorship in Europe and Latin America. This also explains the visit of a large-
scale delegation of Chilean jurists to Madrid, in December 1973. Led by the ICH member, and 
President of Chile’s Bar Association, the Christian Democrat Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, it sought, 
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in the ambassador’s own words, to “explained with great precision and brilliance the reasons for 
the military uprising […] emphasizing the illegitimacy for which the previous government had 
fallen.”140 
          Beyond positive coverage in the Spanish media, Pinochet also implored Franco for material 
help. The Spaniards were obliged to conform, sending Chile an aircraft with “twenty tons of 
diverse equipment” - a somewhat symbolic delivery of military aid that took off from Spain at the 
presence of Chile’s Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Fernández Valderrama. Simultaneously, 
Goigoitía reported of other help offers, one of which saw the director of the Madrid ICH, Alfonso 
de Borbón (Duke of Cádiz), promising to “help rebuild the Moneda Palace.” For Goigoití, these 
were undeniable signs that Franco’s regime “understands the problems Chile has been facing and 
would make every effort, within its powers, to solve them.”141   
         This depiction notwithstanding, Franco’s Spain did not align with Pinochet in unison. In 
1974, within the context of a society in search of its own democratization, reformist groups in 
Spanish society, for instance, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez’s journal Cuadernos para el Diálogo and 
Juan Fernández Figueroa’s Índice, attacked Pinochet. In return, Spain’s new neo-fascist platforms, 
El Alcázar and Nueva Fuerza, reacted by stating that it is “disgusting to see how some Spanish 
pens drool to the service […] of international Marxism.”142 Goigoitía personally contacted Nueva 
Fuerza’s editor Manuel Ballesteros to thank him for these words,143 stating later that this journal 
“is a right-wing movement, very similar to Chile’s Patria y Libertad.”144 Similarly, Álvaro d’Ors 
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appeared in Fuerza Nueva claiming that the Chilean dictatorship is a classic example “a firm 
principle of Public Law.” After all, “who can overcome such revolutionary violence, if it is not the 
legitimate violence of the Armed Forces?” he pondered. Accordingly, said d’Ors, those Spaniards 
who now show “aversion to the Chilean Army” are, in truth, symptomatic of a “resentment of the 
defeated by the Spanish victory of 1939.”145 That this Opus Dei intellectual linked Pinochet and 
the Spanish Civil War further impressed the Chilean Ambassador.146ABC, for its part, as a 
Francoist’s mainstream daily, eventually aligned Pinochet,147 and sent its prominent journalist Luis 
Calvo to conduct one of the first full-length interviews with the Chilean dictator.  
          In 1974, as reports of Pinochet’s atrocities began surfacing internationally, the Spanish left-
wing opposition daringly confronted the Chilean dictatorship. On September 11, 1974, some two-
hundred Spanish journalists signed a declaration stating that “on the anniversary of the fascist 
military coup that took the life of President Salvador Allende, along with thousands of Chilean 
democrats, [...] we the journalists from Madrid hereby express our strongest repulsion of the 
current situation in Chile.”148 Depictions of torture by electric shock even appeared in the Spanish 
press,149 as well as tirades against Chile’s neoliberal turn.150 In fact, ironically Franco’s Spain had 
become, by then, a center stage for Chilean exiles to disclose Pinochet’s brutalities. At times 
utilizing their Spanish-Chilean double citizenship, they were a source of irritation for the Chilean 
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Embassy. One example was Ignacio Gayango’s book Chile: largo camino al golpe.151 Another 
was Hernán Antonio Valdés’s testimony Tejas Verde: diario de un campo de concentración en 
Chile. Published in Barcelona in 1974, the two publications indicated that the Spanish public 
sphere was by now losing fear of the Francoist regime.  
        Despite all this, in 1974 and 1975 Pinochet’s generals and intellectuals arrived in Spain to 
establish a dialogue with the regime and to request further assistance. For instance, Spain saw the 
visits of Chile’s Head of Police (Carabineros), Hernan Isla Rios, who came to “study the Spanish 
Guardia Civil,”152 and Education Minister Arturo Troncoso, who visited Spain and the OEI in 
October 1975.153 Declarations regarding wanting to “learn from the Francoist system” were a 
recurrent theme in the ambassador’s reports.154 The most important official visit, however, was 
that of Navy Admiral José Toribio Merino, one of the three leaders of Chile’s Military Junta.155 In 
January 1975, he traveled to Spain to disentangle what had now become a dispute over the 
aforementioned Pegaso deal, but also to sign an economic and cultural agreement with the Spanish 
government,156 and ask Franco to support Chile in the upcoming UN resolutions of 1975.157 As 
Chile found itself under mounting international isolation, an even more conspicuous need for a 
“accelerated approximation” to Spain became apparent. In the ambassador’s precise words, the 
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visit “served mainly to create a new image of Chile. [...] I estimate that the Spanish foreign policy 
towards us, in the next year and future [...] will open friendly doors in Western Europe.”158 
Allegedly, although this cannot be entirely confirmed, Merino carried home a personal letter from 
Franco to Pinochet.159 Along with the 1975 Spanish-Chilean treaty of Cultural Cooperation, these 
were the last official expressions of solidarity between these dictators who believed themselves to 
be the authors of two definite chapters in one mutual teleological narrative.  
         Several of the intellectuals debated in this chapter also arrived in Spain at this point, mostly 
as Pinochet’s representatives. Roque Esteban Scarpa, now Director of Libraries, Archives and 
Museums, visited Franco then,160 and so did Rodríguez Grez. The latter’s declaration to the 
Spanish press that “the military junta declares itself far from all the traditional political parties” 
and that it cannot rely solely on the “use of repression,” might have seemed surprising to some. 
Rodríguez Grez even spoke of the need for a “national consensus” to allow the dictatorship to 
govern.161 Yet his seemingly moderate tone merely reflected an understanding that Pinochet 
needed to propagate a “political” plan if he wished to win international respectability. Another 
paradigmatic anecdote, in this regard, was the November 1975 tour of Chile’s Women Secretariat 
director Carmen Grez in Spain. Accompanied by the organization’s political adviser, the 
aforementioned Gisela Silva Encina, the two were Pilar Primo de Rivera personal guests. “The 
Falange’s Women’s Section and Chile’s Women’s Secretariat” reported Goigoitía, agreed on 
“establishing contacts and sharing experiences that could be used in the plans of the National 
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Secretary of Women in Chile.”162 Given that Franco was on his deathbed at that time, Spain’s 
dailies did not even report this visit. Still, the encounter was important, as we will see shortly, as 
the similarities between the Spanish and Chilean women organizations were to be conspicuous.  
         When Franco died on November 20, 1975, the Chilean regime declared three days of 
mourning.163 Of the wave of eulogies that followed, Fernández Larraín’s words at the ICH 
conference hall were particularly telling. In what seemed as a comprehensive narrative of his 
friend’s life, he spoke of a leader who by the Grace of God, had led “the most authentic of all 
crusades,” and whose political testament was not democratization but “perfecting the existing 
system.”164 Pinochet’s own well-documented trip to Franco’s funeral was yet another act of 
ideological loyalty. Days before the beginning of Spain’s democratic transition, Pinochet was 
greeted warmly by Prince Juan Carlos, and even more enthusiastically by the heads of the Spanish 
Army and mobs of saluting neo-fascists.165 Later he attended Franco’s burial and crowning 
proclamation of the King. In truth, he was one of the only world leaders at the funeral, and the 
only dictator at the King’s coronation.166 The shady secrets surrounding the visit apart, Pinochet 
fully seized this last opportunity to be identified with Franco and his legacies.167 If there were any 
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doubts regarding the parallels between the two, Qué Pasa was there to underline them once more 
for the Chilean audience:   
Franco’s figure and work are of exceptional importance for Chile today. […] The death of 
the Spanish Head of State, as our President has reminded us during his visit to the Mother 
Nation, has demonstrated that it was possible to defeat Soviet communism […] not just once, 
but twice: the first, on the battlefields; the second, in the offensive of isolation and economic 
boycott [...] That offensive, so similar to the one suffered by Chile today, was defeated by 
Franco’s Spain.168 
 
         As for Spanish figures visiting Pinochet’s Chile: this was not a frequent sight. Particularly 
after Carrero Blanco’s death and the beginning of Spain political opening (discussed in chapter 6) 
for a Spanish figure to appear in Chile was to convey an image of far-right leanings. This was 
precisely the case of Fernández de la Mora, who, in 1975, arrived in Chile triumphantly. In his 
statements to the press, he justified Pinochet’s regime, saying that “Détente only exists at the 
diplomatic level, but nothing has diminished the ideological aggressiveness of Marxism.” He also 
compared Franco and Pinochet stating that “the Spanish situation in 1939 is similar to today’s 
Chilean.” But more important, he unveiled an unapologizing anti-democratic stance. Upon several 
interviews, the technocratic theorist held that Franco’s “corporatist formula is a more organic 
representation and therefore more democratic than the party system.”169 Deeming democracy 
“closer to taboo and superstition than to science and reason,” Fernández de la Mora finally stressed 
that to “rationalize” political life meant to “replace ideologies with rigorous ideas.”170  
         One other prominent Spanish visitor in Pinochet’s Chile was Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer. 
This visit, in July 1974, had been planned before the coup d’état, and was, in Qué Pasa’s words, 
“private and family-oriented.” The importance of this event was the content of Escrivá’s public 
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“gatherings.” Asked about the thing concerning him the most at the time, Escrivá pointed to the 
progressive Catholic movements of the 1970s, stating that the Church is “a Mother with many 
disloyal children” and that it is “very upset.” Somewhat more expectedly, Escrivá also attacked 
family planning: “do not put obstacles on life [...] blessings from God onwards! That the earth is 
small? lies!” he exclaimed.171 Cleverly, Escrivá avoided mentioning Pinochet’s regime. By 
suggesting, however, that the Liberation Theology was treasonous, his words were illustrative of 
the continuous far-right message the Opus Dei propagated in the 1970s.  
         Ultimately the official Spanish-Chilean dialogue was short lived. As we will see in the next 
chapter, with the death of Franco and the onset of the Spanish democratic reform, the two regimes 
disconnected politically and symbolically. Whether in the Chilean press or within Pinochet’s inner 
circles, nobody quite expected the Spanish transition. The ambassador in Madrid even believed 
that King Juan Carlos would be able to “use Franco’s powerful mystique,” and thus continue 
Francoism without Franco.172 Strikingly, Goigoitía refused to even consider that democratization 
was feasible in Spain. “The conception of democracy, as Europe sees it, is very confusing for the 
average Spaniard. […] [who] does not know how to implement it […]  because he was educated 
for de-politicization,” he wrote his superiors in 1976. In his opinion, the Spaniards thus fully 
trusted Franco’s Organic Laws and were to opt, voluntarily, for the regime’s continuation.173 As 
events were to prove, they did not.  
 
 
                                                             
171 “Del autor de Camino a los chilenos,” Qué Pasa no. 168 (July 12, 1974): 13. 
172 Reservado 1832/162, Novermber 21 1975, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1975, caja 76. 
173 Reservado, 9/2, situación política española”, January 2, 1976, AMCAE, Embajada en Madrid, oficios 
confidenciales, 1976, caja 1.  
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Chile’s technocratic-authoritarian model, 1974-1977 
          Between 1974 and 1977 Chile saw the establishment of its own technocratic-authoritarian 
state-ideology. Generally speaking, like Onganía, Pinochet operated two teams of specialists. On 
the one hand, during this period Chile became a laboratory for a neoliberal experiment, under the 
guidance of a distinctive group of economists known as the “Chicago Boys.”174 And yet, the 
endeavors of this team cannot be understood disconnected from the regime’s parallel ideological 
project. Here, once again, the post-fascist gremilialistas and ICH ideologues, rather than the neo-
fascist Patria y Libertad affiliates, were given access to power thereby deciding the ideological 
character of the regime. As one gremialista testified later, they and the Chicago Boys shared “some 
similarities” and worked together “without friction,” but were not the same.175 As the economists 
toiled to propel Chile’s economic growth, Pinochet’s ideological team was to design Chile’s future 
post-ideological system of representation and theorize the country’s unique “change of 
mentalities.”176 As we saw, the regime’s “declaration of principles” was a typical technocratic-
authoritarian manifesto, as it spoke of a society “more technical and less ideological” wherein “the 
word of specialists prevails over slogans.”177 Jaime Guzmán’s influence on this text was no doubt 
decisive given the fact that it pledged the “de-politicization of all intermediate societies,” along 
with the “regionalization of the country.” These labels were now to be reiterated time and again in 
                                                             
174 See for example - Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Patricio Silva, “Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to 
the CIEPLAN Monks,” Journal of Latin American Studies vol. 23, no. 2 (May 1991), 385-410; Patricio Silva, In the 
Name of Reason.  
175 Sergio Fernández Fernández, Mi lucha por la democracia (Santiago de Chile: Editorial los Andes, 1994), 136.  
176 For some noteworthy accounts of Pinochet’s dictatorship early years see - Pamela Constable, A Nation of 
Enemies: Chile under Pinochet (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991); Mark Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: 
Recovering the Truth (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Mary Helen Spooner, Soldiers in a 
Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Peter Kornbluh, The 
Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: The New Press, 2013). 
177 Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government, 38. 
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Pinochet’s speeches as he pledged to the “effectiveness and fundamental realism of the new 
economic policy.”178 
         After one year of so-called “civil war,” which in actuality meant the slaying of nearly two-
thousand Chilean citizens without trial, Pinochet decided that his regime was ready for its civic 
phase. With the publishing of the text Bases de la institucionalidad, in June 1974, the regime was 
now to allegedly probe new forms of “participation.” Only twenty-eight years old in September 
1973, Guzmán played a key role in this process. Given his unique talent to narrate the regime’s 
story in post-ideological terminologies,179 and aptitude in devising a comprehensive sui generis 
Chilean authoritarian state model, Guzmán was, by then, the regime’s chief ideologue. As 
Pinochet’s speech-writer,180 he worked within the dictatorship’s official organs but was even more 
prominent as Chile’s semi-official public intellectual in the Chilean press.181 Apart from Guzmán’s 
work at Qué Pasa, he appeared regularly on television panels and published countless columns in 
Chile’s dailies Ercilla, El Mercurio, La Tercera, La Segunda, and later, in the influential journals 
Realidad and Cosas. As an autonomous public figure, he would ultimately define what he believed 
was Chile’s emerging system of non-ideological participation, for instance via Chile’s own “State 
Council.”182 
                                                             
178 A seis meses de la liberación nacional, 19.  
179 Particularly memorable was his interview to a documentary of the Swiss television about the first years of the 
Dictatorship, from 1976 (directors: André Gazut and Claude Smadja). In perfect French, Guzmán said that 
“returning to a parliamentary system in Chile is impossible” and that “the communists see us as enemies and that 
gives us much pride. We are the enemies of the communists,” see - https://vimeo.com/40748738. 
180 The manuscripts of some of these speeches are available at the Jaime Guzman Foundation. 
181 In a letter to his mother, he wrote: “I collaborate in a commission destined to write a new Constitution, and also 
in the organization of propaganda and of youth, in the General Secretariat of Government,” see - Santiago, 15 de 
octubre de 1973, located at Fundación Jaime Guzmán.  
182 “Habla el abogado Jaime Guzmán: ‘actas constitucionales darán vida a una nueva democracia en Chile,” La 
Tercera (September 13, 1976). 
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         The return to any political participation, Guzmán agreed, depended on swift economic 
progress. Chile was not the only neoliberal “experiment” in Latin America; after all, Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay, and many other countries in the hemisphere underwent overtly similar 
processes. Chile was, however, the first regime to present its social metamorphosis by using 
unequivocal “neoliberal” jargon. These economic reforms developed gradually. Under Minister of 
Economy Fernando Léniz, the country first underwent a relatively modest stabilization program, 
the outcome of which was hardly satisfying. Following an economic recession in 1975, Pinochet 
thus replaced Léniz with Sergio de Castro. Chile’s exemplary “Chicago Boy,” de Castro was 
Milton Friedman’s own apprentice and the product of the intellectual collaboration between the 
Catholic University of Chile and the University of Chicago since the 1950s. In turn, one by one 
the most celebrated neoliberal theorist of that era, Friedrich Hayek,183 Michael Novak,184 and, of 
course, Milton Friedman himself, visited the Andean dictatorship, expressing their delight over the 
implementation of their theories.185 Strikingly, by May 1975, the very term “Chicago Boys” and 
“neoliberalism” were already catchphrases in Chile’s public sphere.186 Friedman even went as far 
as addressing the Chilean public directly from Qué Pasa, stating that he believed in “maintaining 
peace, protecting the individual from coercion by his fellow citizens, and providing a stable 
currency.”187 For him, too, Chile’s return to parliamentary democracy could wait.188  
                                                             
183 Guzmán hosted Hayek during his visit to Chile in 1975, see - Bruce Caldwell and Leonidas Montes, “Friedrich 
Hayek and his visits to Chile,” The Review of Austrian Economics, 28: 3, (2015). 261-309.  
184 “Crisis in Chile,” Crisis Magazine (June 1, 1983); at  http://www.crisismagazine.com/1983/crisis-in-chile. 
185 Friedman wrote in later years that his Chilean students “were among the best foreign student” he ever taught and 
that he was delighted to have had “good influence on them and on Chile,” see - Letter from Milton Friedman to 
Hernan Cubillos, June 2, 1992, Hernán Cubillos Sallato Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1.   
186 “Los Chicago Boys: De Castro enfrenta la criticas,” Qué Pasa, no. 214 (May 29, 1975), 1, 10-12. 
187 Milton Friedman, “Medidas graves para una grave enfermedad,” Qué Pasa, no. 206 (April 3, 1975): 52. 
188 In his letters Friedman even seemed to justify the regime’s human rights violations saying that they were “far less 
extreme than […] the political repression that would have followed [had Allende stayed in power],” see - Letter 
from Milton Friedman to Louise Smith Pencavel, August 6, 1981, Hernán Cubillos Sallato Papers, Hoover 
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         Sergio de Castro lead an entirely new economic policy. Based his founding text El Ladrillo 
(The Brick) he set out to stimulate Foreign Direct Investment, cut public expenditure, and curb 
inflation. Once again, the state was to “realize an effective decentralization” of its economy, “de-
politicize” its workforce, and “decentralize” the education system.189 Despite the common 
assertion in the literature of Chile being the first country in which a “thorough program of 
neoliberal restructuring was initiated,” there was nothing particularly original about its so-called 
“creative destruction.”190 Anti-inflation measures, privatization, and slashing of government 
expenditure - which meant ending traditional distributive pension system, for instance - had all 
been tried, by now, in Spain, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The main difference between Sergio 
de Castro’s “Boys”, Krieger Vasena’s “tecnicos,” and Spain’s Opus Dei “technocrats,” was the 
aura of allure that each of these groups constructed around itself, typically via their affiliated media 
groups. In truth, the similarities between these projects are striking. Take for instance Chile’s 
Office of National Planning (ODEPLAN): A center of the Chicago Boys and gremialista operation, 
this body was to implement Chile’s “regionalization,” through “decentralization” and the 
formation of “poles of development” - all echoing the French, Spanish, and Argentine development 
plans of the 1960s.191  
                                                             
189“El Ladrillo”: Bases de la política económica del gobierno militar chileno (Santiago de Chile: Centro de 
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          Pinochet did not wait for economic growth alone to change the mentalities of the Chilean 
citizens, however. Akin to Franco’s and Onganía’s methods, he was to rely on a combination of 
civic societies and a unique state-controlled apparatus to indoctrinate the population. Perhaps not 
a one-party system as in the case of Franco’s Movimiento, the latter was indeed very tangible in 
the Chilean society. Known as the General Secretariat of the Government (Ministry from 1976), it 
operated the Women, Youth, Unions, and Culture sub-secretariats. As mentioned already, it was 
through these bodies that the dictatorship’s initial Hispanidad message emerged. In a parallel vein, 
Pinochet endeavored to enact an immediate constitutional change. Merely two weeks after the 
coup, his Constitutional Commission opened its sessions towards what would become Chile’s 
1980 Constitution. Having that said, until 1977, the sluggish crafting of Chile’s fundamental 
“constitutional acts” meant the commission was, at least during these three first years, in no hurry 
to define Chile’s political future. 
         All the same, with his catch-phrase “Family, Woman, and Youth” - as the three pillars of 
society and center stages of the creation of a new mentality - Pinochet mobilized Chile’s 
conservative polity towards a novel civilizing process. Hence, discussing the Chilean “new 
mentality” did not happen in secret meetings but publicly, on the pages of the enthusiastic 
conservative media.192 Needless to say, for them, this was not to be an ideological but a “realist” 
national project. The ideologies of the enlightenment, Pinochet told the Chilean youth in 1974, 
were “demagogic utopia.”193 His plans to “change the mentality of Chileans,” on the other hand, 
did not amount to “the absurd pretense of making a new Chilean, as postulated by Marxism.” All 
he wanted, he said, was to “stimulate the virtues that are in the national spirit [...] a realistic and 
                                                             
192 “Coronel Orlando Jerez: hacía un chileno con nueva mentalidad,” Qué Pasa, no. 202 (March 6, 1975): 18-19 
193 El General Pinochet se reúne con la juventud: textos de los discursos pronunciados en el primer aniversario de 
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not utopian goal.”194 Nevertheless, Pinochet admitted that his state was not ethically “neutral” but 
rather an “instrument at the service of a Homeland that has permanent spiritual values.”195 In other 
words, the dictatorship was a promoter of a spiritual truth, understood as antithetical to any 
materialist ideology.  
         Women, as we saw, were for the Chilean far-right the paramount symbol of self-
victimization and anti-Marxist defiance. Building on the 1971 women movement, Pinochet further 
attributing Allende’s downfall to them. During the “courageous struggle waged by our women 
against the Marxist regime,” he said, “each home was a bastion of rebellion, designing a thousand 
forms of repudiation.”196 Yet Pinochet theorized the role of women in paradoxical ways. Given 
their better “sense of reality” women were more suitable than men as teachers, he thought. The 
regime also believed in women’s economic value at the workplace, but like the Opus Dei, also 
suggested women be “compatible to men.” Or as Pinochet’s said in 1974, “equality of rights and 
opportunities” cannot be confused with complete “identification,” alien to the “physical and moral 
reality of the human being.” By demanding of women to give up their “authentic personality” and 
unique mission in society, one risks violating their “natural rights,” Pinochet opined.197  
         The Women’s National Secretariat was an ideological apparatus that mobilized Chilean 
women mainly in the form of voluntary operation (“voluntariado”). Adding to the preexisting 
Mothers Centers (CEMA-Chile), which had been taken over by Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet 
personally, and as a part of the so-called “communal social development,” it was yet another 
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expression of the State’s renunciation from its welfare function.198 With its publications and lavish 
events, and indeed in plain resemblance to Pilar Primo de Rivera’s Feminine Section, the Women’s 
Secretariat main significance was as propaganda apparatus; it was here that the Chilean women’s 
“gratitude” to Pinochet could be channeled throughout the years. Additionally, with the ICH’s 
Gisela Silva Encina on board, the Women’s Secretariat explored other of aspects Hispanidad, for 
instance in the following statement emphasizing the mythological bases for the Chilean 
womanhood. “The Chilean, our race, was forged in the Arauco War.199 For three centuries, to 
maintain civilized life in this land, our men had to fight in the south and our women were left 
behind to lead civil life, family, homes, and cities. [...] We were executors and directors, in this 
joint destiny,” it read.200 Accordingly, Silva Encina contended that in contemporary times women 
ought to equally organize society behind men, by making their homes “a cell where the Chilean 
economic order is born.”201 As importantly, and similar to the Opus Dei’s theories of the 1960s, 
women were presented here as having a fundamental anti-ideological function. Or as Carla Scassi, 
the first director of the Secretariat, said in 1974, the appalling “distortion” that ideologies bring 
with them generate a “deep repulsion” in women, thereby making them the most suitable agents 
of “unity, service, and pacification.”202 That is to say, the Secretariat suggested that given their 
natural inclination to rational thought, Chile’s women were to have a central role in the de-
politicization, and therefore, the unification of the Chilean society.  
                                                             
198 This apparatus also was at the heart of recent revelations regarding Pinochet’s fraud, see - “La Justicia arrincona 
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          Yet the regime clearly limited women’s liberties. When it came to equality at the workplace, 
Pinochet’s 1974 Work Code infamously banned certain production jobs from women - for 
instance, night shifts in certain production lines - ultimately spurring a certain amount of 
discomfort in the press.203 For the Women’s Secretariat spokeswomen, however, these restrictions 
were insignificant. In Carla Scassi’s view, women may work in many professions but would 
benefit more if they find an “artisan” activity in their homes. “We think that artistry is an excellent 
vehicle for women to enter the field of productive activity,” she said, “in a way that enriches the 
spirit.”204 Eventually, the Secretariat developed its own section for “household education” 
(educación para hogar), whereas its journal Amiga promoted women’s housework as “real 
labor”205 subsequently issuing patronizing tips for house cleaning.206  
          More broadly, during these first years, Chile’s public sphere saw the appearance of the 
notion that a novel and more authentic form of Chilean feminism was in the making. María Elena 
Aguirre and Rosario Guzmán - the sister of Jaime and a Qué Pasa and El Mercurio columnist - 
led this trend. In their opinion columns, they argued that women might possess social agency using 
their “sexual presences,” but even more so as respectable housewives.207 Women should aspire to 
higher education, they said, but not to replace men in positions of leadership; they should be able 
to choose whether or not to marry but can have no right for abortion.208 Some of these propositions, 
one might pose, were not entirely dissimilar from debates over matrimony and abortion in the mid-
1970s Western Europe. The difference was the omnipresent narrative of self-victimization at the 
                                                             
203 See for example - “Trabajos prohibidos a las mujeres,” Eva, no. 1974 (April 24, 1974): 5.  
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basis of these concepts of womanhood, whereby western “feminism” sought to “change all 
traditions” and thus did not signify liberation but a fraudulent “liberationalism.”209 This narrative 
quite often involved juxtaposing Chilean “maternalism” with the western pornographic “sexual 
exaltation.” Consequently, well into the 1980s, the regime proclaimed proudly its demarcation of 
gender differences. “We affirm that men and women are physically, psychically, and spiritually 
different from each other. The ideological [...] attempts to desegregate the two sexes, minimizing 
or ignoring their manifest differences, constitute, therefore, an error against nature,” stated the 
Women Secretariat in 1982.210 
        The National Youth Secretariat presented similar methods of ideological interpellation. For 
Pinochet, Chile’s youth was to be purified from its external ideological transgressions and 
thereafter set an example to the world as the docile and obedient server of progress. “The Chilean 
youth,” he said, bears a “cheerful libertarian message,” to those who “have not been able to share 
our fate, and who live under oppressive regimes.”211 Analogous to Chile’s women, the youngsters 
also were to have a key role in the “integration” of the nation.212As head of the Youth Secretariat, 
Pinochet appointed the gremialista Cristián Valdés Zegers, a board member of the ICH and another 
of Qué Pasa’s founders.213 Pledging to make the youth the “vanguard of Chile’s spiritual 
rebirth,”214 under his guidance, the Secretariat became increasingly conspicuous in Chilean public 
life, organizing a host of activities from summer camps to university preparatory courses.215 
Working in cooperation with the Secretariat was the gremialistas’ own National Unity Youth 
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Front, yet another voluntary organization designed to exhibit the operation of Chile’s 
“intermediary” societies. The head of this body, Javier Leturia, stated that he and his followers 
“denounce the suicidal weakness of the so-called great contemporary democracies,” and swore to 
consolidate Chile’s new society upon the “Christian, Hispanic, and republican tradition.”216 The 
Secretariat’s journals Juventud, Revista Araucania, and Diario Loco, promoted strict norms of 
behavior and “responsible” labor as a source of “juvenile mystique” and a cure for young 
“restlessness.”217 Other publications, the Opus Dei’s journal La Pandilla for instance, added other 
traditionalist and militaristic themes to this corpus of texts.218 Even so, given its voluntary nature, 
the Youth Secretariat was ultimately a limited source of grassroots mobilization. Its importance 
emanated from its symbolic presence in the public sphere, as a confirmation of the youth’s genuine 
identification with the regime and its “intermediary” societies.   
          The paradoxical voluntary image of Pinochet’s non-ideological society could be best seen 
in Jaime Guzmán’s own public persona. Despite rarely holding any official role in government, 
between 1973 and 1977 he himself embodied the regime’s alleged grassroot “intermediary” 
essence. His unofficial position derived from the gremialistas’ very self-branding, as agents of 
truth who transcend politics and thus guarantee society’s perfection. An example of this logic was 
Guzmán’s declarations from 1976. “It just so just happens that we are never interested in that 
[power], because, now and in the past, we have presented an ideal far beyond political power. We 
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are fighting for something that we believe is the very source of a free society: the defense of the 
autonomy of the Intermediate Bodies, one that does not postulate a simply blind or dogmatic path 
but one founded on a doctrine of man and society,” he said about the gremialistas.219 As an 
ideological agent, Guzmán thus held a position similar to that of the Opus Dei in Spain, and the 
Ateneo de la República in Argentina. Rather than an abstract constitution, or state-sponsored 
corporatist chamber, it was up to spiritual elite vanguards, he thought, to be the tacit agent guiding 
a “pacified” authoritarian society towards perfection.   
         Similar illuminations also appeared in José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois’s presentations at the 
time. Now lecturing to the regime officials on the nature of Marxism,220 in 1976 the Opus Dei’s 
spiritual leader in Chile stated, plain and simple, that “the critical demolition of Marxism” can only 
be undertaken “by Christians,” as Marxism is “a religious phenomenon, exactly reversed to 
Christianity.” However, when asked whether he thought Marxism is being effectively expunged 
in Chile, Ibáñez Langlois offered an Opus Dei answer by the book: “I do not want to be against 
anything, in principle. I want to be pro. But [Marxism] is intrinsically perverse [...] there is 
something terrible in its basis, it is superhuman, diabolical. But my task stays in the intellectual 
order. [...] priests are not called to make judgments of a political nature.”221 Evidently, the Opus 
Dei’s spiritual leader thought it made perfect sense to refute and demonize the “ideologies” of the 
Left upon every platform, even at the service of a dictatorship in the midst of a merciless purge, 
only thereafter to brand himself and his followers as non-political actors.  
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Conclusions 
         A decade of ideological radicalization among Chile’s conservative elites ultimately brought 
about an idiosyncratic authoritarian-technocratic regime. The post-fascist intellectual projects of 
the late-1960s perhaps facilitated the emergence of the dictatorship, but more importantly, served 
it retrospectively once Pinochet sought to fashion his own coherent state ideology. The regime 
thus constantly proclaimed being both “anti-ideological” and “rational,” this, despite constantly 
evoking notions of the Catholic and Hispanic Sacred. Like Onganía before him, prior to allowing 
any “political phase,” Pinochet attempted to guarantee a fundamental alteration of the minds and 
souls of his citizens, by means of terror but also throught the mobilization of Chile’s conservative 
sectors combined with a distinctive state-led indoctrination. Unlike Franco’s Spain, and like 
Onganía’s Argentina, Pinochet did not even bother founding formal corporatist institutions, and 
instead was fully committed to a neoliberal economic project supported by advisory groups. In 
fact, the only meaningful “intermediary” entity to be found in this regime were the post-fascist 
networks such as the ICH, Opus Dei, and the gremialistas, all of which offered themselves to 
Pinochet as the holders of a definite knowledge thus deciding the regime’s theory of the state, 
gender ideology, and overall “spiritual” rhetoric. Thus, once more, these agencies ultimately were 
far more significant for the design of the regime’s state-ideology than Chile’s neo-fascist 
affiliations - a process that I will touch on further in the last chapter.    
         Pinochet’s regime was indebted to Francoism, from its assertion of being the second chapter 
of the Spanish Civil War, to the gremialistas’ use of the Francoist corporatist jargon of 
“intermediary” societies, to the actual assistance it received from Spain between September 1973 
and November 1975. Being a dictatorship far deadlier than the Argentine Revolution, meant the 
designers of the Chilean dictatorship clearly had an ampler understanding of the Francoist political 
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myths. Unlike Onganía, they did not believe a post-ideological society could emerge devoid of a 
purifying civil war against the Left’s “totalitarian” components in society. Therefore, one can 
easily align with historian Kirsten Weld who has stressed recently that Pinochet sought to 
“transcend and succeed” Francoism, although neither he nor his ideologues ever quite said that.222 
Another way to put it is that Pinochet and his intellectuals aimed to produce a third chapter of what 
was, but now, an acknowledged authoritarian state model; a version that was calibrated to address 
the political and economic contexts of the 1970s, as well as the Chileans supposed unique 
mentality. As we will see in the next chapter, Fernández de la Mora’s repeated appearances in 
Chile during the late-1970s and early 1980s, meant that with the disappearance of the Francoist 
regime, even he identified Pinochet’s Chile as the last bastion of the regime model he had toiled 
his entirely life to conceive. To Fernández de la Mora’s chagrin, however, Pinochet’s identification 
with Francoism also meant that with Franco’s death and Spain’s democratization, the Chilean 
dictatorship too began seeking a path back to parliamentarism, thereby bringing its technocratic-
authoritarian experiment to its conclusion.   
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Chapter 6: The Demise of the Technocratic-Authoritarian State Model 
 
         Throughout the 1970s, the prestige of the technocratic-authoritarian state model diminished 
in Argentina, Spain, and Chile. This happened due to a conjuncture of several historical conditions, 
such as economic crisis, large-scale popular mobilization against these so-called “soft” 
dictatorships, and international pressure for democratization - processes that put into question both 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of technocratic-authoritarianism. Yet a democratic transition was 
neither imminent nor inevitable in any of the three countries. In reality, the democratic reforms of 
the 1970s and 1980s were preceded by the surge of powerful neo-fascist resistance, stemming 
directly from the impediments and ultimate failure of the technocratic state model. The purpose of 
this last chapter is therefore not to analyze to the fullest the regimes that replaced the technocratic-
authoritarian experiments - the scope of this dissertation would not allow us that - but to illustrate 
how the intellectual networks and ideologies that I discussed in the previous five chapters changed 
throughout different historical contexts. In general, I argue that the technocratic-authoritarian 
model continued to inform the regimes that replaced it. The chapter opens with the crisis of the 
Francoist regime in the 1970s; continues to explore the rise of the interlinked Spanish-Argentine 
neo-fascist wave of the 1970s; discusses the Argentine Dictatorship of 1976-1983 and its handling 
of the 1960s formulas; and concludes with debating the legacies of technocratic-authoritarianism 
during the Spanish and Chilean democratic transitions in the late-1970s and early 1980s.  
 
“Francoism without Franco”: the design of Spain’s authoritarian future 
        During the second half of the 1960s, the Francoist dictatorship, despite its seeming economic 




lost fear of the dictatorship, Spain saw a mounting wave of unrest from the street. More important, 
Francoism faced the emergence of its own urban guerilla: the Basque national liberation movement 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). A “terror” group according to the regime’s own definition - 
although it attacked mostly military personnel - it proved to be a crucial factor in deciding the 
regime’s fate. In truth, however, it was the opposition from within the dictatorship’s own political 
sphere that propelled Franco’s technocrats to change strategies in the 1960s, ultimately leading to 
Spain’s peculiar monarchic restoration. To begin with, throughout the 1960s, the moderate Falange 
politicians, namely José Solís, the General Secretary of the Movimiento, and Manuel Fraga, the 
Minister of Tourism and Information, resisted Carrero Blanco’s increasing authority by suggesting 
an alternative political project comprising of further political “openings.”1 Despite rejecting 
parliamentary politics in principle, Fraga believed Spain was a “body in a process of configuration” 
that deserved effective forms of representation within its existing corporatist apparatus.2 His Press 
Law of 1966 was thus a step in the direction of allowing a pluralist society to thrive within the 
regime’s ideological body.  
         The first act of avowed opposition to Franco in the 1960s came not from the Falange, 
however, but from Spain’s Christian Democrats and moderate monarchists. On June 5, 1962, the 
Munich Congress of Europeanists, declared the establishment of “genuinely representative and 
democratic institutions” in Spain.3 Here, those who had been the regime’s supporters in the past - 
most famously Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez - propositioned a monarchy significantly different to that 
put forward by Carrero Blanco and the Opus Dei. Following this congress, angrily, Franco 
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appointed General Agustin Muñoz Grandes as his first Vice-president of Government. Still, for 
Franco the damage had been done: for many respectable monarchists, a transition toward a 
constitutional monarchy had become the preferred political “continuation” to Francoism.4  
         More external pressures began coming into play at this point, beginning with Spain’s 
rebuffed application to join the European Community, and continuing with the opening of the 
Second Vatican Council.5 Sensing an imminent political shift, even some Opus Dei intellectuals 
then began reconsidering their ideological stance. This was the case of the Rafael Calvo Serer. 
Following his interactions with West European intellectuals, in the 1960s he who had once been 
Franco’s fiercest reactionary intellectual began to display increasing democratic leanings. In his 
1964 book Las nuevas democracias, for instance, he promoted a Monarchy as a symbol of 
authority that, given its “appeal to the army,” can prevent exaggerated “desires for executive 
power.”6 While not explicitly proposing democracy, he nevertheless urged the future monarch to 
heed the “will of his citizens” and adapt to the new historical “realities.”7 
        By the mid-1960s, Calvo Serer and Antonio Fontán began insinuating that they too believed 
a democratic opening was pertinent in Spain. This happened upon the daily Madrid - a case that is 
worth examining briefly since the Opus Dei technocrats used it later to dispel any critique of the 
Opus Dei’s political agenda.8 In 1968, during the days of the Parisian May uprising, Calvo Serer 
                                                             
4 Once the moderate monarchist Jose María Anson hinted this position publicly, the regime responded by collecting 
the June 23, 1966 edition of ABC, indicating just how limited the freedom granted by the 1966 Press Law really was, 
see - José María Anson, “Usted primero,” ABC Madrid (June 23, 1966).  
5 Some historians have already interpreted Spain’s aspiration for economic integration with Europe as the sole 
reason for this new age of reforms. Despite not applying again until July 1977, these moderation measures did grant 
Spain with a preferential Agreement with the European Community in 1970, see - Charles Powel, The Long Road to 
Europe: Spain and the European Community, 1957-1986 (Working paper: Elcano Royal Institute, 2015).  
6 Rafael Calvo Serer, Las nuevas democracias (Madrid: Rialp, 1964), 173-74.  
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Ortega y Gasset’s tropes from Rebellion of the Masses that refers to society’s own self-perception and feeling of 
ripeness for a specific political system.  
8 “I can assure you,” said López Rodó to Neustadt in 1971, “that some of the people who are most distant from me 
politically belong, precisely, to Opus Dei. […] Like Rafael Calvo, whose qualities and good faith I recognize, but 




published a diatribe against Charles de Gaulle, declaring the incompatibility of authoritarianism 
with “the structures of industrial society and with the democratic mentality of our time.”9 The text 
said scarce little of the future Calvo Serer envisioned for Spain. This did not prevent Fraga from 
closing Madrid for months.10 Consequently, the incident has led conservative Spanish historians 
to question the Opus Dei’s loyalty to Franco, since “there was an important Opus group whose 
members professed anti-Francoism.”11 This is clearly an overstatement. Calvo Serer and Fontán 
were not “anti-Francoist,” and showed no remorse for serving this regime for decades. In 1968, 
Calvo Serer merely suggested Francoism should progress towards a parliamentary democracy that 
would allow “socialism without Marxism.”12 He did, however, fall from favor with Carrero 
Blanco. “I feel obliged to serve my country in the new situation that the Press Law had created,” 
he even wrote the Admiral in defiance,13 and later, wrote to Franco pledging him not to let Carrero 
Blanco make the Bourbon Prince “his prisoner.”14 Even so, Calvo Serer’s letters to Carrero Blanco, 
Franco, and López Rodó, clearly indicate that he wanted to reform Francoism from within, 
presenting himself as the authentic interpreter of the “July 1936 spirit.”15  
         Ultimately, Madrid was the premature preamble of Spain’s future “pacted transition.” 
Nothing exemplified this more than Fontán’s statement that Madrid advocates “an evolution of 
the country without rupture […] towards a progressive economic, social, and political 
                                                             
9 “No al general De Gaulle,” Madrid (May 30, 1968); See also Rafael Calvo Serer, “La diversidad política es 
necesaria,” Madrid (April 4, 1968).  
10 Writing to Franco, Calvo Serer begged him to order Manuel Fraga to lift the ban on the newspaper saying it is 
“animated by principles and values and objective importance beyond discussion for those with a Christian concept 
of life,” see - Carta de Rafael Calvo Serer al Generalisimo Francisco Franco, June 17, 1968, AGUN, documento 
001/051/131. 
11 Ricardo de la Cierva, El Opus Dei: controversia y camino (Madrid: Arc Editores, 1997), 16. 
12 Rafael Calvo Serer, España ante la libertad, la democracia, y el progreso (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, 
1968), 10. 
13 Carta de Rafael Calvo Serer a Luis Carrero Blanco, November 19, l967, AGUN documento 001/ 051/110. 
14 Carta de Rafael Calvo Serer to Francisco Franco Bahamonde, July 17, 1969, AGUN documento 001/051/326. 
15 Or as he said to Villar Palasi, “to say that the restoration of liberties is impossible since the Spanish people are not 
prepared, is tantamount to making the worst criticism of the work of the rulers of these years of peace,” see - Carta 




democratization.”16 How could a parliamentary democracy emerge from dictatorship without 
rupture? Fontán would not answer that question. Still, this modest defiance sent shock waves 
within the regime and even impressed Dionisio Ridruejo, now the emblem of Franco’s democratic 
opposition. In a letter to the Madrid editors, he sarcastically noted that he was not surprised the 
Opus Dei had produced both “sincere democrats” and “argumentative fundamentalists.” He would 
have been willing to consider the Opus Dei as a pluralist entity, he added, had Calvo Serer not 
pretended that these positions “are one and the same.”17 
          Calvo Serer’s mischiefs were the least of Franco’s problems in these years. Amidst a period 
of constant student riots and ETA attacks, in January 1969 a state of emergency was declared in 
Spain for the first time in decades. Worse yet, Pope Paul VI turned decidedly against the Spanish 
dictatorship. Alfredo Sánchez Bella, then the ambassador in Rome, wrote López Rodó that the 
Pope had not only broken with Francoism “but with the entire conception of Spain,” and that the 
regime had no alternative but to “give an impression of greater openness,” while at the same time 
letting the “absolutely faithful” Francoists “tighten the knots better.”18 Carrero Blanco and López 
Rodó needed no persuasion. Having passed the Organic Laws in 1967, they turned to administer 
what was essentially a silent coup d’état, which meant the elimination of alternative power centers 
in the regime and the design of an authoritarian monarchy to their liking. Carrero Blanco’s 
proximity to Franco meant that on September 21, 1967, Franco appointed him as Vice-president 
of Government instead of Muñoz Grande. Alfredo Sánchez Bella, now plotting inside Carrero 
Blanco’s circle, advised the Admiral on their group’s next political move: 
If we act now, if we carry out what we have said, if the leader in life [Franco] […] designates 
his successor himself, if we establish a crowned presidentialist state - which is what our era 
demands and what the national and international public opinion is willing to accept - the 
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action of the enemy could cause inconvenience but will not substantially affect the historical 
evolution of Spain.19 
 
          The so-called “prince operation” was hence simple in theory. Building on the outlines of the 
1947 Law of Succession, Franco was to designate the Bourbon Prince, Juan Carlos, as a powerless 
symbol at the heart of an authoritarian state, firmly in the hands of a “President.”20 But there were 
complications ahead. For one thing, there were other contenders to the Spanish Crown. Some, for 
instance Sánchez Bella, advised crowning Otto von Habsburg, Austria-Hungary’s last Crown 
Prince, as Spain’s monarch.21 Likewise, the Carlist traditionalists, Javier de Borbón-Parma and his 
son Prince Carlos Hugo, still demanded the throne for themselves. As a result, in 1968 Carrero 
Blanco banished both father and son from Spain. Then there was the problem of Juan Carlos’s own 
ideological orientation. The operation to reinstate Francoism under a Bourbon monarchy was 
based on the belief that the Prince could be educated to be an authoritarian ruler himself. Following 
a two-year military service, in 1960 Juan Carlos thus began his studies in Spain. His education was 
the mission of a special committee that comprised of a salient group of Opus Dei’s ideologues: 
Federico Suárez Verdeguer, López Amo, López Rodó, and Pérez Embid.22 That the Prince publicly 
expressed his admiration to López Rodó was subsequently a matter of deep concern within the 
Falange inner circles.23  
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         While heading towards its authoritarian institutionalization, Francoism saw further 
performances of seeming liberation, for instance with the laws of religious liberty of 1967.24 Villar 
Palasí’s education reform of 1969-70 was another case in point. The law, and the study that 
preceded it (the “White Book”),25 were primarily a propaganda device aimed at the UNESCO 
educational bodies as evidence of Spain’s moderation.26 Underpinning the law were narratives of 
modernization portraying Franco as he who had transformed a nation of “illiterates” into a 
technological power.27 The White Book spoke of Spain’s “political evolution” and even stated that 
Spain’s entire “value system” was now subject to a “broad process of revision.” Expectedly, 
however, the law openly adhered to “Christian concept of life” and the “Principles of the 
Movimiento.”28 Ultimately, Villar Palasí’s efforts to “democratize the education” merely meant 
expanding the state’s expenditure on education slightly closer to Western European levels.29  
         The tensions between the Falange and the Opus Dei technocrats surfaced fully with the 
“MATESA Affair,” in July 1969. A colossal scandal of public money embezzlement involving 
several Opus Dei institutions, it soon became an instrument in Fraga’s hands at the exact time of 
the succession process.30 Carrero Blanco, irritated by the Falange’s utilization of the scandal, posed 
                                                             
24 Known as “Ley 44:1967 de Libertad Religiosa,” see - BOE (España) no. 156, (July 1, 1967): 9191-94.  
25 The book was officially titled La educación en España: bases para una política educativa and was presented to 
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an ultimatum: “It is either me or Fraga!”31 In response, Franco sacked Fraga and Solís. Following 
the official nomination of Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor, in October 1969, Carrero Blanco 
then formed his own so-called “mono-color” government, comprising of his intimate 
collaborators: Sánchez Bella (Minister of Information and Tourism), Fernández de la Mora 
(Minister of Public Works), the Opus Dei supernumerary Gregorio López Bravo (Foreign 
Minister), and López Rodó, as the Development Plan’s director. That is to say, paradoxically, 
following the MATESA scandal the technocrats tightened their control over the state.32    
        But unlike the early 1960s, the period of 1970-73 was characterized by neither social peace 
nor economic miracles. Despite its ongoing growth, the Spanish economy showed the first 
symptoms of stagnation and in 1973, fell into full economic crisis due to the 1973 Oil Crisis.33 
With the Burgos Trials (beginning December 1970), which sentenced several ETA members to 
death, and Sánchez Bella closing of Madrid, the regime also fell back to its repressive propensities. 
True, Franco’s Spain then decided to perform yet another spectacle of democratic elections.34 
Arguably an “escape valve” for political pressures, the 1970s elections for the Cortes third rank 
(of “family representatives”) was nonetheless followed by the placing of other mechanisms of 
control - for instance, the elevation of the Kingdom Council to the regime’s highest advisory body. 
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Under the technocrats’ influence, this body was designed to propose presidential candidates for 
the Cortes to choose from.35  
          On a strictly ideological level, seemingly little had changed in Spain’s technocratic-
authoritarian model in these years. This could be easily seen in Franco’s end-of-the-decade speech, 
where he spoke of Spain’s increase of its per-capita “Renta,” warned against “abstract ideologies,” 
and proclaimed to be “perfecting” the organic democracy as an “open and flexible order.”36 
Nevertheless, in the 1970s the Francoist rhetoric did become more “political.” Even the technocrats 
began to speak differently by then. In 1971, López Rodó stated that he “believed he is a politician” 
- a declaration that caused many in the Spanish press to raise an eyebrow.37 Not by coincidence, it 
was then that the Falange took the Opus Dei to court, for violating the ban on political associations. 
The allegations read as follows: 
The exclusive political ends of Opus Dei, are now revealed clearly in the rapid and 
successive acquisition of the most important newspapers of the country. […] The countless 
incorporations of the journalists of the University of Navarra in the media, and a vast 
presence of their future candidates as members of the Cortes […]  indicates that the Opus 
Dei not only participates in national politics but also aspires to do so exclusively.38 
 
         This was just the beginning of a challenging period for the Opus Dei. Following the 
MATESA scandal, the early 1970s saw the appearance of detailed reports regarding its alleged 
operations.39 In 1974, the publication of Eva Jardiel Poncela’s book ¿Por qué no es usted del Opus 
                                                             
35 Cazorla Sánchez, Fear and Progress, 55; see also - Cañellas Mas, Laureano López Rodó: biografía política de un 
ministro de Franco, 224, 281.   
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Dei? even reduced the game of guessing whether one belonged to Opus Dei to a mere caricature.40 
More striking, the technocratic ideology, in and of itself, now came under criticism. The texts of 
Juan Vallet de Goytisolo and Josep Meliá - both respectable Catalonian intellectuals - were good 
examples of this type of deconstruction. Both took issue with the contraposition between 
“ideology” and “technocracy.”41 The so-called development plans, Vallet de Goytisolo said, 
assume what people want and how to satisfy their needs, and are thus profoundly ideological. 
Moreover, organizing society by specialists towards perfection is where “technocracy and 
socialism coincide,” he said, and further warned that Spain’s development involved destruction, 
pollution, and social inequality.42 Last, with the appointment of Vicente Enrique y Tarancón as 
Archbishop of Madrid in 1971, The Catholic Church turned firmly not only against Franco but 
against the Opus Dei. “Relations between the Holy See and the Government became increasingly 
tense,” Tarancón testified, as López Bravo and López Rodó “quite unbelievably” sought to defend 
Spain’s Church “from the Pope and the Spanish episcopal hierarchy.”43  
         Its outward political opening notwithstanding, Spain’s future lay firmly in at the hands of 
Admiral Carrero Blanco. “The principles of our Movement are permanent and unalterable, born 
of an exact conception of the truth of man,” he stated in March 1973. While denying being an 
“inmovilista” (“resisting change”) and underlining Spain’s “political dynamism,” he stated that 
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“we experience material abundance in our times but within our own national reality.”44 By this he 
meant that despite legends about the causal link between economic growth and democratization, 
the Spanish subject had shown to be capable of living under only one system - Francoism - and 
would therefore continue to do so for eternity. With the further deterioration of Franco’s health, in 
June 1973, the Kingdom Council appointed Carrero Blanco as Spain’s first President of 
Government. In his inaugural speech, on July 20, 1973, the Admiral reiterated that the Spaniards 
will partake in the state’s “tasks,” but never decide the identity of its executive authority, 
lawmaker, or judge.45  
 
Neo-fascism: the return of the revolutionary alternative from the Right in Spain and 
Argentina 
        When Carrero Blanco stated that he was no “inmovilista” he was not speaking in abstractions 
but of a concrete group. Even more than the left-wing opposition, it was Spain’s emerging neo-
fascist mobilization that undermined the technocratic-authoritarian model in this period. Famously 
nicknamed the “Bunker” after the zealots surrounding Hitler’s in his last days, this movement’s 
rhetoric betrayed a nostalgia for the fascist revolutions abandoned in the 1950s, and more 
specifically, to José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s nationalist-syndicalist political myths.46 Strikingly, 
this sentiment surfaced simultaneously in Spain, Argentina, and Chile, thus developing into a 
tangible collaboration in the mid-1970s, perhaps the last neo-fascist international network of the 
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Cold War. Despite their yearning for the 1930s, the 1970s neo-fascists were symptomatic of their 
own era. Rather than merely anti-communist, they spoke primarily in “anti-subversive” terms and 
were fixated on public morality, youth sexuality, women’s mobilization, homosexuality, and other 
1960s alleged transgressions they knotted together to one imagined ubiquitous “enemy.” More 
often than not, their rhetoric showed a return to Anti-Semitism - a proclivity the post-fascist 
technocrats have long since abandoned. What is more, the neo-fascist movement echoed clear 
Third World penchants (“third worldism”) as it attacked the American-led economy of “trusts.” 
Thus, unlike the Opus Dei, the neo-fascists did not seek protective “bridges” with the Western 
Bloc but sought to purge their spiritual domain from its “excess.” 
          The Falange never ceased being a salient part of Francoism’s ideological landscape. Being 
the symbolic core of the Movimiento, it also upheld its youth, student, and women’s organizations. 
Examined more closely, however, by 1960 Francoism barely produced novel militant neo-fascist 
affiliations. This began changing in the early 1960s. A good example for this is Luis González 
Vicén and José Antonio Girón’s intellectual group Círculos Doctrinales José Antonio. Established 
in 1960, it aimed to redeem the ideology of the Falange’s late leader. The second case in point was 
the interlinked Acción Católica Ecuménica (ACE) and the youth movement Joven Europa. 
Acknowledged by the state in 1962, ACE was a part of a transnational neo-fascist network, which 
included Vanni Teodorani in Italy, Leon de Poncins in France, and Franz Von Papen in Germany. 
Joven Europa, too was an international European network that purported to unify the European 
neo-fascist forces. The two movements also linked with the Southern Cone. While Sergio 
Fernández Larraín was intimately linked to the ACE, Joven Europa associated with Tacuara,47 and 
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more importantly, with Juan Perón, then residing in Madrid. In 1962, Perón addressed Joven 
Europa with the following words: 
Social justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty, […] constitute a third 
ideological position, far removed from the extremism of Moscow and Washington, and make 
up the synthesis of our Justicialista doctrine and the basis of our mystique [...] We are 
morally united with all the movements that, like Joven Europa, fight for common objectives 
and ideals [...] I wish and hope that our movements will unite in the future, […] also because 
the Argentines descended from Europe we have never stopped being Europeans in our 
thoughts and in our behavior.48 
 
Not only does this text confirm that Perón collaborated with neo-fascist elements while in 
Madrid,49 it also indicates that European neo-fascists felt Peronism was part of their movement - 
a notion that was to be confirmed in the early 1970s as we will see shortly. Yet despite this link, 
ACE and Joven Europa barely left a mark on Spanish politics at the time.   
        The same cannot be said of Blas Piñar. The ominous leader of the “Bunker” for decades, this 
Falangist, who had replaced Sánchez Bella as head of ICH in 1959, was one of the first to be 
dismayed by the technocrats’ submission to the western economic order.50 Unlike the reformist 
Falange ministers, Piñar presented a clerico-fascist ideology that combined José Antonio’s 
mythology, Hispanidad, and staunch anti-Americanism.51 On the one hand, his so-called 
“Joseantonian reaffirmation” meant a yearning for an anti-Bourgeoisie “syndicate, vertical, and 
nationalized” society.52 On the other hand, he alleged that the Falange and traditionalism “do not 
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oppose diametrically,”53 and set out to Christianize José Antonio’s spirituality,54 among other 
things, by stressing his own “providentialist sense of History.”55 Last, it was his fascist symbolism 
- which included incessant public fascist salutes - that made Piñar a quintessential neo-fascist.56  
         In January 1962, Piñar published an opinion column in ABC that was to become the definitive 
text of disillusionment from technocratic Spain. “Hipócritas” was one of the most staggeringly 
anti-American texts to be written in Franco’s Spain. Months before the Cuban missile crisis, it 
scolded the USA for its pragmatic dealing with the USSR, its violations of human rights, and 
imperial aspirations:  
They had no scruples casting the first atomic bomb on the defenseless people of Hiroshima. 
[…] deep down, they search for a formula of coexistence that would allow them to live in 
peace [with communism] thus letting millions continue to moan as slaves [...] they pretend 
to be anti-colonialists and demand the self-determination of the under-developed nations, 
while binding them to the yoke of total economic dependency.57 
 
As the Chilean ambassador and Piñar’s friend Sergio Fernández Larraín observed, the USA’s 
irritation with Piñar’s allegations led Franco to sack him from the ICH.58 Obviously, Piñar’s words 
exposed the unspoken truth of technocratic-authoritarianism: it depended on the American 
economic order for its very autonomous existence in the midst of the western domain.  
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        In 1966, Piñar established the journal and affiliation Fuerza Nueva. There are those who have 
claimed that by then he was “not a Falangist,”59 but that would be to miss the point. Fuerza Nueva 
wanted to salvage the Falange’s road-not-taken of revolutionary national syndicalism. 
Subsequently, it scorned Spain’s opening of the global economy, its turn to consumerism, and 
social inequalities, but no less important, its reduction of politics to questions of science and 
specialists.60 Put differently, the neo-fascists wanted back their irrational and virile “pending 
revolution.” Or as a Fuerza Nueva editorial stated:  
We do not like this Cold Spain […] where the aroma of a steak is confused with the sweet 
rhetoric of flexible ideologies of circumstances. [...] technocratic Spain, the one that tries to 
educate us in alloys of the spirit, the one that is more attentive to the consumer society than 
the consummation of society […] this Indirect Spain, in short, we do not like, we do not like 
it! [...] We like the Direct Spain, which attests to the strong Celtiberian courage, which is 
willing to die for the sake of an ideal.61 
 
Fuerza Nueva even questioned the Opus Dei loyalty to Franco,62 but was wary of doing the same 
to the Opus Dei’s patron, Carrero Blanco.63  
          Piñar and his followers presented several discursive novelties in the Francoist landscape. 
Similar to the Argentine nacionalistas at the time, they represented a gradual motion from anti-
communistic to “anti-subversive” rhetoric. For them, “subversion” encapsulated any phenomena 
that defied the hierarchies of the Christian Civilization as they understood it, be it European 
socialists, ETA - a movement that had little to do with communism - and Hippies.64 In a parallel 
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vein, Piñar thought he led the “third world” against the Cold War empires. This meant he admired 
Fidel Castro’s initial “desire for justice,”65only then to name Allende a “Trojan horse.”66 More 
significant, Fuerza Nueva defied the 1960s peace movement and demanded the return to a state of 
civil war. “As protesters in England chant ‘better red than dead,’ we want to propose our, quite 
different, version: ‘better dead than red,’” Piñar stated sardonically.67 Calling for the physical 
extermination of an internal enemy was nothing new for the Argentine nacionalistas but quite a 
novelty in Franco’s society where communism had allegedly been vanquished in 1939.68 In other 
words, for Piñar, Franco’s “aseptic, comfortable, bourgeois peace”  was deceitful.69 Last, Fuerza 
Nueva demanded to renew Spain’s ideological role in Latin America. By resuming the call for a 
“Hispanic community of nations,” Piñar simply appropriated Franco’s Hispanidad message.70 In 
short, led by Fuerza Nueva, and later including groups such as Círculo Español de Amigos de 
Europa (CEDADE), Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey, and the newspapers El Alcázar and El Imparcial, 
Spain’s “Bunker” was one of the more formidable neo-fascist movements in Europe.71  
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          The parallels between the Argentine and Spanish neo-fascist movements were manifest, as 
the colossal failure of Onganía’s technocratic-authoritarian regime triggered a salient neo-fascist 
backlash in Argentina as well. With Azul y Blanco closing in 1971, the Argentine public sphere 
saw the resurgence of other far-right cliques. A partial list would include Fernando de Estrada’s 
journal Premisa, Edgard Saa’s Agrupación Nacionalista Argentina, Walter Beveraggi Allende’s 
Confederación Nacionalista Argentina, and Sánchez Sorondo’s Movimiento de la Revolución 
Nacional.72 Other groups pertaining to José Antonio’s ideology were Antonio Mille’s Movimiento 
Nacional Sindicalista, with its journal Leña, Oscar Calzada López’s Falange Restauradora 
Nacionalista, and later, Carlos Flores Allende’s Falange y Fe. The main leader of this nacionalista 
revival was, however, Jordán Bruno Genta. While Argentina’s urban guerilla revitalized his “anti-
subversive” theories of the 1960s (discussed in chapter 3), his 1970 book Seguridad y Desarrollo 
was as much a manifesto against subversion as it was a tirade against technocratic capitalism. 
“There is no doubt that money is the new ‘divinity,’ not only of secular Jews but also for gentrified 
or proletarian Christians,” he wrote.73 In Genta’s opinion, rather than a “new mentality,” Onganía 
had led Argentina to a society plagued by “inessential” citizens, where one could be a “materialist, 
positivist, technocrat, existentialist, psychoanalyst, […] a ‘hippie.’”74 Like Piñar, Genta linked 
these types to a global “subversive war.” For him, the rebellion of the hippies and workers stemmed 
from the same “satanic inspiration” and the “fiercest resentment against unity, form, and order.”75 
His Manichean perception of history, anti-materialist pursuit, and pledge to militarily “organize, 
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nationalize, and hierarchize social life” made Genta the key nacionalista ideologue of the early 
1970s. His assassination in October 1974, by ERP militants, further fueled the myth around him.76 
         By the late 1960s, the Spanish Bunker and Argentine neo-fascists were already collaborating. 
This began with the friendship between Blas Piñar and Alberto Boixados - a hispanista from the 
University of Córdoba who was a fierce critique of the technocratic 1960s in general and of the 
Opus Dei in particular -77 but became even more substantial with the partnership between the 
Bunker leader and the nacionalista Ricardo Curutchet. In July 1973 the latter launched the journal 
Cablido, which after the deaths of Meinvielle, in August 1973, and Genta, in 1974, became the 
new epicenter of nacionalista ideology. Apart from publishing texts ranging from Julio Meinvielle 
and Julio Irazusta to more respectable figures such as Catholic philosopher Bernadino Montejano, 
the journal was the mouthpiece of Curutchet’s own Movimiento Nacionalista de Restauración 
(MNR).78 Curutchet quickly found points of reference in the Spanish “Bunker.” For instance, he 
published Ernesto Giménez Caballero’s article “Ante el 18 de Julio.” Originally published in El 
Alcázar, the Falange ideologue demanded here an “involution,” understood as a return to the 
zeitgeist of the days before the Spanish Civil War.79 Moreover, Curutchet exhibited a deep 
admiration to the legacy of José Antonio, of whom he said the following words: 
No nacionalista will be able to forget his teachings […] The conception of the Homeland as 
“unity of destiny in the universal,” the opposition to the fallacious rationalist “program,” by 
the “instinct” - a total intuition, clear in the soul, of the Homeland and the History - and 
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opposition to capitalism and to communism [...] his synthesis of tradition and revolution. 
[...] José Antonio’s Spain [...] he has given us an imperial gift.80     
 
         In Cabildo, and later in his journal El Fortín, Curutchet further vilified the technocratic 
project of the 1960s. “There is no authentic aristocracy, or true ‘ruling class’” in Argentina, was 
his point of departure.81 And like Fuerza Nueva, he blamed the technocrats for both the 1960s 
“moral decay” and the rise of the subversion.82 In 1975, Marcos Gigena Ibarguren’s nacionalista 
journal Restauración joined Cabildo in attacking not only the “useless revolution of 1966,”83 but 
also the publicists who supported it: Grondona and Neustadt.84 Here a clear demarcation between 
“golpismo” and “crusade” became apparent.85 Whereas the former meant a lame authoritarian rule, 
the latter, like in Franco’s “crusade,” meant the annihilation of the enemy and the nation’s rebirth.86 
Accordingly, the “subversion” appeared in these texts as an abject being, meriting death by non-
constitutional means.87 Indeed, upon hearing of Franco’s death in 1975, the neo-fascists exhibited 
renewed interest in the legacies of the late Spanish dictator and his “crusade”: 
The death of Generalissimo Franco is a tragedy not so much for Spain but for the Christian 
West […] The political experience indicates the importance and the necessity of the 
Conductor; when the system fails, or where the technique deforms reality or the ideology 
denies it, the Conductor knows how to impose order, correct deformations, and reconstruct 
human beings. The Conductor personalizes the politics that, from the French Revolution, 
tend to become abstract and mystical. [...] The Civil War was the Crusade - religious, mystic, 
transcendent, luminous, sharp, imbued with love and metaphysics.88 
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These lines attest to the neo-fascists’ interest in the military leader, not only as a designer of a 
purifying civil war but as the only form of rationality in a world plagued by illusory ideologies.  
         This tribute is noteworthy also because the nacionalistas rarely revered Franco in such words 
in the 1960s. That is not to say that they had given up on Spain altogether. For Juan Carlos 
Goyeneche, it was Muñoz Grandes who was, for a while, the new hope for the regime’s return to 
its revolutionary essence. Goyeneche approached the vice-president in 1964, presenting him with 
his ideas of “pending revolution,” and demanding to unite Latin America’s neo-fascists. “There is 
a Jewish International, a Freemason International, a Marxist International, and an International of 
Money - where is ours?” he demanded to know.89 Thereafter, in 1971 Goyeneche approached 
Carrero Blanco with similar pleas.90 Still, only with the advent of the nexus between Piñar and the 
nacionalistas did a truly Spanish-Argentine neo-fascist amity occur, based on the contempt of the 
“technocratic” era and an unabashed reading of Franco’s “Crusade” as exemplary for 
contemporary Latin America.91  
        While this happened, Argentine was to undergo what was, in essence, Latin America’s first 
prominent, and somewhat forgotten, transition to democracy of the 1970s. Rather than bringing 
solidarity and civic cooperation to the country, however, this transition brought about the rise to 
power of yet another neo-fascist faction: the so-called “Peronist Right.” Juan Perón has been absent 
from this analysis thus far, at least since he abandoned his Hispanidad rhetoric in the 1950s. There 
is a simple reason for this: Peronism was the alternative post-fascist ideology, if not the antithesis, 
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of the technocratic-authoritarian state that is the center of this dissertation.92 While it would be 
impossible, in this study, to provide a comprehensive mapping of Peronist ideology in the 1960s, 
it is important to note that Argentina’s technocratic-authoritarian ideology dissolved also due to 
Peronism reviving its own authoritarian, Catholic, and Hispanic message.93  
        The history of Juan Perón’s return to Argentina in 1973 is an intricate one that still calls for 
more historical research. Following the November 1970 “The Hour of the People” agreement 
between the Peronists and the Radical Party that paved the way for the democratic return, and 
under the leadership of Héctor José Cámpora, Peronism remerged in Argentine politics as an 
adaptable and trustworthy actor. This fact was made clear on November 17, 1972, as Perón 
returned to Argentina from Spain (the “operative return”) and swiftly struck deals with Argentina’s 
key political parties and labor unions. This achievement undercut Lanusse’s own “Grand National 
Agreement” initiative, thereby opening the way for Cámpora’s March 1973 electoral victory, 
Perón’s return to Argentina, and own reelection in September 1973. His pragmatism 
notwithstanding, by catering both to the nacionalistas and the revolutionary Left - thus stimulating 
the Peronist Left’s urban guerrilla activity in the early 1970s - Perón was far from ideological 
moderation. More worrisome, being in Madrid for twelve years, it was the political habitus at his 
residence in Madrid (Puerta De Hierro) that decided the neo-fascist character and stark 
murderousness of his third tenure. 
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         The Peronist “turn to the right” was the brainchild of Perón’s third wife Isabel Martínez de 
Perón, and personal secretary José López Rega94 - the new interpreters of the “Peronist truths.”95 
Of course, Peronism had seen other right-wing figures before them. A case in point was Raúl 
Matera, who in the 1960s advocated his own brand of anti-communist authoritarianism, and rubbed 
shoulders with Sánchez Sorrondo and Cardinal Caggiano.96 But ultimately, the Peronist Right was 
born in Madrid, in López Rega’s journal Las Bases. Here Isabel spoke of a “Christian economy 
where matter and spirit could be in dialogue in equal conditions,”97 and even evoked José 
Antonio’s “dignified concept” of political violence. In the face of a “murderous thieve inside your 
house,” she said, one may act in self-defense. Violence is “systematically reprehensible, only when 
it is contrary to justice,” she further paraphrased the Falange leader.98 Being the close friend of 
Franco’s sister, María del Pilar, meant Isabel was also well-connected with the Francoist 
establishment. On October 7, 1973, following Juan Perón’s electoral victory, María del Pilar even 
arrived in Buenos Aires for Perón’s inauguration as Isabel’s official guest.99 Fittingly, as the 
elected vice-president, Isabel returned to Madrid and displayed further signs of Hispanic and 
spiritual tendencies. On June 25, 1974, in a speech at the Madrid ICH, she stated that “the 
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intellectual and spiritual seed Spain had planted [in Argentina] has germinated with strength and 
hierarchy.”100 As to López Rega, his self-made image of mysticism (he was known as “El Brujo,” 
or the Sorcerer) was accompanied by a simplistic Manichean world-view presenting Perón’s 
adversaries as “enemies of the nation,”101 and more striking, with an obsession for generating an 
Argentine “new man.” Through inner inspection and “spiritual exercises,” he held, “the common 
man may get to know the new man who dwells within himself.”102   
        Whether Juan Perón himself “turned to the right” in the early 1970s is not easy to answer 
based on his texts.103 Some in the Argentine press thought he did, even before “The Hour of the 
People.”104 Mario Amadeo definitely believed so and joined his political movement in 1972. 
Settling old grudges with Sánchez Sorondo, in 1972 they established the Movimiento de Acción 
Nacional (MAN) as a basis for the Ateneo members to join the Peronist electoral alliance 
(FREJULI).105 In May 1973, as Argentina’s second elections of 1973 drew closer, Amadeo thought 
he could “participate actively in the definitive organization of the Movement.” In his fantasies, he 
saw Peronism purifying itself from its Marxist factions, thereby integrating the nation.106 Just 
before Perón’s death, Amadeo stated that the Argentine masses exhibit “clear Christian and 
national inclinations” and are neither influenced by any “liberal ideology,” nor “seduced by the 
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ideological left.”107 In other words, the Ateneo’s ad hoc alignment with Peronism relied on the 
belief that by committing to the “Spanish-Creole tradition” this could become Argentina’s next 
post-ideological “Movement.”108 Perón’s own declarations from that period disclose why Amadeo 
might have reached this conviction. While chiding Argentina’s alleged financial “oligarchies,” 
Perón nonetheless voiced fairly technocratic formulations in the early 1970s, for instance in the 
following statement from 1973: 
This modern world has created new needs, so nations can no longer afford to do politics. 
Those times have passed. Now is the time for Integrated Democracies, where everyone 
struggles with a common goal, maintaining their individuality, doctrines, and ideologies, but 
still working for a common goal. [...] now it is necessary to create truly representative [...] 
superior councils.109 
 
By proposing alternative forms of non-political representation through councils, Perón’s jargon 
merely reflected the spirit of the time.110  
          Nevertheless, the Ezeiza Massacre on June 20, 1973 - the day of Perón’s return to Argentina 
- and López Rega’s formation of the assassin squad Triple A (Argentine Anticommunist Alliance) 
immediately thereafter, indicated that Perón made the physical eradication of the Peronist Left his 
undertaking, thereby quickly moving away from the Argentine Revolution’s legalist approaches 
to authoritarian control. Cabildo was quick to explain the significance of these events: “Marxism 
believed it had the right to put its stamp on a party to which it was not invited. Now it will be 
expelled, with a great shedding of blood.”111 
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         It is difficult to speculate how Perón’s presidency would have developed ideologically, as he 
himself made but few political resolutions before falling into illness, and ultimately dying on July 
1, 1974. But sure enough, after his death, Peronism turned decidedly to the far-right side of the 
ideological spectrum. The twenty months of Isabel Perón’s rule were a showcase of neo-fascist 
rhetoric and much Catholic spiritualism. For her and López Rega, the battle against the urban 
guerrilla was now a “God-given mission.”112 And preoccupied with spurring “the rebirth of a new 
man” Isabel further vowed to regenerate “traditional Christian values,” as the “best patrimony of 
a real Argentineness.”113 A new journal by the name El Caudillo represented this turn fully. The 
Triple A’s mouthpiece and the creation of Tacuara member Felipe Romeo,114 it espoused a new 
hybrid of clerico-fascism and Peronist zealotry. Romeo identified the Nation’s enemy as the 
Jewish-led “sinarquía,” which for him, encompassed liberalism, communism, and the Argentine 
“oligarchy,”115 as well as psychoanalysis and the feminization of men. “Revolutions are not done 
with long hair but with virile attributes,” he told the revolutionary Left.116 Against these enemies, 
he advocated a “civil war” and famously stated that a “good enemy is a dead one.”117 But unlike 
Tacuara, strikingly El Caudillo did not wallow in the margins of society but represented the state 
apparatus, which concurrently was responsible for the assassination of hundreds of Argentines.118 
López Rega’s rule (or “Loperreguismo”) could thus have well been the most grotesque neo-fascist 
                                                             
112 “Enérgico discurso pronunciado la jefe del estado al inaugurar la reunión con los representantes de las fuerzas 
activas del país,” October 8, 1974, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 111.  
113 “Discurso pronunciado hoy por la presidente de la nación,” February 20, 1975, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, caja 111.   
114 For a full account on the nexus between the two movements see - Finchelstein, The Ideological Origins of the 
Dirty War, 116-18. 
115 “Guerra a la oligarquía,” El Caudillo, no. 30 (June 7, 1974). 
116 “Oime Barbudo!,” El Caudillo, no. 2 (November 23, 1973). 
117 Felipe Romeo, “Hay que dar la cara,” El Caudillo, no. 43 (September 13, 1974); this statement has been 
frequently quoted in the Argentine press ever since, see - “Murió Felipe Romeo, vocero de la banda de ultraderecha 
Triple A,” Clarín (May 5, 2009); “El órgano oficial de la Triple A y del Brujo,” Pagina 12 (January 7, 2007). 





regime of the Cold War. Or as a Peronist left-wing journal said, this “fascist Catholicism,” which 
adored “Christ and Mussolini” was the “most mediocre expression of the Right.”119  
         In brief, by rejecting the elite-controlled technocratic society, the neo-fascists of the 1970s - 
be they Piñar, Curutchet, Rodríguez Grez, or Romeo - demanded a return to a civil war mentality, 
as well as to revolutionary, violent, and “corporatist” political action. As a result, despite initial 
high expectations, the period of Isabel Perón and López Rega’s tenure shattered Amadeo’s hope 
for a respectable authoritarian modernization under Peronism. In January 1976, he wrote Sánchez 
Bella of a regime “controlled by events” and of a country “falling apart.”120 The downfall of Isabel 
Perón was a result of a combination of political violence and economic crisis, but not less 
significantly, from her inability to strike alliances with the nacionalistas, Catholic elites, and 
military.121 As in 1966, in 1976 the Argentine Military seized an opportunity to oust what had 
become one of the most politically disqualified, murderous, and unpopular regimes in Argentine 
history. Allegedly, following a brief period of exile in Spain, Romeo and other Triple A associates 
were to return to serve the last Argentine dictatorship in 1976.122 The remaining neo-fascist 
movement, for its part, was henceforth to expand further within the context of the collaboration 
between Cabildo and Fuerza Nueva. 
 
The Argentine dictatorship of 1976-1983 and its links to the 1960s ideological projects   
        The Peronist terror regime ultimately came to its end with the rise of an even more murderous 
military dictatorship: the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional. An exceptionally idiosyncratic 
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regime, the Argentine Dictatorship of 1976-1983 (“the last dictatorship,” or simply the Proceso) 
and its ideology received countless interpretation throughout the years.123 Based on its early texts, 
it is safe to say that the Proceso was indebted to the nacionalista “anti-subversive” theories of the 
1960s. However, to say that the regime was simply neo-fascist would be to overlook the 
complexity of its “democratic” rhetoric, and initial popularity among the moderate Argentine 
middle-class. My analysis will add to the debate on the Proceso by stressing the peculiar 
relationship this dictatorship maintained with the legacies of Onganía and Franco.  
         The Proceso was a regime that justified itself in terms of destruction, targeting both the 
revolutionary urban guerrilla and the Peronist political structure. While Onganía envisioned a 
voluntarily post-ideological society of “changing mentalities,” General Jorge Rafael Videla, the 
Proceso’s leader between 1976 and 1981, sought to purge Argentina form its alleged “impurities,” 
and then, gradually restore a “representative, republican, and federal democracy.”124 As such, the 
Proceso refrained from defining itself in theoretical terms. At times, Videla sounded like Onganía, 
when he vowed to eliminate all ideological “demagogy.” In other moments, he explained his 
regimes as follows:  
The other day, in the cabinet meeting I said: let us imagine that we are in a theatre play, and 
there is a scene in which a group of actors worked, there was a fight, and now all the furniture 
is in disarray. The actors disappear for the moment and another set of actors enters the scene; 
finding everything messy they put things in their place. That is, broadly speaking, what 
happened on March 24, as [we discovered] a backdrop that was already is in shambles, due 
to the subversion.125  
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It is telling that the metaphor Videla chose was that of a theatre. Unlike the neo-fascists, this 
murderous General seldom spoke against Marxism, “sinarquías,” or international “trusts.”126 Often 
times, he even admitted that “subversion” was not the main justification for his regime, but rather 
the Peronist “misrule” and “national frustration” over Argentina’s economic misfortunes.127 To 
the Argentine public, the Proceso hence presented itself as one of the least intellectual regimes in 
Argentine history, certainly next to Onganía’s ideological and spiritual projects. 
         Of course, this is not to say that there was no ideology behind the Proceso. Videla aspired to 
rectify Argentina’s “traditional values” and “authentic lifestyle.” Albeit rarely elaborating what 
these values entailed, he also vowed to purge Argentina from the values of the enemy, which he 
defined as “nihilist and “anti-national.”128 It should be noted that despite being loyal to Christian 
values, the Proceso never once claimed to be either “popular” or the embodiment of the “Grace of 
God” - as we have seen, the more significant of Franco’s and Pinochet’s self-legitimations. 
Through mass-scale state-led terror and psychological warfare, the regime sought to silently 
operate against the alleged subversive enemy in “all social fields,”129and thereafter, vanish.   
         The dictatorship gladly allowed, however, neo-fascist platforms to thrive within its public 
sphere. With López Rega’s ban lifted, Cabildo, now with Blas Piñar as an official collaborator, 
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returned to the center of public life.130 Against the international outcry over human right violations 
in Argentina, Cabildo straightaway reissued Piñar’s “Hipócritas.”131 More Spanish-Argentine 
collaboration ensued as Ricardo Curutchet arrived in Madrid to speak at one of Fuerza Nueva’s 
spectacles of contempt to the Spanish transition: a ceremony at Madrid’s Las Ventas Bullring 
commemorating the beginning of the Civil War.132 Following a tribute to Franco and José Antonio 
at the Valley of the Fallen, Curutchet’s speech attacked the “international power of money,”133 and 
praised José Antonio - “the greatest civil captain of our time.”134 Despite his fascist salutes, by 
now his ideas, it is important to note, were fairly different from Primo de Rivera’s ideology, insofar 
as he emphasized Christian restoration, and market-oriented economic prosperity, rather than a 
nationalist-syndicalist utopia. Even so, this event, which hosted European neo-fascists such as 
French Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour and Italian Gregorio Almirante, should be considered a rare 
public display of what was intended to be the inception of a novel neo-fascist international (the 
“Eurodestra”).135 
        Less than a year later, Piñar led a Fuerza Nueva delegation to Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and 
Paraguay, a trip of which his journal made the following statement: 
The presence of Fuerza Nueva in the South American cone coincides with the rebirth of 
those lands of our ancestry. Another New Force - which has God, the Fatherland, and Justice, 
as a triple ideal - is emerging in places long subjected to subversive movements inspired by 
foreign powers. [...] The Armed Forces, in the patriotic tradition of the leaders who once 
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forged Spanish-American independence, assume the government of the young republics, 
plagued by international Marxism, and besieged by North American capitalism.136  
 
Indeed, in Fuerza Nueva’s worldview, this visit represented nothing less than a triumphant 
gathering of all the “new forces” now operating in Spain and the Southern Cone against the 
enemies of the Hispanic civilization. For Piñar, this trip was one of the highlights of his political 
career. The reception in his honor, at La Salle College in Buenos Aires, concluded with yet another 
spectacle that saw him and Curutchet leading the crowd into singing the Falange’s hymn Cara al 
Sol.137 The mainstream Argentine press, for its part, enthusiastically quoted Piñar’s caveats against 
emulating the “tragic” Spanish transition.138 Piñar, reported the Spanish press somewhat more 
laconically, held several other conventions with “like-minded” groups such as La Liga de 
Restauración Argentina and Falange y Fe.139 Thereafter the Spanish delegation continued to Chile. 
Here Piñar convened with Pinochet, Pablo Rodríguez Grez, and Chile’s Minister of Interior, Sergio 
Fernández, and as a whole, was given an even more formal welcome than in Argentina.140 To 
Fuerza Nueva’s alarm, however, the “opposition” journal Qué Pasa interviewed Piñar with “words 
like bullets.”141 It should come of no surprise that the Opus Dei-affiliated journal appeared in 
Fuerza Nueva as an antagonist.142 As we will see shortly, Qué Pasa did not take kindly to this neo-
fascist alliance. 
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         Contrariwise to these events, the Proceso gradually pursued the services of more moderate 
civic groups. It found them, in many cases, in the shape of Onganía’s own spiritual and 
technocratic figures. Naturally, the affiliations discussed in Chapter 3 did not merely disappear 
from public life in the 1970s. The Opus Dei’s and FFP intellectuals, for instance, were still publicly 
influential, and even continued to attack nacionalistas such as Genta for their “money-hating” 
ideology.143 The Argentine ICH apparatus was also active in the late-1970s and underwent a small-
scale radicalization. “Towards the Hispanic crusade!” was the title of its 1977 annual meeting.144 
Onganía’s technocrats returned to play their most salient role in the regime’s education system. 
The one significant continuation line between the 1966 and 1976 dictatorships was the Proceso’s 
Education Minister Juan Rafael Llerena Amadeo (Onganía’s deputy-minister of Education, 
discussed in chapter 4). Replacing Juan José Catalán - also an Onganía official and Cursillos de 
Cristiandad affiliate - the appointment of Llerena Amadeo meant that Argentina’s education 
system was again affected by his spiritual pedagogy.   
          In no time, the Argentine education system saw the return of Ongania’s educational think 
tank and the reestablishing of the collaboration with Spanish pedagogues Víctor García Hoz and 
Ricardo Díez-Hochleitner. In fact, García Hoz’s theories of “personalized education,” and 
expertise in issues of teenage drug-use and sexuality,145 received their fullest consideration in the 
Proceso’s education system. The personal guest of Llerena Amadeo, in July 1979 the Opus Dei 
pedagogue visited Argentina - an encounter that has already drawn the attention of Argentine 
historians of education.146 Above all, this visit indicated how a Francoist pedagogue who had 
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gradually become marginalized in Spain remained esteemed in Latin America.147 As for Llerena 
Amadeo, not much had changed in his rhetoric since writing in Cuadernos del Sur. Speaking at 
the UNESCO International Education Convention on July 6, 1979, he discussed the overpowering 
“technicisms” of modernity, and promised to protect the Argentine youth from “frivolity, 
extremism, and subversive crime.”148 Faced with growing criticism over the resurgence of Catholic 
contents in the education system, he retorted that his methods were “not religious teaching in any 
way,” but merely the healthy vision of “man, family, society, and the state.”149 In short, while at 
times expressing discomfort over the regime’s reduction of the education system to fighting 
“subversion,”150 all in all, Llerena Amadeo and his intellectuals served the Proceso well, offering 
it a comprehensive educational model and international pedagogical networks.151   
          Similarly, the Argentine media still saw the presence of those who had promoted the post-
ideological theories of the state in the 1960s and who now justified the Proceso by exerting similar 
opinions. Mariano Montemayor, for example, assisted the Proceso in his tabloid Convicción - a 
platform that served Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera personally and that presented itself as “a 
journal of the extreme center.”152 Another noteworthy example was Mariano Grondona’s journal 
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Carta Política. Established in late 1974, and featuring Carlos Alberto Floria (the Cuadernos del 
Sur commentator, see page 156), Heriberto Kahn (Confirmado), and Nicanor Costa Méndez, it 
helped delegitimizing the Peronist Right.153 Argentina, said Grondona, had regressed from being 
a dignified liberal, if authoritarian, state, to being a democratic terror regime.154 Conversely, Carta 
Política attacked the nacionalistas and demanded a future “without Falanges.”155 In March 1976, 
the journal avidly supported the Proceso by using the all-familiar language of rationalization. “The 
revolutionary vanity of the theorists […] must be met with a policy of concretions, of facts,” they 
claimed.156 Subsequently, Carta Política suggested the Proceso should complete the unfinished 
project of 1966, through “rationalization” and “interior peace.”157 Tellingly, while Grondona 
agreed that the Proceso suffered from “lack of intellectual appeal,” and criticized its “dirty war,”158 
he nevertheless praised its “discrete, soft operation.”159  
          As importantly, Carta Política constantly reflected on the meanings of the “Onganiato.” 
“Nobody has done in this country more than Onganía, and nobody has smeared more posters on 
the walls than Perón,” was Grondona’s basic stance. The first lesson to be learned from the 
Argentine Revolution, he thought, was the futility of development “phases.” The Proceso, 
Grondona held, must thus work towards the “political” phase from the start, thereby deconstructing 
“the heritage of populism.”160 By avoiding “corporatist theories,” and pledging to a future 
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democratic restoration, he further observed, the Proceso would gain the middle-classes’ 
sympathy.161 In other words, Grondona did not suggest a “modernizing” phase but rather a return 
to parliamentarism, starting after society is purged from its non-democratic elements. Bernardo 
Neustadt’s Extra was no different in depicting the Proceso as a simple “cleanup” period. “Videla 
is not Pinochet,” he argued revealingly. “We all aspire for a distinct new democracy, with authority 
built-it,”162 he explained himself. In the meantime, amid a period of further neoliberal economic 
reforms,163 these writers drew up the notion of a regime of specialists. The Proceso, Grondona 
stressed, might as well experiment in “architectural policy,” by putting “economists into the 
management of things” and commit to “political gradualism” at the municipal level.164 Indeed, the 
Argentine Revolution’s ideological tropes were still noticeable in these publicists’ texts.  
         As for the Ateneo de la República, ever since 1974 it slowly receded from political life. 
Embittered by the 1966 experience, Amadeo doubted the prospects of a successful military phase 
in Argentina.165 Later, while perplexed by the Proceso’s “methods of combat,” he justified it 
overall; in this battle “it would be utopian to demand strict compliance with the Geneva 
conventions,” he told Sánchez Bella. On this occasion, he also recommended that the Proceso 
established a “Movimiento” to civically support the Proceso, since “for failing to do so, Onganía 
had fallen.”166 Herein lay Amadeo’s lessons from the Argentine Revolution: not having eradicated 
the enemy, and thereafter, not having created a mass-based movement, but choosing an elite-
oriented setup instead. Eventually, however, both Amadeo and Costa Méndez did work for the 
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Proceso briefly, the latter serving as General Galteiri’s Foreign Minister. During the first months 
of 1982, Costa Méndez took a part in the chain of events that led to the Falkland War, although he 
was hardly personally responsible for it. In a dictatorship that had become increasingly unpopular 
internationally, he thought his previous connections in Washington could mitigate the crisis with 
the United Kingdom.167 Somewhat less salient, but no less noteworthy, was Amadeo’s return to 
the public activity in 1980, attempting to promote an Argentine democratic “consensus,” as I will 
examine shortly. On the whole, however, these 1960s ideologues had but a minor influence on 
Argentina’s last dictatorship.  
        All things considered, the Proceso was hardly a technocratic-authoritarian regime as its 
leaders defined their mission in terms of purging Argentina’s supposed subversive enemies and 
therefore did not bother formulating a definite “post-ideological” or corporatist alternative to 
democracy. Whilst sharing some of the Argentine Revolution’s intellectual origins, the Proceso’s 
spokesmen distinctively dismissed “corporatist” ideologies and ridiculed Pinochet, who they 
thought personified them. And yet, it is important to note that the regime’s overall self-identity as 
an invisible “cleaner” cannot be understood detached from the lessons of the failed experiment of 
the 1960s. What is more, the technocratic theorists of the 1960s played an important role in the 
Proceso, rationalizing and legitimizing it upon their intellectual platforms. As a result, while 
assassinating and torturing its citizens in the thousands, this dictatorship, at least between 1977 
and 1981, displayed a mélange of technocratic, neo-fascist, and liberal-democratic jargon.  
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The Spanish transition: from a “protected democracy” to a transitional “consensus,” 1974-
1982 
        The late-1970s witnessed the Southern European and Latin American authoritarian regimes 
undergoing a simultaneous historical process of democratization. Frequently named the 
“Democracies of the Third Wave,”168 in some cases, these regime changes happened due to a 
dictatorship imploding under the weight of economic and social crisis, as in the case of 1974 
Portugal and Greece. In other cases, transition originated from within the authoritarian regime, 
coordinated by its very initial designers. Spain’s transition was the first of such “reforms” and thus 
exemplary for many regimes that followed suit. The following section explores the dissolvement 
of Spain’s technocratic-authoritarian model, but also sheds light on the continuation of certain 
ideological traits from the antecedent political system to the democratic order.  
         Officially, Spain’s transition began on November 23, 1975, as King Juan Carlos I of Spain 
was sworn as the country’s sovereign, three days after Franco’s death. Yet to understand the 
transition one must go back to December 20, 1973, to an even more dramatic event: the killing of 
Luis Carrero Blanco by the ETA at the center of Madrid. Arguably, the death of the sixty-nine 
years old Admiral spared Spain from years of authoritarianism, as can be inferred from the speech 
Carrero prepared for his ministers on the day of his death, and which revealed an ever-paranoid 
autocrat. “Communism, despite its false manifestations of coexistence, remains the same 
communism of more than fifty years ago. [...] the subversive war, tries to weaken countries by 
morally annihilating the human element, by exploiting the human congenital weaknesses, people’s 
religious feelings, their patriotism,” it read.169 López Rodó, who received the news of the 
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assassination while hosting his Argentine associate José López Rega, would be one of many to 
speculate on the CIA’s involvement in the act.170 In any event, no sooner had the Admiral been 
buried than the Falange ministers took over the regime, removing the Opus Dei-led government 
entirely. From serving as Spain’s Foreign Minister, López Rodó was relegated to being Spain’s 
ambassador in Austria. Amongst those rejoicing was Cardinal Tarancón. The Opus Dei’s 
“satisfactory” removal from power, he said, resolved the “many ambiguities that in no way favored 
the Church.”171 Hence, in a haphazard historical turn, in a matter of days, Francoism proceeded in 
an entirely different political and ideological trajectory. 
         On February 12, 1974, Carrero Blanco’s successor, Carlos Arias Navarro, gave a speech at 
the Cortes that, in a way, precipitated the Spanish transition. A new legal process of “national 
consensus” would now lead Francoism to further civic participation, he stated.172 With the 
moderate Torcuato Fernández-Miranda as president of the Kingdom Council and Manuel Fraga as 
the bona fide reformist at his side, thus began the Falange’s political “opening” (apertura).173 Arias 
Navarro, a brutal figure during the Civil War but the moderate Mayor of Madrid in the 1960s, was 
henceforth to represent the “spirit of February 12,” which, in actuality, meant a progression from 
a technocratic-authoritarian model to allowing a “political” culture to flourish at the lower echelons 
of society, while maintaining executive power strictly in the hands of the Francoist political elite. 
Spain’s executions of several ETA and Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front (FRAP) members 
in September 1975, indicated just how paradoxical this “democracy” was to be. Nevertheless, with 
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the demise of Carrero Blanco’s alliance, Spain’s ideological landscape was now decidedly split 
between the Bunker’s “inmovilistas” and the Falange’s moderate “aperturistas.”174 
        While stunned by Carrero Blanco’s death, the Opus Dei apparatus still held firmly to its vision 
of the post-ideological society. With Madrid closed, in 1974 and 1975 there was virtually no Opus 
Dei publication promoting democratic reforms. Whereas Piñar spoke of national-syndicalism and 
Hispanidad, the Opus Dei hence presented its own more refined “inmovilismo.” Álvaro d’Ors and 
the intellectual José Zafra Valverde led this trend, the latter’s books further analyzing Spain’s 
upcoming authoritarian monarchy.175 Furthermore, López Rodó was still the most significant Opus 
Dei public intellectual in this period. In 1974, in an interview to the Opus Dei’s journal Actualidad 
Economica, he said that the label “technocrat” did not apply to him, that the Falange was the “only 
political affiliation in his life,” and that he was “hundred percent a politician.” But he also claimed 
that his 1967 Organic Laws worked “like a clock” and that the Carrero Blanco’s team of ministers 
was the last “legitimate” government in Francoist history.176 That is to say, despite abandoning his 
“post-ideological” façade, he too was still conspicuously in the anti-democratic camp.177 
         Thenceforth, 1975 brought more agonizing news to the Opus Dei. It began with the sudden 
death of Florentino Pérez Embid, at the age of fifty-six. “The regime of July 18 had hardly any 
other intellectual defense better than that of the writers Pérez Embid assembled,” Fernández de la 
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Mora eulogized his late friend. With José María Albareda deceased in 1966, and with Calvo Serer 
and Antonio Fontán joining the democratic opposition, little was now left from the “Generation of 
48.” Then, on June 26, 1975, Escrivá de Balaguer suddenly died in Rome. Months of ensuing 
obituaries could not conceal the fact that Opus Dei was caught unprepared for the death of its 
seventy-three years old spiritual leader. In an emotional article from Chile, Ibáñez Langlois spoke 
of a holy man who “always abhorred personalist governments.”178 Evidently, the Opus Dei 
intellectuals worldwide thus began preparing for the upcoming democratic future.  
         Francisco Franco died on November 20, 1975, predictably, after months of hospitalization. 
In ABC, Fernández de la Mora, then the director of Spain’s Diplomatic School, eulogized the 
dictator by stating that “there was nothing authoritarian” about him, and stressing that Franco had 
received a “impoverished country” and transformed it into “a middle-class society,” and a 
“robustly institutionalized monarchy.”179 Cleverly, he did not state that Franco wanted his regime 
to be replaces by a democracy; still, he insinuated that Franco had in fact made it possible. The 
Opus Dei journals, on the other hand, moved from discussing Francoism as universal regime model 
to depicting it as a simple personalist regime. In Telva, for instance, Franco appeared as the person 
“who was everything in Spain for forty years.”180 Mundo Cristiano, for its part, asserted that “all 
the architecture of the State rested on Franco personality,” and even alleged that Franco “said that 
the Francoism would end with his death.”181 Franco never said that.182  
         What Franco allegedly did say was that he had left Spain “bound and tied” (atado y bien 
atado) for its authoritarian future. It was King Juan Carlos who chose not to implement Franco’s 
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vision as planned. Due to political constraints, however, he selected Arias Navarro to lead his 
democratic reform.183 When the latter failed to do so, Juan Carlos utilized the Kingdom Council 
and on July 3, 1976, appointed the relatively anonymous Adolfo Suárez as Spain’s Prime Minister. 
Having to maneuver between Franco’s loyalists who demanded “continuation,” and the democratic 
opposition that demanded a clear political “rupture,” Suárez prompted instead an ideological 
compromise, namely the so-called “pacted rupture.” After skillfully persuading the Armed Forces 
to cooperate, Suárez led the Cortes to vote its own dismantling in November 1976. Spain’s 
December 1976 Referendum granted a symbolic mark of approval to this Reform Law, and general 
elections were called for June 1977.184 Spain’s true moment of democratic “rupture,” however, 
was not the referendum but rather the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in April 
1977.185 Like any Western European country, the monarchy decided to allow “Euro-communism” 
into its political system, thereby negating Francoism’s raison d’être. 
         As the keystone of the “pacted rupture,” a powerful, if deliberately vague, rhetoric of 
“consensus” appeared in the Spanish public sphere, understood as a commitment among all 
“democratic forces,” from both Left and Right, to avoid political polarization for the sake of a 
motion towards a fully functional parliamentary democracy.186 In October 1977, after winning the 
General Elections, Suárez enacted Spain’s Amnesty Law and Moncloa Pacts. The former, 
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pardoned political prisoners and granted complete impunity for crimes committed by the Armed 
Forces during the dictatorship;187 the latter legalized the labor unions and set the terms for the 
cooperation between them and the government during the transition. Hence, from an ambiguous 
gambit, the “consensus”  became a juridical reality. Spain’s 1978 Constitution even included a 
definite “principle of non-retroactivity,” which essentially meant the legal sealing of the Francoist 
past.188 The “consensus” also championed a full institutional continuation of the state apparatus 
into the democratic order, allegedly to prevent any recalcitrance from undermining the 
transition.189  
         Spain’s conservative press supported the reform by deploying new strategies of dealing with 
Franco’s legacies. A year after his death, ABC hailed Franco as the “Europeanizer of modern 
Spain” who brought into being a country of “middle classes, industry, and services,” and whose 
deeds enabled “a liberal future of civil participation.”190 In an identical fashion, the daily Ya 
declared that Franco had made Spain a society “much better prepared for the new system of 
national coexistence that it deserves.” Franco’s name, the newspaper even insisted, is “too great 
for one to convert into a shallow political flag.”191 In other words, these platforms portrayed Franco 
in teleological terms, as the apolitical missing link that, perhaps unintentionally, enabled Spain’s 
future democracy.192  
                                                             
187 Or as article 2(e) declares, “Included in the amnesty are […] the misconduct and crimes that might have been 
committed by the authorities, functionaries and agents of public order, with the motive of investigating and 
persecuting the [previous] acts indicated in this law.”  
188 Known also as Article 9.3, this ban on retroactive justice has not changed until this very day.    
189 In Vicent Navarro’s critique, this “incomplete transition” has led to a “democratic deficit,” in which the Spanish 
political panorama leans more to the Right than in any other country in Europe, see - Vicente Navarro, Bienestar 
insuficiente, democracia incompleta (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2002), 190-95; for further critical literature on this 
process see - Ferran Gallego Margaleff, El mito de la transición: la crisis del Franquismo y los orígenes de la 
democracia (1973-1977) (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008); Emmanuel Rodríguez López, Por qué fracasó la democracia 
en España: la transición y el Régimen Del ’78 (Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2015).   
190 “Franco,” ABC Madrid (November 20, 1976). 
191 “Primer aniversario,” Ya (November 20, 1976). 




          Within this context, reconfiguring their political future was not a simple task for the 
technocratic-authoritarian ideologues of the 1960s. At first, they avowedly questioned a return to 
parliamentary democracy. Fernández de la Mora, for instance, promoted Franco’s Organic Laws 
as an “autochthonous” model that was “more effective and more susceptible to perfective 
development,” and therefore should not be replaced with recipes that “had led Spain to chaos.”193 
His 1976 book La partitocracia further discredited universal (“inorganic”) suffrage as an 
inefficient form of social organization. “The classical theory of democracy is an unsustainable 
fiction,” he argued.194 Mariano Navarro Rubio, for his part, advocated a “real democracy” to 
bypass the “clumsy compromises” of parliamentarism.195 For him, the Francoist “authority of 
arbitration” presented the best system of perfection, based on “councils, academies, and 
specialized associations.”196 López Rodó followed suit with an even more cynical approach: the 
constitution of 1967 “is not even ten years old,” and thus changing it would be a “symptom of 
political immaturity,” he said.197 Strikingly, all three perceived democracy not as a value in and of 
itself - as a culture of mutual respect and solidarity - but in terms of cold economic “efficiency.” 
         With the 1977 elections a fait accompli, the technocrats did try to get elected, however. The 
lifting of Franco’s censorship, and the emergence of the liberal newspaper El País in May 1976, 
maid this effort ever more difficult.198 Eventually, in a press conference on October 21 1976, 
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Manuel Fraga, Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, Laureano López Rodó, and Federico Silva Muñoz, 
joined forces in forming the Popular Alliance (AP).199 Their party purported to preserve the alleged 
achievements of Francoism, for instance by banning the communists from entering parliament. 
“We take responsibility for the past, we know we have made mistakes, but we dare to appear 
again,” Fraga stated apologetically.200 Justifying his recent anti-democratic views, Fernández de 
la Mora added that he “never said that organic democracy or inorganic democracy are bad in 
themselves,” but should be “valued according to results in specific circumstances.” A false 
statement, it still revealed a purely technocratic attitude: Fernández de la Mora would still not 
commit to democracy if it was not economically effective. 
          To attract conservative voters, AP opted for several other tactics. First, it portrayed Spain as 
a country currently ensnared in “moral decay,” “pornography,” and “permissiveness.”201 Even 
more than their anti-communistic sentiment, the Opus Dei technocrats and moderate Falangists 
unified over the nostalgia for Francoism’s alleged protected society. Second, expectedly, the AP 
members presented themselves as the original visionaries of the constitutional monarchy, working 
within the limits of a “personalist” regime. “Now Franco is dead and that is it,” said Silva 
Muñoz.202 When in 1977 López Rodó published his self-praising memoirs, even ABC observed 
that his work could have well been titled “the History of the pressures I put on General Franco to 
opt for monarchic restoration.”203 But the question still remains: even at this moment, did the 
technocrats ever give their blessing to a parliamentary democracy in Spain? Based on these texts, 
the answer cannot be affirmative.  
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         The AP fared poorly in the 1977 general elections (8.3%), and even worse in the 1979 
elections (6.1%). An opposition party for the next decade and a half, it would watch Adolfo Suárez 
and Felipe González, the young leader of the Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (PSOE), lead the 
Spanish state through its new constitutional phase. It is not difficult to speculate on the reasons for 
the party’s electoral failure. After all, ideologically AP had little to offer the new democracy.204 Its 
electoral fiasco emanated, I suggest, also from its inability to compete with the slogans of its main 
electoral opponent: Adolfo Suárez’s own center-right party, the Union of the Democratic Centre 
(UCD).205 A hastily assembled conglomerate of centric parties, UCD represented a break with 
Spain’s Civil War legacies. Suárez, who had admittedly been an Opus Dei member but had left it 
eventually to become the Movimiento’s General Secretary, was particularly adept in utilizing the 
conditions of the Spanish transition. On the one hand, by 1977 many in the Spanish press agreed 
to the stance that Franco was “was the dictatorship.” Even Franco’s fiercest opposition, for 
example, the monarchist Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, voiced this inclusive sense of victimhood by 
which “the historical responsibility for the events of that era lies on Franco personally.”206 On the 
other hand, an economic crisis, and the ETA and far-right gangs terrorism, further spurred a 
collective anxiety from the return to ideological politics.207 Adolfo Suárez built on these fears 
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effectively, as he both disengaged from Franco’s image, whilst presenting himself as an agent who 
was to overcome Spain’s ideological schisms. Before the 1977 general elections, the UCD 
promoted itself as a historical group that had belonged to neither of the belligerent “two Spains.”208 
Debating this so-called center, La Vanguardia columnists Ángel Gómez Escorial praised Suárez 
for neutralizing the “splintering germ that threw us into war forty-two years ago.”209 Similarly, 
conservative intellectuals such as Carlos Seco Serrano and Ricardo de la Cierva portrayed the UCD 
as a distinctive social stratum. This “third Spain,” they said in ABC, had nothing to do with the 
nation’s “extremist minorities” responsible for the Civil War and currently represented by Suárez’s 
“catastrophist” electoral rivals.210 The UCD leaders quickly joined this narration, describing their 
party as “the last hope” against yet another civil war.211 Notably, these narratives echoed the 1960s 
technocratic ideology. In a society dreading the return of “ideological” politics, the UCD’s image 
was merely a reincarnation of the soothing “end of ideologies” fantasy.212 This might explain why 
Suárez denied Opus Dei members such as López Bravo joining his party - the semblance between 
the two projects might have been too obvious.213 
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          Following AP’s electoral failure, Fernández de la Mora retired from politics and returned to 
his intellectual work with the establishment of the journal Razón Española. Here, he and other 
Opus Dei technocrats would criticize the Spanish transition throughout the 1980s.214 López Rodó, 
on the other hand, was actively removed from the AP. Or as he himself testified “I was 
unexpectedly displaced because of one of those pirouettes that some politicians have accustomed 
us to.”215 Arguably, Fraga understood that the Opus Dei technocrat was not bringing his party any 
voters. As for Alfredo Sánchez Bella, for a while, he aligned with José Antonio Girón and the 
“Bunker.” In 1978, Sánchez Bella still believed Spain’s democratization “will produce unstable 
governments and unviable situations” similar to “the period 1931-1934.”216 But he did not run for 
office and contributed little to Spain’s far-right politics hereafter. While Spain’s constitutional 
commission of 1978 included several figures such as Manuel Fraga and Antonio Fontán, little 
remained of their 1960s ideological positions.217 And as for Rafael Calvo Serer, the Opus Dei’s 
one democrat of the 1970s did not pursue a political career but continued to be a public intellectual. 
In sum, the 1980s witnessed a stark diminishing in these intellectuals’ public influence.  
         Under the King’s reign, the new Spanish democracy reconfigured its role in Latin American 
politics. Nothing represented this more than changing the title and mission of the ICH. In August 
1977, this institution was renamed the Institute for Ibero-American Cooperation (ICI) and was 
redesigned to espouse economic cooperation with Latin America.218 What is more, apparatuses 
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such as the OEI closed down, with their director publicly admitting that the Spanish-Latin 
American bonds were mostly “a myth.”219 More striking, in 1977 Spain abruptly cooled down its 
relationship with Latin America’s far-right dictatorships, and in particular with Pinochet. One 
symbolic moment of falling-out was the Spanish vote against Pinochet in the 1978 UN resolution 
against Chile’s human rights violations. Obviously, this was a disconcerting moment for Francoist 
and Chilean ideologues alike. While Fernández Larraín overtly resigned from the Chilean ICH,220 
Sánchez Bella wrote Fontaine stating he felt “ashamed as a Spaniard” for this “intolerable 
imposition by the socialists.”221 Fontaine’s response was no less telling: “we are the true supporters 
of liberty, unlike Felipe González, the Mitterrands, or the American ‘liberals,’” he wrote.222 
          Once the Spanish transition and constitutional reform were in place, Spain’s young 
democratic reformers turned to promote democracy in Latin America.223 King Juan Carlos’s 1978 
visit to Argentina, and his “lecture in democracy” to one of Latin America’s most brutal 
dictatorships was, in this sense, a watershed moment in this new type of diplomacy.224 The Junta 
did not fail to grasp the importance of the event either. Videla’s earnest reception of the King of 
Spain was illustrative that the Proceso leader definitely sought to foster a moderate international 
image. This did not prevent Cabildo, however, from publicly insulting the democratic monarch: 
A strange man, […] Bourbon by blood and by spirit, in any other time in his family history 
he would have been repudiated as a fool or suicidal. [...] in Argentina, he signed several 
protocols, some of which, as we know, will never be fulfilled. […] no text has been included 
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regarding the extradition of the Argentine terrorists based in Spain, where they provide 
technological support to the ETA assassins. […] the stupid desire to adopt all changes, this 
foolish vocation to ‘Europeanize,’ means nothing less than to end the Caudillo’s philosophy 
and policy of the regime inaugurated in 1939 by the greatest Spaniard of the twentieth 
century.225  
 
Beyond depicting the Spanish transition as a betrayal of Franco’s legacy, Cabildo’s fantasies of a 
link between the ERP and ETA are telling as they show how fixated the neo-fascists were with 
proving the international operations of their so-called “enemy.” In the same breath, Cabildo 
deemed the Spanish reformers “traitors” and Blas Piñar - Spain’s “the last hope.”226.  
         The history of Spain’s efforts to propel Latin America’s democratization during the 1980s is 
a topic too broad to discuss here.227 Still, we should perhaps touch on several key points in this 
history, to bring this analysis to its full closure. To begin with, in the 1980s, the Spanish 
“consensus” emerged as a semi-official transitional model for Latin America. The Spanish 
conservative media had much to with this, as it demanded the exportation of Spain’s “model” 
abroad, as can readily be seen in the following words of ABC columnist, Manuel Blanco Tobío: 
Getting off the tiger, i.e. getting out of a dictatorship to practice democracy is extremely 
difficult […] This is the case of the following countries […]: Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and 
Turkey. For these countries, there is a model of transition to look up to: The Spanish model. 
[…] Our transition, I am convinced, was a miracle. How do the Argentines, Chileans, 
Uruguayans, and Turks envision this miracle repeating itself?228 
 
Indeed, particularly after the electoral victory of Felipe González (PSOE) in 1982, the ICI 
coordinated extensive conferences analyzing the Spanish transition, in Spain, Chile, and 
Argentina. Herein, Spain’s Deputy-Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra (PSOE) declared that his 
government “undertakes the task to propel the creation of an Ibero-American community of 
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democratic nations.”229 Explaining the “consensus” to his interlocutors, Spain’s Foreign Minister 
Fernando Morán (PSOE) further defined a paradoxical mnemonic operation: “to forget without 
forgetting the thing you have forgotten,” or in other words, a transition “without denying the past 
but also with no grudges.”230 Thus, he barely reined in the impulse to assert that democracy is 
worth any price, including pardoning the perpetrator entirely.   
         In Argentina, the early 1980s, and in particular the period of Roberto Viola’s less murderous 
Second Junta, saw the early start of a discussion on Argentina’s own possible future democratic 
“consensus.” Eager to inform the Argentines of the Spanish model, within these circumstances, in 
1981 Adolfo Suárez - who had recently resigned from being Spain’s Prime Minister - visited 
Buenos Aires, and advised the local political class to “appease the military class, that it would say 
farewell to power.”231 In 1983, a series of conferences sponsored by the ICI at the University of 
Belgrano, Argentina, added to that line of argumentation. Aiming “to analyze the recent process 
of democratization produced in Spain,”232 on this occasion the Spanish socialist José María 
Benegas asserted that “Franco was the only source of power of the Spanish dictatorship,” and that 
therefore the Left happily agreed to an “amnesty that would seal the past.”233  
          Regardless of these efforts, few in Argentina ever publicly expressed interest in applying 
Spain’s “consensus” in the Argentine context. Some, Mario Amadeo for example, did believe, 
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however, in “relaxing the regime” towards its institutionalization as a protected parliamentary 
democracy. Having purged the Army’s “hotheads” in 1981, General Viola, he told Sánchez Bella, 
was the most capable figure to carry out an “institutional evolution.”234  In a series of meetings, 
Viola told Amadeo that the Armed Forces would stipulate not to be “subject to verdicts of 
responsibility, for the subversion or the repression that ensued.” Despite being empathetic to the 
“painful question of the disappeared,” Amadeo decided that there is no choice but to “turn the page 
and start anew,” i.e. he believed a collective amnesty prior to a democratic transition was feasible 
in Argentina too.235 This position was evident in a special UNESCO symposium on “Consensus 
and Peace,” in April 1980, where, representing Argentina, Amadeo insinuated that once nations 
achieve “sincere” and “authentic” consensus, they should expect the “generosity” of the 
international community.236 Later Amadeo informed Sánchez Bella that Argentina’s transition was 
to proceed in this path, given that “only a few” demand justice for Proceso’s “disappeared.”237 
Indeed, following the fiasco of the Falkland War in 1983, the Proceso attempted to enforce its own 
Amnesty Law while launching its democratic transition.238 Much additional research is needed if 
we were to suggest that there was a connection between the Spanish transition and the Argentine 
Amnesty Law. Still, it is important to highlight that Amadeo’s efforts to articulate the Argentine 
democratic “consensus” are symptomatic of a generation of ideologues who replaced their post-
ideological authoritarian pipe-dreams with a new vision of protected democratizations, collective 
amnesties, and forgetfulness.  
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The Chilean transition: Jaime Guzman’s “protected democracy” and the Spanish 
technocrats’ return to Chile  
         As it happened, Chile was the country where the concept of “protected democracy” was to 
reach its most sophisticated form. Beyond repeating the axiom “we shall never go back” (to the 
pre-1973 democracy),239 few in 1976 Chile knew how their regime’s so-called 
“institutionalization” would unfold. The answer came in 1977, as Chile’s technocratic-
authoritarian project swiftly disappeared giving way to Pinochet’s novel concept of the 
“authoritarian democracy.” Several factors led to this change. Firstly, with President Jimmy Carter 
in the White House, and following the regime’s scandalous assassination of Chilean socialist 
Orlando Letelier in Washington DC in 1976, Pinochet’s relationship with the USA had been 
severely damaged.240 Secondly, with the first signs of economic success, the immediate threat of 
international embargo further contributed to Pinochet’s urge to design a political reform. Last, one 
should not undervalue the influence the Spanish transition had in Chile. That Francoism had 
dissolved so instantly meant that Chile was both isolated politically, and on the verge of becoming 
an ideological anachronism.241  
        This pressure ultimately set about a series of changes that would in a matter of three years 
determine the fate of the regime entirely. In his famous 1977 “Chacarillas speech” Pinochet 
presented the initial outlines for a “protected,” “integrative,” and “authoritarian” democracy.242 
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These declarations were followed by Chile’s January 1978 referendum (or “consulta”), where the 
regime ratified its reform through means of “universal suffrage.” With its control of the popular 
journal Ercilla, the Opus Dei was, in effect, supportive of this peculiar democratic reform. The 
same can be said of Qué Pasa, which promoted this modest evolution intensively.243 It did so, 
however, while voicing warnings against the Spanish transition, which had prompted economic 
and moral crisis, so it thought.244 In 1978, Pinochet’s reform continued with the appointment of 
the following civilians to his government, all of whom were technocrats rather than nationalists: 
The gremialistas Sergio Fernández (Interior) and Miguel Kast (head of ODEPLAN), Hernán 
Cubillos (Foreign Minister), and Qué Pasa’s own Vial Correa (Education).245 Meanwhile, the 
dismantling of Pinochet’s secret police (DINA), and dismissal of the extreme right-wing Manuel 
Contreras and Airforce General Gustavo Leigh,246 meant the regime’s effective removal of its far-
right components.247 Now that Pinochet established a governing civilian group “firm, determined, 
and effective as him,” the transition was imminent, Vial Correa thought.248  
          The actual design of Chile’s future democracy took place within Pinochet’s Constitutional 
Commission. Headed by Enrique Ortúzar Escobar and Jaime Guzmán, by then it comprised of 
several other authoritarian specialists, such as Luz Bulnes Aldunate and Raúl Bertelsen Repetto - 
an Opus Dei jurist who had been Ismael Sánchez Bella’s student in Navarra and who specialized 
in Francoist law.249 These figures were to make sure that “Chile would never go back,” in 
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Pinochet’s words, to the 1925 Constitution and the 1973 “civil war.” Speaking to the committee 
in 1977, Pinochet explained what “institutionalization” meant to him:  
I am certain that the world observes with attention the new constitutional provisions that we 
are forging and that it will understand very soon that only with a new democracy, 
authoritarian, vigorous, and protected, based on the concept of unity, participation, and 
integration of all sectors of the country, we will be able to withstand the onslaught of the 
powerful enemy.250  
 
Giving concrete meaning to these paradoxical formulations was, as of this moment, Jaime 
Guzmán’s new life-mission.251  
        Chile’s Constitutional Commission, it is important to note, was well-acquainted with the 
Falange’s parallel concepts of “apertura” and authoritarian representation. As mentioned 
previously, Silva Bascuñan and other commission members visited Spain in 1973 and met with 
several Falange jurists such Luis Legaz Lacambra (discussed in chapter 2). They even proposed 
him a “collaboration with the IEP in preparing the new constitution.”252 Yet Chile’s commission 
raised the prospects of a return to parliamentarism before the Spanish transition ever began.253 It 
also reviewed various other constitutions, including that of West Germany and France, and never 
once mentioned the Spanish transition in its sessions after 1977.254 If the gremialistas designing 
Pinochet’s reform learned anything from the Spanish precedent it was rather the importance of the 
spectacle of a referendum. The Madrid daily El País was quick to address this issue, stating that 
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Franco’s performance of referendums inspired Pinochet to “realize the same manipulation.”255 
Apart from that, however, Pinochet’s “authoritarian democracy” was to be an original undertaking. 
Unlike the Falange’s aperturistas in 1974, the Chilean reformers understood that parliamentarism 
and universal suffrage ought to replace the so-called “organic” model of representation. The 
question was rather the ideological spectrum that was to be admitted into parliament. For Guzmán, 
there were no illusions that allowing “Marxists” partake in the democratic game was inconceivable 
in Chile. Thus, while he deemed corporatism “disposable,”256 he envisioned a democracy 
safeguarded by strict controlling mechanisms designed to negate the political representation of any 
ideologies pertaining to “statism.”257  
         Unlike Guzmán, Rodríguez Grez still believed in national-syndical corporatist participation. 
This was the crux of what now became Chile’s well-known feud between the “soft-liners” 
(Blandos) and “hard-liners” (Duros).258 The former affiliation included the gremialistas, Chile’s 
economic elite, and the Qué Pasa network. The latter, comprised of Rodríguez Grez and his 
followers, nacionalistas such as Jorge Ivén Hübner, and even Pinochet’ daughter Inés Lucía. These 
“Chilean Francoists,” said Vial Correa, believed Pinochet should govern “until he died, thus 
allowing a transformation of the Chilean economy and society.” The Chilean neo-fascists wanted 
more than that, however. Rodríguez Grez avidly advocated a “nationalist, anti-imperialist, and 
corporate state.”259 From his columns in the daily La Tercera, he condemned the government’s 
latest efforts to appease the international community and demanded a swift return to a “socially” 
oriented system based on national-syndicalism.260 In November 1979, he even invited Fernández 
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de la Mora and French thinker Alain de Lacoste-Layremondie-éste to Chile to criticize the new 
Chilean constitution.261  
         To the hard-liners’ dismay, the constitutional process continued with an urgency, guided by 
Guzmán and Sergio Fernández. A son of Spanish parents, the latter was a vital addition to the 
reform process. The main promoter of Chile’s 1978 “General Amnesty,” Fernández convinced 
Pinochet to pardon all those sentenced in military tribunals, thereby establishing an equilibrium 
between the criminalities “of both sides.”262As for Guzmán, he was far from being a wholehearted 
democrat; he even paraphrased Churchill by saying that “Democracy is the worst form of 
government, except for all the others.”263 As Fernández de la Mora before him, while promoting 
the reform, he tended to bring into play sheer instrumental conceptions. The new system was to be 
efficient, he said, or else it would be taken away: 
If democracy is a form of government, it cannot be an end in itself, because no form of 
government can ever be. And as a means, its validity stands in direct relation to its 
effectiveness to promote a desired way of life. That is why democracy is only really 
legitimate as long as it serves freedom, security, progress, and justice while losing all validity 
if, due to an erroneous design or practical application, it ends up favoring the anti-values of 
totalitarianism, statism, terrorism, subversion, and demagoguery.264 
 
Efficiency, for him, meant that corporatism, or any “elite or aristocratic formula,” were also 
impracticable in Chile’s contemporary reality.265 The only way forward, Guzmán therefore 
decided, was a democratic transition based on a “minimal basic consensus” over Chile’s alleged 
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“essential values of social organization,” or in short, the indefinite exclusion of any Marxist or 
“statist” theories from politics.266  
          Hernán Cubillos was Pinochet’s answer to international isolation, as well as to the 
aggravating dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Islands. The editor of El Mercurio, and another 
of Qué Pasa’s founders,267 he embarked on a key European tour in September 1979 and was the 
first of Pinochet’s officials to visit democratic Spain and meet King Juan Carlos.268 Tellingly, in 
this instance, both sides flatly denied the possibility of any resemblance between their parallel, if 
not peculiar, democratic transitions.269 “The Spanish experience can neither be copied nor 
transferred,” Suárez assured his guest.270 Cubillos, for his part, spoke of a democracy based on 
“strong executive power” and “exclusion of totalitarian doctrines.”271 His trip was merely one part 
of a broader effort to promote the 1980 Constitution nationally and internationally. In particular, 
it was Guzmán’s new journal Realidad that was to be the central channel for explaining the reform 
to the Chilean public. Along with Juan de Dios Vial, José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois272 and even 
Mariano Grondona, here Guzmán fully developed his visions of Chile’s protected democracy. 
Going against socialism, but also against elite politics, Realidad’s first editorial asserted that “to 
configure a new democracy” means the “elimination of the paralyzing obstacles of socialist 
statism, [...] and of multiple monopolistic centers of power.” Speaking to the hard-liners, the 
editorial also denounced corporatism, as a system that “was valid in middle-ages monarchies” but 
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that in modern times simply turns into a fascist “totalitarianism.” 273 Regardless of these 
illuminations, also in this case democracy never appeared as a value in and of itself, but as means 
to guarantee “progress,”274 “free economy,” and “realism.”275  
         Now well within Chile’s own “economic miracle,” the constitutional referendum of 
September 11, 1980, became a triumphalist celebration of a regime that had chosen this so-called 
“democracy” over technocratic-authoritarianism.276 With 65.7% of Chileans ostensibly approving 
the reform,277 Chile’s own “minimal consensus” was now a juridical fact. Expectedly, the 
constitution declared the illegality any doctrines “of totalitarian character or based on class 
warfare.”278 Less expected was its declaration that “the state recognizes and protects the 
intermediate societies through which society is organized and guarantees them adequate autonomy 
to fulfill their own specific purposes (Article 1)” But this was an inconsequential residue of what 
had been, three years earlier, an entire concept of a post-ideological society. In short, the 1980 
Constitution turned Chile into a lessened parliamentary democracy de jure, waiting to be applied 
de facto in an eight-year transitional phase.279  
         As it happened, the referendum also signaled the end of the gremialistas’ mandate. Having 
been invited and then humiliatingly denied access to the Philippines by dictator Ferdinand Marcos 
in 1980 (a diplomatic incident known as the “Filipinazo”), Pinochet’s returned home to a fanatic 
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wave of support, which might have been helpful in producing popular backing for the 1980 
referendum, but also undermined the hegemony of the soft-liners. With Vial Correa, Cubillos, and 
Fernández discharged, Pinochet moved the regime back towards oppression and violence at least 
until 1983.280 Even so, from 1981 the constitution was a fact. As in the case of Spain, democratic 
transition came from within the regime, using its own constitutional framework. Yet strikingly, 
Guzmán still contested any similitude between the “Spanish model” and Chile’s reform. Franco’s 
“mistake,” he said, was not accepting democracy as an inevitability, and claiming it for himself, 
though he was “objectively its father.”281 Supporting Pinochet’s reelection for president in 1988, 
Guzmán therefore opined that since Pinochet was the original author of Chile’s democracy he 
could continue to be its leader - unlike the King of Spain, without ever needing to rely on 
subterfuge to do so.282 
         Pinochet’s eight-year “transition” also witnessed the Chicago Boys’ economic policies 
ending in deep economic and social crisis in 1982. As a result, a new chapter of social unrest 
opened in Chilean history, spurring further brutality but also, from 1983, bringing about a political 
“opening” with the lifting of censorship and new forms of elections in professional associations. 
In an effort to stymie the return of the democratic opposition to a position of power, Guzmán 
transformed the gremialistas into an official political party: The Independent Democratic Union 
(UDI). Here, despite ducking his own 1960s authoritarian-technocratic theories, Guzmán 
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exemplified how limited his vision of democracy really was.283 Similarly, the Opus Dei’s “soft-
liners” theoreticians, Ibáñez Langlois, Bravo Lira, and Vial Correa, struggled earnestly to keep 
intact what they thought was a society on a path to material and spiritual perfection.284 They 
perhaps rejected the regime’s human rights abuses but were also eager supporters of the UDI and 
Pinochet’s “Yes” campaign of 1988.285 Joining them were new voices, for example the Opus Dei 
economist Joaquín Lavín, who was essential in constructing the political myth regarding Chile’s 
so-called “silent revolution.”286 Throughout the 1980s, Lavín stressed that Pinochet’s regime had 
liberated the Chilean regions from Santiago’s centralist grip via a successful “regionalization” and 
a system of “poles of development,”287 thus enabling Chile’s democratic future. In short, the 
technocrats of the 1970s were still salient in the political climate of a country heading towards yet 
another “consensual” democratic transition, marked by structural continuation and devoid of 
transitional justice.  
         Tellingly, by this time the Spanish reformers lost hope of influencing Pinochet’s regime, 
directing their diplomacy towards Chile’s Christian Democrats instead. Adolfo Suárez, who had 
already hosted Chile’s Christian Democrats at the UCD national convention of 1978, continued 
his intimate cooperation with Chile’s centrist opposition throughout the 1980s.288 In 1984, the 
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Christian Democratic leader Patricio Aylwin accepted the 1980 constitution “as a fact.” Promoting 
the formula of “democracy to the extent possible,”289 he indeed pointed to the Spanish transition 
as his main reference. “This so-called ‘pacted rupture’ allowed a peaceful and continuous 
transition from Francoist authoritarianism to democracy. Why should not our country follow such 
an example?” he pondered.290 In brief, the mid-1980s saw a new format of Spanish-Chilean 
dialogue, mostly upon the international Christian Democratic networks, over the meanings and 
possible design of “consensus politics.”291    
         Meanwhile, politically ostracized, Franco’s technocrats fought over their own legacies. By 
1985, Chile had therefore become a platform where they could unleash criticism towards their own 
transition, retrospectively.292 In particular, Fernández de la Mora’s visit to Chile in September 
1985 was an anecdote worthwhile examining here fully, if only for its ideological transparency. 
Invited by Gustavo Cuevas, the director of the University of Chile’s Political Science Institute, 
and meeting in private with Pinochet, the retired Spanish politician evidently was still considered 
in Chile an intellectual of the highest degree. This was no ordinary visit. Rather, ten years after 
Franco’s death, Fernández de la Mora arrived in Chile to publicly denounce the country’s 
upcoming democratization. As the Spanish ambassador Miguel Solano reported to his superiors, 
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in “series of workshops,” which saw the attendance of Chile’s “most prominent intellectuals and 
four ministers,” Fernández de la Mora advocated Franco’s “corporative” and “organic” 
democracy, based on the efficient work of economic and social “councils.” 293 In lengthy 
interviews with the Chilean press, his technocratic formulas then reached new levels of crudeness. 
“Ideologies are no longer useful,” he said in Ercilla;294 “I evaluate regimes by results and not 
dogmatisms,” he told La Segunda.295 Amazingly, he even noted that Spain’s transition “was not 
the exigency of the masses but the decision of Spain’s political class.”296 
         Fernández de la Mora was no less firm when depicting the alleged “errors,” of Spain’s 
democratization. This message was particularly well-received by his friends in La Tercera, Jorge 
Iván Hübner for instance, who restated his work as the foremost analysis of the failures of 
parliamentarism.297 In 1987, López Rodó joined Fernández de la Mora in publicizing the latter’s 
book Los errores del cambio in El Mercurio.298 In this case, Fernández de la Mora argued that ever 
since 1975 the Spanish society had undergone downright moral decay. From the sudden rise of 
drug abuse to pornography and “trivialization of sex” - for him, nothing was in order in 1986 Spain. 
More pointedly, he argued that the entry of the masses into politics has brought Spain to a state of 
“infantilization.”299 This was the other side of the coin of the technocrats’ authoritarian 
paternalism, which had once demanded its citizens to “be a child,” and let spiritual guides and 
technicians rule them, voluntarily and without qualms.  
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          By the mid-1980s, the authoritarian technocrats had become a fairly marginal political and 
ideological actor, in Spain, Argentina, and Chile. The majority of right-wing politicians and 
intellectuals in these countries - even those who had once rebuked parliamentarism - were 
increasingly prone to the conclusion that the authoritarian models of the 1960s and 1970s reached 
the limits of their functionality. In other words, they agreed that while technocratic-authoritarian 
regimes were perhaps an ethically acceptable arrangement in the past, they were now, even before 
the end of the Cold War, neither sustainable nor respectable enough in the international arena, and 
therefore could be abandoned for the sake of a better democratic setup.300 Whether it was due to 
the pressure of the international community or the Vatican, the workers or the students, the idea 
that the Hispanic world could live under an “alternative” system of representation, “organic” and 
purged of abstract ideologies, was thus considered seriously by a tiny few. Fernández de la Mora’s 
1985 appearance in Chile was, in this sense, a somewhat uncanny exception that attested to the 
rules of Latin America’s new democratic zeitgeist.  
         True, the Proceso and Pinochet’s regime willingly allowed neo-fascist groups to operate in 
their public spheres and propagate a return to a nationalist-syndicalist revolution, and even a new 
civil war. The young Spanish democracy, too, tolerated a host of right-wing actors voicing clear 
anti-democratic slogans, a process that continued at least until the failed coup d’état of February 
23, 1981. But taken as a whole, the Proceso leaders, as well as Pinochet, accepted the finitude of 
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their regime in the early 1980s, and did not formally endorse any novel authoritarian theory of the 
state. Whereas Guzmán, López Rodó, Amadeo - and, of course, the Opus Dei at large - never quite 
believed in democracy as a superior ethical order, many of them did eventually accept 
parliamentarism as a done deal and grappled to formulate their own restrictive interpretation of it. 
In so doing, most of them could be found participating in the new electoral system, where they 
defended what they believed were the dictatorship’s achievements of societal and spiritual 
perfection.  
          There were significant differences between the Argentine, Chilean, and Spanish cases of 
transitions to democracy, certainly when it comes to their concepts of transitional justice and types 
of truth-telling mechanisms commenced in each transition. A closer look reveals, however, one 
important similarity between the transitions, especially in case of the “pacted” transition Spain and 
Chile: The ideologues who had designed the technocratic-authoritarian state ideologies in the 
1960s now all voiced similar narratives. The authoritarian phase of economic growth and 
modernization they had devised, they explained, enabled democracy to successfully take root, 
given the evolution of their nation from a state of “underdevelopment” towards a society of non-
ideological consumerist “middle-classes.” In turn, one could argue that the so-called transitional 
“consensus” of the 1980s meant not only the resolve between all moderate political forces to avoid 
any persecution of the Armed Forces, but also the tacit agreement to accept the dictatorship’s 
alleged functionality and respectability as the authentic birthplace of democracy.   
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Conclusion: On the Legacies of Technocratic-Authoritarianism in Spain, Argentina, and 
Chile 
 
         This study has scrutinized a unique post-fascist ideology and contextualized its appearance, 
apex, and decline within three historical settings. Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism first 
emerged in the 1950s as an ideology upon the international apparatuses of the ICH and Opus Dei. 
Next, in the 1960s, this ideology was translated into a state-ideology in Francisco Franco’s Spain, 
and was further developed within the texts of Argentina’s post-fascist nacionalistas and Chilean 
gremialistas. In turn, it informed the state-ideology of Juan Carlos Onganía’s regime, and 
immediately thereafter, decided the character of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship in its early days. 
And last, this ideology significantly diminished in popularity in the mid-1970s, to be supplanted 
by either a neo-fascist radicalization or “protected” democratic transitions, an entire decade before 
the Cold War ended. Having been the first laboratory of this post-fascist ideological makeover, 
technocratic Spain captivated the imagination of Argentine and Chilean far-right thinkers. By 
propagating the interlinked political myths of Spain’s anti-Enlightenment “crusade” and post-
ideological “economic miracle,” the Francoist regime was both a state-model and a landscape 
wherein Latin American youngsters, intellectuals, and military men toured, writing back home in 
elation. In the 1960s, Francoism thus became the central point of reference for Latin America’s 
conservative elites in their quest for a return to authoritarianism in the name of a modernizing leap 
forward. 
         But rather than replicating Francoism, Onganía, Pinochet, and the post-fascist technocratic-
authoritarian ideologues they handpicked, chose to formulate updated interpretations of Franco’s 
state model. By doing so, they all believed themselves to belong to an ilk of Hispanic “organic” 
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democracies - as a third regime model within the Cold War system. As such, they alleged to have 
successfully transcended the liberal-democratic era, thereby reaching a final mode of economic 
and social progress, all the while maintaining their sovereignty vis-à-vis the other Cold War blocs. 
While never an avowed utopian project, there is a clear genealogy between the messianic fascist 
project of the 1930s and the 1960s spiritual “technocratic” society. My findings outline that the 
two merely proposed different techniques for achieving the same fundamental objectives: a 
technically modernized consumer society, purged from 19th century ideologies, hierarchical, 
fundamentally patriarchal, and last but not least, wallowing in a state of a spiritual sublime.  
          This study thus aims to fill a certain gap in the historical writing on Latin America’s far-
right ideology during the Cold War. Whereas historiography has scrutinized to the fullest neo-
fascist revolutionary movements such as the nacionalistas, and even more so Latin America’s 
authoritarian Populisms, this dissertation points to a realm of post-fascist ideological production 
that has yet to be been aptly labeled. Lest this appears a game of taxonomies, let us underscore 
again that the designers of Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism proudly purported to replace 
what they believed were the imprudent “totalitarian” national revolutions of the 1930s with a non-
statist theory of collective action. By so doing, and by actually being granted access to the center 
of the state apparatus, they were arguably more consequential than the Cold War neo-fascists. As 
I have shown, the latter exhibited fierce opposition to the technocrats throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. In fact, Piñar, Sánchez Sorondo, Curutchet, and Rodríguez Grez, challenged the 
technocrats’ ideology in a fairly similar fashion, consequently making the far-right ideological 
panorama in these countries a binary feud between neo-fascist and post-fascist authoritarianisms; 
between “revolution” and “restoration”; a statist “national-syndicalist” format of corporatism 
versus a neoliberal regime directed by “intermediary societies.” Yet, as this study also shows, the 
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two ideological schools clearly overlapped. For instance, they dovetailed in their endorsement of 
civil war and political violence as the legitimate means to rid society of its “materialist” enemies. 
In this sense, the movements differed only inasmuch as the neo-fascists perceived violence as the 
heart of their perpetual “revolution” and the very means to attain the spiritual sublime, whereas 
the technocrats saw it as a precondition for the formation of a post-ideological society and a 
spiritual project of yet another kind.  
          Indeed, the pages above clarify that despite bearing a thematic consistency with the western 
neoliberal technocratic jargon, Hispanic technocratic-authoritarianism cannot be understood 
disconnected from its matching spiritual project. Paradoxically, for the thinkers I have analyzed, 
“rationalizing” the state economically went hand in hand with cultivating the community’s 
unifying “irrational” mystical core. When Pérez Embid spoke of “European in the means and 
Spanish in the ends,” he merely meant to say that he believed in the existence of a historical agent 
who could guide society peacefully towards a uniquely Hispanic modernity comprising of dual 
process of technological progress and spiritual perfection. By the same token, the confidence of 
these post-fascist intellectuals in the benevolent operation of civil society underneath an 
authoritarian peace-keeper betrayed a holistic fantasy that began with the harmonious Catholic 
household and ended with an antagonism-free elite-oriented method of collective action. 
          Examining the predominance of the technocratic ideologies of the 1960s invites a 
reappraisal of the dichotomy between communism and anti-communism in Latin America during 
the Cold War period. The fear of communism, I argue, was ubiquitous among the authoritarian 
technocrats but was also dissimilar from the zeitgeist of the 1930s. A sense of uncontrolled 
technological acceleration, the progressive turn within the Catholic Church, and rapid change in 
gender roles and sexual norms were no less crucial in mobilizing a generation of conservatives in 
 356 
demand for an authoritarian project that was not a nationalist revolution. By evoking a pre-modern 
anti-nationalist Hispanic mythology, the technocrats’ “anti-totalitarian” language thus mirrored 
both the traumatic legacies of fascist Europe and the preoccupations of the conservative subject 
during the 1960s. Beneath the canopy of authoritarian “social peace,” the society Pérez Embid and 
the likes of him envisioned entailed a middle-class fantasy of material abundance rather than 
violence, followed by an apparition of a protective act of cultural intermediation. This could be 
best seen in the case of the Opus Dei feminism. Bringing a “European” technique into the 
“Hispanic” realm meant producing a “modern” womanhood that seemingly endorsed new 
economic and social undertakings, only thereafter to strip women of their political agency and 
reproductive rights in the name of protecting both their alleged inner nature and the Hispanic 
spiritual domain.  
          Apart from touching on the Cold War’s right-wing theories of the state, this study 
contributes to the history of this era’s ideologies of development and neoliberal reforms. Despite 
not being an economic history per se, it still exemplifies that technocratic-authoritarianism should 
be read through the prism of the international economic circumstances of the 1960s. Franco, 
Onganía, and Pinochet all believe in the feasibility of a distinctive economic “miracle,” thus 
placing a neoliberal economic mechanism at the heart of their modernizing and civilizing process. 
Given the stark similarity between the Francoist, Argentine, and Chilean “development plans,” 
administrative “rationalizations,” “regionalization” initiatives, and even usage of “development 
poles,” these dictatorships should therefore be perceived as three interlinked episodes in a 
systematic platform of authoritarian economic stimulation, a phenomenon that calls for further 
historical analysis.   
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           Beyond these insights, as any historical research on the 20th century, this study has been 
written with the concern over current distortions of collective memory in mind. Unlike in the case 
of European fascism, the legacies of technocratic-authoritarianism have not been aptly challenged, 
let alone purged, in Spain, Argentina, or Chile.1 In truth, the technocrats are still among us, as are 
their ideologies. Thinkers such as Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, Laureano López Rodó, Jaime 
Guzmán,  and Joaquín Lavín have all energetically participated in parliamentary politics following 
their countries’ democratic transitions.2 Mariano Grondona, Bernardo Neustadt, and Mariano 
Montemayor - all of them respectable intellectuals in Argentina - have never publicly repented 
their endorsement of, and assistance to, either Onganía or the Proceso.3 Others, Roberto Bosca for 
example, who had still spoken against parliamentarism in 1981,4 later became advocates of 
democracy in the public sphere.5 As of yet, especially in regards to the Argentine Revolution, these 
figures have shown an inability to assume responsibility for Argentina’s authoritarian turn. 
Decades later, figures such as Jorge Mazzinghi even doggedly justified their participation in the 
plot against Illia - whom he still labeled an “honest man, but an iniquitous mediocrity.”6  
                                                        
1 The literature on German memory has recently begun to challenge this alleged “denazification” of the German 
society, see for example - Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der 
Bundesrepublik unddie NS-Vergangenheit (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996). 
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greatest thinker of all times,” see - Francisco Umbral, “Seis personajes en busca de su autor,” El País (October 13, 
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4 Horacio Verbitsky, La mano izquierda de Dios. La última dictadura (1976-1983): historia política de la iglesia 
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filosóficos,” Colección, no. 20 (2009): 147-71; far-right groups have even accused Bosca of being committed to a 
“democratic auto de fe,” in order to “redeem his past” as someone who cooperated with the Proceso, see - 
http://info-caotica.blogspot.de/2014/11/una-replica-roberto-bosca.html  
6 Mazzinghi, Ni memorias ni olvido, 61.  
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          In a parallel vein, the Opus Dei, Cursillos de la Cristiandad, and Tradición, Familia y 
Propiedad, are still immensely present in the Latin American public sphere.7 The Opus Dei, in 
particular, has maintained its influential position as an ultra-conservative pressure group in global 
politics, as many historians, sociologists, and journalists have pointed out in recent years.8 The 
beatification of Escrivá de Balaguer in May 1992, and Álvaro del Portillo in September 2014, are 
further indications of the Opus Dei’s dominance within the Catholic world at large.9 This evolving 
interest in the Opus Dei has produced a rather distorted public image of its character and history, 
however. “Opus Dei is a deeply devout Catholic sect that has been a topic of recent controversy 
due to reports of extreme practices,” are the opening lines of Dan Brown’s novel The Da Vinci 
Code, perhaps the most famous reference in popular culture to what is, in truth, the Vatican’s 
formal Prelature.10 Hereafter, the public debate over the Opus Dei ideologies and agency has been 
                                                        
7 The amount of publications on these societies is tremendous and included a myriad of conspiracy theories, see for 
instance: “El Opus Dei da la cara,” Clarín (February 14, 1997); Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez y Hernán Brienza, “Los 
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Propiedad,” Página 12 (August 7, 2011); Barbie Latza Nadeau, “This Secret Catholic Exorcist Cult in Brazil Is 
Making a Deal with the Devil,” The Daily Beast (June 18, 2017); “The secret doctrine of the Heralds: ‘Correa 
encourages the death of the Pope,’” La Stampa (April 16, 2018). http://www.lastampa.it/2017/06/14/ 
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Ynfante, El santo fundador Del Opus Dei: biografía completa de Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer (Barcelona: 
Crítica, 2002); Jaime Escobar, Opus Dei: génesis y expansión en el mundo (Santiago de Chile: LOM ediciones, 
1992); Mercedes Balech (ed.), El Opus Dei y la restauración católica (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2002); 
Corbière, Opus Dei: el totalitarismo católico.  
9 With the advent of Pope Francis’s papacy, in March 2013, the international press has speculated on the 
antagonistic relationship between the Jesuit Pope and the Opus Dei given the former’s Peronist past, a claim that 
both sides have consistently denied, see - Paul Elie, “Francis, the Anti-Strongman,” The New York Times (April 9, 
2018); “Pope Francis Removes Opus Dei Bishop,” Catholic Herald (September 25, 2014); “Pope Remembers Opus 
Dei Head as ‘Paternal and Generous’ Witness,” Catholic Herald (December 13, 2016); Thomas G. Bohlin, “The 
Pope and Opus Dei,” The New York Times (April 4, 2018); “Pope Francis Brings a New Energy Many Young 
People Can Identify With,” August 30, 2018, is https://opusdei.org/en-us/article/pope-francis-brings-a-new-energy-
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10 Dan Brown, The Da Vinci Code (New York: Bantam, 2003), 1. 
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reduced to disputes over the veracity of its methods of self-torture and maltreatment of its members 
- a proclivity I hope my analysis will assuage.11  
          The Opus Dei, too, has yet to come to terms with its participation in authoritarian 
experiments worldwide. This fact is evident in the Opus Dei’s own scholarly system, which 
nowadays is a source of numerous historical analyses touching on its own intellectuals and 
politics.12 At times, these studies are informative and important. By and large, however, they 
demonstrate a failure to criticize the organization’s founders, or fully scrutinize the role the Opus 
Dei’s intellectual apparatus played during the regimes of Franco, Onganía, and Pinochet. What is 
more, whereas Franco’s legacy has been fairly successfully erased from the Spanish public sphere 
by now, authoritarian ideologues such as Álvaro d’Ors, Florentino Pérez Embid, and Ismael 
Sánchez Bella are still venerated in the Opus Dei’s campuses, further exemplifying the difficulties 
this institution exhibits when dealing with its anti-democratic legacies.13 As importantly, over the 
years the technocrats have expressed no repentance over the economic, social, and even ecological 
consequences of their theories of development and population control. On the contrary: to this day 
many of them, Joaquín Lavin to name one, stress the unequivocal success of this alleged 
authoritarian development phase. 
           A problem arises when members of the scholarly community restate the technocrats’ 
assessment of their own success in spurring economic development and social peace. Take for 
                                                        
11 See for instance - “I use spiked chain, says senator in Opus Dei,” The Telegraph (March 9, 2007); “Catholic 
Group Says of ‘Da Vinci Code’ Film: It’s Just Fiction,” New York Times (February 7, 2006).  
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13 “Inaugurado un busto en la UN en recuerdo de Álvaro d’Ors, una gran persona crucial para el centro 
universitario,” Europapress (April 25, 2013); “Presentan libro en homenaje a Álvaro d’Ors,” Udep hoy (April 27, 
2012), http://udep.edu.pe/hoy/2012/presentan-libro-en-homenaje-a-alvaro-dors; Ana Barrero, “Homenaje a Ismael 
Sánchez Bella, Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1992,” Anuario de historia del derecho español (1993): 1303-
11. 
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example the work of sociologist José Casanova on the Opus Dei from 1982. True, Casanova 
explored fully the Opus Dei’s paradoxical Catholic scientific project and return to scholastic 
reasoning. However, by referring to Max Weber’s thesis on the connection between the protestant 
ethics and the nature of capitalism, Casanova’s work quite plainly suggested interpreting the Opus 
Dei’s “inner-worldly asceticism” as a Catholic version of protestant ethics and therefore a catalyst 
for “economic modernization.”14 Subsequently, Casanova argued that the Opus Dei technocrats 
had been “adequate carriers of the Spanish modernization process,”15 as they “rationalized the 
Francoist administration” and, in so doing, “served indirectly to prepare the state administration 
for the role it was called to play in a democratic system.”16 Scholars have since then contested 
Casanova’s standpoints, stating that the Opus Dei was “conspicuously absent from the ranks of 
democratizing reformers.”17 This present study takes this critique one step forward. I argue that 
when Casanova praised López Rodó’s so-called “ethics” he brazenly reiterated the technocrat’s 
own self-branding as a spiritually-driven immaculate “directing elite.” Likewise, my study has 
shown that for the Opus Dei, as the powerhouse of Franco’s unique technocratic-authoritarian 
state-ideology, a return to parliamentary democracy went against the very essence of its post-
ideological project and was therefore nonsensical.  
                                                        
14 José V. Casanova, “The Opus Dei Ethics and the Modernization of Spain” (Dissertation) The New School for Social 
Research, 1982.  
15 José V. Casanova, “The Opus Dei ethic, the technocrats and the modernization of Spain,” Social Science 
Information (1983): 27.     
16 José V. Casanova, “Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain’s Transition to Democracy", Social 
Research, vol. 50, no. 4, (1983): 963; elsewhere Casanova claimed that the technocrats had “promised that 
democracy would come automatically when Spain reached the 1000$” per capita level, and thereafter “found 
themselves helpless to bring about democratization,” see - José V. Casanova, “The Opus Dei Ethic, the Technocrats 
and the Modernization of Spain,” Information, vol. 22, no. 1 (January 1, 1983): 41. 
17 Frances Lannon, Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: the Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 227-30; according to sociologist Joan Estruch the foregoing “Weberian 
thesis” was the Opus Dei’s own self-made “stereotype”; see - Estruch, Saints and Schemers, 221.    
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           A word is still in order about the actual consequences of technocratic-authoritarianism. Let 
us begin with stating the obvious: the three regimes at hand produce an impressive, if temporal, 
GDP hike in their economies, a fact they promptly used for their own self-legitimation. However, 
with hindsight, it is evident that the one crucial factor that enabled this impressive economic 
growth was the American and Western European agreement to direct investments to these 
dictatorships while turning a blind eye on their authoritarian practices. The so-called “economic 
miracles” in Spain, Argentina, and Chile - as well as in other Latin American dictatorships - were 
therefore not the outcome of some enigmatic “administrative rationalization” but of routine 
deregulation, a measure that had been put in place in other countries in the Western hemisphere 
without necessitating dictatorial rule.   
         Cruelty, brutality, and terror, where other prerequisites for these regimes seeming “economic 
miracles.” Having stripped the working class from its rights to either vote or strike, the technocratic 
dictatorship became attractive to foreign investment, allowing its leaders to cynically “thank” the 
workers for their willing sacrifice. Yet the notion of popular authoritarianism and participation 
through “intermediary societies” was a myth; a meager residue of the 1930s corporatist jargon, 
this notion was true only insofar as these dictatorships mobilized certain elite groups to consolidate 
power and gain absolute control over the public sphere. For the rest of the population, resistance 
was the only path forward and was met with varying degrees of violence, even during periods of 
democratic transitions. Being the least murderous of the three, the Argentine Revolution’s “soft 
dictatorship” was ultimately not only unpopular but, as historian Luis Alberto Romero has argued, 
opened “a Pandora box” of protest and violence, as the last symbols of solidarity between 
Argentina’s social groups were disjointed.18 Of course, one cannot attribute the rise of Argentina’s 
                                                        
18 Luis Alberto Romero, “A 40 años del golpe contra Illia: el espejismo de Onganía,” La Nación (June 25, 2006). 
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urban guerrilla to Onganía alone. It is, however, important to note that Francoism inspired Onganía 
and Pinochet differently. While Onganía believed he could institute a peaceful post-ideological 
regime mirroring technocratic Spain, Pinochet was more loyal to the entire legacies of Francoism 
- starting with its civil war and concluding with a neoliberal dictatorship of civic “participation.” 
Not by coincidence, Pinochet’s regime was more long lasting.  
          The social consequences of technocratic-authoritarianism in Spain, Argentina, and Chile is 
a topic that encompasses an array of studies. Ultimately, there is a consensus among historians that 
authoritarian neoliberal development came at an extremely high cost, benefitting mainly the elites 
who directed it. While the western Europeans enjoyed the emergence of a democratic welfare state 
(also known as the European Social Model) the Spaniards and their Latin American counterparts 
were coerced to live under governments that invested proportionally far little in their citizens’ 
welfare, thereby causing a soaring gap between the wealthy elites and the rest of the population.19 
As historian Peter Winn pondered in the case of Chile, “have Chile’s workers paid the costs for 
their country’s economic success?”; are they “victims of Chile’s neoliberal ‘miracle’”? His answer 
was, overall, affirmative.20 Beyond pointing to the detriment of neoliberalism, historians have also 
specified other unintended consequences of authoritarian development, such as mass immigration 
and human capital flight (“brain drain”). Additionally, Catalonian sociologist Vicenç Navarro has 
held that low public expenditure, social polarization, high public debt, and chronic corruption 
                                                        
19 A partial list of this type of critique, especially in regards to Chile, would include: Vicente Navarro (ed.), 
Neoliberalism, Globalization, and Inequalities: Consequences for Health and Quality of Life (Amityville, N.Y: 
Baywood Pub, 2007); Cal Clark, Challenging Neoliberalism: Globalization and the Economic Miracles in Chile and 
Taiwan (Northampton, Ma.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016); Marcus Taylor, From Pinochet to the ’Third Way’: 
Neoliberalism and Social Transformation in Chile (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006); Larissa Adler de Lomnitz, 
Chile’s Middle Class: A Struggle for Survival in the Face of Neoliberalism (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1991);, 
Patricio Silva, In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2008). 
20 This exceptional edited volume is dedicated entirely to the harms of the Pinochet’s economic and social policies, 
see - Peter Winn (ed.), Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002. 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 5.  
 363 
caused by a faulty separation of powers, meant that Spain was still an underdeveloped society in 
the 1980s.21 Or as the Spanish historian Antonio Cazorla Sánchez summarized it: “Francoism’s 
damage to society has no equivalent in any post-war West European society. It could be said 
without exaggeration that only the most callous of dictators could have maintained for so long 
such absurd economic and social policies.”22  
          Within this field of critique, the contribution this study makes is to address the technocrats’ 
peculiar understanding of democratic societies, and intimate transatlantic collaborations in an 
effort to undermine the democratization of the Hispanic world. Take the correspondence between 
Amadeo and Sánchez Bella: upon nearly two-hundred letters these kindred spirits pronounce their 
contempt for parliamentarism, which they perceived as a gateway for an imminent communistic 
infiltration. But beyond this, a sincere belief in the ethical superiority and functionality of the 
“organic democracy” arises in these exchanges of opinion; the notion that once liberated from 
ideological distractions, the population becomes both prosperous and “unified,” and can thus 
contribute its technical skills better through means of councils and intermediary societies. Was 
there any truth in these claims? This is a question that is quite difficult to answer, as it touches on 
the causality between social solidarity and economic performance. Some theorists, for instance, 
Brazilian philosopher Roberto Mangabeira Unger, have vehemently contested the notion that the 
political empowerment of the population hinders economic and technologic modernization. 
Historically, “technical innovation” and “individual emancipation” had always enhanced one 
another other, he has argued, since innovation relies heavily on participation, collaboration, and 
                                                        
21 Vicenç Navarro, El subdesarrollo social de España: causas y consecuencias (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 
2006). 
22 Cazorla Sánchez, Fear and Progress, 94. 
 364 
circulation of knowledge between different parts of society.23 Seen from this perspective, by letting 
an elitist minority control the state, thereby untangling the basic solidarity networks within society, 
technocratic-authoritarianism may have well damaged the very economic modernization that was 
its alleged reason for being.  
         There is also no evidence to sustain the argument that technocratic-authoritarianism had been 
a stepping stone for democratization and robust civil society. If anything, my findings indicate that 
this very narrative surfaced within the context of the technocrats’ electoral campaigns during 
democratic transitions. The return to democracy in 1973 Argentina was anything but orderly. 
Moreover, it so happens that the technocrats bequeathed the newborn democracies with 
particularly troubled constitutional frameworks, tailored with an authoritarian imaginary in mind. 
In particular, Chile’s 1980 constitution is nowadays considered a politically polarizing symbol, 
suggesting that rather than modernizing the state apparatus towards democratization, Pinochet’s 
dictatorship had damaged Chile’s democratic system for years to come.24 This situation is not 
dissimilar from that of Spain. Surely, there are those who have stressed that Spain’s elite-
orchestrated democratic transition had initially produced a steadier democracy than, say, Brazil.25 
However, as the Catalonian independence movement and general political and economic crisis in 
Spain have recently shown us, there are still vast portions of the Spanish society that express 
discomfort with the monarchy Franco had perpetuated in the country. 
                                                        
23 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (New York: Verso, 1998); more 
on “organizing solidarity” and “making democracy profound” in Spain, see - Roberto Mangabeira Unger, España y 
su futuru ¿Un país en transformación? (Madrid: Sequitur, 2009). 
24 See for example - Javier Couso, “Trying Democracy in the Shadow of an Authoritarian Legality: Chile’s 
Transition to Democracy and Pinochet’s Constitution of 1980,” Wisconsin International Law Journal, no. 29 (2012-
2011): 393-415; Claudia Heiss and Patricio Navia, “You Win Some, You Lose Some: Constitutional Reforms in 
Chile’s Transition to Democracy,” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 49, no. 3 (2007): 163–90. 
25 Political scientist Omar Encarnación, while being one of the fiercest critics of the Spanish transition, has also 
argued provocatively that the Spanish transition was particularly effective given the fact that it took place in a 
society with a weak civil society, see - Omar G. Encarnación, The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and 
Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 46-73.  
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          A distorted memory of the technocratic era in Spain, Chile, and even Argentina, is therefore 
fairly common as it is politically consequential. This is particularly true in Spain - a country where 
the democratic transition had not even established a truth commission for the criminalities of the 
dictatorship, in what has become known as the “pact of oblivion.”26 But even in the case of 
Argentina, one of the only Latin American democracies to have applied retrospective justice 
towards the crimes of its last dictatorship, the collective decision to overlook the crimes of the 
Peronist Right and the Argentine Revolution meant that these periods are especially sensitive to 
historical revision and memory falsification. In an effort to explain the gap between historical 
knowledge and collective memory, critics of the Spanish transition have argued that the deep 
Francoist state, which the transition had allegedly failed to dismantle, controlled the consciousness 
of the Spanish middle classes.27 Further historical analysis is due to understand this phenomenon. 
What is beyond doubt is that during the 1980s, Spain, Chile, and Argentina witnessed a public 
sphere dominated to a large extent by the same right-wing apparatuses that had buttressed 
authoritarianism for decades, a fact that has made the benign treatment of these dictatorships in 
the public arena all the more likely.28  
         “Oblivion” in and of itself is a slightly unsuitable way to describe the memory politics ever 
since the 1980s, either in Spain or in Chile and Argentina. Rather, the rise of far-right revisionism 
                                                        
26 A process that had been debated intensively in recent years, see for instance - Joan Ramon Resina, 
Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to Democracy (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2000); Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memoria y Olvido de La Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Alianza, 
1996); Madeleine Davis, “Is Spain Recovering Its Memory? Breaking the Pacto Del Olvido,” Human Rights 
Quarterly vol. 27, no. 3 (August 1, 2005): 858–80. 
27 Juan Luis Cebrián, “The pre-constitutional experiment,” in José Luis Cagigao, John Crispin, and Enrique Pupo-
Walker, Spain, 1975-1980: The Conflicts and Achievements of Democracy (Madrid: J. Porrúa Turanzas, 1982), 15.  
28 All three countries have allowed the activity of memory agents preserving their authoritarian legacies. While 
Spain saw the establishment of the Francisco Franco Foundation in Madrid, Chile saw the establishment of Jaime 
Guzmán and President Pinochet Foundations, and Argentina saw the creation of the Instituto Bibliográfico Antonio 
Zinny, as well as the reappearance of the Ateneo de la República; needless to say, the Opus Dei’s journals, and 
platforms such as the Chilean Que Pasa and El Mercurio, have all maintained their predominance in the public 
sphere until this very day.  
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in these countries has been challenging mainstream historiography by circulating the dictatorships’ 
official narratives as legitimate alternative histories. Here too Spain seems to be setting a negative 
precedent. This began in the 1980s with the politicking of Fernando Vizcaíno Casas - the unofficial 
spokesman of the so-called “Sociological Francoism” (franquismo sociológico) - whose narratives 
betrayed an unbashful nostalgia for Franco’s society. “Under Franco we lived better,” was even 
his memorable maxim.29 Later, it was the journalist Luiz Pío Moa’s who made the rebranding of 
the dictatorship’s narratives in their entirety his mission. For Moa, Francoism was perhaps 
“authoritarian” but a much lesser evil compared to the “totalitarian” alternative Spain had faced in 
1936.30 Similarly, Moa has stated that given that Franco liquidated totalitarianism from the Spanish 
society, and granted it “peace and prosperity,”31 the Spanish democracy “grew from within 
Francoism and not from anti-Francoism or from the Republic.”32 Spanish historiography has 
fiercely contested Moa’s opinions.33 Arguably he does not even represent the Spanish moderate 
Right. Still, it is important to note that his positions are not unthinkable, and at a minimum are 
undeniably legitimate, in Spain’s public sphere.  
                                                        
29 Fernando Vizcaíno Casas, Viva Franco! (con perdón) (Madrid: Editorial Planeta, 1980); The public debate over 
the trope “Con Franco vivíamos mejor,” and novelist Manuel Vázquez Montalbán’s struggle against it (“contra 
Franco vivíamos major”), has appeared in the work of several scholars, see - Juan Egea, “El desencanto: La mirada 
del padre y las lecturas de la transición,” Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures, vol. 58. no. 2 
(2004); Teresa M. Vilarós, El mono del desencanto: una crítica cultural de la transición española, 1973-1993 
(Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1998); Jaume Guillamet, Las sombras de la transición: El relato crítico de los 
corresponsales extranjeros (1975-1978) (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2017); Angel Díaz Arenas, Quién es 
quién en la obra narrativa de Manuel Vázquez Montalbán (Kassel: Edition Reichenberger, 1997). 
30 For Moa there is no doubt that the Popular Front had been influenced and manipulated by Stalin, see - Pío Moa, 
Los crímenes de la guerra civil y otras polémicas (Madrid: La esfera de los libros, 2004), 24; “I do not condemn 
Francoism because it saved Spain from revolution, from WWII, and from the new Civil War planned by the Maquis 
guerrilla,” he stated elsewhere, see - Pío Moa, Falacias de la izquierda, silencios de la derecha (Madrid: Libros 
Libres, 2008), 210-11. 
31 Ibid, 212. 
32 Pío Moa, Contra la mentira (Madrid: Libros libres, 2003), 226. 
33 Alberto Reig Tapia, Anti-Moa: la subversión neofranquista de la historia de España (Barcelona: Ediciones B, 
2006). 
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          The Argentine and Chilean right-wing polity is not devoid of authoritarian and technocratic 
remainders either. Its spokesmen’s eagerness to debate the dictatorships’ “pros and cons” reveals 
time and again a tendency to tacitly accept the technocratic-authoritarian narratives of 
modernization.34 In effect, against the backdrop of the rise of Latin America’s left-wing “pink 
tide,” it is not uncommon to witness right-wing politicians contrasting the Left’s “utopian” 
ideological projects with their own alleged “pragmatism” and “political realism.”35 Thus, the 
question regarding the Right’s relationship with its authoritarian legacies is a vexed one. 
Assuredly, actual expressions of nostalgia for authoritarianism are an entirely marginal 
phenomenon.36 Yet nostalgia does not necessarily signify hoping to return to life under a 
dictatorship but rather a fantasy of a simpler world of economic miracles and no ideological 
complexity. Therefore, we should think of nostalgia foremost as conservatives evoking the 
dictatorship’s teleological narratives. Kept alive throughout the “consensus” transitions of the 
1980s, they reappear encapsulated in the demand to be allowed to take pride in the dictatorship as 
the authentic embryo of civility, modernity, and democracy.   
          Analytical historiography, for its part, is torn between the commitment for a dialogue with 
all political orientations and the need not to allow far-right authoritarian “residues”37 become 
                                                        
34 This trend was particularly conspicuous in 2013 with the commemoration of forty years since Pinochet’s rise to 
power, see for instance – Gideon Long, “Chile: los que todavía defienden a Pinochet,” BBC Mundo (September 9, 
2013). 
35 Sebastian Piñera’s latest presidential campaign highlighted this dichotomy frequently, see for example - 
“Realismo político o volador de luces? UDI se divide ante la opción de que Longueira forme su propio partido,” 
Cambio 21, (September 21, 2017); “Piñera, en Chile y América Latina: se consolida una profunda división 
ideológica en la región,” El País (December 24, 2017); For more on the right-wing tactics in confronting the “pink 
tide,” see - Barry Cannon, The Right in Latin America: Elite Power, Hegemony, and the Struggle for the State (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2016). 
36 The Chilean public sphere has seen several debates over the alleged nostalgia for Pinochet Chile, for instance in 
Patricio Guzmán’s documentary, Nostalgia for the Light, at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1556190/; see also - 
Verónica Foxley, “Augusto Pinochet Molina: ‘Mucha gente siente nostalgia por el gobierno Militar,’” Cosas 
(August 27, 2015); “Why Pinochet is the dictator who never dies,” New Statesman (November 21, 2013). 
37 “Residual Francoism” is the way historian Sebastian Balfour has labeled these historians in the past, see – “The 
concept of historical revisionism: Spain since the 1930s,” International Journal of Iberian Studies, vol. 21 no. 3, 
(2008), 179.  
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official national histories, all the while avoiding being labelled as “leftist” in the public arena. 
British historian Eric Hobsbawm famously said that “nations without a past are contradictions in 
terms,” and that we historians, like drug traffickers, “supply the essential raw material for the 
market.”38 Building on these insights, I contend that nowadays historians have a much arduous 
responsibility than this. In the bipartisan enmity that is Latin American politics, it is up to us to 
demarcate the ethical boundaries for a scholarly and communal debate over authoritarianism and 
democracy, compromising neither the historical truth nor the capacity to communicate with 
conservative audiences. Thus, it is up to us to aid reconstructing national histories towards the 
restitution of national and international bonds of solidarity. 
      
 
                                                        
38 “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today,” in Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson (eds.), Mapping the 
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Appendix: Sources and Methods 
 
         For the most part, this study falls within the category of intellectual history. Nevertheless, 
throughout my research, I have sought to broaden the borderlines of this somewhat rigid subfield 
of historical analysis by drawing on a range of archival and literal sources, many of which are 
crucial to the research of transnational ideological networks. Therefore, a brief explanation is due 
on the types of original, and slightly less original, sources used for this study.  
         My analysis builds primarily on published ideological texts, most of which were originally 
devised to impact the public sphere. Roughly one hundred newspapers and more than two-hundred 
published monographs serve as the main underpinnings for my textual analysis. Moreover, the 
innovations in the field of digitization and search engines in recent years - for instance the case of 
the Spanish newspapers and journals ABC, La Vanguardia, and El País, Cuadernos 
Hispanoamericanos, Arbor, and Nuestro Tiempo - have allowed me to gather corpuses of texts in 
great speed, but even more importantly, to reach statistical approximations regarding the 
popularity of certain trends in the public arena. What is more, this study puts special emphasis on 
inner-publications and pamphlets from the ICH congresses, which can be found in abundance at 
the AECID library in Madrid, as well as the UNAV library in Pamplona, and the Argentine 
National Library - at the Centro de Estudios Nacionales, in collections such as the “Que” 
newspaper boxes. In addition, this analysis illustrates the resistance to the technocratic ideology 
and the Opus Dei, by far-right groups as well as from the side of the Spanish, Argentine, and 
Chilean left-wing polity. A fairly good source for primary texts on Opus Dei from the left-wing 
spectrum of the public sphere can be located at the Emilio Corbiére Opus Dei collection, archived 
at the CEDINCI institute in Buenos Aires. Additionally, the study highlights educational theory 
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and pedagogical representations. Argentina’s Ministry of Education Archives and central library 
in Buenos Aires are, for example, a useful location to gather both digitized materials and rare 
pedagogical texts from the 1960s.  
          Another highly significant type of representations my work builds on are public speeches. 
Texts written for public discourses differ substantially, I believe, from those directed either to 
intellectual journals or to popular dailies, not only stylistically but, in many cases, in their actual 
content depending on the audience they address and spectacle they aim to stimulate. Interestingly, 
some of the most ideologically compressed texts in the 1960s and 1970s appear in the shape of 
speeches, some of which were later published as pamphlets and booklets. This is particularly true 
in the case of military leaders such as Franco, Carrero Blanco, Onganía, Lanusse, Pinochet, and 
Videla - all of whom rarely appeared in the press as published ideologues in their own right (Juan 
Perón was, in this sense, an exception to the rule). Collecting speeches, in the case of Argentina, 
has been made fairly easy in recent years with the opening of the personal archives at the 
abovementioned Centro de Estudios Nacionales, for instance at the Arturo Frondizi collection, and 
even more so, at the recently-opened collections of the Presidencia de la Nación (Secretaría de 
Presna y Difusión) located at Argentina’s General Archive of the Nation (AGN). Save for the years 
1974-1976, in the latter case, the Argentine Office of the Presidency has meticulously archived 
most every press release and speech made by Argentina’s presidents and prominent ministers from 
1956 until the early 1980s. This collection therefore provides historians of Argentina a unique tool 
to systematically survey the ideological and political trajectory of most any of the country’s Cold 
War administrations.  
          But most importantly, in this dissertation, I have made a specific effort to bring to light and 
integrate correspondences between intellectuals, publicists, politicians, and military dictators, on 
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a national and transnational scale. If to paraphrase Erving Goffman’s classic formulations on the 
human presentation in everyday life,1 then whereas publications and speeches serve as the 
“frontstage” of intellectual production, correspondences are the key to understanding the 
ideological “backstage”; an arena wherein genuine motivations, intrigues, and self-doubt are 
expressed candidly in the shape of dialogue, far from the public eye. The newly opened archives 
at the University of Navarra, in Pamplona, Spain, have been crucial for this methodological 
approach. At the personal archives of Alfredo Sánchez Bella, Laureano López Rodó, Florentino 
Pérez Embid, Rafael Calvo Serer, and many other Francoist ideologues, I discovered countless 
personal correspondences. Going back and forth from the Spanish technocrats to their Latin 
American counterparts, it is the first time many of these letters appear in a historical analysis. 
Likewise, in the Hoover Institution Archive at Stanford University, the Juan Perón, Hernán 
Cubillos, and Sergio Fernández Fernández personal collections further enable historians of 
Argentina and Chile to study the ideological production of these figures fully. In addition, the 
Hoover Institution includes valuable collections for any historian researching Chile’s neo-liberal 
turn, as it contains a special archive dedicated to the “Chicago boys” comprising of 
correspondences, speeches, and rare publications. Last, the Francisco Franco Foundation in 
Madrid (or alternatively, the Historical Memory Archive in Salamanca) contain Franco’s 
invaluable personal archives - a source of many of the private correspondences not only of Franco 
but of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco and Alfredo Sánchez Bella.    
         As for official correspondences, bilateral protocols, and official governmental reports, for 
instance between Franco’s Spain and the dictatorships of Onganía and Pinochet, these types of 
documents were also important to my analysis. While illuminating fairly little the inner worlds of 
                                                        
1 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959). 
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certain far-right intellectuals, they still are fairly useful informants on how each dictatorship 
grasped the other regimes’ key assets and problems. As importantly, more often than not these 
sources disclose how regimes sought to shape the public opinion within their authoritarian 
counterparts. One particularly useful source for this type of knowledge were the Spanish Embassy 
collections at Argentina’s Foreign Ministry Archive, and even more so the Spanish Embassy boxes 
at the Chilean Foreign Ministry Archives. In the case of the latter - and while the archives 
containing documents from the Chilean embassy in Argentina are indefinitely closed to the public 
- the boxes from Chile’s embassy in Madrid are fully open for consultation, and have already 
yielded several noteworthy historical analyses. What is more, after several years of being 
frustratingly closed, the Spanish Foreign Ministry Archives are nowadays gradually opening at 
their new location in Spain’s Central Archive of the Administration, at Alcalá de Henares (AGA). 
While containing scarce little documentation from Franco’s Latin American embassies, this 
archive still holds much correspondence and documentation regarding the establishment and 
operation of the ICH. With the ICH’s own archives still closed, this is the place where more 
discoveries regarding the transnational operation of Franco’s ideological apparatus in the 1950s 
could be made. Interestingly, the fullest collection at the AGA is the Spanish Tourism and 
Information archive. Most likely the initiative of Manuel Fraga during his tenure as Minister of 
Tourism and Information, i.e. the outcome of political spying, the collection contains valuable 
information not only on the Opus Dei but also on the Argentine and Chilean intellectuals.  
          Last, this dissertation relies on interviews with several figures from this era, as well on the 
oral history collected throughout the years by other scholars such as Robert A. Potash and Maria 
Olivia Mönckeberg. The case of the former is particularly noteworthy, as his entire oral history 
project of the 1980s has become recently available at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
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This appendix does not suffice to fully debate the methodological problems of oral sources. 
However, I do wish point out that being a historian of the Argentine military whose work is 
considered an obligatory read for those researching the 1960s, Prof. Potash has left much of his 
findings on the cutting room floor, so to speak. This is particularly true in the case of his oral 
history with intellectuals such as Mariano Grondona, Mario Díaz Colodrero, Carlos María Gelly 
y Obes, and Nicanor Costa Méndez, whose remarks on issues of ideology had served Potash’s 
analysis little but are crucial for several of the argument laid down in my study. On the whole, 
however, the interviews I have conducted with Opus Dei and ICH figure have been effective to 
the extent that they illuminate the official narratives these men have developed ever since the 
1960s. With the exception of Dr. Alberto Moncada, who has left the Opus Dei in the 1970s and 
has been a critic of the organization ever since, rarely did these speakers betray any secretive 
information regarding their operations in the 1970s, or any remorse for that matter. And yet, as the 
case of Ernesto García Alesanco also shows, even these official histories are at times utterly 
revealing, especially when discussing the spiritual “sanctity” these figures have aimed to reach 
ever since encountering Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer in the 1950s.  
 
